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The most fundamental meaning of citizenship is that of showing political attribution. Needless to say, citizenship is one of the political systems of a national state derived from modern Europe. But once this concept is used in non-Western society, the argument will be retracted quickly. To take such an example, it is sometimes critically discussed as a conceptual device promoting orientalism which continues to reproduce the superiority of Europe (Isin 2012: 563–572). Here, the concept of citizenship is interpreted to be one of Europe’s dominant devices as those in power. In Africa, to which it is considered that such concept had been ‘transplanted’, citizen and non-citizen were classified and ranked according to ethnic divisions in the modern state system. Such recognition that in postcolonial Africa, where it has not been permitted to hold multiple ethnic identities at the same time, the maturity of a national state of African countries has been prevented by the homogenised ‘ethnic’ or ‘ethnicity’ concept with an exclusive and closed ethnic boundary is whispered indeed (Keller 2014). In government census, there is also a tendency not to issue population statistics by ethnic groups (because ethnic problems should not exist or because they create opportunities to evoke ethnic unit conflict). ‘Citizen’ is a term transplanted from the outside to African society, and the limitation of that concept has also been acutely pointed out (Majima 2000). In short, this foreign term is difficult to fit into this society as it is.

Whether these two research trends are combined or not, ‘citizen’ in Africa has been considered to be a scarce empty concept, if anything. Therefore, there has not been enough light shone on the fact that the structurally weak, who form an overwhelming majority living in urban and village societies in Africa, from a certain point of view have rearranged, in the local context, the ways of citizenship in terms of membership of their own political communities. The possibility that a mutual relationship of dialogue and understanding are sometimes created by flexible operation based on the concept of imported citizenship has been seen as a reality, but was rarely examined directly. It is precisely this point that we intend to focus on in this book.

As can be easily understood by considering that the original image of ‘citizen’ is that in the ancient city state (polis) surrounded by the walls, in the
The inherent implication of ‘citizen’ is an implicit premise of a society with a border. The civil society surrounded by the boundary is composed of citizens that own the individual rights and duties that exist within it. This view of citizenship, regarding it as an internal element of a particular society, is also a premise of modern European thought and political mechanism from republicanism to multiculturalism. However, in this way of thinking, the boundary that marks the space is regarded as an absolutely immutable precondition, and as a result, it becomes difficult to have such a viewpoint including the possibility that society’s range will change due to the active practices of ‘citizen’, that is, mobility and changes in attribution, more specifically, the reorganisation of composition and boundaries of social units themselves by confluence to a given social unit and withdrawal from it. Therefore, such an irony will appear in that immigrants and refugees migrating from the outside into society are not included in the concept of ‘citizen’; as emerged from relations with them, in reality their existence is forgotten or ignored (Urry 2000). In other words, if extending this idea to the extreme, the conventional ‘citizen’ encompasses the existing fixed human figures of the modern European type, and that as such the structure is preserved in that humane imagination does not allow for others except for those figures. In particular in recent years the immigrant/refugee citizenship can be the centre of the problem partly because this background is closely related. In this case, citizenship can be a tool for acquiring rights, and it can also be a basis for being excluded.

Let us expand a little more on the concept of citizenship in this book. Kabeer differentiates ‘vertical citizenship’ and ‘horizontal citizenship’ to emphasise that citizenship is a concept related to the relationship between the state and the citizen, as well as to the relationship among the citizens (Kabeer 2005). This book is based on the idea to reconceptualise it as an intersection of these two citizenships, that is, the interactions of the people’s (legal) position and their activities to establish, update and change citizenship. The source of one tidal stream of such anthropological studies of citizenship can be traced back to political anthropological research of micro politics, for example. Bailey (Bailey 1969, 1971) investigated the politics in everyday life of peasant society by focusing on the concept of ‘rank’, ‘privilege’ and ‘fame’, and analysed the games and rules of ‘political competition’ at the leaders’ level and ‘small politics’ in the local community. Likewise, Barth’s studies (Barth 1965, 2007), which focused on different political agencies led by ‘chiefs’ and ‘saints’ in North Pakistan, and argued that political organisations are the result of strategic choices and partnerships by leaders and supporters, and that choice is reasonable as well as a result of numerous discussions, may be also remembered as being in the same trend. Barth’s emphasis on how groups collaborate to
present their strengths to others shows a shift in decisive interest from structure to practice in the history of research. This transition of analysis is obviously followed by much of today’s anthropology on citizenship. This is because politics understood as practice is a central element of many understandings of citizenship. This also means that the applicability of citizenship as the ‘old word’ which imagines the society like an ancient city state (polis) premised on the immovable boundary, beyond its classical semantic field, has been challenged and obliged to alter its meaning.

Such concern will also be combined with research on ethnicity and ethnic groups, which is another important direction. Well known Barth’s point of indication that the ethnic unit is not a natural one but group of belonging, and is culturally constructed, with keeping the boundary between members and outsiders and changing features that mark the boundary over time has a decisive importance in today’s citizenship study (Barth 1965, 2007). This is because, if we extend to citizenship what Barth argues about the ethnic group, ‘self’ requires ‘others’ to construct itself and citizen and non-citizen are suggested to be established within a complex power relationship including ones formed by laws and economic regimes on a local scale and beyond.

Sources of anthropology on citizenship can be also traced back by using as clues anthropological research on the state. Anthropological research on the state has increased since the 1980s, shifting the scale on the political community from the village level to the whole world and to the states as their middle (Sharma and Gupta 2006). Their attention, for example, did not accept as obvious Weberian notions of the character of the state to promote social order, but was paid to the importance of the theatre and a ritual in the creation of the state (Geertz 1980) and state-ness emerging from a series of encounters (whether some are violent and others non-violent) between the state officials and citizens (Aretxaga 2003). What has been made possible by the concept of citizenship in relation to the state is consideration as to who is controlled by the state organisation, how successful it is and in what kind of situation it is being done.

To summarise this trend, today’s anthropological citizenship study has themes aggregated including politics of citizenship, ethnicity and citizenship, and state management and citizenship.

**Citizenship in Africa**

*Transplanted Citizenship*

Setting the area as what this book calls Africa is not grasping at substance because the geographically bound territory called the African continent has its
internal homogeneity. Africa has been greatly distorted by the history of slave trade commencing in the latter half of the 15th century and the history of suppression and exploitation following it, especially the history of the world system centred on the European great powers after the industrial revolution and the civil revolution. What gave rise to this asymmetry is the cognitive classification of ‘Africans’ and the effect of disdain that puts ‘Africa’ outside the range of ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’. Studying ‘Africa’, which has been degraded in the structure of rule linked with politics and representation, from the viewpoint of people’s everyday life is to rethink dynamism of local intrinsic logic for the overwhelming power from the outside as ‘centre’ and the microscopic communal life, and to make it possible to review the whole world (Hirano (Nomoto) 2016).

Then, is there a possibility of ‘African citizenship’, a unique form of citizenship in the area called Africa (here, sub-Saharan Africa). Or is there any sense to discuss the concept of citizenship by limiting concrete cases to such areas? The former is highly dubious. This is because the form of the citizenship experienced is inseparable from history, economy and politics rooted in each locality, and the discussion will hold, no matter which region name is inserted instead of ‘Africa’ in ‘Africa original’. Suffice it to say that, since Africa is the birthplace of humanity, if there are ‘things African’, they must be considered to be latent in all human beings. As for the latter, of course, we think that there are. There are a number of reasons but here are a couple of major things related to each other.

First, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as symbolised by the Berlin Conference between 1884 and 1885, were artificially and forcibly colonised by the Western society, and then before and after 1960 (Independence of African Nations) became independent relatively quickly at the same time. Therefore, permeation of the modern concept of ‘citizen’ that is forced on and transplanted in a sense together with the modern political system is only relatively superficial, and there are many possibilities that there are numerous areas where embodiment of it has not yet been done, at least subjectively. There is also a tendency for subjective consideration in at least the residents. Therefore, although this is a reversal phenomenon of that, the principle of not the citizen but indigenous or autochthonous collective integration can be observed with sufficient presence. Furthermore, the situation of the connection between the concept of modern citizen and the autochthonous principle can be observed in a fully visible form. Discussions such as cultural contact transformation, syncretism and creole became popular early in the research on the New Continent, but as far as we can see, there are not so many studies of such genres set in the continent of Africa. That is why there lies significance in further
discussion of this area. In examining these relationships, something to point out is the so-called ‘multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2000) or ‘varieties of modernity’ (Schmidt 2006).

The second issue is also closely related to the first point. The formation of modern nation was made so sudden by external pressure which was almost independent of such autochthonous principle as collective integration. For this reason, there are several cases of plurality or even hundreds of subgroups in a single country and, in fact, many of them are distributed beyond the national borders. The latter is not only somewhat accurate but, rather, there are many cases where the colonial and eventually the modern state border after independence was drawn through these groups. These groups are not necessarily nested within the boundaries of the state. There are many cases where they cross the nation. This will present a more complicated aspect when considering mobility such as immigrants mentioned below.

Thirdly, before the establishment of the modern state, people in many societies lived by oral culture and not in a literal world. Although not being dealt with entirely in our book, this concept seems to have many meanings.

Of course, much of the above discussion is applicable to any other region. But that is the very reason why we believe that discussing African citizenship as a starting point for discussion is meaningful. This book is mainly based on African ethnographic facts, which is one of arbitrary areas, and the practice of citizenship. By doing so, we hope, it will be possible to develop discussions to comprehensively understand phenomena such as reinterpretation and re-contextualisation they are concepts related to the modern Western mode of governing devices beyond the regional context.

Furthermore, despite the context of Africa, reviewing the concept of citizenship and pursuing its possibilities are undertaken at various levels (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001; Benhabib 2004). This book is aimed at becoming the first touchstone to conceive dialogue with them in the future.

**Modernity and Citizenship in Africa**

As is well known, many African countries since independence have experienced long civil wars. Later, conflicts among group categories (such as clan and territorial segments, or so-called tribal groups) that divide the people, created during the colonial era, are still going on in many areas. Many states have made it their aim and most important political task the realisation of peaceful coexistence by devolatilisation and disarmament of these conflicts. The concrete disarmament policy for that was one of the biggest challenges of the African countries. Some of these policies, albeit temporarily, have been successful (see Mkutu 2008 for examples).
The waves of globalism are also flowing over modern states in Africa being created in such a way. The continent of Africa is also in the midst of neoliberalism that progresses with globalisation of human rights principles and institutions of democracy, free market and laissez faire (Englund 2006).

In addition, Western donors, NGOs and policy makers who are showing great presence when thinking about such a modern African society have a tendency to express bourgeois worth of ‘liberal democratic citizenship’ and ‘citizen participation’ at least officially and to provide development assistance in exchange for it (Robins et al. 2009). On the surface, the multi-party system has been realised, the ratios of female ministers and female parliamentarians have increased. Even so, the actual state of ‘citizen participation’ in many areas is mostly not conforming to the model pre-assumed by Western society, which is the subject of aid. Moreover, it does not seem that the realities of institutions such as ‘transplanted’ elections and democracy are progressing according to the wishes of the Western countries involved (and to take into close account the views of individuals – even those who are involved as donors in the West – that the facts are not in line with official views).

One part of the reason is attributable to no understanding of the actual situation that the modern concept (here, for example, the concept of citizenship) is imported and transplanted so that it cannot exist in a bodily form as it was when the concept was originally launched in the first place. In other words, at least one of the problems is that we have not been trying to understand citizenship based on the daily life of Africa. Of course, citizenship is also a concept of modernity and, as well as other modern concepts, has the property aiming at universality. At the same time, however, these modern concepts have been localised, indigenised, rearranged and reused differently since their birth, as is empirically understandable for many anthropologists who have conducted research for a long time in the local society. To take as an example the arts that the Dodoth have adopted to realise the sustenance of nomadism against the state policy, apart from the citizenship of the modern nation state which requires politics based on linguistic agencies, the Dodoth use the citizenship of pastoralists coexisting with cattle and goats differently according to social and political scenes, and reflect the resistance of animals as co-citizens into the political system of modern nation state. At the national election campaign movement and voting behaviour in the West Nile society, people have interwoven the idea of the real world to honour independence of individuals as derived from Western modernity, and embodied a philosophical way of thinking to respect the solidarity of society including the order within the spirit world. To see pessimistically, globalisation as a plan of modernisation and modern citizenship as its tool, as Marshall Sahlins proclaimed about poverty a long time
ago, must be a process of hierarchisation that affects each individual and community (Sahlins 1972). Indeed, regardless of where on the earth in terms of phenomena, the exclusive trend of identity politics and citizenship seems to become increasingly serious. As long as we continue trying to capture ‘citizen’ in a modern standard, we are only supposed to repeat identifying and classifying the differences between citizens as insiders and non-citizens as outsiders.

Also, we as Africans and African researchers may think about the factors limited to political and economic rationality. This is the affliction of so-called modern diseases. For example, South Africa, which is in an economically advantageous position, is suffering from the affliction that considers citizenship separated by its boundaries as an exception compared to other countries of the continent. Thus, on the continent of Africa there is discrimination which rests on an important basis for the elimination of nationality based on a very salient, political and economic boundary. In search of initiatives in society, differentiation often causes social and cultural tension. For the occurrence of such tension, accelerated mobility including immigration and floating population is deeply involved (Nyamnjoh 2007b). Even in trying to understand the motivation for such social dynamics, there is tendency to focus on economic issues and to underestimate the importance of ethnic factors to a minimum in comparison with political and economic factors. However, the motives for moving are not only economic and political. Such aspects as attachments or sentiments are also heavily involved in the motivation for movement (Nyamnjoh 2013). In Africa, even a successful cosmopolitan and diasporas will not completely break the relationship with their relatives and comrades at home. Even business-oriented successful urban dwellers who do not ever return to the villages or do not return to the villages after retirement hope to maintain relations with their villages and to be buried or re-buried there. Nyamnjoh pointed out that there is no one too cosmopolitan to be local as well, through identification with things, beliefs and practises that tend to be associated with particular localities and cultural communities (Nyamnjoh 2001: 28–32). The citizenship study in Africa today lies between the open-ended possibilities and tension interconnecting the global and local hierarchical structure. Inadvertently, we tend to get caught in a short circuit that connects politics related to such hierarchical structure and citizenship of immigrant to economic rationality.

As Mamdani points out correctly, each immigrant has a difference derived from nationality, and derived from the descent group including the ethnic group. Nevertheless, media, politicians and scholars have had little regard for historical immigration patterns and benefits to their host countries, and have a strong tendency to focus on the large scale of ‘civic’ citizenship with a legal political foundation, ignoring minority ethnicity. The foundation is uncritically believed
to be more comprehensive than the cultural foundation of the ‘ethnic’ citizenship involving ethnic political communities (Mamdani 1996).

Another problem of the concept of Western-derived citizenship is the idea of liberal citizenship. Liberal citizenship has been regarded as an individual’s status since John Locke in old times. In theory, with the rights related to the status of citizen, individuals can use themselves on good life as long as they do not interfere with similar (= about good life) pursuits of others, and as long as the state protects this status (Lazar (ed.) 2013). A citizen has minimal responsibility, mainly concerned with maintaining management of the state such as tax payment or military service. However, ethnographies submitted by anthropologists have often complicated this normative idea of liberal citizenship. This is because there are a lot of cases that are difficult to apply to these normative ideas. For example, anthropologists have made clear the contingency of political membership, relationship between everyday practices related to politics and political membership, and how citizenship is the mechanism for claiming rights to various political communities the state is just one of. The concept of Western-derived citizen that hopes for such a free entity and is conceived under that idea is forced to make a lot of corrections in the context of African culture and society. One of the focus areas of what is reported on here is a member of the political community that seems not so liberal and is not a citizen. Conversely, we are trying to say that there may be a citizen that is made unseen by a *doxa* of liberal citizen.

Turning back to a specific ethnography, what is actually happening in Africa is more creative and dynamic than it is supposed to be. From a macroscopic perspective, Africa has been exposed to external forces supported by the idea of globalisation and neoliberalism. Citizenship in Africa is flexibly operated with the inner logic shared in a society with a well-defined outline at least in the microscopic everyday life and becomes the foundation of life-cooperative network (Konaka 2016). It means that there is a remarkable divergence between the everyday political practice observed empirically in ethnographic study and the conceptual model of citizenship that is exported and distributed around the world.

One of the measures necessary for better understanding African culture and society (here, this book sets Africa as the main object, but it enables readers to get better understanding of human as well), and for us to have to weave a better modern society together on Earth is to understand this microscopic politics in everyday life in a correct form in the context. Moreover, rhetoric of modern actors related to development and international cooperation, that is, modern states, NGOs and donors, or, a relatively macroscopic programme such as ‘active citizenship’, ‘participatory governance’ and ‘public reason’ should be
conceived and positioned on the extension of such micro politics and thus more attention should be paid to the possibility of the existence of African citizenship where the citizenship is autochthonous or was imported from the West first and later has achieved an autochthonous mutation. With this kind of understanding, it is possible to clarify the limits of normality incorporated in the discourse which has surrounded conventional citizenship. And by doing so, it will be possible to get a more substantial foundation to rethink citizenship from the viewpoints of villagers and urban dwellers, themselves living in Africa and other regions, of similar structure of politics and economy. As everyday life in Africa is actually organised by such unique citizenship, every project that lacks such an attempt seems to fail.

The fatalistic deficiency of these existing petrified Western-origin stories (which attach importance to the fixation of the boundary) is rather the people’s wisdom or epistemology which exists in reality before our eyes but become invisible, for example, Francis B. Nyamnjoh, one of the contributors to this book, points this out (Nyamnjoh 2001, 2016, 2017a, 2017b). In other words, it is an understanding of the new and flexible forms of citizenship actually practised by negotiable cosmopolitan people, which celebrates inclusiveness, conviviality and differences (Nyamnjoh 2007b). Even after experiencing various political and economic external pressures already mentioned, in Africa the political economical margins are being constructed in a variety of forms. There, many efforts to build a coexistent relationship with others are being delivered one after another in reality.

Nyamnjoh points out that ‘outsiders’ (whether immigrants or not) create identities across cultures, languages, spaces and places in the context of cities and states, frequently and vibrantly fluctuate boundaries and act as mediators. With trying to cross academic fields such as literature, history and sociology of knowledge, he fundamentally criticises Western origin intellectualism spreading even to modern Africa, reconstructs Africa’s original ‘autochthonous’ knowledge system and praises the emergence of African epistemology (Nyamnjoh 2016, 2017a, 2017b). This allegory named by Nyamnjoh ‘currency’ and ‘conviviality’ gained its idea in the novel by African writer, Amos Tutuola from Nigeria. As in the seamless journey between Christianity and his cultural beliefs among the Yoruba, mutually heterogeneous areas (modernity/tradition, global/local, normal reality/spirits, ghost, ‘demonic’ ‘magical’ world) can be made one-dimensional ground and be proceeded with by flowing between them. This is the practice of ‘frontier Africans’ itself. ‘Frontier Africans’ means those who can deal with change and continuity cleverly and can make various dichotomies and alternatives compatible (Nyamnjoh 2016, 2017a, 2017b). Nyamnjoh’s idea, which seems extraordinary at first glance, is made possible on
the premise of ‘incompleteness’ of every existence. If there is universality (although there is not) in the world where great prosperity and decline is constant, nothing but this ‘incompleteness’ is universal. It goes without saying that the concept of citizenship transplanted from the West at a certain stage cannot be perfect, and even in the Western society as its origin, has fluctuated repeatedly through the historical change. Since the host societies (in this case African societies) that adopted Western concepts are originally ‘incomplete’ and ‘incomplete’ societies introduce ‘incomplete’ things, there cannot be alternatives (Nyamnjoh 2016, 2017a, 2017b). To have flexible response on a case-by-case basis in a sense is necessary, and it must have already been realised everywhere. By thinking like this, Nyamnjoh proposes to live a convivial reality in a so-called suspended state without investing in either the binary confrontational Western modernity or tradition (Nyamnjoh 2016, 2017a, 2017b). With this, he will also salvage Western modernity which had criticised severely on the other hand (Umeya 2017b: 94-95). Of course, we are aware that there is a context in which the ‘conviviality’ Nyamnjoh argues is often linked even temporarily to neoliberal wealth and resources, is based on them, or enhances the affinity with them. Furthermore, it should be added in a hurry that it is necessary to pay sufficient attention to the fallout that ‘romanticise’ a specific area or group (Matsuda 2016).

**Problem Consciousness**

This book aims at depositing as ‘citizenship in Africa’ wisdom and practice for the political community that are, though under exposure to external influence, originally created by Africa which has suffered catastrophic damage in political, social and cultural aspects from the colonial period to the postcolonial period through the ‘global standard’ derived from the modern Western Europe, and examining the characteristics of ‘citizenship in Africa’ from the viewpoint of possibility as future coexistence based in the world today.

Specific materials include ethnographic cases such as Uganda’s marginalised nomadic people, the Dodoth of the Eastern Nilotes and those who were originally historically nomadic people like the Acholi, Alur and Jopadhola of the Western Nilotes. While referring to them, we describe the cases in modern urban society in South Africa and Uganda, both of which, on a superficial basis, appear to achieve inclusion of diverse ethnic groups and apparently make such ethnicity meaningless, and use them as comparison reference points to explore complicated interrelation between nation state and people and others from home and abroad by questioning taken-for-granted assumptions of citizenship as modern civil society’s view of citizen. The possibility of citizenship in Africa overcoming the modern European republicanism and multiculturalism
citizenship model will be presented in this book by taking the viewpoint of flexibility and fixation in the operation of citizenship and focusing on creativity in the process of building, claiming, operating and transforming the civic sphere as a social space.

One interest among others in this book is the microscopic phase that urban people and villagers living in Africa create by the interaction of a dialogue and understanding through citizenship practice in the context of everyday life and politics. In that sense, citizenship studies in postcolonial African are not based on the normative concept of citizenship aiming at universality, but based on daily experiences in social, cultural and historical situations and is an attempt to develop a ceaseless variation of forms.

This may also add one anthropological contribution to the concept of the citizenship. In recent years, a new perspective to its concept is required in political frontier studies for immigrant workers, conflict refugees, resource development, internally displaced persons, and humanitarian space and so on. For example, as Benhabib argues, the policies of each country which accepts refugees and immigrants, who are rapidly increasing on the planet, also differ depending on the extent to which citizens are conceptualised. In the EU, people who do not know the language, customs and history of the host country appear, but have special status and privileges such as voting rights because they are citizens of EU member countries. (Benhabib 2004: 129–169). Also, that ‘conflict mineral’ in resource mining in the Democratic People’s Republic of Congo was regarded as a problem from the humanitarian point of view and the so-called ‘Obama Act’ was enacted is one of such frontiers, regardless of its propriety (Umeya 2017a; Smith 2015). As with the discussion of ‘indigenous rights’, which is of increasing interest internationally, if we are limited to the formal modern citizen concept (in terms of the narrowest definition of citizen), the argument becomes rigid and faces limitations of the range of discussion.

Underlying these attempts is the problem of being conscious that for the citizen living on the Earth of the 21st century acquisition of such a viewpoint is urgent and has opened up the possibility of differentiation and division in a different way from that of the former type of citizen and other grouping/differentiation/organisation. And such viewpoint must be one that is flexible according to the circumstances and allows negotiation with relative external and heterogeneous others including modernity. The situation is the same for any citizen on Earth. The gaze of understanding towards citizenship in Africa developed in this book can be a way to contribute to establishing a path for problem solving to some extent. From the etymological background of doing that, studying citizenship is to learn how to live with others in a political community (whatever it means).
**Structure**

First of all, we will conduct a conceptual study on citizenship in Africa in this preface and the first part. The second and third based on ethnographic cases analyse the concept of democracy and human rights compatible with citizenship, or citizenship nationalism (the power effect hidden by claims for citizenship), as well as the feelings and practices unique to the lived world. The fourth part looks at the future of the citizenship. The examinations on active and creative negotiation and articulation, exclusions and inclusions by communities and individuals mentioned in this book consisting of four parts shed light on the ‘citizenship from the ground’ which transforms the dominant concept of citizenship based on the freischwebend or free-floating principle such as modern world system and nation state.

Ayanda’s chapter is an overview of scholarship on citizenship in Africa. While scholarly debates on how to constitute citizenship are plenty, this chapter focuses on the group of scholars who approach the issue of citizenship through mobility. Francis Nyamnjoh along with others included here develops categories to help us think through both the implications of exclusionary abstract ideas of citizenship and the efforts to redefine and renegotiate belonging in various communities. By considering these categories Ayanda seeks to show how the literature in question helps us understand the complexities and problems inherent in conceptualising citizenship through a template that is largely Eurocentric and that has been fine-tuned during the long process of African colonisation. Ayanda proposes, like these scholars, to take seriously the project of redefining citizenship in Africa. Furthermore, he considers that to take such a project seriously will require a methodological approach that is particularly local: that is based on lived experience, embedded in an examination of local customs, histories and conceptions of kinship, individuality and community that are contingent and changing. This is his intervention: that is if we are to take seriously this proposal, we need to employ a methodology that is based on local realities. What is interesting about these scholars is the examination of citizenship through their positionality, and how this positionality is productive in their selection of examples that are relevant and important to driving the project to redefine citizenship. These examples of field studies justify why we must redefine citizenship away from the ideas of Enlightenment and universalism. Citizenship is cribbed from Enlightenment thinking and imposed by European colonisers onto African colonised subjects. Individualism is a European ideal. Universalism and the extension of rights from one to ‘all’ has not served African nations or their people. The examples chosen by the scholars upon whom this chapter focuses, demonstrate that equal citizenship has not led to social justice, restoring of dignity and inclusion of difference beyond the
ideal. The analysis of citizenship based predominantly on institutional and constitutional agreements does not reveal the complexities of life. What is left out of such an analysis are the hierarchies and relationship of inclusion and exclusion that intersect with the categories such as geography, ethnicity, race, class, gender and sexuality that determine accessibility of citizenship in real terms (Englund and Nyamnjoh 2004; Alubo 2004; Nyamnjoh 2017a, 2017b). This chapter does not merely review the examples used by the scholars but shows how their examples themselves imply a method of redefining citizenship which is both hyper local and which recognises that even the construction of narratives and their transmissions is shaped by conventions that are decidedly local. This kind of observation, on a methodological level, is not translatable out of the particularity of, for instance, a lived experience and historical context of the Ivory Coast or Botswana (Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Nyamnjoh 2007a).

It is this specificity that these scholars suggest should be the guiding principle in compiling national constitutions. To take on the project to redefine citizenship requires a method that is local and transportable. A research method that is particular to a local context does not mean it cannot be a template. It is not a template that we would propose to impose. What a method with a focus on locality takes seriously is to be historically accurate and taking into account the particularity of lived experience and life histories instead of exporting Enlightenment ideas on abstract citizenship rights extended to individuals whose land was colonised. In seeking to understand and redefine citizenship through the physical as well as social mobility of people and ideas requires looking differently at categories of geography, ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality and class. These groups of scholars suggest that a redefinition of citizenship is applicable and invite us to think collectively about how that redefinition would need to be approached for a particular historical moment and condition (one that is particularly African in the cases they consider). But Ayanda’s contention is that the method their project necessitates is one that is, importantly, accessible and usable by other communities, nations, communes or even neighbourhoods. The need to think collectively is particularly so because the method to understand citizenship is local and at the same time transportable. It is from the group of scholars in this chapter we learn that to take seriously the project to redefine citizenship is to commit to local ways of understanding how belonging is negotiated through a web of relations that connect an individual to the collective. A method based on understanding our positionality in a local context can go a long way to invite scholars and politicians to commit to finding other ways to conceptualise citizenship through mobility.

As Anye-Nkwenti Nyamnjoh and Claire Lester show, many debates have
characterised the study of citizenship, both in Africa and globally. It is used varyingly as an analytical concept, category, status, identity and practice. Within these uses, citizenship is often a relational notion expressing a mode of belonging to some form of political community. They note three key debates, beginning with various normative accounts of this relationship to one’s political community. In the Western political history of citizenship, this is captured by a number of theories, such as liberal, communitarian and republican conceptions of citizenship, which have varying emphases on equal membership to a defined political community as constituted by rights and responsibilities. From these accounts and their various accents, this chapter can effectively distil two ways in which belonging is articulated. These include a political/public conception of citizenship and a legal/private citizenship. Taking this into consideration, one could argue that the ways in which we understand citizenship, whether in the public or private sense, answer politico-philosophical questions about why humans enter into society with one another. The aforementioned theories also generate sub-debates about citizenship as a universal category. Within feminist and multicultural critiques, it has been argued that traditional understandings of citizenship retain a pseudo-universality that masks the ways in which various identities located in status hierarchies impinge on citizenship. In masking realities of unequal hierarchies of citizenship therefore positing citizenship as a universal category only serves to actively undermine equal membership to political community. This observation ground calls for differentiated citizenship under the rubric of a politics of recognition.

The second area of contestation Nyamnjoh and Lester highlight concerns criticisms of the centrality of ‘rights’ in citizenship studies. They present a series of arguments which call for the displacement of emphasis on rights (and responsibility), to an understanding of citizenship as a practice which unfolds as joint processes of subject and community making. Third, the continued relevance of the nation state as the locus of citizenship is questioned and they observe myriad claims that posit the nation state as one of multiple loci of citizenship, co-existing with other relevant political communities at transnational, local, ethnic, religious and regional levels. Nyamnjoh and Lester explore this further as a key debate in African discourses on citizenship, where citizenship has functioned as an analytical lens through which social phenomena, such as conflict, justice, democracy and democratisation are studied. In other words, the idea that there are multiple layers of citizenship often existing parallel to and contesting national identity is prominent in African discourses. This chapter notes significant attention to the challenges of consolidating democratic citizenship posed by the continued salience of ethnicity within processes of nation building. This is evident in struggles against
unequal citizenship or the tendency for citizenship to develop as expressions of exclusionary nationalism. Furthermore, the importance of ethnicity also underscores global debates around the locus of citizenship at the level of the individual in contrast to the level of the group, grounded in ontological claims around personhood.

Tamara Enomoto’s chapter critically examines conceptions of the human subject and citizenship in the era of human security and global civil society. Alongside efforts to reconceptualise the human subject and citizenship, there developed an increasing volume of analysis criticising this reconceptualisation. This chapter first reviews the existing critical literature on conceptions of the human subject and citizenship in the last few decades, introducing two schools of thought. The first school claims that the idea of the human in ‘human security’ is the same as the modern liberal prototype of an autonomous rational subject, and it therefore carries with it the same problem found in the modern conception of citizenship. The second school contends that the human security approach entails the erosion of the classical conceptualisation of the citizen as an autonomous rational subject. Adherents of this school point out that once the rational capacity for choice making is denied to the human subject, there is no basis for liberal representative political and legal theory, leading to a hollowing out of such concepts as citizenship. The chapter then looks at the ‘peace and justice’ debate in the period between 2004, when the International Criminal Court (ICC) began intervening in the Ugandan situation, and 2006, when the Juba peace process started between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The views on the human subject and citizenship that were articulated in this debate are described, and the actions taken by the self-proclaimed global civil society are scrutinised. The chapter argues that what was articulated in these actions and discourses can be understood to be the vulnerable neo-liberal (or post-liberal) subject critically reflected on by the above second school of thought. The logic of inclusion and exclusion expressed in the actions taken by the self-proclaimed global civil society is disclosed: Citizenship in global civil society in this case is contingent on a person’s acceptance of a supposedly universal norm. The chapter further argues that these recently developed expectations toward global civil society are not a manifestation of a belief in human rationality, but rather can be seen as an embodiment of the decline of collective political subjects and a general disenchantment with politics itself, mainly in societies situated in the global North.

However, it should be recalled that such degraded conceptions of the human subject and citizenship have not been straightforwardly embraced or reproduced by local actors in Uganda. Rather, these misanthropic ideas seem to
have been interpreted, utilised and circumvented by various local actors with differing, and at times hybrid, worldviews and visions of governance. We also need to be aware that while global civil society leaders have projected their vision of the vulnerable subject onto local peoples and pathologised their capacities to think, imagine, know, create and act purposively in the world, such a diminished view of the human was not necessarily shared by the local actors. In fact, it was in most part the local actors who tried to define the good, to develop strategies and set priorities to achieve the good, and to seek multiple legal and political ways to address peace and justice issues in Uganda. Since citizenship in the global civil society in this case was contingent on a person’s acceptance of supposedly universal norms, those who were included in global civil society were not able to involve themselves substantially in the detailed debate on how to strategically attain peace and justice in Uganda. Instead, it was those who were more detached from global civil society – and whose ability to define the good and act purposively in the world was doubted by external actors – who in fact exhibited the will to think and act ‘agentially’ in the world. This case also indicates the need to think outside the box and move beyond simply criticising, deconstructing or resisting the modern conceptions of the self, citizenship and nation states, since such an argument risks affirming the idea of the vulnerable neoliberal subject and results in problematising the agency of populations in the global South and invalidating them as political actors. It is now urgent that we use our ongoing conversation to foment pathways that will enable us to manoeuvre away from this grotesque trap.

Hazama’s chapter pays attention to the fact that two concepts that have informed discourse surrounding freedom, citizenship and politics in liberal democracy – civic republicanism, which dates back to Aristotle, and social contract theory – have been substantially dependent on the exclusion of several groups to the extent that citizenship took a form that disenfranchised slaves, women and the subjects of the empire. The legacy of this may be discerned in the modern nation-state system; for example, in the uneven distribution of citizenship’s benefits across various gradations from ‘full citizenship’ to ‘second-class citizenship’. Universal equality is an ideal by-product of official citizenship. However, the experiential realities of citizenship vary according to its various regional and historical contexts. The material examined in this chapter was obtained from field research conducted in a pastoral society, composed of so-called ‘second class citizens’, who have been denied agency by linear modernisation theory of the nation state from the colonial era to the postcolonial period. Against the backdrop of the decentralisation of state power following globalisation, the gaze of the West was directed toward the periphery of Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan, and forced disarmament and sedentary
development policy were heavily promoted in cooperation with the central government. Under these circumstances, how did the pastoral Dodooth in the Karamoja area resist suppressive policy against nomadism and the practices of ethnic citizenship? The Ugandan government have adopted an anti-subsistence-pastoralism policy in pursuit of a national isomorphism of politics, economics, culture and society, and regularly raid the livestock of pastoralists living in the Karamoja area. As a result, the ethnic community has found it impossible to claim citizenship. The analytic focus of this chapter, therefore, is on the means by which these pastoralists embodied the practice of ethnic citizenship in defence of their habitat and as a means of resisting the dominant order, bypassing the normative idea of citizenship. Pastoralists in the Karamoja area, who have confronted the nation state regarding its raiding activities whilst fully aware that direct confrontation with power influences the relationship between the perpetrators of unilateral violence and their victims, appreciate the risks inherent in outright criticism of inconsistencies in state governance. Furthermore, their views do not align with those of the ruling order, who hold that the state is equal to social order. Their strategy was to nurture a repertoire of multiple citizenships, to adapt them to various social and political scenarios and to insist on the rights of animals to co-citizenship on pastoral land. The nation state has consistently politicised subsistence pastoralism since the colonial period, forcing pastoral societies to abandon the practice and homogenising them into a nation-state system. The pastoralists, however, have insisted on ethnic citizenship that extends to animals, asserting their spontaneous organisational form in the face of hostility from the ethnic group with hegemony in the nation state. In doing so, they accomplished a political struggle for the ‘right’ to be ‘different’ within the exclusive definition of nation-state identity.

African studies that centre on themes of conflict resolution and coexistence frequently adopt a particular standpoint, which holds that knowledge, institutions and values created by Africans, accumulated and utilised for conflict resolution and reconciliation, restoration of post-conflict society and regeneration of social order, can be understood as ‘African potentials’. These ‘potentials’, it is believed, may offer a new perspective on divisions and differences and establish new methods of navigation and negotiation among the global citizenry in the 21st century. At its core, African cultural potential is an interface function that may create symbiotic order, facilitating interdependence without excluding any group (it encompasses not only human beings but also other concepts and entities, including thoughts, institutions, materials, animals, spirits, etc.). According to Nyamnjoh, this point is crucial to the history of thought in Africa, which diverges from that of modern Western
Europe. In other words, it concerns the ability to connect and mix with others while also complementing them, to negotiate with external parties and to maintain the capacity for problem solving without conceding to essentialist dualisms such as ‘African/Western’, ‘nature/culture’, ‘tradition/modernity’, ‘animal/human’, ‘invisible/visible’, ‘emotional/rational’ and ‘truth based on physical evidence/truth based on empathy’ (Nyamnjoh 2001). The creative potential among Ugandan pastoralists to construct, claim, operate and transform the citizen realm as a social space by catabolising, eroding and degenerating the modern governance system, which rests on imagined homogeneity among citizens, both as individuals and on the national level, demonstrates that non-citizens’ processes of citizenship attainment (or the process of attaining full citizenship among ‘second-class citizens’) include the potential to transform the very nature of citizenship itself. The insistence on inclusion as resistance for inclusion or struggle against exclusion has fluidised public opinion regarding the categories of ‘human’ and ‘citizen’ as they occur within the framework of ‘completeness’ derived from modern Western European civil society, and has radically transformed the ‘rational’ citizenship regime.

Umeya examines the meaning of the re-burial and memorial ceremony concerning the historical case, the bishop killing case in 1977, in the election campaign, and points out that ethnic factors including agency of the dead worked, and questions the universality imposed on the concept of citizenship. Three of the murdered were celebrities from west Nile region and were normally subject to the ceremonial award for death. They were said to have been murdered by the then President Idi Amin, the troops were stationed for several months after the burial and gatherings were prohibited under the state of emergency declaration. A full funeral ceremony was not held for such a person who had died, so a fear of slander remained. Against this backdrop, Umeya points out that the government’s reimbursement for the deceased and ceremonial ceremonies held by the government since 2014 worked favourably for President Museveni’s re-election during the election campaign. The spirit of the deceased person who has not yet completed a funeral ritual is very aggressive and dangerous, and anyone involved, including the murderer, may be the victim. The spirit moves around seeking the target of attack without staying in the place where it died. These cursed spirits became a concern of people for many years to come. This attitude of President Museveni who led the re-burial of the deceased and the prayer ceremony, intentionally or not, is taken as important because it encourages the order of the real world and the spiritual world, promotes reconciliation, and makes the dead spirits non-aggressive. It gave spiritual security to many people. As a presidential campaign, re-burial and
commemorative ceremonies were eventually effective. By Museveni honouring Jopadhola’s great men, some percentage of the voters of Jopadhola moved to support President Museveni. He succeeded in breaking down resistance of voters from the west Nile region who had been devoted to a political party whose first party leader was Obote from Western Nilotes. The act of respecting the dead by the government strongly urged the ethnicity of Western Nilotic people. The agency of the dead acted on the political behaviour of the living.

It may be said that in personhood, dead people shared everyday life and social space. The concept of citizenship is considered universal as well as many concepts of Western origin (like human rights and democracy). However, we are not the entities that make reasonable choices that are as free as we think, but often get caught between the idea of honouring independence of individuals derived from Western modernity and the way of thinking that respects social and community solidarity. Umeya’s chapter clearly shows that citizenship as a concept imported from the West cannot be established alone but can be inevitably interwoven instantaneously with African autochthonous concepts.

Tsuchitori’s chapter begins with depopulation and aging which have long been a major social problem in contemporary Japanese society. Measures to deal with increasing vacant houses have been considered an urgent issue. However, on the other hand, there are some people who keep vacant houses and Buddhist altars for a long time in Sado where depopulation and aging progress. Why do they keep the Buddhist altar and the mortuary tablet in vacant houses without disposing of vacant houses? Tsuchitori’s chapter considers the citizenship of the deceased based on a case of a vacant house and a Buddhist altar in Sado Island, Niigata prefecture, Japan. In the village community of the former Sado Island, people lived with the aim of maintaining and inheriting the family business with *Ie*. In the former *Ie* in Sado which is the group-sharing livelihood, *Oyaji* (patriarch) and *Kaka* (housewife) led family members as representatives of *Ie* and guaranteed livelihoods of family members. The authority of *Oyaji* and *Kaka* passed through ritual and it was succeeded to by the next generation. Even if a person who expected to be a successor failed to succeed to *Ie*, there were measures to maintain the *Ie* (*Otouto-naoshi*, *Imouto-naoshi*, *Nakamoebi*, etc.). Also, even if *Ie* was abolished, there was the possibility of it being revived through taking over the house, the land, the house name, the graves and mortuary tablets, which are symbolise *Ie*. Among the things symbolising *Ie*, land is of particular importance. For that reason, *Shinrui* (relatives) by the ‘transmission of land’ is regarded as a persistent relationship.

As a result of investigating the current village society in Sado, it was found that there are hardly any surviving principles, such as measures to preserve *Ie*, among the principles of *Ie* which once existed in Sado. However, it turned out
that the principle of emphasising houses and lands remained. In other words, there are no intangible elements related to \( Ie \), but tangible elements partially remain. To analyse cases of vacant houses and people who maintain Buddhist altars in Sado, it is necessary to consider elements other than the traditional principle of \( Ie \) that is, the concept of the citizenship of the deceased. That is to say, it is possible to point out that the people in Sado continue to maintain the Buddhist altars in vacant houses under the influence of the agency of the deceased. In Sado, residents maintain the idea of capturing the soul of the dead in material form from long ago. In the village in northern Sado, it is said that the soul walks outside when people die. The idea of materially capturing the soul of the dead is considered to have something to do with the agency and citizenship of the deceased in Sado. There is ample room for discussion of the cases we have seen so far regarding those who maintain Buddhist altars in vacant houses. Presently, we cannot give a definite answer as to why they keep vacant houses and altars. In Tsuchitori’s chapter, he has indicated the general direction the principle of \( Ie \) and citizenship of the deceased might take when considering this problem in the future and necessity of future investigations to clarify why residents maintain vacant houses and their Buddhist altars.

Tahara’s chapter discusses a type of citizenship that prevails within the ritual space shared by the deceased and the living among the Alur people. Although they were divided into people living in the west Nile region in Uganda and those inhabiting the northeast end of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the colonial era, the Alur used to perform the ritual of \( myeł agwara \) (which means the dance of long flutes) some years after a person’s death. According to Alur belief, when a person dies, he or she becomes a \( tipo \) (spirit) and sometimes protects and sometimes challenges the bereaved before transitioning to the ancestral world. Alur people respectfully maintain the \( abila \) and \( jok \), which are small shrine-like structures made of wood and grass, at home to communicate with their ancestors through the \( tipo \) of the father and grandfather. Although the practices related to communications with the \( tipo \) have been strongly rejected by the Christian church, the spiritual world continues to lie snugly against the real world. The \( myeł agwara \) is the final mourning ritual, and it is a three-night ceremony that includes music and dance, which are planned by the offspring of the deceased and other members of the clan. According to the Alur, \( myeł agwara \) is performed only through the spiritual power of \( ambaya \), which is a spiritual item made of the skin of a small animal and includes a whistle and some herbs, and is controlled by the power of \( kajagi \), which is a long pole built at the centre of the ritual place. The ritual has not been performed in Uganda since 1987, because Uganda was in political turmoil during the 1970s and 1980s and people’s lives were affected.
Tahara first discussed the *myel agwara* ritual with people of the Unu lineage of the Pamora clan in 2009, and they finally performed a *selewa*, which is a ritual similar to *myel agwara*, between 2 and 4 March 2012, despite encountering many difficulties such as a shortage of funds and *agwara*. The term *selewa*, whose literal translation is ‘You are late, so I (am) do (ing) it by myself’, originated from the Swahili word *chelewa* (which means late in English). The *selewa* encompasses all the procedures of *myel agwara*, except for the guest clan. Based on the trial of *myel agwara*, she makes two observations. First, the performance of this ritual indicated that a new cooperativity based on a sense of neighbourhood exists among the clans in Uganda. Formerly, the cooperation that had existed between the Pamora clan in Uganda and Cubu clan in the DRC could extend across national borders. However, the cross-border cooperation that existed in the past could not be worked out this time. Instead, members of the Pamora Akew clan in Uganda, who shared the same grandfather but did not have a sufficiently close relationship with the Cubu clan to share the ritual rites, and members of the neighbouring Angal clan participated in a *myel agwara* performance. This cooperation across clan lines in the performance of a *myel agwara* had not existed before. Moreover, rather than being based on blood ties to the same father, this new ritual was based on the sense of neighbourhood among the Alur in Uganda. This is a factor of ritual citizenship that enables people to temporarily get together to share a convivial space for dancing, drinking and singing. Second, the scepticism of the people in this area regarding the practices and thoughts related to *tipo* is revealed. At the *selewa*, the practice of *ambaya* people was alienated by the other participants. Although the *kajagi*, which is set up by the power of *ambaya*, should be placed at the centre of the indigenous *myel agwara* ritual place, it could not be placed at the centre of this *selewa*. People did not play or dance near it, since they feared its power and did not want to approach it. This avoidance of the *kajagi* coincided with the avoidance of ancestor worship. Paradoxically, this scepticism encouraged youths to perform the *selewa*, along with their elders, by playing the *ndara* (xylophone), which was something that had never before been used in a *myel agwara* ritual. Originally, the ritual space is owned exclusively by the elders. However, for this trial, youths could perform their activities.

Hence, in this case, ritual citizenship was opened to include youths, elders and other people who were related to the deceased individual, allowing them to share in their collective mourning and create a sense of belongingness. This type of membership, which can be named *ritual citizenship*, originates from the people’s shared sense of mourning for the deceased and appeared in the ritual related to ancestors. It was clear that the *myel agwara* ritual was performed not only to mourn the dead but also as a sign of friendship between the clans of the
host and visitor. This ritual citizenship that was based on the performance of a ritual created solidarity within mourning among all people around the deceased, not only those related to the ancestors, but also those who share the sense of neighbourhood. It is supposed that ritual citizenship is universal in nature, since it shares the idea that every human being has the same fate, that of death. Therefore, it might have the potentiality to enable us to proceed to a convivial space, which rejoices in the liberty of nation states and constrained societies, and could be one of the factors of citizenship in Africa, which is discussed in this book.

Moriguchi’s chapter examines the question of ‘can women dance?’ relating it to the sexual behaviour and practices of bar girls in Kampala, Uganda. To explore that question more theoretically, two kinds of citizenship are considered: (1) women’s social status and their marginality in the urban settings of Africa, and (2) the theme of subjectivity and agency, to be discussed with reference to Gayatri C. Spivak and Judith Butler. As case studies, this chapter presents an ethnographic description of bar girls’ activities in nightclubs, Kampala. The first kind of citizenship in African urban settings is the familial (and inclusive) one, which basically covers women’s security and life insurance, in which women play the role of wives, daughters and mothers serving as primary pillars of their families. Such familial citizenship is linked deeply to clan lineage systems. In poor circumstances, such as in the suburbs and slums, it may force girls particularly those who have dropped out of primary school- to work for the family under paternal control. The distinction between being married and single also matters for women insofar as their economic independence is concerned. Although married women are quite relational in their status, they do become more stable economically by running personal businesses at local markets. Single and divorced women, on the other hand, generally find it difficult to maintain their own businesses as they do not have the financial support of a husband. Secondly, sexual citizenship plays a particular part in women’s lives once they leave their original family, through dropping out, running away, divorcing or the like. Being gazed at sexually by other people represents something in the way of social status for women. Women in Kampala, even teenagers, are keen on seeing and being seen for social recognition. In that context, sexuality, including motherhood, is a part of that recognition and the way in which women establish relations with others. As Foucault and Butler pointed out, sexuality has a hidden regime of sociality.

Between those two kinds of citizenship, this chapter considers the theme of women’s subjectivity and agency by describing the scene at local nightclubs, critically reviewing the question of ‘Can women dance?’ If women’s subjectivity and agency are forged by societal structures (or citizenship), such as their
paternal clan lineage and family, along with the desires and gaze of men and other people, what kind of free will do they have in their life choices? Is there any possibility of their having their own choice, voice or sexuality in domestic and public domains? Subjectivity and agency are dilemmatic words, according to Judith Butler’s idea of performativity, in which subjectivity can be divided into two parts: subjectification and subjection. In Butler’s terms, subjectification follows one’s desires, exploring new dimensions of sexuality and constructing performativity in the way of subversion. In that sense of sexuality, women as the agencies of desire disrupt familial citizenship through their existence, by seduction, dances and (casual) prostitution. In general, around the nightclubs, three types of prostitution are conducted, the first of which is the ‘stand’ type, in which girls stand on paths next to nightclubs and wait for men to pick them up. That type of business earns less money, but is easier for newcomers to take part in. The second type of prostitution is the ‘room’ type, in which bar girls are more professionally prepared for their business by keeping their own rooms in cheap hotels and wandering around nightclubs with drinks. They often have frequent customers, but tend not to stay in the same place for more than a month. The ‘room’ type of bar girl tends to be divorced, with several children to raise. The last category of bar-girl prostitution is the ‘dance’ type, whose practitioners, better dressed than the others, operate inside nightclubs, where they dance with male customers. Dancing is their main practice, as the Luganda word for ‘dance’ – *ku-zina* – also means sexual conduct. Therefore, their activities at nightclubs comprise both dancing with men and hunting for them. Moriguchi depicts their seduction tactics and methods, representing their subjectivity and agency of sexual citizenship in that domain, and also suggests their desire toward the other domain of familial citizenship that they had had previously.

In her chapter, Olivia Joanes notes the existence of a wide body of academic literature on citizenship, mainly accounting for how the class and race nexus is shifting in the neoliberal order, especially for elites. She points to the lack of work on authentic case studies of how citizenship translates in real terms. Most literature recognises problems in how the state fails to make good on its promises of citizenship stipulated in the Constitution. This chapter seeks to unpack the translation of citizenship beyond constitutional provision, from the perspective of Bonteheuwel, a Cape Flats community in South Africa. As most scholarly studies conducted on Cape Flats communities focus on gang violence and substance abuse, having research directed in more ‘positive’ light could be empowering to the community. The fall of apartheid brought rise to a people-focused vision of the new democratic South Africa.

During apartheid, inequalities were prescribed by law. As a result, the
African National Congress (ANC) focused on the remaking of South African society in order to create a new form of democratic citizenship. The South African Constitution is central to this idea and is often praised by the rest of the world for its protection of social, political and civil rights, yet South Africa remains one of the most unequal nation states to live in today. It is faced with a great deal of gross inequalities. In one part of the country a person may stop having take-out because of an economic downfall while their neighbour faces the possibility of not eating at all. South Africans find themselves in a web of theoretical promises enshrined in their Constitution, which, as a document, in fact does nothing more than paint an attractive picture of democratic citizenship. This compromises the ability of the marginalised South Africans, who had previously been deprived by apartheid, to claim tangible citizenship (Dawson 2010). Tangible citizenship is defined here as the individual’s ability to comfortably afford living expenses of a decent standard.

Kongo’s chapter draws on his own experiences as a former refugee working as a car guard in Cape Town from 2000 to 2002, as well as longitudinal research from 1994 to 2016 with a group of Congolese refugees. The chapter investigates some of the dynamics behind the issues of their immigration, work and citizenship, by exploring the ways in which these Congolese car guards earn a daily living, and how their social exclusion and the struggles to get legal documents impinge upon their life choices. The chapter employs the qualitative research method to get deeper insights on the subjectivity created by citizenship and mobility within South Africa. Kongo uses his voice to reflect on his experience as an individual, as a member of communities and as a human being. Kongo methodically documents his fate in this South African society through a focus on the situation of makwerekwere who cross borders in flight from political and economic challenges in his own land of birth, the DRC. The chapter finds that due to the subjectivity imposed by citizenship and mobility in South Africa Congolese refugees employ different strategies to survive and amongst them are car guarding, Stokvel, social network and kinship, belonging to a church.

The chapter argues that makwerekwere have agency; yet, their agency has been trampled on because they are perceived as people who still need to conform to citizenship norms and customs. The chapter shows why some adapt and conform to citizenship in South Africa, while others fail. Furthermore, the chapter maps the ways these young men navigate space by trying to escape the confining structures and refers to these attempts to reconfigure their lives. The chapter also demonstrates the processes through which an individual's access to resources and identity is constructed through citizenship and rights. The chapter concentrates on the intersection of two aspects of contemporary mobility: the flow of people, pushed across national borders and the growing crisis of
citizenship in South Africa. The chapter is a critique of the global rhetoric of open societies in an era of increasing closures. This chapter offers a perceptive issue that resonates in South Africa. As citizenship and mobility become a profound reality in the bodies of people in transit, citizenship, identity and belonging are subjected to stresses to which few societies have devised a civil response beyond yet more controls.

According to Zuziwe Msomi’s chapter, one of the important areas of participation as a citizen in South Africa is higher education. Since 2015 when student movement protests rocked the higher education landscape, historically white institutions have faced increased criticism for having institutional cultures of whiteness that exclude a large portion of the black citizenry. One of the sights at which this exclusion occurs is at the discursive level, as students interact with each other in often unintended or unconscious ways. White talk, according to whiteness studies, is the sight at which exclusion and the privileging of whiteness occurs. However white talk has often been studied in reference to white people only. This focus on the white body, poses the question of what happens when we do not assume that particular ways of speaking and acting are limited to particular types of bodies. Using the discursive strategy referred to as vesseling, Zuziwe’s chapter argues that a focus on the social aspects or social indicators of whiteness used in the strategy of vesseling reveals that anybody can acquire the social aspects of whiteness. If race is indeed not limited to essentialisms as vesseling suggests, then this chapter poses the possibility that discursive strategies such as vesseling which are not limited to phenotypical essence can open up deeper, reflexive conversations about how exclusion and alienation from participating in South Africa’s social institutions may therefore be more complex and nuanced than is often understood.

As a start to this conversation, she suggests that perhaps the way whiteness is produced and reproduced through vesseling may provide insight into how exclusion and alienation from participation in one of South Africa’s key institutions may be an unintentional product of speakers’ negotiation of the socio-politico landscape as they seek the best outcome in a racialised, competitive neo-liberal society. Zuziwe draws from interviews conducted as part of PhD research between 2014 and 2015 which aimed at getting a better understanding of how whiteness is produced and reproduced at the everyday level within historically white higher education institutions. The project focused less on structural causes of exclusion, but on how whiteness is privileged in minute and often unconscious ways through the way that people talk, and thereby lead many to feel excluded and alienated from participation in the country’s social institutions as a citizen. The project upon which this chapter draws assumed that discourse plays a critical role in not only constructing the
world, but that actors may unconsciously challenge or enforce ideologies that support inequality as they navigate the social world and pursue their interests. The study used Gee’s (2011, 1999) critical discourse analysis to analyse the interviews. This method enables the researcher to look beyond what people simply say, but rather paying closer attention how they relate and construct their narratives. This method not only allows deeper insight into the wider socio-political implications of the speakers’ ways of constructing a narrative but also allows the researcher to locate the data within the larger contextual socio-political landscape and its concomitant discourses. Thus, the meaning of the data is as much as what is uttered at the time, as well as the larger social context in which it is uttered.

At a time when South African Universities were facing protest action by students, Msakha’s study was undertaken. During the protests that took place between 2015 and 2017, some of the key demands included a decolonising of university curricula and making universities more inclusive. This study is an attempt at figuring out what a decolonised and inclusive curriculum can look like. The study focused on a first-year foundation course in the faculty of Humanities as a case study – Concepts in the Social Sciences (DOH1009F). Race, coloniality, canonical selection and cultural capital were problematised as relevant in curriculum development. The study employed an analysis of the lecture sessions, the reading materials, class survey as well as interviews.

The study found that DOH1009F stands as an example of a socio-culturally relevant curriculum. The choice of authors who make up the curriculum, the manner in which the course is positioned in South Africa’s local context, the multilingualism and the cultural sensitivity, among other findings, qualify DOH1009F as a relevant and exemplary case study. Throughout the study, race comes up as a problematic concept that influences the education process. The study therefore shows the limitation of race in transforming the curriculum, while also looking at how race is still used for positive discrimination in redressing past educational injustices. Msakha is hoping that this case study will contribute towards the realisation of more inclusive and decolonised university curricula by pointing out examples of how to conduct such a complex task. While this case study is not a perfect example of a fully inclusive, decolonised and sociocultural relevant curriculum, at the least it reflects steps in the right direction.

Swai’s chapter focused on a time long before our current era of mass media, when resistance movements such as abolitionism, anti-segregationism and black nationalism circulated from shore to shore, port to port and city to city, drawing the inhabitants of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban and others into a transnational conversation about freedom. Before the internet, television and
mobile telephones, radical ideas and ideologies travelled through the precarious, yet relentless, sojourn of racially classified bodies. The apartheid era comprised a litany of policies that attempted to regulate every aspect of social life and mobility. For those resisting the colonial project’s chronic and calculated obsession with the control of people’s movement and mobility, every step toward liberation demanded (and continues to demand) intense creativity and tenacity to stake out ways of circumventing borders and boundaries, both terrestrial and psychological. This chapter focuses specifically on mobility as a crucial aspect of social and civic life, and how the relationship between movement/mobility and citizenship has unfolded in the two decades since ‘democracy’ from the perspective of someone whose childhood took place during apartheid, but whose adolescence was enmeshed with the shock-doctrine-related upheaval South Africa experienced post-94. In a chapter entitled ‘Democracy in Chains’, Naomi Klein’s *The Shock Doctrine* (2007) outlines the ways in which the 1994 moment fits into a model of conquest in which power brokers take advantage of the effects of mega events like coups, political transitions or natural disasters which render populations vulnerable or temporarily susceptible to regressive change. Swai is particularly interested in the counter-culture role that early Hip Hop played in circulating ideas that resisted apartheid and during the 1990s fought the post-94 neoliberal onslaught.

Hip Hop played a fundamental role in promoting both material and mental mobility. It is a type of mobility that now squarely fits into the realm of transnational studies as it has greatly expanded notions of citizenship and belonging. His chapter begins with a rather rudimentary overview of the continuity of cross-Atlantic contact; this is necessary for situating the emergence of Hip Hop in South Africa on the long timeline that symbolises the ongoing cultural exchange across the Atlantic. This long history of contact and exchange was not only a back-and-forth trading of production values for various performances or musical styles but, more importantly, a lot of the art (for lack of a better word) directly served the purpose of politicisation, resistance and social justice struggle. Because these artists broadened the scope for how people of colour imagined their position in, and connectedness to, a larger, indeed global, collectivity, these circulations inevitably promised/threatened to remind people that they belonged fully to the human race, even though they were being excluded from participation as full humans in the lands of their birth or the territories they desired to call home. Hip Hop served as a reminder that the youth were yet again more than capable of making something out of nothing, and that the youth possessed a set of resources that linked them to something older and larger than the proverbial blinkers that state borders would have them wear.
The bulk of the chapter then showcases a selection of Hip Hop practitioners who have been active between 1994 and 2019 in order to show how the Cape region, in particular, amounts to a spectacular nexus of Afro-cosmopolitan contact. This nexus itself is a site of identity formation and transformation. Some scholars have recognised this circulation and exchange as a distinct ‘Black Globality’ (Edwards 1998), while others have identified it as a branch of Pan Africanism (Decker 1993, Alridge 2005); others still have preferred to think of it as a modality of Afropolitanism (Selasi 2005; Mbembe 2016). Swai’s chapter activates the various terms and their contingent archives in order to explore how the so-called Hip Hop nation, which amounts to one of the most significant global cultural revolutions to emerge in the 20th century, affords alternative and fluid notions of citizenship that directly challenge the failure of the nation state to democratise and accommodate its most marginalised people. This chapter interrogates the ways in which Hip Hop not only provides avenues to move outside of the strictures of colonial and postcolonial mapping, but also instantiates a platform for creating a truly global collectivity forged by resistance, but elevated through art and humanity.

In his chapter, Harry Garuba discusses how in the wake of the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of apartheid, the idea of democracy in postcolonial, post-conflict, post-cold war polities became inextricably linked with the idea of civil society. Democracies will only thrive if and only when civil society is strong. In short, a certain model of citizenship had become hegemonic in thinking about forms of sociality, solidarity and belonging in the world.

Garuba underlines the fact that this discourse has remained pervasive and hegemonic in South African studies and then explores the ways in which this normative idea of citizenship is haunted by the spectre of the history of violence which always already casts a shadow over it. He asks why this historical and present trauma is not written into the normative scripts of citizenship that define and interpellate these societies and their subjects. Garuba then examines another form of citizenship enacted in one novel by Zakes Mda – *Ways of Dying* – in which alternative forms of belonging and citizenship are highlighted; a form of citizenship haunted by the spectre of violence and death. Finally, Garuba asks what attention to these alternative/supplementary citizenships may mean specifically for South African studies and for comparative postcolonial studies in general.

According to Francis Nyamnjoh’s chapter, a major characteristic of African countries since the 1980s has been a growing obsession with belonging and the questioning of conventional assumptions about nationality and citizenship almost everywhere. This is an obsession shared with countries elsewhere, from Europe to North Africa, Asia and South America. Everywhere in the 21st
century, identity politics is increasingly important, alongside more exclusionary ideas of nationality and citizenship, as minority claims for greater cultural recognition and plurality are countered by majoritarian efforts (in the USA, Britain, France and most of the Western world, for example) to maintain the status quo and, in some cases, turn the clock back on more cosmopolitan and inclusionary identities (as with Brexit and Trump’s Make-America-Great-Again campaign and policies) cultivated through a careful negotiation and navigation of histories of unequal mobilities and unequal encounters of people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. In Africa, obsession with exclusionary indicators of citizenship and belonging have meant that minority (especially ethnic, religious, migrant and the transnationally mobile, refugees and others displaced by conflicts and natural disasters) clamours for recognition and representation are countered by greater and sometimes aggressive reaffirmation (in South Africa, for example) of age-old exclusions informed by colonial registers of inequalities amongst the subjected. This development is paralleled by increased awareness and distinction between ‘locals’ and ‘foreigners’, with an emphasis on opportunities and economic entitlements. Apart from official measures to restrict further access to citizenship by foreigners, public attitudes towards foreigners are hardening generally. Customary policies of inclusion by taking the outside in as means of taking the inside out – i.e. opening the society up to minorities and foreigners – is under pressure from the politics of entitlement to the benefits of economic growth in an era of accelerated flows of capital and migrants.

This article explores how our understanding of citizenship and belonging in Africa and in general can be enriched by interrogations of how ideas and practices of mobility change in a world of closing borders and ever diminishing circles of inclusion. It explores the extent to which convivial forms of interaction (welcoming and accommodating mobile outsiders through open migration policies and practices, and by promoting greater social integration between insiders and outsiders, national and foreigners, citizens and non-citizens) are amenable to counter the exclusionary trends, or to serve as a basis for bonding fictional/constructed insiders against perceived outsiders. The chapter dwells as well on how race, ethnicity, citizenship and belonging are constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed along the fluid, yet increasingly oppressive frontiers that link ‘nation states’ North and South in the troubled times of the 21st century, and in context of its reality of nimble-footed mobility of humans, things and ideas. Now that even ‘civic citizenship’ is proving to be anything but an inclusive and satisfactory solution for even its foremost proponents, driving both nationals and non-nationals, settlers and natives, ethnic strangers and ethnic citizens to rediscover fundamental and chauvinistic
identities, the citizenship debate is back in full force. The chapter argues in favour of a conceptualisation, articulation and re-presentation of citizenship informed by the histories of mobility and encounters that give meaning and contexts to claims of identity and belonging to particular places and spaces, be these local, national, regional or global. In this regard, scholars ought to pay closer attention to the manner in which multitudes (ranging from women’s movements to diasporas through youth movements and cultural communities big and small), are using mainstream or social media and related technologies to clamour for inclusion by challenging the myopia implicit in the conservative juridico-political rhetoric and practices of nation states.

How these movements are daily challenging the indicators of citizenship narrowly informed by the privileged biases of Western and African masculinities ought to be meticulously documented and fed into the recalibration and theorisation of citizenship in scholarship. Such reconceptualisation of citizenship should be guided by the need to provide for and facilitate access to political, cultural, social and economic space for excluded nationals and non-nationals alike, as individuals and collectivities. The chapter points to flexible citizenship as the best guarantor of such inclusivity. Flexible citizenship is understood as citizenship that is unbounded by race, ethnicity, class, gender or geography, and that is both conscious and critical of hierarchies that make a mockery of the juridico-political regime of citizenship provided by the coercive illusion of the nation state. It is a fluid and open-ended citizenship in which space is created for its articulation at different levels from the most global to the most local or autochthonous, from the ethnic to the civic and from the individual to the collective. The idea of corporate, digital, electronic, cyber, global, itinerant and related claims to citizenship are easily understandable and accommodated under the framework of flexible citizenship. The emphasis should be on the freedom of individuals and communities to negotiate inclusion and opt out and opt in with total flexibility and reversibility of belonging in consonance with their realities as repertoires, melting pots or straddlers of various identity margins.

Thus, in individual ethnographic cases and conceptual studies, in contrast to top-down schemes that allocate specific citizenship based on specific categories of people, ways of understanding of people about citizenship are explored with reference to how they see community in everyday practice, state of encountering state power or situation where rights are claimed or utilised or denied. As Aihwa Ong points out, the process of people being moulded in a top-down fashion is inevitably joined with a bottom-up self-creation process named as technologies of the self (Ong 1999). This point became one of the opportunities for new requirements to direct ethnographic interests to citizen
and agency of citizen that asserts citizenship (or better citizenship). Then, the way is to be opened wide to understand citizenship as (legal) position and at the same time as a sense of people practising citizenship (sentiments and attachments) and activities based on it. However, the ‘flexibility of the citizenship’ pointed out here refers to the privileges which bypass different state systems and benefits by choosing different bases under the global neoliberal economic development. It can be said that the subject of description and analysis of ‘flexibility’ has been strongly inclined to practise winners in the flexible accumulation system of capitalism after the Fordism system, such as multinational elite. If we can read about maintaining its flexibility in the activities of African people, even (or very) in the marginalisation of capitalism and modern civil society, constantly coordinating the sense and practice of citizenship, adapting, innovating, then this book would have some meaning to a certain extent, whatever it is.

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Notes:

1 For example, in recent years, collaborative research organised at the Institute for Language and Culture of Asia and Africa at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies ‘Migrant/Refugee Citizenship – Institution and Practice for Inclusion and Exclusion from the State’, and ‘Citizenship and Political participation – Comparison study on formation of community by migrants/refugees and impact on social welfare’, both of which Aiko Nishikida has led as project leader, are quite ambitious to quit seeing citizenship as nationality and rethink citizenship with the eyes of immigrants/refugees, not from the national perspective (see also Nishikida 2016).

2 In the case of Uganda, the first Muslim visited Buganda in the 1840s, John Hanning Speke (1827–1864) discovered the source of Nile and interviewed the king of Buganda in 1862, and it was 1864 that Sir Samuel Baker (1821–1893) reached Lake Albert. The Christian mission arrived in 1877, Uganda was incorporated by the British Protectorate by the Buganda treaty in 1900 and gained its independence was 1962. When considered from the point of view that the Pan-Africanism conference, which had the most influence on the independence of African countries, started from 1919, we get the impression that it
happened relatively immediately, but the centre of the issue does not lie there. In addition, the Great Lakes Region including Uganda is generally characterised by diversity in the point of wide variety of political systems like a politically systematic kingdom, emirate country, acephalous societies and so on which are still functioning to some extent, and in the aspect of human ecology it shows a wide diversity such as hunting and gathering, pastoralism, shifting cultivation and so on.

As is well known, ‘flexibility’ was originally derived as logic to define alternative late capitalism when the Fordism system of mass production stalled facing to the resistance to modern business management and the loss of regularity in the consumption pattern. It indicated ‘flexible accumulation system’ with ‘flexibility’ on the labour process, market, products, and consumption (Harvey 1989). Ong conducted research on transnational processes in the Asia-Pacific, and added the concept of Harvey’s flexibility to a description of human agency, its construction, and negotiations on cultural meaning.

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SECTION A

Conceptualisations: An Exploration of the Literature in Broad Strokes
Chapter 2

Global and African Discourses on Citizenship

Anye-Nkwenti Nyamnjoh and Claire-Anne Lester

Introduction

The concept of ‘citizenship’ has connotations that are, at the same time, descriptive and normative; theoretical and empirical. Understood as interrogating the relationship between individuals and political communities, as well as relationships between individuals and groups within those communities, empirical approaches to citizenship draw theory from actually existing relationships; while citizenship theory tends to be prescriptive, offering ideas concerning what these relationships should actually look like (Taylor-Gooby 1991; Lister and Pia 2008). Furthermore, citizenship tends to refer to a status denoting membership/belonging to a political community (Marshall 1950; Delanty 2000; Bellamy 2014). It is distinguishable from other forms of belonging such as subjecthood and kinship. Those who hold the status of ‘citizen’ are different from ‘non-citizens’ by their possession of a range of rights and/or obligations vis-à-vis a said community and other citizens in that political community. These rights confer a civic and political equality on those delineated as citizens. Typically, the nation state forms the basic structure against which the theoretical and empirical dimensions of citizenship are anchored, although this trend is becoming increasingly subject to contestation.

For Tilly (1995) one’s citizenship identity is both relational and cultural, and conceptualised as (a) a category, (b) a role, (c) a tie or (d) an identity, constructed upon one or several of those manifestations (Tilly 1995: 1–17). As a category, citizenship refers to actors who share a position in relation to a nation state; whereas, as a tie citizenship points to an ‘enforceable mutual relation between an actor and state agents’ in so far as that tie encompasses enforceable rights and obligations, which also depend on an individuals’ categorical membership and relationship to a state (Tilly 1995: 8). As a role, citizenship entails the relations to others that depend on the actor’s relation to a state, whereas citizenship as an identity may both inform and describe an individual’s experience and how one performs that category, tie or role. Tilly proceeds to advance a conception based on citizenship as a ““certain kind of tie”: “a continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in
which each has enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by virtue of (1) the person’s membership in an exclusive category, the native-born plus the naturalized and (2) the agent’s relation to the state rather than any other authority the agent may enjoy.” (Tilly 1995: 8).

Alternatively, Bosniak (2000) has discussed the following dimensions of citizenship: (a) status, (b) rights, (c) political activity and (d) identity/solidarity. As a legal status, citizenship distinguishes citizens from aliens/denizens. As a set of rights, citizenship illustrates the recognition of status in virtue of possessing certain rights. For example, T.H. Marshall (1950) outlines three phases in the development of citizenship, beginning with civil rights in the eighteenth century including the liberty of the individual, freedom of religion and right to own property (Marshall 1950: 14, 21, 41). In the 19th century the extension of voting rights exemplified the extension of political rights. However, he asserts that it was the 20th century that became inspired by ‘the modern drive towards social equality’, where citizenship began to encompass social rights, ‘from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society’ (Marshall 1950: 10–11). Citizenship as political activity denotes ‘active engagement in the affairs of the community’ at formal and informal levels (Lopez 2018: 254). As identity/solidarity, citizenship captures the ‘quality of belonging – the felt aspects of community membership’ (Bosniak 2000: 479).

Below, we engage with three key debates that have framed the study of citizenship – on the one the one hand, we present debates on the nature of the relationship between individuals and political community and on the other, over the nature of political community itself, or more specifically, the locus of citizenship. Finally, we present the more anthropological emphasis on citizenship as a practice, which calls for the displacement of rights and responsibilities, as well as theoretically laden understandings of citizenship, and for rethinking our understanding of contemporary citizenship as multifaceted.

The Content of ‘Citizenship’ as a Relation to Political Community

In the first instance, we can contrast different theoretical approaches that prescribe what the relationship between individuals and political community ought to be. Herein, we observe the primacy of a liberal conception of citizenship in contrast to a range of other traditions that critique it. Liberal citizenship emphasises citizenship as a legal status vis-à-vis the state where the mode of belonging it signifies is transactional and mediated by dual components of rights and responsibilities. Alternatives to liberal citizenship include
republican and communitarian citizenship as well as differentiated citizenship (feminism, multiculturalism).

From a theoretical perspective, a Western political history of citizenship can be plotted along the contours of a distinction between political/public citizenship – where the citizen is a collective agent acting on behalf of the ‘people’ – or nation’ and legal/private citizenship (Bellamy 2014: 13). To a large degree, competing theoretical discussions on the relationship between individuals and political communities amount to competing accounts of what drives people to form political communities to begin with. Consider the contrast between republican and liberal citizenship for example.

Civic republicanism can be differentiated into Aristotelian and Roman traditions. As a form of republicanism, their unity consists in articulating a political dimension to citizenship, where citizenship as equal membership is conceived in terms of political participation. However, they differ in terms of how they value the rights and obligations associated with citizenship. In the Aristotelian conception, equal membership grounded in rights and duties has an intrinsic value, subscribing to a perfectionist account of human nature where political participation is seen as constitutive of the ‘good life’ or human flourishing. In the Athenian city state, for example, this form of citizenship was enjoyed by a privileged minority constructed along narrow, exclusivist lines predicated on economic and social hierarchies (Kymlicka 2002; Bellamy 2014).

Roman civic republicanism, on the other hand, treats equal political membership in instrumental terms – as a means to an end. The ‘end’ in this case is liberty, understood as relations of non-domination that allow for the representation of one’s interest in the constitution of the public good (Petit 1997; Skinner 1998). For example, in the context of class conflict between Plebeians and Patricians, Machiavelli articulates the instrumentalist character of citizenship as a check against the domination of one set of class interests (Bellamy 2014: 8–10). Thus, while politics consists of the purging private interests in the Aristotelian conception, the public is precisely the space for the contestation of private interests in the Roman conception. This reinforces the prudential value of political participation in that the failure to participate in the public sphere means that others will do so at your expense.

Nonetheless, integral to the instrumentalist citizenship that characterises the Roman conception is the notion that humans enter politics to advance their own interests. This is distinct from the Aristotelian idea that we are political animals, and thus being in society is constitutive of ‘the good life’. While a fairly homogenous sense of the common good may be possible in tightly knit communities, larger political formations - such as empires - will have difficulty sustaining such projects. As such, assuming reasonable pluralism, it becomes
necessary to create a political community whereby dispersed members can pursue their varying private interests. For example, the expansion of the Roman Empire saw the supplementation of political citizenship with a legal citizenship (as status before the law), although this form of belonging still excluded a vote. While this civic equality protected private interests, citizens nonetheless remained under imperial domination as they lacked citizenship as a form political participation that preserved their right to self-determination (Bellamy 2014: 7–8).

Despite the internal differences to civic republicanism, republican citizenship is anchored in political participation and often related to an understanding of freedom grounded in self-government (Petit 1997). However, at least in modern societies, this conception may tend to underestimate the value derived from private life, and hence the difficulty of cultivating civic virtue non-coercively, whatever its prudential salience. Furthermore, it goes without saying that not all forms of participation are morally or politically desirable. Republican traditions do not always pay sufficient attention to the existence of a hegemonic societal culture grounded in status hierarchies, which may impinge on the content of the ‘common good’ (Lister and Pia 2008: 29).

A helpful way of contrasting republican and liberal understandings of citizenship is to examine the linkages between political citizenship and liberty. Aristotelian civic republicanism is wedded to a positive conception of liberty understood as self-mastery, where freedom is an exercise notion. Freedom is necessarily located in action, hence the salience of political participation. Roman civic republicanism, on the other hand, can be located in the republican tradition where freedom is merely construed as non-domination. Liberal citizenship subscribes to negative freedom, where freedom is represented as non-interference, concerned more with the existence of opportunity for action (contrast between freedom as exercise versus opportunity concept in Taylor (1979) and Berlin (1969) on positive and negative freedom). For the liberal, the individual is ontologically prior to the state and community, in possession of pre-social and pre-political, the preservation of which justifies political society (Lister and Pia 2008: 9; Bellamy 2014: 11). In the contractarian tradition, citizenship is a legal status before the law, where law functions to ordain a civic and political egalitarian order that protects the rights of citizens to devise and pursue their varying conceptions of the good life in ways that do not harm other citizens (Lister and Pia 2008: 9).

Communitarian citizenship, on the other hand, derives from a communitarian critique (popular in the 1970s and 1980s) of the liberal ontology. In articulating an account of personhood, it is argued that liberal citizenship is wedded to a false ontology marked by an ahistorical subject – what Sandel
(1984) termed ‘un-encumbered selves’. This ignores a reality of personhood as socially emergent and thus contextually situated, leading to an overemphasis on individual rights, at the expense of the moral, social, environmental and political health of community. The implications of this on understanding citizenship are that it is community, and not rights, that delineates political membership and belonging (Delanty 2002). Whereas liberal citizenship focuses on rights, the thrust of communitarian citizenship lies in its emphasis on obligations to one’s community. This does not mean we jettison rights altogether, but exhort a recognition that rights presuppose existing stable communities and thus must be attended by obligations to community (Etzioni 1995, 2011; Kymlicka 2002; Lister and Pia 2008). More importantly, the ahistoricity of liberal ontology fosters a false universalism. An implication of the communitarian critique, therefore, is the denial of a universal conception of citizenship (Walzer 1983).

These theoretical debates reveal the contestation over the relative pre-eminence of rights versus responsibilities on the one hand, and citizenship as individual versus group expression on the other, in attempts to define what the relationship between individuals and political community should look like.

Delanty (2000) observes that citizenship usually involves the interrelation of four different elements: rights, duties, participation and identity. The aforementioned theoretical debates differ on the elements they emphasise in articulating citizenship (Lister and Pia 2008: 30). These theoretical debates reveal different estimations of what the relationship between citizens and political communities should be. But nonetheless, they present an account of equality that is difference neutral. In so doing, they implicitly posit the notion of a universal category of citizenship. However, feminist and multicultural critiques of citizenship challenge this idea fiercely, as is evident in the notion of ‘differentiated citizenship’ often associated with multicultural politics (Kymlicka 1995, 2002). Despite its egalitarian spirit, the universal impulse of citizenship can mask or accentuate status hierarchies, rather than overwhelm them. The debate therefore arises as to whether citizenship should be difference neutral or specific (Lister and Pia 2008).

Feminist scholarship contends that citizenship is a gendered concept because traditional conceptions of citizenship – whether republican, liberal, or communitarian – exclude women from the status of citizen (Pateman 1989; Okin 1992; Walby 1994; Dietz 1998; Lister and Pia 2008: 35–38). Lister (2003) notes a double exclusion of women from citizenship, both in the idea and practice of citizenship. Historically, the rights and duties of citizenship in practice as well as in its abstract construction were reserved exclusively for men. Even where women have formal citizenship rights, full citizenship tends to be hampered by a moral division of labour, which, together with the sequestering
and invisibilising of the private sphere, precludes full citizenship for women (see also Lister 1997, 2000; Walby 1994; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999; García-Del Moral and Dersnah 2014).

Feminist critiques were significant in identifying that the ‘gender question’ can often be overlooked in discussions of states and citizenship; particularly when it has been central to debates on decolonisation movements in Africa. During the anti-apartheid struggle for example, there was conflict about how the question of women’s liberation should be taken forward – whether it should be asserted congruently with the liberation of people of colour, or whether it was a secondary struggle. At the Nairobi conference of 1985, an anti-apartheid feminist stated that to discuss gender inequality within the struggle would only create division and rancour. As described by Chatterjee (1989) and Chazan (1989), it was common for nationalist movements to subsume the issue of gender discrimination under the goal of national liberation. Seidman (1999) criticises the tendency of prominent scholars (such as those by Adam and Moodley 1993; or Adler and Webster 1995) to analyse apartheid and the liberation struggle only in terms of racial and class dynamics. Invoking a notion of citizenship as identity/solidarity, it is noted that men and women experience democratic citizenship differently, meaning one must always seek to identify and incorporate women’s interest in the state (Seidman 1999: 288–289).

The multiculturalist critique debates citizenship as a politics of recognition, which recognises the myriad of status hierarchies impinging on political equality, necessitating calls for differentiated citizenship (Isin and Turner 2002; Kymlicka 1995, 2002, 2004). From this perspective, the multiplicity of identities people hold within a broader context of cultural diversity means that equal legal rights are necessary but not sufficient to generate full citizenship. The politics of recognition has also encompassed struggles for sexual citizenship (Richardson 2017), as well as a growing concern about people with disabilities as well as the elderly (Emery 2009; Phelan 2012; Guldvik, Askheim and Johansen 2013).

Approaches to the Locus of Citizenship

A second set of debates involves the locus of citizenship and the nature of the political community in which citizenship is anchored. In Aristotelian civic republicanism, we saw that political citizenship required a particular kind of political community – the small-scale polis/city state. This rendered the task of government relatively simple in order to preclude the necessity of a professionalised bureaucracy or political class. It was also conducive to the cultivation of the requisite civic virtues – civic friendship/tight-knit community that grounded deliberation around the ‘common good’ (Bellamy 2014). Against
the contemporary primacy accorded to the nation, there have been calls to revisit cities as a central locus of negotiations of citizenship (Holston 1999). In the Roman conception of civic-republicanism, we saw empire as another locus of citizenship.

Contemporary understandings of citizenship tend to link belonging to national identity within the context of a territorially bounded nation state. The development of the nation state as a distinct political formation provided an opportunity to preserve political and legal citizenship, as it was large enough for one to anticipate reasonable pluralism and thus legal citizenship, but not too large as to belie the possibility for political participation (Cohen 1999). Historically, the nation state was ‘subject to pressures to create a form of citizenship that could successfully integrate popular and legal rule by linking political participation and rights with membership of a national democratic political community’ (Bellamy 2014: 13). This may well have been the promise of the nation state; however, legal citizenship has largely displaced political participation, as is evident in sociological observations around the increasing deflection of citizens to the private sphere. However, this may simply be a reflection of a state-centric bias, requiring that we pay attention to both formal and informal strategies which citizens adopt to express themselves politically.

One of the most dominant themes in citizenship studies is the question of the nation state as only one of many layers of people’s citizenship, whereby belonging can be emphasised in relation to other political communities at local, sub-national and transnational levels (Yuval-Davis 1999, 2006). Notions such as post-national, cosmopolitan and transnational citizenship challenge the emphasis on the nation state as the prime locus of belonging and have been subjected to substantial debate (Soysal 1994, 2012; Turner 1997, 2006; Bosniak 2000; Brysk 2002; Brysk and Shafir 2004; Levy and Sznajder 2010; Sassen 2009; Shafir and Brysk 2006; Benhabib 2004, 2005; Held 2010). The international human rights architecture is usually invoked as a transnational discourse exemplifying post-national citizenship, enmeshed in the disentanglement of citizenship rights from the shackles of the nation state (Soysal 1994). This is illustrated either through discourses of expanding citizenship, where human rights represent the globalisation of national citizenship; or discourses positing the suppression of national citizenship, where the primacy of the nation state is declining either due to globalising pressures that hamper state capacity, or the displacement of national sovereignty to post-national/transnational locations (Lopez 2018: 237).

Similarly, cosmopolitanism notes the reduced salience of the nation state in political life, frequently anchoring itself in a broader critique that posits the multiplicity of spaces and arenas of citizenship. Held’s (1995, 1996) notion of
‘cosmopolitan democracy’ posits that the state is not the only power that can guarantee the rights of citizens. Because citizens increasingly belong to ‘overlapping communities of fate’ at varying levels, this discourse has linkages to education, in the instrumentalisation of education to produce global citizens (Nussbaum, 1998).

To contest the idea of a human rights-driven post-national citizenship, one could point to other reasons for the recognition of non-citizens such as national constitutions and anxieties pertaining to social cohesion (Bosniak 2000; Lopez 2018). Contrary to the idea that national citizenship is being suppressed, it is observed that notions such as post-national, transnational, cosmopolitan and global citizenship are constructed in relation to the state, rather than posing distinctive alternatives to it (Hansen 2009; Staeheli 2011). Some defenders of cosmopolitanism argue that cosmopolitan ethical principles, such as human rights, can only be consolidated through iterative processes by self-governing polities (Benhabib 2013). This is especially interesting as it anticipates critiques of cosmopolitanism whereby the prospects for cosmopolitan citizenship are undercut by institutional deficiencies, notably the absence of a world state. However, cosmopolitanism could refer to a set of international norms governing a loose federation of sovereign states, with variations around how ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ this mode of citizenship should be. Furthermore, rather than presupposing a world body to enforce these rights, cosmopolitan citizenship should be seen ‘as a means whereby states offer reciprocal rights of recognition to each other and their citizens, collaborate to tackle global problems, and foster the global extension of liberal democratic citizenship rather than making us global citizens’ (Bellamy 2014: 17).

On the validity of post-national citizenship, Sassen (2002, 2006, 2009) has contrasted ‘post-national’ and ‘denationalized citizenship’, to argue that the pressures of a global and globalising world produce denationalised rather than post-national citizenship (see also Levy and Sznaider 2006, 2010). Today, there are ample examples of states reasserting their primacy in determining citizenship, whether through citizenship tests/requirements (Hansen 2009: 14–17; Schain 2009; Goodman 2012; Mouritsen 2011), or the scaling back of multicultural policies (Joppke and Morawska 2003: 8; Messina 2007: 186–87; Mouritsen 2011; Triadafilopoulos 2011; Triandafyllidou et al. 2011; Schmidtke 2012: 35; Alexander 2013). Furthermore, we only have to look at the fact that within the European Union (EU) itself (conceptually an instance of post-national citizenship), member states have diverging responses to the influx of migration (Goodman 2012; Koopmans 2012: 22–27; Koopmans et al. 2012; Messina 2007: 192–93; Baldi and Goodman 2015). Specifically, on the EU, it has also been argued that what it offers – ‘market citizenship’ (Everson 1995) –
lacks the depth of authentic personal ties and there is doubt concerning whether it can be considered citizenship at all (Bellamy 2008; Kochenov 2009; Maas 2008).

Differentiated citizenship discussed earlier has implications for the locus of citizenship. Feminist analyses of citizenship have also challenged liberal citizenship by questioning the privileging of the individual as the navel of citizenship, as accounts of women’s community activism demonstrate political action through cultural/class/ethnic communities in contrast to an atomised individualism (Jaggar 2005). Furthermore, some feminist scholarship problematises the sites of citizenship, moving beyond the lens of the state and market to posit the domestic and private sphere as an arena of citizenship (García-Del Moral and Dersnah 2014), although, according to Lister (2003), this risks emptying citizenship of conceptual significance.

The call to think of citizenship beyond the discursive framework of nation states is further echoed in postcolonial critiques of citizenship. Such critiques question the universality of citizenship by observing that dominant understandings of citizenship are culturally specific to and contingent upon ‘Western Traditions’ due to their intimate connection to the idea of a nation state. For example, Chatterjee’s discussion on popular politics argues that there is a marked conflict between ‘the universal ideal of civil nationalism’ (based on the idea of equal freedoms and rights regardless of race, culture and language) on the one hand and the ‘particular demands of cultural identity’ on the other, which calls for ‘differential treatment of particular groups on grounds of vulnerability or backwardness or historical injustice …’ (Chatterjee 2004: 4). Hence, for Chatterjee, understanding political engagement, and indeed civic belonging, requires thinking about the actions of subaltern populations outside the language and discourse of citizenship and civil society. For him, ‘western’ political theoretical approaches obscured the particular, cultural milieu within which individuals create a sense of belonging to a political community. More specifically, what may be considered a nation state is often heterogeneous and fragmented in form, with diverse communities finding belonging via connections external to national citizenship.

**Citizenship as Practice**

Another set of debates, which are somewhat linked to questions around the locus of citizenship, is represented by the turn to theorise citizenship as rooted in practice. This calls for a shift away from the focus on rights and responsibilities as well as theoretically laden understandings of citizenship. As a practice, citizenship involves the strategies adopted to establish oneself as
belonging to particular community, such as cultivating ‘nested affiliations’ (Lazar 2008). Herein, citizenship is simultaneously entangled in processes of self and community making. This renders citizenship a practice of ‘subjectification’ (Ong 1996).

This turn towards the practice of citizenship is supported by a commitment to a ‘grounded approach’ to researching citizenship and democracy rooted in the ‘everyday experiences in particular social, cultural and historical contexts’ (Robins et al. 2008: 1069). It is argued that the word ‘citizenship’, much like the term ‘democracy’, is normative and linked to certain discursive buzzwords, like ‘participation’, ‘accountability’ and ‘civil society’, within the development discourse of Western donors. However, there is often a ‘glaring disjuncture’ between the models of democracy and citizenship extolled by Western donors (made evident by programmes like poverty reduction strategies and programmes promoting participatory budgeting) and the way in which democracy and citizenship are performed everyday by citizens, especially in the ‘Third World’ (Robins et al. 2008: 1070). Histories of disenfranchisement, authoritarianism and clientelism are not simply dispelled at the point of transition, as narratives of struggle, liberation and democratisation may suggest. This position calls for the need to problematise the implicit assumption that increased modes of democratic participation necessarily translates into higher levels of democracy, or that new democratic citizens will favour policies that do in fact permit increased civic participation. This is echoed by Chandoke (2003) who highlights the ‘uncivil’ tendencies in civil society, arguing that civil society is only ever as democratic as its members. As Robins et al. state (2008: 1073), ‘We need to acknowledge more explicitly the paradox in the construction of citizenship practices, the unsettling of old ground and its markers, and the attempt to introduce a range of political practices (democratic and non-democratic) that shape the identity of new polities in the context of its contestation by emerging groups and identities’.

Rigid theoretical signifiers of citizenship simply do not always describe what is happening on the ground. In diasporic studies, Priya Swamy (2017) uses the term ‘flexible cultural citizenship’ to describe a Surinamese Hindo community in the Netherlands. Stressing the ‘importance of difference’ (2017: 1063), she points to real life demonstrations of cultural flexibility to show how diaspora actors express belonging to a transnational moral community, which informs the way that they construct their identity as model citizens in varying contexts. She draws upon the work of Ong (1998, 1999), who used the concept of ‘flexible citizenship’ in theorising modes of belonging and survival in Chinese diaspora communities. The significance of Ong’s work lies in its examination of the ‘orientalising tendencies’ of host populations and states, and how these
characteristics become appropriated by ‘flexible citizens’ as a strategy of their community integration in a transnational world. In contexts where there is a need to adapt to the cultural norms of host states, diaspora citizens employ ‘flexibility’ as a strategy for effective integration, whilst retaining their bond with their homeland. As Ong (1998: 136) stated, diasporic citizenship involves, ‘handling the diverse rules of governmentality of host societies where they [diasporic subjects] may be economically correct in terms of human capital, but culturally incorrect in terms of ethnicity’. Within Ong’s framework, cultural flexibility becomes a survival strategy in which actors negotiate belonging in precarious or even heavily regulated citizenship discourses. Ong provides an example of elite Chinese migrants who perform or iterate certain elements of ‘Chineseness’ or select notions of Confucianism (Ong 1998: 153) which are perceived as more conducive to capitalism. By doing so, these immigrants are able to justify that economic or entrepreneurial prowess is an integral part of the ‘Chinese’ worldview or ethos. Similarly, Swamy asserts that Surinamese Hindus manage the harsh and often xenophobic citizenship discourse in the Netherlands through certain strategies of adopting the characteristics of a ‘model minority’, outwardly valuing hard work and education. Through her exploration of the flexibility enacted by Surinamese Hindus in Holland, she illustrates how ‘value flexibility relies on self-orientalizing notions of difference that help to navigate through culturalized norms and values of Dutch citizenship today’ (Swamy 2017: 1063).

Citizenship in Africa

In discourses that take Africa as an object of study, citizenship has often served as an analytical lens through which to study socio-political phenomena such as conflict, justice, democracy and democratisation. Conflicts are often seen as resulting from democratic struggles against unequal citizenship for inclusive and meaningful citizenship. The intersection of conflict, citizenship and democracy poses questions around the challenges of nation building and the relevance of democracy in a context of ethnic diversity (Smith 2013: 28–9). The politics of recognition and the practices of citizenship that attend it have been used as an entry point for an analysis of democracy in Africa (Englund and Nyamnjoh 2004). Englund (2006) has further argued that the aesthetic of politics of recognition in Africa (the language of human rights), together with the politics of foreign aid, can undermine prospects for democratic citizenship.

Issues surrounding the locus of citizenship have generated considerable debate. For example, Branch and Mampilly (2015) argue for the primacy of ‘political society’ as opposed to civil society in understanding popular protest as
a practice of democratic citizenship. In transcending the conventional locus of citizenship, political society often intervenes in the terrain of citizenship to think outside and disrupt the state-civil society dichotomy. In addition, we see similar debates around the locus of citizenship in relation to the paradigm of national identity. What is at stake here is the accuracy of talking about citizenship exclusively in terms of membership to a nation state mediated by the possession of legal rights. This is especially the case when one considers the juxtaposition of inclusionary and exclusionary practices of citizenship along the grid of identity – be that religious, ethnic or gender. This challenge is invariably about the nation and the state as loci of citizenship, underscored by the view that there are multiple layers of citizenship existing parallel to and even contesting national identity. The limits of national citizenship have been discussed from a legal perspective through the plight of stateless persons (Manby 2013). Furthermore, the possibility of a transcendent national identity (Mattes 2004) is complicated by antagonisms cultivated against the backdrop of cultural diversity. The primacy of the state as the guarantor of rights is also subject to debate, especially considering appeals by citizens to international human rights frameworks and its representatives. The state has been problematised in terms of its capacity to provide meaningful citizenship and is often discussed as complicit in creating realities of unequal citizenship. Moreover, a state-centric lens obscures a fruitful analysis of citizenship as political participation, because attention will more likely be paid towards formal as opposed to informal forms of participation.

The issue of state capacity is situated within the economic context in which citizenship is contested and defined. The crippling of state capacity in the construction of citizenship along national democratic lines is linked to chronic economic instability due in part to unequal encounters with international finance capital. For Mkandawire and Olukoshi (1995) the international finance agenda (often articulated through the IMF and World Bank) has delegitimised the state as an actor in the political economy and led to the emergence of new actors with competing interests rushing to fill the resulting void. This has reverberated to all spheres of social and political life, including how civil society has come to organise itself within processes of democratic transition and change.

Aside from the issue of state capacity, Adejumobi (2001) notes the bifurcation of citizens’ loyalties in ways that preclude the idea of the nation as a community of shared ends/purposes. Citizenship is often studied in the context of challenges to postcolonial nation and state building whereby the practice of citizenship is characterised by a politics of inclusion and exclusion. What is frequently noted is a tension between an inclusive national citizenship and the exclusionary disbursement of rights and responsibilities along religious, sexual,
ethnic, gender and racial divisions. In these cases, citizenship manifests as a sort of exclusionary nationalism (Keller 2014).

The idea of bifurcated citizenship or multiple layers of citizenship parallel to and clashing with one another in socio-political life is prominent in African political discourses on citizenship (Ndegwa 1997). An example of such bifurcation is Peter Ekeh’s (1975) ‘two publics’ thesis which advances the notion of simultaneously belonging to two types of political communities, which often make contradictory ethical demands of citizens. The institutional legacy of colonialism in Africa was the creation of two bases for citizenship – one civic and determined by the state, the other primordial and delineated by one’s community usually conceived of in ethnic terms. While civic citizenship is distinctly amoral and a site of passive entitlement, ethnic citizenship is treated as the reservoir of moral obligation, often encouraging a parasitic relationship to the civic public.

Mamdani’s (1996) text also reflects on bifurcated citizenship as a colonial legacy whereby race and ethnicity were mobilised in the construction of citizenship. It helps explain the continued salience of ethnic identity in postcolonial nation building. The politicisation of ethnic identity continues to shape struggles for inclusion and exclusion where decolonisation has been incomplete in terms of the de-racialisation and de-ethnicisation of the state. While a helpful framework, the citizen–subject dichotomy has been criticised for its failure to reflect substantive internal variation within these categories, for example, gender as a factor that effects qualitative differences in experiences of citizen-ness and subjecthood (Hunter 2016). In relation to citizenship and nation building, it may lead one to a default assumption that ethnic identity is necessarily conflictual with national identity and democratisation, a view that is empirically contested (Keller 2014: 7). Moreover, the framework fails to explain reasons why tribal identities become the vehicles for political action (Smith 2013: 34–5). For an example of such an explanation, one could refer to Kandeh’s (1992) account of the colonial politicisation of ethnicity to accentuate the conflict potential of Mende and Temne identity in Sierra Leone.

The salience of ethnicity in the construction of citizenship in Africa can be used to intervene in another aspect of the locus of citizenship. It has been posited that citizenship as group as opposed to individual rights captures the African political imagination (Ake 1987, 2000; Davidson 1992; Nyamnjoh 2005; Mutua 2008). This is often grounded in ontological claims around African conceptions of personhood as socially emergent and communal (Mbiti 1970; Menkiti 1984; Gyekye 1998; Nyamnjoh 2004, 2017). However, contrary to this as it relates to citizenship, Isimonah (2016) critiques the ethnic language of rights in Nigeria on the basis of the reification of ethnicity, making a case for
universal citizenship as opposed to group-differentiated rights in the process. A different critique of group rights comes from Ethiopia, where Gofie (2016) shows how the formal recognition of difference is reified by the state and is instrumentalised in the exercise of state power to foreclose possibilities for meaningful citizenship.

Some of the most widely discussed practices of exclusionary nationalism in Africa include autochthony, xenophobia and the weaponisation of indigeneity in an ever-unfolding politics of origin (Bøås and Dunn 2013). This has been discussed in many countries across the continent (Geschiere, Nyamnjoh and Socpa 2001; Nyamnjoh 2006; Geschiere 2009; Neocosmos 2008, 2010; Banegas and Marshall-Fratani 2007; Nzongola-Ntala 2007; Balaton-Chrimes 2016; Yéré 2016; Naicker 2016). As a marker of belonging and practice of citizenship, autochthony complicates the nation state and national identity as the locus of citizenship, for the nation is being reconfigured along increasingly narrow lines. Meaning ‘born of the soil’ the term equates socially constructed notions of authenticity with belonging, unfolding as a nervous affair fraught with contradictions in which the circles of belonging are ever diminishing (Geschiere 2009: 2; Nyamnjoh 2007). Its distinct characteristic is the creation of ethnic strangers excluded from rights, resources and the powers and prerogatives of political office; and reflects a more malignant form of struggles for group-differentiated rights that translate into the primacy of autochthones over strangers (Geschiere, 2009).

Ethnicity and autochthony have been prominent in debates around the continued salience of the nation state as the lens through which to view citizenship. Often presented as a paradox of globalisation, one question that arises is whether these practices of exclusionary nationalism signal the erosion of the nation state, pointing to the ethnic as opposed to the state–civic public as the locus of citizenship. In response, it is argued that rather than dispensing with the state altogether, these struggles for inclusion and exclusion remain exercised within the terrain of state. Therefore, at the intersection of citizenship and ethnicity is a process of postcolonial state formation in and of itself (Geschiere 2009, Mbembe 2001), where the construction of political community in the institutional form of a nation state is carried out along narrow and exclusivist lines. This underscores a general tenacity of the nation state as basic structure against which global developments emerge and develop (Bayart 2007).

Furthermore, practices such as autochthony have been used to comment on notions like cosmopolitan citizenship. The ephemeral nature of nation states in Africa perhaps shows that the reason cosmopolitanism has considerably more traction in the Euro-America is because of the embeddedness of national citizenship in these regions. So even though national citizenship is being
contested it is still of immense pragmatic importance (Adejumobi, 2005). A different issue is whether or not autochthony can be read as a return to the local in response to the palpable failings of a globalising world to deliver on its promises exemplified by the image of the world as a global melting pot. Geschiere (2009) counters that the mobilities that often constitute identities within discourses of autochthony are themselves a function of global processes. Secondly, when considering some of its key stakeholders, autochthony can be seen as the negotiation of access to global circuits through the instrumentalisation of the social currency embedded in claims to the local/national.

Nyamnjoh (2007) has responded to the rise in claims to autochthony in the context of heightened xenophobia in South Africa and Botswana, highlighting the paradoxical process whereby the purported inclusivity implied in assimilationist discourses of ‘bounded belonging’ is challenged by the inherent contradiction that any discourse of inclusion necessitates those who are excluded. South Africa and Botswana exemplify this tension, as their relative economic success on the continent has manifested in gross inequality. The result is a state of affairs where disaffected nationals, in collaboration with the state, project the cause of the nation’s hardships onto strains caused by immigrants and/or ethnic minorities who are designated as the source of crime, terrorism or the lack of jobs (Nyamnjoh 2007). Whilst ‘flexible citizenship’ has been approached in myriad ways since the 1990s, he argues that academic and political discourses surrounding citizenship and belonging ought to be broadened to ‘flexible citizenship’ as evidence of groups in Africa – like youth groups and women’s movements – who challenge conventional, ‘bounded’ indicators of citizenship informed by, for example, the ‘privileged bases of Western and African masculinities’ (Nyamnjoh 2007: 80). Like Robins et al., Nyamnjoh asserts that conceptions of civic citizenship are exclusionary when used to further drive chauvinistic identities, challenging scholarship to be aware of the contradictions contained in ‘rigid’ and ‘essentialist’ articulations of citizenship, which (a) do not aptly account for the modes of citizenship practised by individuals, but (b) makes everyone ‘a slave of the past in a world pregnant with mobility’ (Nyamnjoh 2007: 79).

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a cursory overview of theoretical and empirical understandings of citizenship in global and African scholarship, identifying three key debates in the process. The first had to do with what the relationship between citizens and political communities ought to look like. What is at stake
here are questions around belonging as passive or active, observable in differing emphases on rights and obligations in theories such as liberal, republican and communitarian citizenship. We argued that these theories are also rooted in ontological and philosophical questions pertaining to the nature of personhood and the relevance of being in society with other humans. In addition, we showed how they generate considerable argument as to whether there is a universal category of citizenship, evident in the notion of differentiated citizenship and a resultant politics of recognition. The second debate is constituted by challenges to the dominance of the nation state as the sole locus of citizenship. Although national citizenship is nonetheless recognised as important, the nation state is continually emphasised as only one of multiple layers of citizenship. We used this second debate as an entry point into Africanist scholarship, where citizenship has functioned as an analytical lens to understand social phenomena such as nation building, state building, conflict, democracy and democratisation. Herein, the idea of multiple layers of citizenship existing parallel to and contesting national identity is prominent in African discourses. In this chapter, the accent given to ethnic identity only exemplifies this multi-layered citizenship. It should not be seen as diminishing other arenas such as gender and religion. If anything, these modes of belonging can equally be used to illustrate the broader argument in this chapter, which is to describe, as a key debate, questions around the exhaustiveness of discursive constructions of citizenship within the paradigm of the nation state. We described the third debate as involving calls to displace the emphasis on rights and responsibilities in understanding citizenship. Instead, it is argued that citizenship should be seen as a set of practices in which subject and community making are embedded.

Bibliography and Recommended Reading


References


Chapter 3

Inclusive Citizenship: Review of Literature

Ayanda Manqoyi

Introduction

This chapter is an overview of scholarship on citizenship in Africa. While scholarly debates on how to constitute citizenship are plenty, this chapter focuses on the group of scholars who approach the issue of citizenship through mobility. Francis Nyamnjoh along with others included here develop categories to help us think through both the implications of exclusionary abstract ideas of citizenship and the efforts to redefine and renegotiate belonging in various communities. By considering these categories I seek to show how the literature in question helps us understand the complexities and problems inherent in conceptualising citizenship through a template that is largely Eurocentric and that has been fine-tuned during the long process of African colonisation. I propose, like these scholars, to take seriously the project of redefining citizenship in Africa. Furthermore, I consider that to take such a project seriously will require a methodological approach that is particularly local: that is based on lived experience, embedded in an examination of local customs, histories, and conceptions of kinship, individuality and community that are contingent and changing. This is my intervention: that if we are to take seriously this proposal, we need to employ a methodology that is based on local realities. What is interesting about these scholars is the examination of citizenship through their positionality, and how this positionality is productive in their selection of examples that are relevant and important to driving the project to redefine citizenship.

These examples of field studies justify why we must redefine citizenship away from the ideas of Enlightenment and universalism. Citizenship is cribbed from Enlightenment thinking and imposed by European colonisers onto African colonised subjects. Individualism is a European ideal. Universalism and the extension of rights from one to ‘all’ has not served African nations or their people. The examples chosen by the scholars upon whom this chapter focuses demonstrate that equal citizenship has not led to social justice, restoring of dignity, and inclusion of difference beyond the ideal. The analysis of citizenship based predominantly on institutional and constitutional agreements does not reveal the complexities of life. What is left out of such an analysis are the
hierarchies and relationship of inclusion and exclusion that intersect with the categories such as geography, ethnicity, race, class, gender and sexuality that determine accessibility of citizenship in real terms (Englund and Nyamnjoh 2004; Alubo 2004; Akyeampong 2006; Nyamnjoh 2017a). This chapter does not merely review the examples used by the scholars but shows how their examples themselves imply a method of redefining citizenship which is both hyper local, and which recognises that even the construction of narratives and their transmissions are shaped by conventions that are decidedly local. This kind of observation, on a methodological level, is not translatable out of the particularity of, for instance, a lived experience and historical context of the Ivory Coast or Botswana (Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Nyamnjoh 2007a). It is this specificity that these scholars suggest should be the guiding principle in compiling national constitutions.

To take on the project to redefine citizenship requires a method that is local and transportable. A research method that is particular to a local context does not mean it cannot be a template. It is not a template that we would propose to impose. What a method with a focus on locality takes seriously is to be historically accurate and taking into account the particularity of lived experience and life histories instead of exporting Enlightenment ideas on abstract citizenship rights extended to individuals whose land was colonised. In seeking to understand and redefine citizenship through the physical as well as social mobility of people and ideas requires looking differently at categories of geography, ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality and class. These groups of scholars suggest that a redefinition of citizenship is applicable and invite us to think collectively about how that redefinition would need to be approached for a particular historical moment and condition (one that is particularly African in the cases they consider) (Nyamnjoh 2017b). But my contention is that the method their project necessitates is one that is importantly accessible and usable by other communities, nations, communes or even neighbourhoods. The need to think collectively is particularly because the method to understand citizenship is local and at the same time transportable. It is from the group of scholars in this chapter that we learn that to take seriously the project to redefine citizenship is to commit to local ways of understanding how belonging is negotiated through a web of relations that connect an individual to the collective. A method based on understanding our positionality in a local context can go a long way to invite scholars and politicians to commit to finding other ways to conceptualise citizenship through mobility.
Mobility and Citizenship

In Africa, as elsewhere, mobility is central to living and understanding the world. As social beings, we have to be mobile. Peter Adey states, ‘Without mobility we could not live. Without mobility we could not get to work or to the nearest source of food, neither could we stay healthy and fit’ (Adey 2017: 1). Mobility is not only a physical concept but a social one as well, which includes values, ideas and material objects. While physical mobility emphasises people and things crossing geographic borders, social mobility involves the movement and flows within social systems which are often taken for granted within the borders of, for example, nation states. Although many would agree with Adey that mobility is essential to life, the indicators of citizenship as they are conferred to ‘autonomous individuals’ are concerned more with physical movement (i.e. mobility that takes place within the nation state) and fail to sufficiently recognise the ways in which mobility is constituted within communities themselves.

For Nyamnjoh (2010a) the rhetoric of rights, dominated as it has been, historically, by Western neoliberal logic, places its emphasis on the individual and ignores the vast alternative understandings of the self in African conceptions of personhood and agency. In particular, he argues that citizenship, narrowly defined as the prescriptions of empowerment and rights of independent individuals, fails to capture mobility as transformative of relationships and accommodative of difference within communities (Nyamnjoh 2010a). Since the permanent settlement of Europeans in Africa, it has been widely accepted that ‘citizenship’ be understood in the Western, Enlightenment sense, as a status that is conferred to all members of a community, by being conferred to each individual. But the critical oversight here, in transferring a European enlightenment value onto an African subject, is the assumption that citizenship status transcends difference and particularity (Young 1989). It is often assumed that the universality of citizenship, in the sense of ‘citizenship for all’, implies that citizenship status transcends particularity and difference. By reviewing fieldwork-based anthropological studies, I join these groups of scholars to argue that thinly defined notions of citizenship as an individual rights project do not capture mobility as transformative of relationships within communities.

The distinctions these boundaries established extended beyond ‘natives’ and ‘Europeans,’ to include differences between ‘native citizens’ and ‘native settlers’ among ethnic communities within a single colony. Such distinctions conceived of the ‘native’ subject and culture (its values, ideals and material objects) as static or immobile, justified the shunting of populations to the edges of socio-economic and juridico-political margins. In rural areas, ‘native’ mobility within a colony was largely restricted to regions that would serve as labour reserves thus doubling up the necessity and practice of communal living. We learn from Kabeer (2002) that those ‘indigenous’ people who were able to move into towns as ‘modern’ citizens experienced restricted mobility, which made it difficult for these ‘indigenous modern’ citizens to establish a sense of home or belonging in towns, even as they had left their rural communities. Given this situation, so-called ‘townsmen’ straddled two positions: they were both modern citizen-subjects in towns, and natives, forced into a cultural system that, by necessity, kept them returning to their native communities to maintain familial and group relationships – but with an experience of modern citizenship and mobility that necessarily had a wholly new effect on the native community (Ngwane 2003). Native communities then had to creatively adapt traditions to allow for new values and objects of modernity, and to effectively domesticate modernity to fit local contexts, and reflect identities specifically constituted between towns and rural countryside (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 1998; Jua 2005). Yet even under such conditions of restricted mobility, citizenship and its conferral of mobility to the marginalised African subject was central to the flourishing of colonial economies and the successful emergence of nation states throughout the continent.

In the book #Rhodes Must Fall: Nibbling at Resilient Colonialism in South Africa, Nyamnjoh (2016) puts forward a question that deserves to be read in full because it situates mobility in relation to the persistent investment in using categories of belonging that are exclusionary and often result in violence:

If mobility is at the very heart of being human and being social, and if contemporary South Africa has come about thanks to the human mobilities, however unequal, of yesteryear, then what do current questions of particular categories of mobility – that of white South Africans (the amakwerekwere, Uitlanders or Europeans colonisers of yesteryear) and that of blacks from Africa north of the Limpopo (present-day amakwerekwere in the eyes of present-day sons and daughters of the native soil) – tell us about claiming and denying belonging as a mobilising force, a form of strategic essentialism and in historical perspective? If boundaries (physical, social, cultural, psychological and otherwise) are made, contested, unmade and remade through human mobility, action, and interaction, how do we
interpret the violence of Rhodes Must Fall and that targeted at black immigrants – be it xenophobia or Afrophobia? What does the insistence by black South Africans (in the academy and suburbs, as well as in townships, informal settlements, and crowded city centres), claiming the bona fide status of sons and daughters of the native soil, on lighting their cigarette from both ends imply? (Nyamnjoh 2016: 229)

Nyamnjoh (2016) argues that the persistence of bounded notions of citizenship and problematic representations of African mobility by Cecil Rhodes and amakwerekwere of European origin reproduced in independent African nation states are at the core of current articulations of citizenship and belonging that end up being zero-sum game in South Africa and throughout the continent. By zero-sum game the author means that if the articulations of authentic belonging were to be taken to the logical end then those minority groups often located in the lower ranks of the social hierarchy might be the unlikely societies remaining in the process of identifying the bona fide sons and daughters of the soil. From Nyamnjoh (2016) we learn a great deal about Rhodes’s ambitions. Cecil Rhodes was a wealthy and powerful amakwerekwere who used violence and oppression to dispossess African populations of their land by effectively transforming them into foreigners. The Rhodes Must Fall protest of March 2015 by youth movements at the University of Cape Town (which later spread throughout universities in the country and world-wide, abroad) brought to the fore questions around the complexities of situating the attributes of being and belonging, where lived experiences – including being confronted daily with symbols (such as the statue of Cecil Rhodes, at the heart of the protests) that glorify and reinforce exclusion, violence, and oppression – are at odds with notions of ‘free’ civic citizenship (Nyamnjoh 2016).

Throughout the world, civic citizenship is challenged as many people seek inclusion by bringing to question the limits of a conservative rhetoric and practices of the nation state. The contested ideals of civic citizenship and its illusions of autonomy, inflexible and ruthlessly exclusionary affirmations of being indigenous have begun to obsess majority and minority communities alike within various states in Africa. Nyamnjoh (2016) draws on local stories in South Africa to indicate the increasing popularity in the use of the ideas of indigeneity to exclude by reputable public figures in South Africa. In May 2002, for instance, according to a popular and controversial song by Zulu musician, Mbongeni Ngema, South African Indians were accused of accumulating wealth by abusing black people to a point that resembled enslavement. In addition, Ngema questioned the loyalty of Indians to South Africa since, similar to black migrant labourers and rural areas, as well as descendants of Cecil Rhodes and the likes, they maintained connections with their countries of ‘origin’. The subtext to the
song was a threat that Indians who refused to change their ways were being singled out as a ‘non-native’ population, and one that risked being rejected South African citizens should they refuse to change their ways (Nyamnjoh 2016). Nyamnjoh (2016) draws on equally controversial political figures as an example to demonstrate how such sentiments remain salient in no small measure due to allegations and evidence of corruption and abuse of government politicians by the Gupta family and their relationship with President Jacob Zuma. Such regressive logic of belonging and citizenship continued against the Gupta family in 2016 by Julius Malema (of the Economic Freedom Fighters – EFF political party) when he threatened the family with practical action if they did not leave the country. Similar to other politicians, various elites and scholars, Malema was no stranger to calling upon bounded notions of citizenship with the intention of excluding certain groups and people. But most recently Jacques Pauw (2017), in *The President’s Keepers*, reveals the potential predatory forms of citizenship that implicate the Gupta family and the use of wealth and power to claim belonging, mainly in order to carry out government deals that are alleged to be corrupt. If anything, the manipulation of the concept of citizenship raises questions around how South African Identity Documents (ID) – now moving from paper form to digital card system – were issued to members of the Gupta family. The granting of ID documents to undeserving foreigners suggests a privileging of the wealthy and connected, and even the potential of illegitimate business operations at the expense of other new citizens who truly contribute to the well-being of their ‘new home’. As a permanent work in progress, a nuanced understanding of citizenship takes seriously flexible relationships that require more sensitivity than often afforded. But it is exclusionary politics based on bounded citizenship that continues instead to permeate the continent.

As a reference to the particularity of South Africa, it is worthwhile to return to Julius Malema of the EFF as an example of the growing trends in the politics of exclusionary citizenship and narrow nationalism among politicians in the new South Africa (Nyamnjoh 2016). Leading up to his expulsion from the African National Congress (ANC) on 29 February 2012, Malema gained popularity as the figure privileging the rhetoric of exclusion and underplaying the envisioned social cohesion of all peoples in the concept of the ‘rainbow nation’. For Malema, white South Africans, descendants of Cecil Rhodes and Paul Kruger as *amakwerekwere* of yesteryear are the enemies within. White South Africans themselves carrying a history of exclusion when in Rhodes’s day Afrikaners were *amakwerekwere* who felt sufficiently indigenised to refer to the more recent arrivals of British immigrants to South Africa in the making as *uitlanders*. However, Nyamnjoh (2016) laments that even those seemingly obvious outsiders are able to transform those with indigeneity into foreigners within the
same state. In March 2012, Helen Zille, leader of the Democratic Alliance referred to people from the Eastern Cape Province coming to the Western Cape Province (where she was premier) as ‘refugees’ thus making reference to forms of undesirable mobility. But what remains a continuous point of contest and questioning by those claiming indigeneity to South Africa is whether Zille as a white woman and a descendant of amakwerekwere of yesteryear with a status as somewhat an outsider within will ever become an insider (Nyamnjoh 2016).

**Historical genealogy of citizenship in Africa**

Citizenship as a status that fundamentally permits or bounds a subject’s mobility, and the emergence of the nation-state, has served as much to exclude people or communities as it has served to include them. Kabeer’s (2002) genealogy of citizenship is useful to understand its origin and the ideas that informed its applicability in colonies. In what is commonly known as the feudal West, in particular in the ancient city-states of Athens, Medieval Europe and Britain, the conferral of citizenship gave rise to notions of ‘community’ as a group bounded by geography, of individual consciousness through rigid distinct identities, and to gendered private property and social rights (Kabeer 2002: 2). The concept and application of citizenship in the ‘new’ World (i.e. in the United States of America) required more practical definitions to operationalise various forms of exclusion in relation to gender, as well as race. As Kabeer (2002) explains that in discussing exclusionary citizenship in America, where inherited feudal privilege did not exist: ‘Justification for exclusion took on a more primordial form when rights were bound up with socially-ascribed identities such as those of race and gender’ (Kabeer 2002: 3). The exclusion of white women and the black population (women and men) from civil and political rights restricted them to household chores and confined them to secluded locations, creating non-citizens with restricted mobility both within and between nation states.

Those Western nations with more advanced technologies (such as ships) for mobility across continents faced various challenges in establishing colonies that based belonging of indigenous people on Eurocentric ideas of citizenship (Mamdani 1996). In order to establish indirect rule in Africa, the British Empire constructed boundaries in terms of geography and interpretation of a way of life that broke the fluidity of local cultural social processes. (Bose and Jalal in Kabeer 2002: 4). The main aim of constructing boundaries of space was to establish separate ‘communities’, each with separate traditions and customs accompanied by separate civil rights often realised at the margins of a civil society. Tensions within and between the colonised groups were exacerbated by the unequal terms
of interaction with representatives of the colonial powers. As a consequence, Kabeer states that ‘political power was absorbed into the centralised state apparatus of colonial rule that replaced the diffused and diversified political arrangements that had existed previously’ (Kabeer 2002: 5).

Boundaries in Africa that were constructed by the colonial powers along with the way those boundaries reified the customs and traditions had two important effects. First, they have filtered into lived experiences. Secondly, the same colonial boundaries have become the basis for independence of most African countries. Such rigid colonial construction of geography, space and time continues to influence state citizenship and to deny flexible mobility in the postcolonial and democratic era. African countries with rigid ideas of state citizenship are experiencing increasing conflict. But these conflicts arising from citizenship based on rigid indicators such as, for instance, the principles of autochthony in Nigeria and ethnicity in Kenya are all too familiar (Diouf 2003; Kagwanja 2005). South Africa too often shifts betwixt and between lineage and ethnicity when operationalising the notions of African foreigners (Nyamnjoh 2016).

**Bounded Citizenship of the nation-state in Africa**

While South Africa often regards its bounded citizenship as an exceptional one on the African continent, the truth is that it faces tensions and conflict that are no different from any other country in Africa that bases belonging to a nation on bounded citizenship. Post-apartheid South Africa, just like any other country in Africa that bases belonging to a nation on bounded citizenship experiences tension and conflict. It comes as little surprise that with accelerated mobility in Africa, uncertainty and tensions around unemployment, foreigners and immigration have also increased among host communities often producing tensions encouraged by exaggerating difference (Nyamnjoh 2006; 2007b). Even though such differences exist, it is in no small measure that media, politicians and scholars have ignored historical immigration patterns and their benefits for recipient states. Minority ethnicity is ignored by researchers of the nation state and the tendency for such studies in Africa often focuses on large-scale ‘civic’ citizenship, whose juridico-political basis is uncritically taken to be more inclusive than the cultural basis of ethnic citizenship (Mamdani 1996). What is missing in these narratives, Nyamnjoh (2007b) argues, are the success stories of forging new relationships of understanding between citizens and subjects that are suggestive of a new, more flexible, negotiated cosmopolitan and popular forms of citizenship with the emphasis on inclusion, conviviality and the celebration of difference (Nyamnjoh 2007b).
In African countries where accelerated mobility and increased uncertainty lead to tensions, the media is yet to shift focus from large-scale and territorially bounded forms of belonging to capture the lived experiences of those affected as a result of ethnicity, race, gender and geography (Nyamnjoh 2010a). As Nyamnjoh (2005a) states, ‘No amount of questioning by scholars, human rights advocates, and immigrants immersed in the reality of flexible mobility seems adequate to de-essentialise the growing global fixation with an “authentic” place called home’ (Nyamnjoh 2005a: 2). While legal rights are often extended to migrants and racial and ethnic minorities, the difficulties of claiming these rights are often related to exclusion as social members in local and national communities where access to such rights is contingent (Basok 2004; Nyamnjoh 2006; Kweka 2017). Countries in Africa such as South Africa and Botswana consist of hierarchies and dichotomies in citizenship that are structured according to race, ethnicity, gender, class and geography. Nyamnjoh affirms that the state immigration services, along with various media outlets and broadly the public, tends to focus narrowly on race and geography with certain implications. These institutions and parts of the public are overly critical of black migrants from the rest of Africa (Nyamnjoh 2006). By taking seriously the importance of race, ethnicity, class, gender and geography, more grounded questions can be constructed that go further toward understanding globalisation, mobility, xenophobia and citizenship in the 21st century. In the instance of labour in Africa, the practices of nation-state immigration services are informed by categories of race, ethnicity, gender, class and geography. For South Africa and Botswana, the degree of a labourer’s mobility and his or her acceptance by immigration authorities varies tremendously between, for instance, female black Zimbabwean maids and female white Zimbabwean farmers (Nyamnjoh 2007a, 2010b). From the ethnographic fiction titled ‘Intimate Strangers’ (Nyamnjoh 2010b) we learn that whereas the white female farmer looking for work opportunities would easily be granted citizenship; the female black Zimbabwean would likely be discriminated against. But that same black female Zimbabwean maid’s mobility is also far more restricted than a black male’s would be, was he seeking employment far and beyond his home. Through anthropological studies, we are better able to understand the various forms of the injustice of collective exclusion taking place, despite the popular rhetoric that claims the rights of women are constitutionally protected as ‘independent citizens’. For it is ethnographic evidence related to the problematic nation-bound concept of citizenship in South Africa and Botswana in the context of accelerated globalisation, that demonstrates how maids, as dependent citizens and immigrants, endure devaluation and dehumanisation (Nyamnjoh 2005 and 2010b). Within the context of ‘rights talk’ and its ‘emancipatory’ rhetoric, more
attention must be given to locality and its related meanings and practices that arbitrarily (or preferentially) offer citizenship for some while precluding others.

**Citizenship and Autochthony**

Where citizenship is defined in local terms, nation building, as an ideal, is achieved by the ideological opposition of the autochthons and the *alloëne* (strangers), often by means of the active support of national politicians (Geschiere and Jackson 2006, Geschiere 2011). The emergence of forms of exclusion and inclusion as politicised identity issues form a symbolic order that undergirds national integration (Jua 2005; Alubo 2008 and 2011; Kweka 2017). For many African states created under colonial rule, the construction of urban communal spaces – in the tradition of the Roman forum or Athenian market place – where citizens were expected to gather to express their grievances or concerns as a performance of civic society and civil rights, was often completely contrary to the communal practices of African subjects under traditional structures and hierarchies. Even in the early stages of colonial nation building, where citizenship was characterised and enacted by the mobility of the ‘modern’ African citizen’s ‘emancipatory’ movement from rural society to urban, African people faced various forms of oppression and exclusion. They experienced what Jua (2005) calls ‘double hegemony’ as citizen-subjects incapable of attaining full citizenship (Jua 2005: 102). Postcolonial cities in Africa remain today spaces of uncertainty for people as citizens. Citizenship in many states is understood as an effect of state action, standing in passive relationship to the state. In this sense, the state is perceived as a pre-existing form or container of society and social relationships which lead, naturally, to a society’s creation of a substantive definition of the good, as conceptualised and examined within its own fixed, spatial boundaries (Agnew 1994 and 1999). The consensual definition of the good in multicultural societies involves a process of sorting identifications that is so exacting it excludes collective identity. A citizen, in this sense, becomes a form of identification, a type of political identity. The citizen is constructed rather than empirically constituted. Emphasis on the construction of a citizen becomes part of the hegemonic process, which is continuously contested (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 1998; Kabeer 2002; Alubo 2004; Jua 2005; Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Alubo 2011).

The uncertainty of citizenship and phenomenon whereby certain urban citizens continue to maintain relationships with their places of origin and the rural community is a specific trait of urbanisation in Africa (Magubane 1973; Geschiere and Gugler 1998; Daloz and Chabal 1999; Ngwane 2001, 2003). In Africa, the extent of the continued connection between city and countryside,
coupled with the worsening economic crisis and corruption, has made illusive the benefits formerly realised through lucrative networks of patronage (Mbembe 1992; Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998). Drawing on the Cameroonian context, Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (1998) reveal that it is often elites as aspiring politicians who were left out of previously enjoyed benefits through networks of patronage who draw on ‘home’ villages (including townships) collectively to demand a share of the national economic wealth. By reaffirming their rural roots and drawing on the rhetoric of representation, they position themselves as ‘spokesmen’ for their people. In this way, the urban elites and their newly formed parties engender forms of participatory democracy. Hence the process of democratisation takes the form of aggressive and often violent struggles concerning who ‘really’ belongs and who is a stranger or outsider. Focus shifts from differentiation by national identity to the local sphere of identity. Citizenship, in this context, is defined more in local terms as the politics of belonging, via the ideological opposition between autochthons and allogène (strangers) (Geschiere 2011). However, the urbanites’ relationship with their rural ‘home’ is marked in practice by a deep ambivalence. For, on the one hand, those from the city must balance political or economic interests with moral aspirations, such as wanting to be buried alongside their umbilical cord (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 1998). On the other hand, there exists a continued suspicion by the people at home of the riches amassed in the city. Ethnographic literature on ‘witchcraft’ in relation to inequalities where citizenship is defined locally within urban–rural relationships has provided great insight and has also encouraged a more flexible and empirically sensitive reformulation of citizenship (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 1998; Geschiere 1997; Nyamnjoh 2005; Golooba-Mutebi 2005).

**Gender and Sexuality of Citizenship**

Contemporary understandings of gender and sexuality beyond prevalent conventions provide grounds for an urgent reformulation of citizenship with inclusive frameworks that reflect new, more flexible forms of family orientation, diverse sexualities, gender neutrality, and with emphasis on the celebration of difference. In some African states’ contestations to the myth of ‘universal citizenship’ have emphasised the necessity of understanding citizenship as contextual where, for instance, as feminist theorists argue, ‘all citizenship is sexual citizenship’ (Van Zyl 2009). Scepticism over the narrowly defined notion of individual rights evinces the inability of such citizenship, even when constitutionally enshrined, to both respond to social and economic needs while maintaining citizens’ respectability and dignity. Although more ethnographic
studies of gender are necessary, evidence reveals categories of women and those regarded as strangers and excluded from citizenship, exemplified in countries such as Tunisia (Amri and Ramtohul 2015). In addition to differences between genders, intra-gender relationships also reveal further dichotomies and hierarchies in citizenship and belonging, such as is seen in Jacques Tshibwabwa Kuditshini’s (2014) work in the context of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Whether revealing the subsumption of sexuality under reproductive rights that lays bare the heteronormative history that pathologised queer sexualities as a particularly European import to Africa, issues of mobility with regard to gender and sexuality have transformed the way that sex and sexuality are delineated and understood. Contrary to the unproblematised, essentialist notion of ‘indigenous’ knowledge, Van Zyl argues that research on sexualities in Africa actually affirms the heterogeneity of precolonial, as well as postcolonial sexual practices – ‘and where it could be argued that homophobia, and not homosexuality, is a colonial import, therefore, it is homophobia which is “un-African”’ (Van Zyl 2009: 369).

While national constitutions such as South Africa’s boast that they are progressive in the protection of women’s rights, same-sex relationships, and sexual diversity, there has been silence regarding the lived experiences of victims exposed to the violent injustices of collective exclusion upon which claiming such rights are dependent (Nyamnjoh 2007a). Contrary to concepts of globalisation and cosmopolitanism, which suggest accelerated mobilities of people and ideas, citizenship remains hierarchical, inegalitarian and hetero-patriarchal. As with notions of belonging, essentialist and rigid notions of gender and sexuality continue to face opposition by activists, while scholarly and political studies fail to include the voices of those whose mobilities complicate accepted norms of family and sexual orientation (Amadiume 1998; Mama 2001; Van Zyl 2009; Gqola 2006 and 2015). Sociological and anthropological accounts are better placed to bring attention to local context and to the meanings and practices that make citizenship possible for some more than others. As the examples presented so far demonstrate, civic citizenship in Africa remains exclusive for nationals and non-nationals and is further complicated by unconventional forms of gender and sexuality, even while national constitutions profess to have enshrined individual rights. In the 21st century, which is marked by various forms of mobility and flexible relationships and identities, the lived experience of gender and sexuality that challenge ‘established’ definitions provides grounds for urgent reformulation of citizenship (Oyéwumi 1997; Amadiume 1998; Gondola 1999; Mama 2001; Abbas and Ekine 2013; Gqola 2006 and 2015). Ever-expanding frameworks of citizenship, opposed to the ever-diminishing circles of inclusion against which Nyamnjoh famously warns,
must celebrate difference, whether it occur in the form of normative gender, alternative sexuality or a wholly new gender identity.

**Youth and Citizenship**

In the last three decades most literature, media and public policy, have perceived African youth as a socio-economic problem to be solved (Seekings 1996) and excluded from realising full citizenship. As victims of unemployment and structural exclusion (and broadly, poverty, war and disease), African youth are characterised by international and local development agencies as people with no agency and in need of rescue (Warnier 1996; Diouf 2003; Fokwang 2008). As perpetrators, such youth are often depicted as criminals, mercenaries or as desirous of new political power (Utas 2003, 2012; Fuh 2012). Whether portrayed as ‘victims’ or ‘perpetrators’ youth have long been targeted for social intervention and have become scapegoats in the politics of generational conflicts (Kagwanja 2005). With young people making up the majority of the African population at present, they increasingly contest the way in which citizenship is defined in exclusionary terms. These young people are often perceived as lost in the transition to adulthood, distracted by materialist and conspicuous modern consumerism (Steenkamp et al. 2011; Bordonaro and Payne 2012; Jones 2013).

The continued depiction of young people as stuck-in-the-middle, unemployed and mired in youth-related frustration has led scholars such as Fokwang (2008) to refer to these pathways to establish economic and social stability as ‘ambiguous transitions’. Put differently, young people are placed in ‘liminality’ (Turner, Abrahams and Harris 2017), a mode of being that locates youth as everywhere and nowhere at the same time. As a consequence, even though youth represent the majority of the African population, they are approached as a minority, often marginalised and excluded from participation and decision making on policies related to social and economic affairs that impact individual lives and communities. Accordingly, their position as incomplete citizens comes as no surprise. Through structural exclusion, young people are often used as instruments to secure adult accumulation, as seen in the roles played by politicians and international organisations that approach them as objects of experimentation, ‘only fit to be acted upon rather than acting’ (Fuh 2012). In this manner, although youth are promising as economic producers and valuable contributors to community development, there is a relentless habit of viewing them as consumers. Honwana (2012) refers to this period of delay between childhood and adulthood as a condition of ‘waithood’. On the one hand, young people are no longer children in need of care, but on
the other hand, they are still unable to become independent adults. Yet even in waithood, youth are not passive victims; instead they are dynamic and use their agency and creativity to invent new forms citizenship of being and interacting with society (Dhillon and Yousef 2011; Honwana and De Boeck 2005; Honwana 2012; Fuh 2012).

Diouf (2003) affirms that young Africans create spaces of socialisation that demonstrate the difference, either on the borders of society or at the centre, at the same time victims and active agents, and geographically mobile in ways that elude the limits of the national territory. Even with difficult circumstances that force some of Africa’s youth to be trapped within critically mobile situations, many turn the uncertainty into dreams, and in the process recast themselves as communal citizens (Gondola 1999). Cellular phones and social media platforms have become important instruments for creating and facilitating dreams that enable relationships to be negotiated with communities. During the process of creating something from very little, enabled by cheaper access to information communication technologies, young people at times are able to change both their own futures and their communities (Diouf 2003). Scholars such as Diouf and Gondola demonstrate that an understanding of contested, negotiated and flexible relationships that reflect the lived experiences of youth requires the reformulation of citizenship as unbounded and constantly negotiated by society (Dhillon and Yousef 2011; Honwana and De Boeck 2005; Honwana 2012; Fuh 2012). Anthropological research on youth in Africa have shown how, in great contrast to the stereotypes we have produced and reproduced over decades, youth find ways to constitute citizenship as individuals who are connected to interrelationships embedded in the community and increasingly facilitated through adoptions of new technologies in novel ways.

Technologies of Citizenship

The progress in Information Communication (ICTS) has produced tremendously increased flows of capital (Appadurai 2000). Yet mobility as global citizens has become increasingly restricted and confined, particularly for people from African nation states. While capital has expanded and rationalised new markets by seeking out the cheap and efficient production locations made possible by ICTs, the tightening of immigration conditions in the West and other potential centres of accumulation reveals the unequal opportunities afforded to labour coming from Africa (and broadly from the global South) (Thomas and Lee 1994; Nyamnjoh 2000). Globalisation, which is often characterised by increased flows of capital and products across borders, has yet to extend the same privilege of movement to migrants. On the contrary,
investment in technologies devoted to controlling and freezing mobility excludes migrants from Africa and makes it nearly impossible to realise global citizenship. For instance, obtaining citizenship in Japan has historically been extremely difficult. But with a declining population, Japan is increasingly pressured to confront its resistance to taking in outsiders. For Dr Sacko, an African-born Japanese citizen who became the first non-Japanese born University President, allowing outsiders to enter Japan as workers and dignified citizens stands to enable Japan’s self-preservation. Drawing on his personal experiences, having lived in China and Japan, Dr Sacko states that outsiders offer a broader understanding of the cultures of host communities. Such an understanding calls for flexible citizenship and acceptance of potential contribution by outsiders towards achieving goals as a community, national and global sphere (The New York Times 2018).

As Amin (1997) affirms, global capitalism has been more invested in creating autocratic powers in many African states after independence in order to ensure unrestricted access to the peripheries. The inability of African states to do more than yield to unequal global accumulation by the West, results in local contestations and conflicts that have culminated in violence and in some instances genocide under a politics of autochthonous citizenship. It has been widely reported how the powerhouses of global capitalism, in seeking to create an environment of predictable profits, have aided states and governments to neutralise opposition to their unpopular neoliberal policies that deepen poverty (Nyamnjoh 2000; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Owusu 2003; Ferguson 2006; Osuoka and Zalik 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). Instead of providing technologies that enable inclusive citizenship, international institutions have helped finance and support biometric inventions that facilitate and constrain opposition mobility. Even prior to the rise of a fascist regime development of biometric technologies such as fingerprints and digitised identity cards have been required particularly for Africans. For instance, The Guardian (2017) reported a decline of migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Italy due to the Libyan Coast Guards’ use of various technologies of citizenship identification.

Drawing on Bamenda Grassfielders, Nyamnjoh (2005b) demonstrates how new information and communications have further enabled and facilitated Nyongo (the zombification to various family obligations) where modern conveniences and inconveniences converge. With new information and communication technologies, Grassfielders in Cameroon for example, come to know about faraway places and what they may offer. While technological advances have enabled many to seek opportunities far from their birthplaces in distant lands and virtual spaces, at the same time, these technologies ‘multiply
opportunities both for accountability and opportunism’ (Nyamnjoh 2005b: 243). *Nyongo*, like the black tax in South Africa, refers to a world of abundance, but one that comes at a price: the humanity of those sacrificed to slave away as zombies, and the risk of disharmony with the home village. A double exploitation – by ‘home of origin’ and ‘home of refuge’ – generates critical discourse around a complaint of helplessness and a wish for more flexible ideas of what it means to feel at home (Nyamnjoh 2005b). Those in the diaspora, more successful than their families and friends at home, can also be accused of practising *Nyongo* by means of technologies and information that enable them to regain agency in negotiating ways of being and belonging. The emphasis, therefore, is not on victimhood but rather on outlining the contradictions involved in inhabiting spaces that call upon the images of *Nyongo*.

Information Communication Technologies have been central in mobilising youth movements. Social media such as Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter offer the ability to mobilise horizontal spontaneous actions evident for instance during the #RMF and #FMF protests at universities across South Africa in 2015. Contesting established forms of exclusion embedded in apartheid history, students’ immediate demands were informed by two larger, long-term desires shared among many protesters, for free higher education and the redress of stark racial disparities that persisted in the sector. Indisputably, South African universities remain racially stratified. Those that catered to whites during apartheid continue to benefit from this legacy: the top South African performers in international rankings hail from this group. Often, they remain racially unintegrated in all but name. They still have more resources than their formerly ‘black’ competitors, and their faculty and student demographics skew disproportionately white. No less insidious, university curricula nationwide reflect a Eurocentric view of the world. In the social sciences, for example, the study of Western theorists and methodologies dominates undergraduate and postgraduate courses. Even where African scholars and approaches are considered, students complain that they are debated through the lens of Western academia, rather than the perspectives and concerns of black South Africans.

Protesters rejected attempts from the top to impose bureaucratic structures to channel their demands because they feared that these processes would neutralise their calls for change. At the same time, the inability to negotiate inclusively through social media group chats and Facebook pages influenced their refusal for engagement resulting in an obstacle to the creation of a structured grassroots dialogue that could have provided long-term direction to their actions. The use of social media by ‘fallists’ was also instrumental in manipulating and manoeuvring technologies and opportunities to level accusations against fellow members, thus reinforcing distrust and exclusion.
from the movement based on race, gender, class and sometimes ethnicity. This
demonstrates that while technologies of citizenship in the form of new
information and communication may empower through mobilisation and
expression of discontent towards nation states and institutions, they can likewise
exclude by drawing on established tropes of race, gender, class, ethnicity and

**Contribution of Flexible Citizenship in the 21st Century**

The future of citizenship in Africa and globally depends on recognising that
rights, articulated in abstraction and without obligation, amount to very little.
Throughout the world, civic citizenship as exclusive and rife with chauvinistic
identities is being successfully challenged, as multitudes (ranging from women’s
movements to diasporas to youth movements and cultural communities large
and small) clamour for inclusion by challenging the myopia implicit in the
conservative juridical-political rhetoric and practices of nation states. In Africa,
youth movements that mobilise though social media (such as North Africa’s
Arab Spring and South Africa’s RMF) have been involved in contesting,
challenging and renegotiating the exclusionary basis of citizenship that has
fuelled conflicts over belonging and representation (Honwana 2012, 2013;
Ahmari and Weddady 2012; Branch and Mamphilly 2015).

Women’s movements are equally active throughout the continent,
challenging the indicators of citizenship narrowly informed by the privileged
biases of Western and African masculinities (Amony and Baines 2013). There is
a clear need to reconceptualise citizenship in ways that create political, cultural,
social and economic space for excluded nationals and non-nationals alike, both
as individuals and collectivities. Such inclusion is best guaranteed by a flexible
citizenship (Ong1999; Nyamnjoh 2007b; Isin 2012) unbounded by race,
ethnicity, class, gender or geography, and that is both conscious and critical of
the hierarchies that make a mockery of the juridico-political regime of
citizenship provided by the coercive illusion of the nation state. In this fluid and
open-ended idea of citizenship, space should be created for this articulation at
different levels, from the global to the most local or autochthonous, from the
ethnic to the civic, and from the individual to the collective.

Just as cultural, economic and social citizenship are as valid as juridico-
political citizenship, so collective, group or community citizenship is as valid as
individual citizenship, and should be claimed at every level, from the small-scale
local level to the mega-scale global level. The ideas of corporate, digital,
electronic, cyber, global, itinerant and related claims to citizenship are easily
understandable and can be accommodated under the framework of flexible
citizenship. The emphasis should be on the freedom of individuals and communities to negotiate inclusion, to withdraw, and remain included but with total flexibility and reversibility of belonging in consonance with their realities as repertoires, melting pots, mosaics or straddlers of various identity margins.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have outlined an overview of scholar researching citizenship in Africa through the prism of mobility. These scholars help us think through the implications of exclusionary notions of citizenship. The literature reveals the efforts people make to redefine belonging in different contexts. By providing categories to think through, the literature assists us to better understand the complexities and problems inherent in conceptualising citizenship through Western and colonial ideals. Just like these scholars, I take seriously the project of redefining citizenship. The chapter has shown that to take such a project seriously needs a methodological approach that is particularly local. However, to state that a method must be particularly local does not mean that it cannot be transportable. Rather it invites us to think collectively with individuals and communities. The project to redefine citizenship is an invitation to take seriously the transformative nature of relationships through flexible mobility.

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Introduction

It is often said that the modern Western model of the human subject is an autonomous rational one that laid the foundation for such conceptions as human rights, state sovereignty and the progress of human history. Critics have long argued that this modern conception of the human subject and its equation with the citizen lead to the deprivation of citizenship from those who are regarded as insufficiently autonomous or rational.

Since the 1980s, efforts have been made by international relations (IR) scholars to search for a more human-centred IR paradigm that goes beyond the logic of inclusion and exclusion embedded in modern conceptions of humanity, citizenship and nation states. These scholars have called for the referent object of security to be ‘deepened’ from the state to the individual and for the notion of security to be ‘broadened’ to include such issues as repression, poverty, environmental degradation, gender injustice and social exclusion. The term ‘human security’ was first articulated as part of this revision of the idea of security. At the same time, such IR scholars have expected global civil society to overcome the limitations of the modern state-based concept of citizenship, believing that civil society can transcend state sovereignty by forming universal norms from the bottom up and contribute to the realisation of human-centred cosmopolitan ethics, thereby serving human security.1 Concerted efforts have been made among scholars and practitioners alike to reframe conceptions of the human subject and citizenship, both at the level of theory and at the level of the everyday practices of policy making. The human-centred, rights-based approach has also contributed to the erosion of classical principles of humanitarian aid and the accompanying emergence of what has been termed the ‘new humanitarianism’.

The main purpose of this chapter is to critically examine conceptions of the human subject and citizenship in the era of human security and global civil society. Alongside efforts to reconceptualise the human subject and citizenship, there developed an increasing volume of analysis criticising this reconceptualisation. This chapter first reviews the existing critical literature on
conceptions of the human subject and citizenship in the last few decades, introducing two schools of thought.

The first school claims that the idea of the human in ‘human security’ is the same as the modern liberal prototype of an autonomous rational subject, and it therefore carries with it the same problem found in the modern conception of citizenship. The second school contends that the human security approach entails the erosion of the classical conceptualisation of the citizen as an autonomous rational subject. Adherents of this school point out that once the rational capacity for choice making is denied to the human subject, there is no basis for liberal representative political and legal theory, leading to a hollowing out of such concepts as citizenship.

The chapter then looks at the ‘peace and justice’ debate in the period between 2004, when the International Criminal Court (ICC) began intervening in the Ugandan situation, and 2006, when the Juba peace process started between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The views on the human subject and citizenship that were articulated in this debate are described, and the actions taken by the self-proclaimed global civil society are scrutinised. The chapter argues that what was articulated in these actions and discourses can be understood to be the vulnerable neoliberal (or post-liberal) subject critically reflected on by the above second school of thought. The logic of inclusion and exclusion expressed in the actions taken by the self-proclaimed global civil society is disclosed: citizenship in global civil society in this case is contingent on a person’s acceptance of a supposedly universal norm. The chapter further argues that these recently developed expectations toward global civil society are not a manifestation of a belief in human rationality, but rather can be seen as an embodiment of the decline of collective political subjects and a general disenchantment with politics itself, mainly in societies situated in the Global North.

However, it should be recalled that such degraded conceptions of the human subject and citizenship have not been straightforwardly embraced or reproduced by local actors in Uganda. Rather, these misanthropic ideas seem to have been interpreted, utilised and circumvented by various local actors with differing, and at times hybrid, worldviews and visions of governance. We also need to be aware that while global civil society leaders have projected their vision of the vulnerable subject onto local peoples and pathologised their capacities to think, imagine, know, create and act purposively in the world, such a diminished view of the human was not necessarily shared by the local actors. In fact, it was in most part the local actors who tried to define the good, to develop strategies and set priorities to achieve the good, and to seek multiple legal and political ways to address peace and justice issues in Uganda.
Since citizenship in the global civil society in this case was contingent on a person’s acceptance of supposedly universal norms, those who were included in global civil society were not able to involve themselves substantially in the detailed debate on how to strategically attain peace and justice in Uganda. Instead, it was those who were more detached from global civil society – and whose ability to define the good and act purposively in the world was doubted by external actors – who in fact exhibited the will to think and act ‘agentially’ in the world.²

This case also indicates the need to think outside the box and move beyond simply criticising, deconstructing or resisting the modern conceptions of the self, citizenship and nation states, since such an argument risks affirming the idea of the vulnerable neoliberal subject and results in problematising the agency of populations in the Global South and invalidating them as political actors.³ It is now urgent that we use our ongoing conversation to foment pathways that will enable us to manoeuvre away from this grotesque trap.

Reframing of Human, Citizenship and Humanitarianism

Since the 1980s, and especially since the 1990s, mainstream IR theories such as neorealism and neoliberalism have come under severe criticism for their Western, modern and state-centric assumptions (Devetak 2005; Held 2004). It has been pointed out that IR theories need to be more human-centred and overcome the logic of inclusion and exclusion embedded in the modern conceptions of humanity, citizenship and nation states. For instance, Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler have asserted that we should extend our moral horizons beyond nation-based conceptions of citizenship and shift from an exclusivist ‘us and them’ identity relationship to an internationalist or cosmopolitan ‘we the peoples’ relationship (Dunne and Wheeler 2004). Critics of mainstream IR theories have also asserted that we should ‘place emancipation at the centre of new security thinking’ (Booth 1991: 321). These scholars called for a ‘broadening and deepening of security’, by deepening the referent object of security from the state to the individual and by broadening the notion of security to include issues such as repression, poverty, environmental degradation, gender injustice and social exclusion (Booth 1991; Dunne and Wheeler 2004; Linklater 1982). Such scholarly efforts went hand in hand with the actual broadening and deepening of security and the articulation of the conception of ‘human security’ within policy-making circles. The physical and psychological well-being of Global South populations was given centre stage in this human security discourse, and ownership by and partnership with local actors in developing and implementing international, state and local policies
were deemed imperative. At the same time, a broadening and deepening of security meant that the modalities of underdevelopment became problematised as dangerous and destabilising threats to human security (Duffield 2001).

At the same time, these thinkers and practitioners claimed that more attention should be directed to the formation of international norms and the roles of transnational actors. For instance, Andrew Linklater suggested that new modes of transnational, global, or cosmopolitan citizenship, which would bring insiders and outsiders together to promote their common concern with freedom and equality, were becoming possible in a post-Westphalian society of states (Linklater 1982, 1998). Proponents of this line of thinking began to expect that what could be termed ‘global civil society’ could overcome the limitations of the modern, state-based conception of citizenship, transcend state sovereignty by forming universal norms from the bottom up, and contribute to the realisation of human-centred, cosmopolitan ethics and values, thereby contributing to human emancipation.

In terms of the definition of global civil society, authors tended to equate the term with large-scale international NGOs based in the North. For instance, Dunne and Wheeler (2004) observed that groups such as Amnesty International, Médecins Sans Frontières, the International Red Cross, Oxfam and Save the Children existed to raise the consciousness of the security ‘haves’ about the plight of the ‘security have-nots’. They also embraced the role of these organisations in the formation of international norms:

The best recent examples of this process of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ pressures are the emergence of a new norm banning landmines and the development of the International Criminal Court. Enlightened state leaders were crucial in realizing the normative potential of these ideas. But without the pressure exerted by what Geoffrey Robertson calls the global ‘human rights movement’, it is unlikely that these political projects would have secured the widespread support that they achieved in the society of states. (Dunne and Wheeler 2004: 21)

Large international NGOs such as Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Oxfam and Save the Children quickly adopted this notion of global civil society. They claimed to represent the voices of the world’s security ‘have-nots’ and promoted ideas of emancipation, such as transitional justice, poverty reduction, debt cancellation and arms transfer control in the name of ‘global civil society’, either on their own or by leading transnational NGO networks.

The shift from state-based ideas to human-based ideas also led to the emergence of what is known as the ‘new humanitarianism’ of the 1990s. As has
already been illustrated by a number of authors, the proponents of the new humanitarianism claimed that the old-fashioned, modern, apolitical humanitarian aid based on deontological principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence was naïve and could do more harm than good, making it therefore morally questionable. They called for a shift toward goal-oriented, consequential ethics that are more politically conscious and focus on promoting human rights and contributing to conflict prevention, peace building and sustainable development (Fox 2001; Hendrickson 1998; Macrae and Leader 2001). The neutrality principle of classical deontological humanitarianism was especially denounced, and a new set of ‘human-centred’ principles, including human rights and development, was embraced, effectively blurring the boundary between humanitarian and development aid. In the course of the 1990s, an increasing number of major humanitarian aid organisations, including Oxfam, Save the Children, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Care International, started to adopt the new humanitarianism, while the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to adhere to classical humanitarianism (Brauman 2012).

The sharp division among aid agencies became evident in early 1990s, during the drafting period of the ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief’ (IFRC and ICRC 1994). As has been vividly illustrated by Peter Walker, a former IFRC staff member and one of the main drafters of the 1994 Code of Conduct, the document reflected the sharp division and resulting compromise between the proponents of classical humanitarianism and new humanitarianism (Walker 2005). For instance, the Code of Conduct’s 10 articles incorporated the principles of humanity (Article 1), impartiality (Article 2), and independence (Article 4), but neutrality was not clearly included. Article 3 dealt with the concern of neutrality, but it was ambiguously written, and the document does not have a single reference to the words ‘neutrality’ or ‘neutral’. In addition, a new set of developmental principles was also incorporated, such as respect for local cultures and customs (Article 5), the need to build on local capacities (Article 6), community participation (Article 7), long-term development (Article 8), accountability (Article 9) and the dignity of disaster victims (Article 10) (Hilhorst 2005).

As the new humanitarianism increasingly dominated the debate in the humanitarian aid sector, the arenas of development aid and humanitarian aid converged, and both were expected to address a wide range of threats to human security, including poverty, inequality, social and cultural deprivation, psychological ill-being, environmental degradation, hunger, disease, violence
and repression. A range of development, humanitarian and peace building technologies have been devised to purportedly act on populations to improve their resilience, satisfy basic needs, promote inclusion and ensure the physical and psychological well-being of individuals and communities (Duffield and Waddell 2004).

The Human Subject and Citizenship in Human Security Discourse

While some IR theorists and practitioners championed the reframing of the human subject and citizenship, a large volume of critical literature over such a reframing emerged in the field of IR. The critical literature can be roughly divided into two schools of thought in terms of their perceptions of the reframed conceptions.

The first school claims that the human in ‘human security’ is the same as the modern liberal archetype of the autonomous rational subject, and therefore it carries with it the same problematique as the modern conception of citizenship. This school tends to argue that under such banners as capacity building, civil society development, partnership, ownership and good governance lies the desire to make people in the Global South internalise liberal ideas and values, to discipline Southern individuals and their governments, and to intervene in and supervise the behaviours and decision making of Southern populations. Global civil society is often seen as part of an intricate network of global liberal governmentality. For instance, Abrahamsen (2004) points out that today’s proponents of human security are trying to nurture autonomous, rational and self-disciplined modern citizens and states that can be trusted to govern themselves according to liberal democratic norms. Drawing on liberal ideas that see everyone as equal and entitled to freedom and autonomy, states in the Global South are reframed as agents rather than recipients of aid, and Southern populations are defined as active and free subjects, as informed and responsible actors capable of taking control of their own lives and futures (Abrahamsen 2004: 1460). By emphasising partnerships and ownership, aid agencies place developing countries ‘in the driver’s seat’, assigning them prime responsibility for their own development strategies (Abrahamsen 2004: 1460). Shani also emphasises that concepts such as human security and human development are consistent with the biopolitics of liberal governmentality, which seeks, through the construction of modern, rational and self-interested autonomous individuals, to reduce the great mass of culturally differentiated humanity to ‘bare life’ (Shani 2010, 2012). Marhia (2013: 26–27) also observes that human security reproduces an Enlightenment model of human subjectivity, the universal autonomous, rational subject that functions to suppress those who are
Deemed incapable of achieving rational self-mastery, such as women, colonial subjects, blacks and other minority groups. She observes that human security targets peoples in the developing world, frames them as insufficiently human, and sets the aim of human development and human security as making such less-than-human peoples more human (Marhia 2013: 30). Such a conception gives room to slip into a discourse that more actively and aggressively dehumanises certain categories of people construed as dangerous to ‘our way of life’ in the centres of Western modernity, thus reproducing discourses of difference, such as between ‘us’ in the ‘civilized’ West and the barbaric ‘others’ of the Global South, which effectively creates the continuities between human security and the ‘war on terror’ and reproduces structural inequalities and insecurities (Marhia 2013: 30–32).

Japanese IR scholars and anthropologists often echo this school of thought and tend to claim that the conceptions of the human subject and citizenship embedded in the idea of human security is precisely the same as modern Western conceptions of the human subject and citizenship (Ishikawa, Shibuya and Yamamoto, eds 2012; Nishikida, ed. 2016; Shimizu 2011). Based on such an understanding some of these scholars, especially those in anthropology, focus on the concepts and everyday practices of locals that cannot be fully grasped by such modern conceptions of the human subject and citizenship. Most chapters in this book also seek to problematise or relativise the conception of the modern, autonomous, rational self or to introduce local concepts and situations that fall outside of these modern conceptions.

On the other hand, a leading thinker of the second school of thought, Vanessa Pupavac, points out that today’s human security approach erodes the classical conceptualisation of the citizen as an autonomous rational subject, which formed the premise for modern law and was the prerequisite for democratic rights (Pupavac 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2012). The political ideal of the individual as a mature, autonomous, robust, rational subject has been displaced by a neoliberal model of the self, which depicts a more fluid, vulnerable, emotional, feminised creature who is at risk of harm or dysfunction and requires external support for self-realisation. Under human security discourse, the contemporary subject takes the form of a vulnerable victim who is to be enabled or protected by a third party; this is in contrast to earlier civil rights movements, where subjects empowered themselves. This effectively invalidates the population as political actors while validating the role of external actors and fundamentally questioning the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and the private lives of individual citizens. The role of local institutions thus becomes merely about adapting and administering externally devised policies, and politics loses its raison d’être. Symptomatic of the
problem of the decoupling of populations from policy formulation is the exhortations by external agencies that post-conflict societies take ownership of reconstruction processes. In the curtailment of self-determination, society and the individual citizen are effectively denied their moral capacity for the conceptualisation of the good.

Another leading thinker of the second school, David Chandler, argues that the shift away from state-based power to a ‘human-centred’ approach constitutes the population as a political problem and therefore focuses on the real, everyday lives of individuals and communities and their environments (Chandler 2001, 2009, 2013; Chandler and Reid 2016). In this framework, governance operates on society indirectly, through shaping the inter-subjective processes of societal everyday life itself, rather than through the formal framework of public law in relation to individuals as citizens. This shift reflects our neoliberal understanding of what it means to be human, and of what being human means for our engagement with the world in which we live. In the neoliberal framing, rather than the classical liberal subject emancipating itself through its growth and the transformation of its circumstances, there is no longer the starting assumption of a transformative subject who drives progress and emancipation. In this framing, human rationality is universally degraded and doubted, and the individual is defined as a vulnerable subject with diminished capabilities for autonomy and agency. Once the rational capacity for choice making is denied to the human subject, there is no basis for liberal representative political and legal theory, and concepts such as citizenship are hollowed out and lose their political meaning. This degraded understanding of the subject has transformed and undermined the role and possibilities of politics. The discourse of human development inevitably reduces the status of the subject and limits the horizon of political possibilities.

The new humanitarianism has received express criticism from the second school. Pupavac observes that while classical humanitarianism infantilised the recipient community in international aid, treating them as innocent victims waiting to be saved, the new humanitarianism conceptualises affected communities as being at risk of dysfunction and in need of therapeutic governance to break the vicious cycles of psychosocial dysfunction (Pupavac 2012). Therapeutic assistance is now believed to be able to address the consequences and causes of violence and underdevelopment, and therefore it is deemed to be a basic component of consequential humanitarian aid. Pupavac (2001a) also suggests that the new humanitarianism is a retrogressive move to reprobation and sanctions based on a moral division between the deserving and the undeserving, which could work in inhumane ways by denying humanitarian aid to those who are seen to be undeserving. Chandler (2001) also contends that
rather than supplementing traditional humanitarianism, rights-based new humanitarianism can lead to the ‘ethical’ justification for subordinating universal humanitarian needs to selective political ends.

The argument presented by the second school is in consonance with Foucault-inspired works in other fields of study, such as sociology and philosophy, in which the neoliberal shift in the Global North from the centrality of the state to the importance of society tends to be perceived as grounded on the problematised subject rather than on the classical liberal assumption of the naturalness of the liberal subject (Burchell 1996; Dean 2010; Marquand 2004; Miller and Rose 2008; O’Malley 2004). Pupavac and Chandler generally show that the shift in the conception of the human subject from the autonomous, rational self to the problematised degraded self in the global north has influenced the way Northern actors see themselves and others, including people in the Global South.

One of the notable differences between Pupavac’s and Chandler’s works is the latter’s emphasis on the lack of a sense of mission and purpose on the side of Northern actors in relation to Southern societies (Chandler 2007, 2009). For Chandler, the recent globalisation of politics and the expectation towards global civil society reflects ‘the decline of strategic, instrumental engagement concerned with transforming the external world and the rise of a more atomised politics of self-expression – of awareness, of identity and of values’ (Chandler 2009: 2). As the subject’s capabilities for autonomy and agency are degraded and representational forms of politics decline in Northern societies, Northern political elites face their own crises of subjectivity and political purpose, both domestically and internationally (Chandler 2007). Rather than reflecting the political elite’s confidence in formulating coherent, forward-looking political programmes and determination to engage with and transform the world, the ethical or values-based projection of power in the international sphere (e.g., ethical value-based foreign policy, global civil society) is based on the incapacity of Northern elites to formulate a collective project and their failure to assume political responsibility for taking society forward. Power is still projected internationally, but it is power which increasingly lacks a clear purpose; therefore, this power seeks to engage idealistically rather than practically with the world. This is expressed in the present seemingly contradictory phenomenon wherein political elites all too often express the rhetoric of high moral responsibility (e.g., justice for victims of atrocities, make poverty history, responsibility to protect) in the international sphere but are reluctant to take responsibility for either policy making or policy outcomes. International politics become more inward-looking and solipsistic, and idealised policy declarations of intent are prioritised over long-term strategic policy making, coherent
frameworks for policy planning, or assessment. This also means that what the first school of thought calls ‘global liberal governance’ does not entail a framework of coherent intervention, clear long-term strategic or instrumental aims, or strategic priorities in terms of Southern development and security.

Global Civil Society in the ‘Peace and Justice’ Debate

This section looks back on the history of conflict in northern Uganda and reviews the ‘peace and justice’ debate in the period between 2004, when the ICC began intervening in the Ugandan situation, and 2006, when the Juba peace process began between the government of Uganda and the LRA. It specifically examines the self-proclaimed global civil society’s discourses and behaviour in the ‘peace and justice’ debate. The views of the human subject and citizenship articulated through these discourses and behaviours will be analysed in the following chapter.

In January 1986, the army, led by current president Yoweri Museveni, overthrew Tito Okello’s regime, which was dominated by the Acholi. Absorbing many of the soldiers of the former regime who had fled to the north of the country, a number of anti-government forces were formed. The LRA, led by an Acholi named Joseph Kony, emerged in the late 1980s, and the war between the LRA and the government forces, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), has not come to an end. While claiming that it was fighting for the Acholi, the LRA abducted people, especially Acholis, from northern Uganda and ordered them to commit atrocities against their families and communities. The government forces have also been accused by international human rights organisations of committing atrocities in northern Uganda (HRW 2003).

Therefore, when the newly formed ICC announced its first investigation into the situation following a referral by the government of Uganda, both the LRA and UPDF seemed to be appropriate targets for the court. However, this was met with an unexpected barrage of criticism from the so-called traditional and religious leaders of the most affected Acholi sub-region as well as from local and international aid organisations and researchers (Coalition for Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda 2004; Hovil and Lomo 2005; Rose, Sattarzadeh and Baines 2005). Some voiced concerns that the ICC would be used as a political tool by the Ugandan government, which they alleged wanted to gain international support for its policy of a ‘military solution’ to the conflict. Others argued that the ICC was unlikely to deal with the crimes committed by the government forces and that this would, therefore, worsen the domestic north–south divide that had been created through colonial rule and fuelled much of the country’s post-independence political turmoil. It was also pointed out that
the investigation would complicate any efforts to negotiate with the LRA and might prolong the war and the associated suffering of the people, approximately ninety per cent of whom were by then confined in squalid camps. In addition, many critics vehemently claimed that Acholi traditional justice was more appropriate than the ICC to handle the crimes committed during the conflict. In response to such criticisms, some researchers and international NGOs, especially international human rights NGOs, claimed that it was the ICC, and not the Acholi traditional justice, that would deliver true justice and lasting peace in northern Uganda. As the heated debates continued, the ICC decided to launch a formal investigation in July 2004, and it issued sealed arrest warrants for five senior members of the LRA in July 2005; these were unsealed in October 2005.

Among the large international NGOs that referred to themselves as members of global civil society and claimed to represent the interests and voices of those suffering in Uganda, there were two main groups that reacted to the ICC’s intervention between 2004 and 2006.

One was composed of international human rights NGOs such as AI and HRW, which were the core members of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) during the negotiation process of the ICC Statute and after the ICC was set up. These NGOs acted as de-facto representatives of the global civil society on issues related to the implementation of the ICC Statute, and they were extensively involved in relevant high-level policy debates in New York, The Hague and Global North countries.

The second group comprised international NGOs that were registered with the CICC but were not core members, such as Oxfam and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), which had conducted humanitarian aid projects in the Acholi region and worked jointly with local NGOs on peace advocacy in northern Uganda.

Both groups basically took it for granted that Acholi traditional justice was restorative justice which was based on forgiveness and reconciliation, had no punitive elements and was irreconcilable with the idea of punishment or retributive justice (CSOPNU 2005; HRW 2005). For instance, HRW argued as follows:

A major shortcoming of the traditional reconciliation approach is the tolerance of impunity. The process involves acceptance of perpetrators back into the community after certain rituals, but does not take into account the views of the individual victims who might not want to forgive serious crimes, nor does it require the perpetrators be punished or pay material compensation to the victims. (HRW 2005: 55)
However, as I explained extensively in my previous work, Acholi traditional justice need not merely be narrated in line with the idea of restorative justice, since it is also possible to describe local practices in accordance with the idea of retributive justice if we try to do so (Enomoto 2011). While conducting my fieldwork in northern Uganda in 2006, I learned that the term ‘traditional justice’ is often expressed in the local language as *ngol matir* (right decision) or *ngol me te kwaro* (decision according to tradition). While the ICC deals with crimes within its jurisdiction in accordance with the Rome Statute, Acholi traditional justice, in a sense, decides the appropriate processes, including rituals and compensation, in accordance with the customary law of the group (e.g., clan) that has jurisdiction over the crime concerned. The ‘Law to Declare the Acholi Customary Law’, prepared by the Acholi traditional leaders (Ker Kwaro Acholi 2001), states the following under the clause ‘Punishment’:

Any person who contravenes any provision of any section of this law commits an offence against the customary law of the Acholi and shall be punished or ordered to pay reparations in accordance with the appropriate customary practices/punishment as declared and defined in the Schedule of this Law.

The most appropriate ritual and the type, number, sex and colour of the animal(s) necessary for the particular process depend on the kind of taboo, or crime, committed. Generally, a ritual called *mato oput* is applied in cases of murder. Other rituals are applied in other kinds of crimes. The type and amount of compensation in cases in which a person has been killed may differ, depending on, among other factors, whether the act was intentional, accidental or in self-defence, the status of the victim and the relationship between the offender and the victim.

Here, a crime can be explained as a violation of the customary law. The offender is expected to go through the appropriate process and is burdened with a proportionate amount of compensation. While the clans of the offender and the victim participate in determining the suitable ritual and compensation, these are principally decided by the chiefs and elders in accordance with the law in which they specialise. Therefore, it is possible to narrate Acholi traditional justice through the retributive lens.

Moreover, in my interviews with Acholi NGO staff and traditional leaders, elements that could be viewed as repentance and compensation were often given rather punitive meanings and portrayed as preconditions for what could be described as reconciliation, forgiveness and the restoration of relationships. In fact, the documents prepared by Acholi NGO staff and traditional leaders, such as the abovementioned ‘Law to Declare the Acholi Customary Law’, tend
to equate compensation with punishment. A document written by a local researcher, ‘The Acholi People’s Rites of Reconciliation’, also explains that an offender ‘is made to pay a less severe punishment’ in cases of unintentional murder (Okumu 2005: 10).

In addition, the local practices recently described as Acholi traditional justice have historically been understood by external actors within various other frameworks, such as traditional medicine and Acholi religion, which implies that they do not, in fact, need to be narrated as justice mechanisms. However, in the actual debates following the ICC intervention, Acholi traditional justice has widely been perceived as a form of restorative justice, and some researchers, activists and aid workers, particularly the non-Acholis among them, have tended to believe that Acholi traditional justice is irreconcilable with the idea of punishment.

Views of the Human Subject and Citizenship within the Global Civil Society

What kinds of views of the human subject and citizenship were articulated in the discourses and behaviour of the self-proclaimed global civil society in the ‘peace and justice’ debate? This section first tries to explain why the local practices were so widely narrated within the framework of restorative justice by global civil society in the debate following the ICC intervention. By contextualising the narrative within the international attention and support given to the ‘revival of Acholi tradition’ since the 1990s, it observes that in its discourses and actions, global civil society articulated the same ‘vulnerable subject’ narrative that was described and criticised by the aforementioned second school of thought.

The notion of Acholi tradition started to gain international support in the latter half of the 1990s. With support and funding from donor states and international NGOs, ‘traditional chiefs’ were identified and formally reinstated, and the chief of the Payira clan was elected as the paramount chief in 1999. Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA),13 an institution consisting mainly of the paramount chief, other chiefs and elders, was established in 2000. Prior to this, there was, in essence, no institution such as the KKA to bring together all the chiefs from the area. The title of the paramount chief, Lani Rwodi,14 was also new (Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. 2005: 44). The internationally and locally supported efforts that followed to restore or empower the roles of traditional leaders and institutions greatly increased the presence and influence of the traditional leaders in the area.
In general, aid donors and agencies supported the revival of Acholi tradition under the frameworks of reconciliation and the reintegration of ex-soldiers (Afako 2003; Bradbury 1999; Simonse 1998), which were given great importance after the mid-1990s in the context of peace building and conflict prevention. Under such frameworks, one of the main problems was identified as ‘trauma’ and the associated conduct of former LRA members, many of whom had been abducted and forced to become soldiers or the ‘wives’ of soldiers. They were perceived as having the tendency or potential to resort to violence due to their violent experiences in the bush. Aid donors and agencies expected that traditional rituals would be effective in dealing with the psychological problems and violent tendencies of the former LRA members. They hoped that the rituals would help promote acceptance by the community, restore social relationships and bring about reconciliation. They also believed that education on traditional Acholi values should be an integral part of peace education and the promotion of the culture of peace. At the level of aid projects, such traditional elements were most often incorporated under the label of ‘psychosocial activities’.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, psychologists and sociologists considered that the masses were driven by their emotions rather than by reason, while the elites could act rationally (Le Bon 2002; Ortega and Gasset 1964; Trotter 2009). However, as the political ideal of the individual as a mature, autonomous, rational subject has been replaced by a postmodern model of the vulnerable self, public policy has become premised on the assumption of general vulnerability (Pupavac 2006). The dichotomies between health and disease, sanity and insanity, normalcy and abnormalcy, rationality and irrationality have become blurred (Nakajima 2008). Instead of placing individuals on either side of these binary divides, the contemporary therapeutic approaches view individuals as universally susceptible to psychological and social dysfunctionalism, with varying degrees of risk (Nakajima 2008). While Western colonialists painted wars among Africans or their resistance to colonisation as manifestations of their irrationality and backwardness, the current interpretation of southern conflicts is not based on a dichotomy between rationality and irrationality, since it is based on this vulnerable model of the self. Southern populations, especially those that have been affected by war, are now regarded as being at a higher risk of emotional dysfunctionalism and therefore as being more dangerous.

Termed ‘therapeutic governance’ by Pupavac (2001b), not only inter-ethnic relations, economic policy, or political system, but also a population’s psychology and intimate relationships have been problematised and become the sites of external intervention. ‘Psychosocial activities’ are seen to be an essential component of consequential humanitarian aid, which is expected to address the
consequences and causes of violence and underdevelopment (Pupavac 2012). Proponents of such therapeutic intervention do not necessarily perceive their approach as challenging the autonomy of societies and individuals, since they promote it under the name of empowerment. They understand it as a new and improved approach that effectively addresses the criticism of earlier practices of development and humanitarian aid as being paternalistic and disempowering. However, this approach that supposedly empowers individuals and builds a peaceful society is founded on the model of the self as ever-vulnerable to risk and dysfunctionalism, not as an autonomous rational subject; as such, it legitimises pacification interventions at the level of people’s personal emotions.

Based on this line of thought, aid agencies eagerly sought to ‘heal the trauma’ of the Acholi and deployed psychosocial activities in various forms and methods as part of their humanitarian aid in the middle of ongoing conflict. Even when the author visited IDP camps in the Acholi sub-region in 2006, when basic food and water supplies were frequently interrupted and people died of diarrhoea and other preventable diseases each day, aid agencies were eagerly trying to address the ‘root causes’ of conflict through psycho-social activities, including traditional dances, songs, and rituals.

Moreover, concerns over a population’s psychology and the conception of the self as vulnerable also contributed to the model of restorative justice (Pupavac 2004). As psychological wounds of crime offenders, victims and communities increasingly became subjects of concern in Northern societies in the latter half of the 20th century, the idea of restorative justice aiming to heal such psychological wounds gained popularity as a way to reform justice systems (Zehr 1990). Beginning as an alternative to, or a complementary mechanism of, the existing ‘retributive’ justice system in the United States, Canada and other Western countries, restorative justice is commonly associated with the participation of the victim, the offender and the wider community. This classification of justice mechanisms moved into the international arena in the 1990s, when transitional justice became one of the core issues among international policymakers in the context of peace building and conflict prevention.

In addition, retributive justice has been transformed to include restorative elements, both at the national level and at the international level. For instance, a wide range of mechanisms to deal with the emotional, psychological, material and security needs of victims and witnesses are included in the ICC Statute, including the provision of psychological counselling to witnesses. The ICC Statute has been praised by members of global civil society as an advanced justice mechanism that empowers survivors and helps them regain hope and dignity, protects witnesses from trauma and harassment and helps rebuild lives.
through reparations (Citizens for Global Solutions 2004: 45). Encompassing both restorative and retributive approaches, transitional justice in general is expected to play a role in healing individual trauma, promoting a sense of emotional well-being and, thus, addressing both the consequences and causes of violence.

Obviously, there is some overlap between such measures and restorative justice. Therefore, when those who specialise in transitional justice learned of the statements made and documents published by NGOs, researchers and traditional leaders on local practices in the context of the reintegration of former LRA members, they were likely to have perceived the practices in the framework of restorative justice. The fact that other post-conflict justice mechanisms adopted in Africa since the 1990s, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa and the Gacaca of Rwanda, are often portrayed as restorative in the study of transitional justice may have been an additional factor that reinforced their conviction.

Throughout the revival of tradition in the Acholi sub-region, and in the debates following the ICC intervention, external agencies projected the conception of the vulnerable self upon the Acholi people and their categorisation of justice mechanisms upon the local practices in the sub-region. It was the degraded problematised conception of the human, which has been critically reflected upon by the aforementioned second school of thought that formed the basis of the understanding that Acholi traditional justice was restorative.

Problematique of Citizenship in Global Civil Society

What exact actions and positions did the self-proclaimed global civil society take in relation to peace and justice issues, and how did they work with local actors whose interests they claimed to represent? The first group of global civil society actors – international human rights NGOs such as AI and HRW – claimed that it was the ICC, and not Acholi traditional justice, that would deliver genuine justice and long-lasting peace in northern Uganda. For instance, AI compared ‘traditional reconciliation procedures’ with ‘independent and impartial courts in accordance with international law and standards’ and stated that ‘[t]hese traditional reconciliation measures do not involve judicial determinations of innocence or guilt. They also do not effectively ensure that the full truth about crimes will be known, or provide victims or their families with full reparations’ (AI USA 2005). HRW, another major international human rights NGO, claimed that ‘[a] major shortcoming of the traditional reconciliation approach is the tolerance of impunity’, and condemned the
approach for not punishing perpetrators or obligating them to pay material compensation to victims (HRW 2005: 55-56). HRW essentially denounced Acholi traditional justice for being tantamount to impunity and claimed that its proponents did not represent the needs and voices of victims. On the other hand, they did not provide detailed practical strategies for how to deal with the possible negative consequences that could be brought by the ICC’s involvement or for how to end the conflict while pursuing ICC’s form of justice.

Meanwhile, the second group of global civil society actors – humanitarian aid NGOs such as Oxfam and CARE, which had formed a peace advocacy group with local NGOs in northern Uganda – took an ambivalent position on the ICC intervention. The staff of these organisations’ Kampala offices were keenly aware of the problems with the ICC intervention, and feared that any arrest warrants issued by the ICC could push the LRA to commit further atrocities against the Acholi as well as against the aid personnel working in the region, which would make it difficult for aid organisations to provide life-saving aid. Moreover, organisations such as Oxfam and CARE had been leading the Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU), a coalition of domestic and international civil society actors founded in 2002 to advocate for a ‘just and lasting peace in Northern Uganda’ (CSOPNU 2004: vi). Given that the domestic members of the CSOPNU were, in general, against the ICC intervention (O’Callaghan and Gilbride 2008: 26–32) those international NGO members could not openly give strong support to the ICC intervention, especially at the national level in Uganda.16

At the same time, staff at the headquarters of these organisations, located in Northern cities such as Oxford and New York, tended to have different perspectives (O’Callaghan and Gilbride 2008: 29–30). The headquarters staff tended to be concerned that openly expressing concerns over the ICC intervention, pointing out its possible political and historical implications, or supporting or tolerating ‘retributive’ Acholi traditional justice (which they perceived to fall short of the ‘international standards of justice’) could be tantamount to questioning the universality and desirability of the ‘international norm’ that they had worked arduously to build since the 1990s. It would in turn have posed a substantial risk to their organisations’ legitimacy and their brand image as entrepreneurs and supporters of the ‘international norm’.

The conflicting internal needs and opinions within international NGOs that were members of the CSOPNU made it difficult to develop a coalition-wide consensus on the issue or to take a strong joint stance against the ICC intervention at the national and international levels (O’Callaghan and Gilbride 2008: 29–30). Due to their homeland concerns, the CSOPNU’s international NGO members, such as Oxfam, tended to choose not to proactively advocate
against the ICC intervention, although neither did they advocate strongly for the intervention. Instead, they remained rather quiet in their public communications and worked reactively on this issue while anticipating a horrendous humanitarian crisis caused by intensification in LRA violence and a subsequent halt of humanitarian aid. Rather than representing the voices of the local actors or attempting to avert the much-anticipated humanitarian crisis and accompanying massive loss of life, they prioritised the legitimacy of the ‘international norm’ that they had propounded.

On the other hand, AI and HRW decided to publicly support the ICC intervention. As international human rights NGOs had been the core civil society actors in the process of developing the ICC Statute, doubting the efficacy and legitimacy of the ICC in its first-ever case was not an option. In addition, international human rights NGOs were not running any aid projects in the sub-region and worked fairly independently from the domestic NGOs. They could therefore formulate their positions on the ICC intervention from an international legal perspective and based on their need to maintain the legitimacy of the ICC. It was this group that was influential in the debates at the United Nations headquarters in New York as well as at the ICC in The Hague.

The local NGOs, regardless of whether they were Acholi or from other areas of Uganda, did not necessarily agree with the positions taken by either of the global civil society groups. Many local NGOs expressed criticism of the ICC intervention between 2004 and 2006. But for these two global civil society groups, their global citizenship was contingent on their endorsement, or at least passive acceptance, of the supposedly universal humanitarian norm – the ICC Statute. Therefore, those who did not agree with the groups’ position did not have any option other than to withdraw from the groups.

As Chandler (2007, 2009) argues, the recent shift to the global and towards global civil society cannot be read as a manifestation of the belief in human rationality and our capacity to conceive of the transformation of the world and the power relations to which it finds itself subject. Rather, it can be seen as an embodiment of the decline of collective political subjects, the increasingly limited horizon of political possibilities, a general disenchantment with politics itself, and the simultaneous rise of a more atomised politics of self-expression – of awareness, identity, and values (Chandler 2009: 2). In this context, global civil society leaders become keen to put forth rhetoric of high moral responsibility and seek to engage idealistically rather than practically with the world. The discourse and actions of both the first and second global civil society groups vividly embodied this logic. The first group continued to sing its mantras while failing to provide coherent strategic policies and practical planning, while the
second group remained silent in fear of damaging its ‘ethics’; neither based its actions on coherent strategic policy making.

At the same time, their discourses and actions were a result of their homeland needs. As the collective political projects and subjects decline and a more atomised politics of self-expression emerge in Northern societies, global civil society is increasingly expected to play its role as a competing community in what Nikolas Rose (2007) calls ‘ethopolitics’ – politics that seek to regenerate and reactivate sentiments, values and beliefs, and to shape individual conduct. An NGO’s ties to its supporters are necessarily contingent on the perceived legitimacy of its ethics, or in other words, its ability to provide ways to cultivate a ‘new and improved’ self-image as an ethical global citizen. Fundamentally questioning the ethics of the international norm would therefore pose a major threat to the already precarious and vulnerable self-identity of ethopolitical subjects and would effectively put in question an NGO’s legitimacy as an ethopolitical community. In the case of the ICC intervention in Uganda, both the international human rights NGOs and the humanitarian aid NGOs had already marketed and sold their ethical ideas of the ICC to their supporters. Thus, if they had suddenly argued against the norm, they would have been blamed not only for the act itself but also for destabilising the identities of their homeland supporters in Northern societies, as well as the identities of those working inside their own organisations. The ‘peace and justice’ debate was a minefield for both international human rights NGOs and humanitarian aid NGOs as it had the potential to threaten their ethics, self-image, brand image and perceived legitimacy.

Faced with these rather inward-looking needs and based on the therapeutic understanding of ‘Acholi tradition’, the international NGOs chose to either proactively support the ICC intervention or remain fairly quiet about it. Moreover, in this case, the idea of membership or citizenship in global civil society was in a sense much narrower than the conception of citizenship in modern societies. As explained earlier, global civil society has been expected to overcome the logic of inclusion and exclusion embedded in the modern conception of citizenship, to represent the voices of the voiceless and the weak, to promote global norms, and thereby to contribute to a new cosmopolitan global order. While citizenship in the self-proclaimed global civil society in this case certainly crossed the borders of sovereign states, it presented a much more limiting arena than did the western modern concept of citizenship in that it was granted only to the limited groups of people who endorsed or at least did not question the legitimacy of the so-called universal norm or the ethics of global civil society.
Agency Detached from Global Civil Society

Since the 1990s, external agencies have projected their concept of the vulnerable self upon the Acholi and transplanted and inscribed their categorisation of justice mechanisms onto local practices in the sub-region. The archetype of the vulnerable subject with diminished capacities for agency has been projected onto the Acholi; on the face of it, this seems to have invalidated the Acholi population as political actors and denied their moral capacity to conceptualise the good. Nonetheless, external agencies’ understanding of Southern conflicts and their degraded foundational conception of the self have not been straightforwardly embraced or reproduced by Acholi actors.

As I demonstrated in detail in my previous work (Enomoto 2011), these misanthropic ideas seem to have been utilised, reinterpreted and circumvented by various Acholi actors with differing, and at times hybrid, worldviews and visions of governance. The ‘revival’ of Acholi tradition since the 1990s, along with the attention and enthusiasm accorded to ‘Acholi traditional justice’ following the ICC intervention, has enabled various local actors, including chiefs and elders, to attempt, albeit in a new and hybrid form, to reorder society, (re)establish social norms and (re)gain their power and status.

For instance, some of the Acholi proponents of ‘tradition’, such as the KKA, problematised the vengeful spirits brought by the ‘impure’ former LRA members who had committed crimes while in captivity and emphasised the need to deal with those spirits, which might cause further suffering and disorder and create a cycle of violence in the sub-region. By identifying the vengeful spirits, rather than psychological dysfunction, as the root cause of the conflict and suffering, and claiming the authority of the newly reinstated chiefs and elders to cleanse the former LRA members and others of the spirits in accordance with the ‘traditional’ regulations and codes of conduct, the chiefs and elders seem to have attempted to force the former LRA members and their families and clans to submit to their authority.

Within the framework of external aid agencies, what can be understood to be a consequence of vengeful spirits, such as nightmares, is regarded as a symptom of ‘trauma’, which can be healed through psychological programmes provided by aid agencies. From the 1990s onwards, an increasing number of aid agencies tried to heal the Acholi based on their own psychologised understanding of the causes and consequences of the conflict as well as its solution. They started to tell people that former LRA members were having nightmares due to their traumatic experiences and that they could be healed through psychological programmes provided by aid agencies. Such an argument implicitly denies the claim that former LRA members are suffering because of
the vengeful spirits brought about by their conduct, which requires ritual processes organised by chiefs and elders. In the course of my research, many proponents of Acholi tradition seemed well aware that donors supported Acholi tradition as a way to deal with the Acholi people’s alleged trauma. One elder who spoke English and often had contact with donors noted the following:

The meaning attached to Western words is not necessarily the meaning we attach to the same words, such as trauma. To us, that meaning is very light. Our meaning is much deeper and heavier than they think. It is more than trauma. It is the soul of the deceased that causes problems.

In response to my question about whether he had explained this view to donors, such as to foreign NGO staff, he answered in the negative:

We usually interact with them very officially. They have already decided the way they conceive.

Indeed, there was some concern and uneasiness among traditional leaders and Acholi NGO staff about activities such as counselling and psychotherapy because they understood these activities to be more strictly based on Western psychology. However, in trying to discourage foreign aid personnel from carrying out such activities, the Acholi actors generally did not criticise the therapeutic understanding of Acholi individuals and the conflict; instead, they presented ‘traditional’ practices as more appropriate for healing trauma in the Acholi context.

As the above remark of the elder may imply, it is almost impossible for Acholi actors to receive donor funding unless their proposals fit within the frameworks that donors have already set. In fact, donors supported ‘Acholi tradition’ because they saw individual psychological dysfunctionalism and broken social relationships among the Acholi as both the causes and the consequences of conflict, and thus considered healing, reconciliation and the reconstruction of social relationships to be essential. Acholi tradition was expected to serve these purposes. However, actors such as chiefs and elders were able to attempt to recapture their lost power and status and to pursue their own vision of Acholi society in a new and hybrid form by utilising donors’ frameworks and negotiating with the Western psychological approach, without necessarily sharing the Western aid agencies’ misanthropic view of humanity. Rather, the therapeutic paradigm of governance seems to have been utilised, reinterpreted and reconfigured by various Acholi actors who have held differing and, at times, hybrid worldviews.
We also need to be aware that while global civil society leaders projected their vision of the degraded, vulnerable subject onto the Acholi and imagined them as people at the edge of dysfunction, thereby pathologising the Acholi people’s capacities to think, know and act purposively in the world, such a diminished view of the human condition was not necessarily held by the Acholi actors themselves. Nor was the limiting idea of the citizen as an agent of ethopolitics necessarily shared by the Acholi actors. In fact, it was in most part the local actors who tried to define the good, to develop strategies and set priorities to achieve the good, and to seek multiple legal and political ways to address the peace and justice issues in Uganda. These local actors were deeply involved in the negotiation and drafting of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (26 August 2006), the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions (2 May 2007), the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (29 June 2007) and the Annex to the June 29 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (19 February 2008), and they participated in the formation and implementation processes of the ICC Act, an act adopted on 10 March 2010 that gave the force of law in Uganda to the ICC Statute and articulated the power to implement obligations under the Statute.

While in this case citizenship in global civil society was contingent on an individual’s acceptance of the supposedly universal norm, it was those individuals and organisations included in global civil society that were unable to involve themselves in the detailed debate on how to strategically achieve peace and justice in Uganda. The opinions and actions of global civil society were limited by their need to avoid questioning the universality and desirability of the ‘international norm’, and therefore its citizens were not able to suggest or support ways which may be seen as undermining or questioning the legitimacy of the ICC. On the other hand, many of the local actors did not need to consider the risk of delegitimising the so-called universal norm and were rather excluded or detached from global civil society. Because of their detachment, they were able to participate in legal and political debate on ways to end the conflict and develop laws and systems while taking into consideration Uganda’s legal obligation as a signatory state of the ICC, the possibility of negotiation with the LRA and voices of a wide range of local actors. It was those whose ability to define the good and act purposively in the world was doubted by external actors, and who were rather detached from the so-called global civil society, who in fact exhibited the will to think and act agentially in the world.
Conclusion

Since the 1980s, increasingly critical reflection has been generated on the Western modern archetype of the human subject and the system of nation states, for they remove citizenship from those who are not regarded as citizens of nation states. Both IR theorists and policy makers have made concerted efforts to overcome the limitations of such modern conceptions, through which the term ‘human security’ emerged. Global civil society increasingly came to be expected to address the limitations of the modern state-bounded conception of citizenship, to represent the voices of the voiceless and to build universal humanitarian norms that transcend national sovereignty. These human-centred ideas have also given rise to the new humanitarianism, while delegitimising and demeaning the classical deontological humanitarianism, blurring the boundaries between development aid, humanitarian aid and politics.

The notion of human security and its associated policies have since been criticised for promoting and normalising the Western vision of humanity. The first school identifies it as the classical modern conception of the mature, autonomous rational subject, while the second school points out that it is rather the erosion of the classical conception of the subject and the shift to the neoliberal model of the vulnerable subject that has formed the basis of the conception and policies of human security.

This chapter examined the debate over peace and justice issues in Uganda in the 2000s and concluded that it was the vulnerable model of the self that external agencies, including those of the self-proclaimed global civil society, projected upon the Acholi. As a result, local practices were framed and interpreted through the categorisation of justice mechanisms founded on the vulnerable model of the self, which directed the way the debate over peace and justice was configured. Some external agencies supported the revival of ‘Acholi tradition’ or ‘Acholi traditional justice’ as a potential mechanism to deal with the psychological and social dysfunctionalism of the Acholi and thereby to address the ‘root causes’ of the conflict. Others, especially international human rights NGOs, denounced ‘Acholi traditional justice’ as tantamount to impunity, arguing that it therefore falls short of the universal needs of vulnerable victims of atrocities. Moreover, citizenship in global civil society was in this case contingent on a person’s acceptance of certain ethics that had been embodied in the ICC Statute.

Nevertheless, this vision of a vulnerable and diminished humanity and its associated worldviews has not necessarily been shared and has rather been interpreted, utilised and circumvented by Acholi actors. Moreover, those included in global civil society were bound by the primary duties of its citizens
– to promote and protect the norms that they had built – and were therefore incapable of defining the good and providing prescriptions and strategies to achieve the good. It was in fact those whose ability to conceptualise the good was doubted by external actors – and who were rather detached from global civil society – who in fact exhibited the will to think and act purposively in the world.

Having shed a positive light on the agency of the Acholi, we need to bear in mind that the Acholi are not a monolithic group. Neither should we exaggerate the current level of power and authority of the traditional leaders in the sub-region. As I noted earlier, their power and authority had already waned before the conflict started in the 1980s. The subsequent long war and displacement have meant that some Acholi, especially the youth, do not even know the names of their clan chiefs. Furthermore, some chiefs and elders do not recognise the authority of the KKA or the paramount chief. There have been those inside the KKA who point out its internal division and discontent. As young, educated Acholi who use personal computers and the Internet have become the main workforce within the aid industry in the sub-region, the authority of the KKA and the chiefs and elders in general is not necessarily highly regarded these days, even by those within the industry. Moreover, some, including NGO workers, are critical of some KKA members and local NGO workers specialised in transitional justice who appear to have enriched themselves in the course of the renewed attention to so-called tradition. Most major local NGOs that were actively involved in the peace and justice debate in the 2000s have since downscaled or ceased their activities on transitional justice, in part due to the staff’s mismanagement of funds and the resulting loss of donor confidence.

We also need to take into account the broader and longer-term context. In the course of the revival of Acholi traditions since the 1990s, much attention has been paid to the theory that the inner problems of the Acholi people are both the consequences and the causes of the conflict. After the ICC intervention, overwhelming focus was again placed on the issue of Acholi traditional justice versus ICC justice. In such debates, ways to deal with the crimes committed by the LRA and ways to psychologically heal the ‘traumatised’ Acholi were deemed to be most crucial issues. However, such attention may have overshadowed the responsibility of the Ugandan government for the crimes committed by its troops and shifted attention away from the historical or international contexts of the conflict, such as colonial rule, which created the country’s north–south divide. Nor was much attention given to the conflict’s other international dimensions, such as the relation between Uganda and Sudan, Western countries’ political, economic and military support to the Museveni regime and the negligence of the situation in northern Uganda in the 1990s. The
emphasis on the need to heal the ‘traumatised’ (and, thus, potentially violent) Acholi may have reinforced the innately violent image of the Acholi people that had been originally forged through colonial rule and then utilised by the current regime (Allen 2008).

Such aspects aside, Acholi actors in this case were not simply the objects of intervention nor vulnerable individuals who lacked the moral capacity for the conceptualisation of the good. It was in fact Acholi actors who acted upon therapeutic discourses to reshape, reconfigure, and utilise them to serve their own visions of the social order in the region. In contrast to the remarkable lack of strategic clarity and political engagement on the side of the self-proclaimed global civil society, Acholi actors themselves sought ways to strategically balance and achieve peace and justice in the region and the country. It remains to be seen whether their actions can be interpreted as reflecting their conceptions of modern political agency or as representing something that can be grasped by neither the modern conceptions of the autonomous rational self and citizenship nor the post-modern conception of the vulnerable self and hollowed-out citizenship. Nevertheless, this case seems to indicate the possibility of some sort of citizenship and political agency on the side of those who are more detached from global civil society and who are therefore unconstrained by its exclusive and limiting vision of citizenship.

This case also demonstrates the need for IR scholars, anthropologists and others to think outside, depart from and move beyond the comfortable old frameworks. Most critics of the idea of the vulnerable subject, including this author, do not consider it to have entirely replaced the modern conception of the self, but rather perceive it to be working alongside the debris of it; in other words, it works alongside the ghosts of modernity that are haunting our society. Still, if the forms of subjectivity inculcated through policies and praxis, which address the lives of Global South populations and thus affect their everyday, are degraded, hollowed-out beings, simply continuing to rely on the old ways of criticising, challenging, deconstructing and resisting the classical liberal concepts of subjectivity may risk legitimising, affirming and normalising the ostensible objects of critique.

As Chandler and Reid point out, many of today’s so-called radical critiques of neoliberalism seem in fact to merely replay and echo neoliberalism’s own understandings of the limits of human subjectivity (Chandler and Reid 2016: 5–6). Indeed, critics who identify the human subject in human security discourse as the modern autonomous rational subject often end up questioning and pathologising the human ability, especially of Southern populations, to make sense of the world, to conceive of the good, and to work agentially to transform the world in which they live. The clichéd claim that aid policy and praxis should
be founded on deep knowledge of ‘the lived everyday’ can also be easily interrupted and reframed by the neoliberal discourse that problematises and seeks to intervene in the everyday lives of individuals and communities in ‘culturally relevant’ manners. What is required is to demarcate afresh the lines of political battle, to imagine avenues to expand political possibilities and to set in motion carefully negotiated approaches that cannot be easily seized and apprehended, neither by the ghost of modernity nor by the misanthropic degraded view of humanity.

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Notes

1 Terms similar to ‘global civil society’, such as ‘transnational civil society’ and ‘transnational advocacy network’, are used in the existing literature. For the purpose of examining the roles played and the conceptions of the human subject and citizenship held by actors whose roles were embraced by its proponents of global civil society, as outlined in Section III, this chapter defines global civil society as a non-governmental network or alliance that is led by major Northern non-governmental organisations and that conducts advocacy or campaigning work on particular policy areas.

2 Fieldwork was conducted in Uganda in March–April 2006, February–March 2008, November–December 2008, January–February 2010 and in February, March and August 2017. Between September 2003 and August 2015, I worked as a policy officer in the humanitarian section of one of the international NGOs that referred to itself as part of global civil society in the debates on peace and justice in northern Uganda. Although I was not directly in charge of issues related to the conflict in northern Uganda, the fact that these issues were handled by other staff in the humanitarian section enabled me to observe the arguments within the organisation and among the wider circle of NGOs, researchers, the ICC and others. The fieldwork was conducted as part of my academic research, not in the course of my work for the NGO, and therefore most interviewees in Uganda were not aware of my affiliation with the NGO. The analysis in this chapter is my own and does not reflect the position of the NGO.

3 In this chapter, the categories of North and South are not premised on prior existence but are treated as imagined spaces that are produced and reproduced through discourse and practice.

4 This entire paragraph is based on the publications by Pupavac.

5 This entire paragraph is based on the publications by Chandler and the book published in 2016 by Chandler and Julian Reid.
The critique of the new humanitarianism offered by the second school of thought is echoed by a number of critics of the new humanitarianism, who do not necessarily share the second school’s analysis of the self and citizenship in human security discourse (Atmar 2001; Curtis 2001; Duffield 2001; Duffield and Waddell 2006; Fox 2002; Hammond 2002; Herman and Peterson 2002; Macrae and Leader 2001; Piotukh 2015; Reid 2010).

This entire paragraph is based on the publications by Chandler.

In the Acholi sub-region today, ‘traditional leaders’ refers to chiefs and elders of various clans. Christian and Muslim leaders are generally called ‘religious leaders’.

The conflict has affected other sub-regions of northern Uganda, southern Sudan, eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic.

The terms are mentioned in Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. (2005: 127).

This literally means ‘drinking of the bitter root’. The ritual includes the shared drinking of a bitter juice made from the oput tree.

Ker means authority and Kwaro means tradition.

The term literally means ‘Chief of All Chiefs’ or ‘Head of Chiefs’.

It needs to be noted that colonial boundaries between the ruler and ruled, civilised and savage, rational and irrational, white and black were murky, took much hard work to sustain and were repeatedly subverted (Cooper and Stoler 1997).

Interview with an Oxfam staff member, 21 March 2006, Kampala, Uganda.

In the eyes of the elder, the meaning that donors attach to the term ‘trauma’ is superficial compared to the meaning he would give.

Interview with an Acholi elder in Gulu town on 12 February 2008.

The idea here is that foreign NGOs arrived with preconceived notions and assumptions.

Interview with an Acholi elder in Gulu town on 17 February 2008.

Interview with Acholi NGO staff in Gulu town on 17, 20, 21, 22 and 25 February 2017.

Interview with Acholi NGO staff in Gulu town on 17, 20, 21, 22 and 25 February 2017.

For example, see Shimizu (2011).

Bibliography


IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) and ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) (1994) Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief, Geneva: IFRC and ICRC.


SECTION B

Citizenship
Informed by Interconnectedness
Two Approaches to Citizenship

One way that citizenship can be conceptualised is through the consideration of civic and republican ideals developed by Aristotle. Here, citizenship is considered to be based on acts that create both *homo politicus* behaviour and collectiveness. The conceptualisation of citizenship through social contract theory conflicts sharply with this approach. It considers citizenship to be rooted in property ownership and the freedom of individuals, and needs to exist before individuals partake in collective membership of a society. These two traditions, derived from the West, provide a liberal democratic understanding of the freedom of citizenship. There is historical common ground between these two traditions. The Greek concept of policing and rights enlightenment is deeply dependent on the exclusion of a large number of people, given that the concept of citizenship was constructed in a form that suppressed slaves, women and subjects of the Empire (Lazar 2013). This heritage remains in the way that the benefits of citizenship are unevenly distributed among modern nation-state systems. For example, Rosaldo noted that citizenship in the sense of ‘quality of membership’ is perceived as gradation from ‘second class citizenship’ to ‘full citizenship’ among people (Rosaldo 1994). A second-class citizen refers to an individual who has been structurally marginalised within a national system that is closely related to everyday life. Sassen also found a distinction between a ‘citizen who is not authorized but is approved’ and a ‘citizen who is authorized but not approved’ and defined the latter as ‘a full citizen who is not yet recognized as a political entity’ (Sassen 2002). Many of the heterogeneous groups that encompass the majority of citizens fall under this category of ‘unauthorised citizen’, which includes, for example, indigenous people who are not recognised as a complete political entity but have acquired the formal status of citizenship from their own viewpoint, and immigrants who have gained legal citizenship through naturalisation, or their children and grandchildren (Lazar 2013). Marshall defined citizenship as a status given to a full member of the community and indicated that those with citizen status are equal with respect to the rights and obligations associated with the status (Marshall 1983: 253). Ideally,
universal equality is achieved through formal citizenship. Despite this ideal, the realities of citizenship have developed diversely in different regional and historical contexts.

In the pastoral area in the north-eastern part of Uganda (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Karamoja region’), which is the subject of this paper, disarmament has been implemented since 2000 and a forced sedentarisation policy prohibiting nomadism was promoted. Mwangu reported that land grabbing, which transfers pasture ground to foreign companies and other capitalists, has become increasingly synchronous with this policy, leading to the vulnerable status of pastoralists who are easily exposed to marginalisation as ‘second class citizens’ (Mwangu 2014). From the colonial period to the present day, pastoralism in the Karamoja region, and in other parts of East Africa, has been stereotyped as an inefficient and outdated economic activity (Hazama 2012; Ohta 2009). These practices have been considered in setting up development policies (HRW 2007), with recognition of human rights abuses. In this context and background, there is a denial of the agency of pastoralists, giving them ‘citizen not approved’ status using linear modernisation theory, and justifying the mission of enlightenment and edification from the colonial to postcolonial periods. This study investigated how the Dodoth, the pastoralists in the Karamoja region, have resisted policies that oppress nomadic pastoralism and organised practices related to citizenship.

In this article, I outline East African pastoral society and, in particular, the Dodoth society, and then consider case studies of the ethnic citizenship of pastoralists in sections 3, 4 and 5. Specifically, these sections focus on indigenous citizenship in the self-governed community built by the Dodoth, who have rejected forced sedentarisation and the use of state violence to enforce conventional citizenship. The illusion that the nation state is the only body that can confer citizenship in modern society is powerful. Therefore, an informal, hidden but thoughtful self-governing system that supports people’s lives and the concept of practical citizenship tends to be thought of as a ‘castle in the air’, but this is not the case (Nyamnjoh 2007; Graeber 2004). Ekeh defines two kinds of public, which characterise African civil society and differ from the (Western) concept of citizenship, tightly coupled with the national community (Ekeh 1992). He analysed the ‘primordial public’ based on ethnicity separately from the ‘civil public’ that emerges in the process of modern state formation. According to these definitions, in the case of civil society in Africa, it is necessary to consider not only agency in the civil public but also agency in the primordial public. Citizenship, as membership of the civil public in the modern state, does not take into account the primordial public. However, a political space without state intervention is given to Africa’s primordial public, and opportunities for participation and cooperation that support everyday life are exploited to the full
in this public domain. Ndegwa (1997) reported that a strong rejection of the legitimacy of state sovereignty by people is a characteristic of African politics. In exchange for a dependence on civic citizenship (enabling participation in national politics), ethnic citizenship is guaranteed by showing ethnic loyalty through specific political actions and conflict. In a study of citizenship in East African pastoral societies, Konaka (2016) highlighted the practice of citizenship by the socially vulnerable who faced severe direct and structural violence. He questioned the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in Africa and claimed that external support should be conducted in response to the type of citizenship that the pastoral communities have developed in the process of ensuring collective survival. Aspects of the protection of internally displaced persons are subject to the jurisdiction of the country within whose borders the individuals reside. In both conflict-ridden and poor countries, it is usually not possible to realise citizenship in terms of rights guaranteed by the state. As a result, the protection of internally displaced persons is difficult to achieve through a state-initiated citizenship approach. By recognising the provisional role of citizenship practised by internally displaced persons, cooperation between the international and local communities can be effective for humanitarian assistance in an emergency (Konaka 2016). One focus of the present study was to consider the citizenship of people under an emergency evacuation from the space expediently created by pastoralists rather than a national government, and the role such a status plays in defending livelihoods and the resistance of the dominant order.

Subsequently, sections 5 and 6 focus on African potentials, a common shared feature in the practice of citizenship during the resistance of north-eastern Ugandan pastoralists, and in the practices of various societies throughout sub-Saharan Africa. The idea of African potentials is based on the conviction that Africans have devised their own knowledge and institutions to solve problems faced by Africans and their societies (Ohta 2016; Matsuda 2014). When citizenship is discussed in the context of Africa, there has been a focus on the contradictions and conflicts between national identity and ethnic attachment in the construction of the nation state (Keller 2014). For ethnically diverse East African nations, the inconsistency between republic citizenship in the ethnic political community and liberal citizenship in the national political community, along with the ‘democratic opening up’ triggered by the introduction of a neoliberal structural adjustment policy, is considered to have manifested a transient and stagnant transition characterised by competition among groups (Ndegwa 1997). People exposed to the risk of involvement in ethnic conflict, due to the political and economic conflict in national politics being brought into areas of daily life, will create spaces based on their own logic
that are separate from the areas where power is distributed. They will defend their lives and maintain the base of their livelihoods. This separates the domain of collaboration in everyday life from the power distribution domain, in which elite politicians mobilise ordinary citizens into their supporters to maintain their control efficiently during struggles in the power distribution domain of national politics. People whose livelihoods and safety are urgent issues occupy multiple spaces and simultaneously use multiple discourses and multiple social relations. The study considered African potentials and analysed the functions of the interface between such ideas outside the community and the inherent considerations of African origin, which cannot be reduced to exposure to the imperial ambitions of modern Western Europe (Matsuda 2016).

In the following we will first examine the plasticity of social group structure seen from the relationships that underpin everyday life collaboration among East African pastoralists and the Dodoth. Then, we consider the impact of the modern state system on the issue of armed violence among pastoral societies.

Outline of East African Pastoral Societies and Dodoth Society

*Plasticity of Group Structure*

The Dodoth speak a language belonging to the Eastern Nilotic branch of the Eastern Sudanic languages. Their society is based on a symbiosis with livestock in one of the harshest environments in Africa, adjacent to the Karimojong, Jie, and Teso in Uganda, the Turkana in north-western Kenya and the Jiye, Nyangatom and Toposa in South Sudan. Two hundred years ago these pastoral groups united to form the *Atker* political community, which, although initially heterogeneous, became differentiated due to conflicts over livestock raiding (especially cattle). They have maintained a level of co-existence to this day, despite kaleidoscopic changes to the collective harmony due to antagonism over the sharing of pasture ground and the repeated occurrence of violent armed raids (Lamphear 1976). Like other East African pastoral societies, Dodoth society is characterised by a flexible group structure and fluid ethnic identity. Social groups in East African pastoral areas are not fixed units defined by a single cultural and ethnic tradition but are, rather, constructed considering the politics of access to ecological resources, relationships of mutual relief and gift giving, and the avoidance of raiding, drought and animal disease (Schlee 1998; Lamphear 1993). Gifford-Gonzalez and Hanotte reported that East African pastoralists have developed cattle pastoralism over the past 5,000 years as a mechanism to ensure the utilisation of ecological resources in an environment where climate prediction is difficult, and in combination with other subsistence activities (e.g., hunter gathering) (Gifford-Gonzalez and Hanotte 2011). In an
environment where the impacts of climate change are significant, the location of pasture and water will change according to the year and season and, therefore, an exclusive occupation in a specific location by a particular group would be an ineffective survival strategy. In the East African savanna, several groups co-located in the area are loosely associated with the land and an egalitarian system of social negotiations has been established in which people’s mobility and mutual resource use are allowed. The reason why East African pastoralism has survived to this day can be found in the development of such a dynamic ‘cultural mosaic’ (Gifford-Gonzalez 1998: 195). The characteristics of the ethnic identity of pastoralists are associated with the comprehensiveness and plasticity of group organisation that allow coexistence with heterogeneous groups. Sobania notes that East African pastoral societies of the 19th century formed a comprehensive integrated body that recognised a mutual transboundary between ethnic groups. As a result, they were able to overcome frequent drought and animal disease, or accelerate the recovery process from catastrophic livestock losses and natural disasters (Sobania 2011).

The same clans and sub-clans exist across ethnic groups, with mutually different languages, histories, customs and, sometimes, hostilities in modern East African pastoral societies. They play a role in preventing the occurrence of all-out war between ethnic groups and smoothing over conflicts by urging peace forums to be held (Matsuda 2016). Schlee analysed the clan principle in groups such as the Gabra, Sakuye, Rendille and Borana in northern Kenya and reported the ‘mobility of identity’ that allows individuals to choose an identity adequate for their situation from a range of ethnic identities (Schlee 1989). Naito also found that the Rendille and Samburu have a dual membership through which individuals can belong to any ethnic group through the patrilineal clan principle (Naito 2004). In societies where such mutually hostile ethnic groups are simultaneously connected through the clan identity extending beyond ethnic boundaries, it is possible to read hostilities using ethnic identity in certain circumstances and, at the same time, to develop a conjugate point using clan identity. In East African pastoral societies that have developed a mechanism allowing selectivity of identity, the hierarchical (top and bottom) relationship in stratification of ethnic groups and clans can be reversed, and boundaries between ethnic groups, or the upper units (for example, the phratries), inevitably become obscured by the subordinate group as they jointly construct their everyday lives beyond the boundaries between the upper units.

In Dodoth society, the concept of boundaries and territories with neighbouring groups is very vague. Even during periods when large-scale raiding between neighbouring ethnic groups occurs frequently, people of different ethnic groups share the pasture ground and co-habit the same herding camps to
maintain cooperative relations. Members of different ethnic groups who live together in the camps will work together to defend animals as property. The boundary line between ethnic groups has permeability according to the benefits to individuals and society as a whole. It is impossible for ethnic groups to depart from the bonds between individuals and residential groups in real life situations or to make a member self-devoted. The vertical relationships between ethnic groups and their subordinate classification units can be reversed. The potential for such inter-ethnic level and inter-personal units to be reversed is not limited to Eastern Nilotic pastoralists such as the Karimojong, Jie and Dodoth. Sagawa (2011) studied the Dasanetch, Eastern Cushitic pastoralists in south-eastern Ethiopia, and found cross-cutting ties across ethnic groups through the exchange of goods and mutual visits. These relationships have a personal quality and are not determined by the relationships between powerful persons who represent the nation or institutionalised friendships but are, rather, generated by each person’s hope for concrete interactions and the willingness to network. Conversations, joint herding, communal eating and livestock gifts are all behaviours practised by individuals across ethnic groups that prevent the essentialisation of collective differences. Eastern African pastoral societies are hierarchical but the relationships between the upper and lower classification units can change. Absolute ‘structures’ that establish an ethnic group at the top of society do not endure forever. Over time they undergo a process of alienation, including a movement that constantly contests the structure of society.

*Pastoral Societies in the Nation State*

Historically, the central government of Uganda took various forms, i.e., a colonial government, post-independence government, socialist government, neoliberal government, populist government and authoritarian government. However, as with other modern states, the central government is not free from the teleology that requires the satisfaction of an infinite appetite for revenue. This has encouraged the standardisation of administrative, economic and cultural standards by pacifying and subordinating non-national space and the citizens, while imposing social control. As mentioned earlier, the characteristics of ethnicity in the everyday life of an East African pastoral society are flexible and the sense of attribution where one can phantasmagorically re-read openness to others and the relation between and hostility and friendship, while logic of living can allow for free movements beyond social and ecological boundaries. The concept of the nation state is now deeply embedded in East Africa, but the concept of boundaries that depict the surface area (the two-dimensional surface enclosed by the boundary) is foreign. Administrative divisions (districts) and
grazing areas that were established during the colonial period were drawn along the boundary of the ‘tribe’ as perceived by the colonial government, and boundaries were created in the process (Gray 2000). The anaphoric relation between people and their cultures, referred to as compartmentalisation and territorialisation of ethnicity in East African pastoralists, was constructed and acquired a form of cognition and expression that could be expressed on a map. This resulted in the territory of a ‘tribe’ being realised by the colonial government, with chiefs appointed to help its efficient control (ignoring the everyday management of collective decision making in the local context). This was continued by policy makers after independence because it coincided with the framework of pasture conservation assumed by herding ecologists (Schlee 2013).

However, since the earliest colonial period, the modern state system has been fundamentally opposed to the ecological logic and politics among subsistence pastoralists. The key to colonial policy in Uganda was to control the two most fundamental reactions presented by pastoralists to changes in the physical and political environment, namely, mobility and the utilisation of raiding as a pastoral strategy in an environment that fluctuates in an uncertain manner. With the decentralisation of state power in the 21st century, along with gazing in the remote border areas of Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan, international concerns have focused on how power operates in a ‘failed state’ and ‘fragile state’, such as South Sudan and Somalia. Asad reported that these nations’ margins are so unstable that state law and national order must be continuously re-established (Asad 2004: 279). In this sense, the pastoral societies of the 21st century in the nation states of East Africa are the core units that clarify the mechanisms of modern politics and power, and its limits. For example, after 2000, a serious and complicated armed conflict arose in pastoral areas, which was caused by a disarmament policy implemented mainly by the Ugandan government, and a ‘coping’ strategy was implemented by the international community. The national intervention in the Karamoja region involved armed conflict and strongly reflected global governance measures on transboundary terrorism networks. Immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, ‘failed states’ and ‘collapsed states’ were designated as hotbeds of terrorism. At the same time the ‘disorder’ of north-east African countries, including Sudan, was emphasised, and the governments of Western countries and international organisations drafted and implemented policies involving anti-terrorism activities and social development. For example, in a joint statement of the Uganda-Sudan bilateral talks, held by the UK, that involved the United Nations and large European NGOs involved in international development, pastoral societies in the Karamoja were positioned as rebellious groups equivalent to the
Lord’s Resistance Army, an anti-government organisation that fought with the government from southern Sudan to northern Uganda. The ‘elimination of the arms trade beyond the border to pastoral areas’ was set as a cooperation target of the UK, the EU, non-government representatives and UN agencies. The Government of the United States has also addressed transboundary violence and, as part of the ‘US International Development Agency mission’ related to the border areas of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan (i.e. the entire residential area of the Ateker group), directly requested President Museveni to continue supporting the government’s disarmament of Ugandan pastoralists. Financial aid for anti-terrorism social development flowed into Uganda, which was positioned as a country promoting anti-terrorism policies, and the World Bank also provided substantial support in terms of defence expenses to implement disarmament in the Karamoja region. In international politics, the Ugandan government was accepted as a single entity, with an established social order. As a result, in recent years, development activities led by both domestic organisations and those implemented through international cooperation have increased rapidly in the area. The ‘Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme’ was remarkable in terms of the number of personnel involved, size of budget, length of implementation period and the impact on the everyday life of pastoralists. The Ugandan government’s agenda against pastoralists was to pursue the recovery of law and order centred on sedentarisation and disarmament through compulsory detention at military herding camps installed adjacent to army barracks. This compulsory sedentarisation system adopted by the government and officially called ‘protected kraal’ used international aid to provide modern medicine, school level education and agriculture, and gave the appearance of protecting citizens. However, the reality was a military intervention that threatened the sustainability of pastoralism and the safety of individuals. One report gave the example of a Dodoth family who continued their nomadic movement between herding camps between 2006 and 2008 and engaged in battle five times with the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), which enforced their accommodation in a protected kraal but, after being bombed by UPDF battle helicopters, they decided to move to a protected kraal (Hazama 2018). Western donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs, who supported the militarisation and authoritarianism of the central government, were accomplices in the violations of the pastoralists’ human rights.
Ethnic Citizenship

The term *emoit* or ‘enemy’ in the Dodoth language refers to any general threat to survival and includes human and livestock epidemics as well as threats from certain human groups. The enemies during the disarmament period were state violence and animal and human diseases (Hazama 2015). The most severe countermeasure against human enemies is an armed uprising, which was undertaken by the Dodoth through ‘people wearing a red hat without a brim’ (*Ngirengelen*), a group that was spontaneously formed by young men in the border zone when the military stopped the ground warfare and began relentless air strikes using battle helicopters. According to a note from a 30-year-old community health worker living in the village examined in this study, 11 people died in the village from June to December 2009. All were ‘people wearing a red hat without a brim’ and died fighting the army. The crude mortality rate during the period was 1.6 deaths / ten thousand people per day. This is about three times the normal crude mortality rate in Sub-Saharan Africa (Jaspars and Khogali 2001). A society where deaths are concentrated among young males is unusual. An ecological anthropologist, Sandra Gray, who studied in the southern part of the Karamoja before the disarmament period, quantitatively showed that the mortality rate of young men was abnormally high in the Karimojong society due to conflict that occurred during livestock raiding (Gray et al. 2003). The deaths during the disarmament period occurred in a period when state order was being re-established and violent confrontation with powerful authorities determined the relationship between perpetrators and victims. Violent confrontation with the state is deadly to society. Based on different alternative kinds of resistance, such as the treatment of illness, mutual help in collaborative herding camps, and influencing decision making at a general assembly, in the following section we consider other types of ethnic citizenship.

**Formation of the Resistance**

Disarmament, imposed by state violence, has resulted in disparities in the levels of armament between peoples and has triggered further attacks. Unlike the application of biomedical medicine, which is based on Western traditional thinking, African pastoralists in the midst of this complex violent situation clearly understood that the body of a sick person was not affected by ill fortune as a process of nature, which can be separated from the experience of life itself. The process of healing consists of a dual strategy of intervening in the body to tackle the disease, as well as intervening in the environmental context surrounding the body.
For example, we examine a disease called *etukuri*. *Etukuri* is a kind of ‘heart disease’ (*etau*) caused by the sound of continuous gunshots, flying battle helicopters and rocket gun bursts ‘entering the heart’. Symptoms can occur when affected individuals recall gunshots, explosions, battles and torture, and include an increased heartbeat resulting in the blood vessels in the head and heart ‘jumping’ synchronising heartbeat, chest pain, breathing difficulties, gasping, fainting and confusion. In the treatment of *etukuri*, medicinal herbs are used to discharge substances from the body, while narration and singing take place to calm the body, and death and regeneration are emphasised through dance and an altered state of consciousness. In the herbal remedies provided by a traditional medicine man, a sick person drinks water containing the herbs and experiences repeated violent diarrhoea and vomiting; a powder is applied to stimulate an endlessly runny nose. The sick person then drinks a large amount of soup boiled together with meat of the waist and the large and small intestines of a male goat or sheep with a certain skin colour (black, blue or red and black, as specified by a traditional medicine man according to his dreams). This causes the sick person to sweat intensively. At the same time, the medicine man and the family of the sick person will whisper to the patient to calm him or her down (*akisiliwrorun*), causing the patient to forget past events and encourage the sick person to be calm. They whisper the phrases ‘Do not worry. Reduce the heart. People are peaceful together. Silence heals disease. Peace is medicine’. Thereafter, sacred soil (*emunyen*), with a specific colour (white, red, blue or green), is applied to the body of the sick person and the whispering to calm him or her down is repeated.

In the process of singing and dancing called *abur*, participants sing a ‘song of medicine’ by hitting a half-gourd and plastic container floating in water. The sick person dances with the participants, cramps, faints and then falls into a strange conscious state called *ngijokin*. At this time, the body of the sick person is thought to be in a state of death. Participants and traditional doctors shake a cowbell so that the sick person will not die and whisper the phrases ‘keep peace’ and ‘forget the past’. They also touch the sick person’s chest with their hands or the cowbell (the Dodoth refer to this behaviour as ‘touching the heart’). The Dodoth claim that their song of medicine ‘releases closed heart’ of the sick. *Abur* is an attempt to heal ‘a closed heart’ with suffering by death and regeneration. Approximately 20 people gather together during *abur*. Military soldiers and pastoralists other than the Dodoth also participate. The troops stationed in the Karamoja region consist of people other than pastoralists. Many individuals from agricultural societies such as the Ganda, Teso, Ankole, Acholi and Langi became soldiers but refused to train or participate in actual warfare despite being ordered to do so by military officers. They had a ‘special relationship’ with the
pastoralists and routinely exchanged food provided by the army for milk from the Dodoth. They also exhibited the symptoms of etukuri and participated in abur. This demonstrates that the Dodoth could participate in shared rituals with individual soldiers, while rejecting the violence imposed by the government forces and also showed that the Dodoth did not embrace collective and alternative thoughts of ‘them’ and ‘we’ or ‘enemies’ and ‘ally’. They believe that there are alternative activities in their daily reality that can intervene in violent situations and they use healing as a form of resistance to stop repression and violence.

Feyissa (2010) focused on the flexible thoughts and practices of the Nuer political community in the border areas of Ethiopia and South Sudan. Unlike the closed border concept of Western Europe, the boundaries between groups (Cieng) are transparent and individuals develop alternative forms of citizenship that enable people to travel across multiple nations and ethnicities for the convenience of their livelihoods. For example, there is a fictitious kinship system that permits other people from different ethnic groups and nationalities to arrive at any time and coexist as a member of same group. The expansion of the network extends choices regarding destination for individuals. The healing process used by the Dodoth to cope with the ‘disease of violence’ also enables a reorganisation of state space, giving priority to actions that benefit daily life, because it, in the context of dealing with circumstances, attempts to lead state actors into the side of the governed to create the same cognitive world as ‘ours’ by having them participate in a practice of co-living, and to embed it in space of hostile regime of nation state and organised violence. ‘Crude citizenship’, which appeared with the rise of the oil extraction industry in the Turkana land in north-western Kenya, indicated that life security can be provided as a form of ‘enclavement’, created by foreign capital (Enns and Bersaglio 2015). Neighbours of the oil extraction site approached oil companies to be provided with guaranteed minimum living standards. With the entry of oil companies, a hierarchical ranking of citizenship was formed in enclaves: head office employees, local employees, neighbouring residents and pastoralists in the surrounding wilderness. Although the capital interspersed through enclaves emphasises the imbalance between the inside and the outside of these spaces, the Dodoth have achieved ethnic citizenship within the dominance order. This has changed the relationship between those in control and those controlled, and has encouraged solidarity among the weak. In doing so, they are attempting to resist state violence by making cracks in the space of the governance.
**Collaborative Herding Camps**

In December 2006, the Dodoth were attacked by both the Turkana and the army but managed to escape to a pasture ground in the South Sudan border zone. Together with the Toposa and Turkana (a different Turkana from the group that attacked them) they constructed eight herding camps that shared a single enclosure in a design that enabled them to see each other. This was referred to as an *akigunya* (neighbourhood or neighbouring group) and now functions as a joint community group (population of about 4,600 people). This ethnically mixed herding camp community hold meetings in a field within the camp every morning and evening. There are eight elected councillors, who manage community problems of everyday life and two representatives with the responsibility to encourage discussion at the meetings and guide the group toward an overall decision. Individuals from each herding camp operate a shift system in which individuals guard animal herds when they graze during the day and overnight in the camp. There are shepherding groups, armed escort groups, and night watchman groups, and all pastoralists voluntarily participate as representatives, councillors or as members of herding and security management organisations. Their share of labour and the security risk are equal.

The collaborative herding camp also has a system to guarantee a healthy mind and body through the formation, maintenance and expansion of a web of mutual aid, wherein traditional welfare citizenship, as defined by Isin and Turner (2007) is embodied. People without livestock and property, people with disabilities and elderly people can maintain a basic quality of life not only by borrowing lactating cows and receiving gifts through begging but also by ‘food ‘aid’ (cereal flour). Gatherings are arranged by camp members with friends and relatives in the implementation of food relief to provide details of when food aid will be provided. The food aid is distributed at the place of the Turkana near to the Kakuma refugee camp and the Ik community practising agriculture and hunting and gathering on the Ugandan side of the border. All inhabitants of the target area or households including socially vulnerable people (aged 60 and over, disabled, orphans, widows) can receive international food aid every one to two months. Maize flour, beans, salt and cooking oil are distributed, with cereal flour being a particularly valuable commodity to the residents of the joint herding camps. The residents (mainly women and boys) travel on foot for one to two days to the Kenya-Uganda border for a secondary distribution of aid food. Usually, this expedition team is a group of four to five people and returns to the camp with secondary food aid of about 20 kg per person. When I observed one of these expeditions reaching the main hut in the camp, ten people (those without property, family members, those with disabilities and their families, and elderly people) arrived to beg for food. A Dodoth woman was observed who...
came on behalf of an old Turkana woman who was in bed with a high fever due
to malaria. She pleaded, ‘Help my mother’, even though the old woman was not
a relative. When she explained that, ‘My mother cannot walk’, she received a
distribution of maize flour of about 3 kg from a married Dodoth woman who
had received a secondary distribution of food aid from the Turkana in Kenya.
She also received about half as much again after stating, ‘I am hungry, what
should I eat?’

The collaborative herding camps have inclusive citizenship characteristics.
The general assembly operates a direct democratic consensus decision-making
system. One of the problematic features of the community is the principle of
the superiority of group over individual. For example, the spirit of self-sacrifice
among members for the profit of the whole group, or the rejection of those
who do not show that loyalty, is often admired. However, in the collaborative
herding camp, all people are allowed to express disagreement with the dominant
view. During the assembly, pastoralists verbally confirmed many times that they
could participate in the process of making people’s peace (ekisil angikirionok).
The Dodoth clearly distinguish this direct democratic assembly as being
completely different from the peace meetings (ekisil apukan) and the government
and NGOs sponsored meetings (eperit apukan) in which only representatives can
talk at specific times and are told, ‘In our approach, big people do not force
answers.’

Women, children, and disabled people participate in the general assembly,
which influences general decision making. The gatherings in collaborative
herding camps are non-hierarchical and, therefore, a few people do not
dominate a large number of people and the voices of minorities are not ignored
by the majority. In contrast to Western political philosophy, non-logocentric
ideas and practices are often applied. Since Aristotle political participation ‘for
citizens by citizens’ has been emphasised as a virtue of those living in a
community. However, the ability to become a member of the political
community is restricted to those with the linguistic agency (eloquent and wealthy
men) to declare justice and injustice. At the pastoral assembly, the body
movement and presence of children and disabled people, who do not
linguistically assert their own thoughts on the collective, may have important
meanings in the decision making of the camp management. For example, an
‘enemy repelling ceremony’ is frequently conducted to guarantee the safety of
grazing routes. On one occasion such a ceremony was agreed at the morning
meeting but was opposed by the crying voice of a child and the resolution was
withdrawn (a case study will be presented later). Examples of paralinguistic
voices and gestures affecting decision making were also observed among the
relations of those with the ‘heart diseases’ described in the previous section.
After the treatment ceremony was carried out on a sick person with *etukuri*, people of the same age arrived to care for him or her so that he or she would not fall from high ground or into the fire, or disappear in the bush. This care was provided not only during meals and at bedtime but also inside and outside the settlement, even in casual circumstances. These activities were undertaken without a request from the camp representatives or parents. The individuals involved shared a sense of simple interpersonal feeling, such as a mutual consciousness and a feeling of cooperativeness that encouraged them to perform rituals centred on sick people. They were able to interpret the expressions of the sick through their physical movements and facial expressions, and convey them at meetings, which had an influence on the decisions. For example, with regard to security at night, a decision was made to place security personnel away from the hut of a sick person so as not to cause a seizure due to the sound of footsteps or gunshots. This political philosophy of pastoralists, who do not absolutise linguistic agency, has also been expressed as an inclusive citizenship practice, which also includes animals (livestock) and will be described in detail in section 4.

A further characteristic of inclusive citizenship is the interactivity in the relationship between the representative and the participant. The full confrontation with power has not only introduced physical and structural violence into the Dodoth society but has also generated a repressive regime that demands a homogenous identity. I found that pastoralists were creating a mechanism to skilfully avoid this. In a political regime that trusts power to delegates, minority objections indicate a lack of harmony and are a threat that can shake the foundation of collective integration. The community of pastoralists have solved this issue by identifying common points of disagreement. Representatives of the collaborative herding camps do not eloquently express sublime ideals or enlightenment about the virtues of citizens. Rather, they play an important role as coordinators to help other participants share a common story by restoring accord using humour closely related to their lives, or by inviting them to remember past events. For example, to overcome a potential enemy, such as ‘those who will be encountered on grazing routes’ in the dream of a traditional healer, all participants of a meeting were asked to present a sheep as a sacrificial beast (specifically, an individual black sheep). A girl from the herd’s milking group broke down saying, ‘Do not kill *kirion* (the sheep’s name based on its black coat colour)’, while many were praising the owner of the herd who generously offered the sheep. Through this discord, the representatives of the Dodoth uttered such a metaphor as ‘There is no need to surround the small warriors (the girl who cries for sheep and her friends) and confiscate (*arem*) animals’. The laughter of the participants gave the impression
that they were left with no choice and it was suggested that their planned actions had similarities with the military cordons and the manner in which they searched settlements and took animals. Pastoralists started looking for an alternative pasture ground, and eventually established a different grazing route from the one that was originally intended.

Thompson, who analysed 18th century British activity using the moral economy concept, claimed that mob behaviour is not as irrational as it appears on the surface (Thompson 1971). A collaborative herding camp not only operates to enable the daily lives and survival of pastoralists but also functions to resist the relationship between the governing (state system) and the governed (the weak) at a time when there is a lack of life security. It also leads to better coexistence practices based on the values of mutual aid. The interdependence of morality among pastoralists is, unlike Western cultures, not based on a consistent traditional idea of social norms and obligations as a fixed member of a belief community that shares certain customs and ideas (Thompson 1971: 79). In the collaborative herding camps, social citizenship across permeable ethnic boundaries is practised within non-homogenised spaces in the ethnic sense. The evacuation of the Dodoth into the collaborative herding camp was primarily the art to withdraw from the control of power and violence. However, it was supported by the construction of a new community, and it was an attempt to determine what kind of alternative form of mutual behaviour was possible.

Citizenship That Includes Animals (Livestock)

Two Perspectives Regarding Animals

Kirksey and Helmreich (2010) have argued that animals exist at the periphery of anthropology as human food, part of the landscape and as symbols, and they also explained how ethnography that had once been limited to human subjects has been transformed into interspecific ethnography. In interspecific ethnography, the relationship between humans and living things is the focal point, with the relationship organised by concepts such as symbiotic connections, interconnections and non-hierarchical alliances (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010: 546). In terms of a qualitative interest in interspecific parity, the pastoral world is compatible with the world of interspecific ethnography. In the pastoral world, animals and humans are involved as persons with mutual characteristics. This is in contrast to animals being treated as human property, products to sell, sources of power and sometimes resources to preserve as in capitalist and modern state systems. The relationships between colonial and postcolonial state principals and animals, unlike those in pastoral worlds, involve an eccentric collection of concepts that excludes anything emic, with
communities in nation states having moved outside of natural society. Humans and animals are deeply divided. The view of the modern state is that animals do not have independent agency, they do not deserve collective rights and their lives are of little value outside of service to human beings.

Animals among the East African pastoralists are considered to be raw materials and a labour force. In particular, animals have provided people with the various conditions necessary for survival and for maintaining a livelihood as both objects and companions and through their roles in ecosystem services. For the Dodoth, cattle, donkeys, goats and sheep provide wealth and can be exchanged, while cattle and donkeys are working animals. However, these animals are not treated as commodities, machines or artefacts that can be manipulated at humans’ will. There is a close relationship between pastoralists and animals. Communication can be established, with each animal being called by an individual name. Each animal has a gender, expresses emotion and is considered to possess wisdom, personality and personhood (Hazama 2015). In addition, animals have customary rights, can participate in ceremonies and have the power of a curse. When animals and people move from settlements to herding camps in the dry season, all animals and shepherds are blessed by the elders. The life of animals has more value than that of production and reproduction. Animals are an irreplaceable point of identification with their ancestors for the Dodoth, who realise that ‘who we used to be’ coexist with animals. Animals in the pastoral world embody the habitus of people as active members of society.

**Resistance of Co-citizens**

Individual animals have personhood that exists interspecifically and they are also citizens of pastoral societies together with humans. An expression of citizenship including animals was frequently observed in the peace meetings (*ekisil apukan*) held between government and pastoralists. In August 2014, the Dodoth consulted with the Karimojong, Turkana and Jie along with district governors, council members and NGOs. Three district governors, military chiefs and hundreds of pastoralists gathered together, and a large meeting was held. In the shade of an acacia tree in Loyoro, the administrative centre at the boundary of each pastoralist group, the meeting proceeded with the representatives of each pastoral community presenting their opinions in order. The focus was the insistence by the pastoralists that the freedom and peace of animals had to be restored. Subjectivities were raised on behalf of the animals, such as ‘Animals must not be confined in one place by the government’, and ‘The heart of a cow detached from the family of humans and other animals is filled with suffering. Stop taking the cow from the owner’. It was clear from the
comments made by the pastoralists that they considered animal behaviour to be abnormal in a protected kraal, and this was seen as a form of resistance by the animals based on their dissatisfaction with and anxiety ensuing from their living environment. Animals in the daily lives of pastoralists are not seen through the lens of reflective and symbolic systems as in the classical conceptualisation of correspondence between animals and humans (Lévi-Strauss 1966). Animals are considered to have agency in their lives and are able to sense specific situations through the (empathic) attitude of pastoralists. This can be expressed by the following case study:

In herding camps under military surveillance, shepherds milk the animals early in the morning. On one occasion, a bull named Inyang made a short and low bellow, ‘dwat, dwat’ …’, at the edge of the pen. At almost the same time, 200 cattle in the pen made sounds and, at once, jumped, rushed out, thrust at each other with their horns, and pushed each other. Under pressure from the moving bodies of the large undulating cattle herd, the fence of the pen collapsed. This abnormal behaviour lasted for around five minutes. The shepherds and eight young people calmed Inyang and the other herd animals and somehow controlled the situation. One young man explained the reason for the disturbance: ‘Inyang remembered the smell of Namechele, and the grief was transmitted to the herd. They tried to commit suicide by grieving for their companion’s death.’ Namechele was a mature female that had been shot dead by a soldier when she was moving outside the fence at night, four days earlier. Animals frequently try to escape to the outside during the night because the interior of the fixed camp is uncomfortable. The soldiers often kill and eat such animals. They ‘say that, ‘Animals must be housed in the camp during the night, or we will punish the owner of the cow for neglecting his duty.’ Inyang smelt the undigested grass in the stomach of Namechele from the ground. The Dodoth believe that this behaviour of a cattle herd is due to the sorrow of bereavement and that Inyang expressed this feeling by crying. It is a collective synchronisation of despair and self-destructive behaviour. Namechele was killed, Inyang cried, and this resonated with the herd, which then sympathised with Inyang’s grief. When explaining the situation and actions of the animals, the pastoralists replace ‘them’ with ‘us’ when referring specifically to the animals.

Pastoralists claim to have abolished the military herding camp regime by acting as one with the animals, who are co-citizens, sharing their lives and feelings with human beings. In other words, due to the animal’s resistance (akitepeg) to the military herding camp regime, the Dodoth were able to claim rejection against state control:

The cows refuse to lie in the protected kraal. Goats and sheep jump on the fence. Animals lie down refusing to eat grass during day-trip herding. The cows
ignore the shepherd who calls their name. Due to illness and fasting, the animals’ walking speed fell.

Clever cows and goats hide themselves in the bushes and intentionally get lost and try to escape from the herd. Bulls pulling an ox-plough lie down and will not move. The donkeys who tow building materials also quickly collapse and, when forcibly raised, they begin to kick. If you place your luggage on their back, they collapse, and rampage, and destroy your luggage, and will bite a person.

Animals refuse to return to the protected kraal in the evening. Even if you hit a cow with a cane and force it into the pen, the cow hates to stay inside and breaks through the fence. Following the sudden command of the military to move inside, the animals are angry because they must stop grazing and enter the pen. They abuse people, break through fence, run around, break legs, disturb the gardens, and fight with people. The cows become ferocious, especially when they hear explosions or gunshots.’

The cows head for the watering place after the soldiers sleep. Cows refuse to sleep in the protected kraal and keep raising their voices. When a cow owner was charged with possession of a gun, the cows were not allowed to graze, and were left in the enclosure where they continued to vocalize and protest.

The pastoralists recognised the following behaviours, which were observed during my fieldwork, as resistance by the animals: pretending ignorance, refusal of orders, walking with their legs dragging, refusing to work (in the absence of food), refusing to work (in hot weather), taking breaks without permission, vocal complaints, stealing, destroying equipment, running away and direct confrontation. These are the behaviours of the ruled toward the controlling mechanisms and are referred to as ‘the art of life’ or ‘weapons’ of the weak (Matsuda 1999). Although these concepts and practices are rarely organised, they operate actively and constantly every day in the behaviour of the oppressed weak, and sometimes have the desired effect. In pastoral societies, a casual non-obedience attitude is not limited to humans. To resist the protected kraal system, animals adopt the life of the weak; interpreting the situation like this, the pastoralists recognise the political subjectivity of animals and represent them as co-citizens. Animal resistance and death have crossed species through their interdependence with humans and have generated objections to modern civil society.

Self-help Security System

The pastoralists, who resisted herding camps under army control, continued to promote the voice of the animals at the inhabitants’ meetings, and in 2011
they led the state to agree to review camp movement restrictions. This was an epochal change. When pastoralists wanted to move camps, they sent a letter of application to the district governor or the army and could move if they obtained permission. However, the will of pastoralists continued to be ignored due to the influence of the military. The route and the start and end time of day-trip herding were still commanded and controlled by the military. In August 2014, pastoralists regained the right to self-determination for all herding and movement. The decisive role in the negotiations against the government that brought about this change in attitude was played by a security organisation that combined the community’s hegemony and external hegemony in a pluralistic manner. Pastoralists’ negotiations with the government, in which they had secured the freedom of the herding camps from the military surveillance that restricted their free movement, were based on African ways of applying knowledge and institutions to solve the problems faced by African societies. In other words, there were distinctive characteristics linked to the practice of bricolage that were considered to be African potentials. The practice of bricolage is a concept used by Matsuda (2016) to analyse the self-policing created by urban migrants coping with Kenyan post-election violence. It refers to the development of thought and practice based on the necessity of residents’ lives, which is required to realise the protection of the body, life and property. It satisfied the external hegemony of the West and the Kenyan state and the hegemony of the community.6

In the case of the Karamoja region, in August when the last group of Dodoth left in South Sudan returned to the Ugandan side of the border, the Dodoth, Karimojong, Turkana and Jie set up a joint camp community in pasture ground on the ethnic boundary. The pastoralists (including the Toposa) launched a ‘traditional’ search team for raided animals at each sub-county level, in which people from the same ethnic group pursued and reclaimed raided animals. Because armed conflict had arisen due to the resumption of raiding among pastoralists dispersed across Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan, if there had been a limit to the range of raiding deterrence within Uganda, conflict resolution would not have been possible. The escarpment in north-eastern Uganda is a wet savanna and provides suitable pasture ground for fattening animals. Neighbouring pastoralists, including the Toposa and Turkana, have a strong desire to share this land. The pastoralist group showed solidarity beyond national boundaries with regard to the improvement of security to ensure pasture sharing. The self-help security system crossed national and ethnic boundaries and became the basis of the mixed system of pastoral communities. Through a forum involving local governments at the district level in Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan, together with NGOs, agreements were made to trial
various new mechanisms (e.g. pastoralists will report the proceedings ‘of cattle-herd-owners’ ‘meetings’ to the military every two weeks, districts will participate in joint meetings to establish search teams for raided animals every three months, and search teams for raided animals will develop a system to coordinate team activities with the government and NGOs). The self-help security system operated by the pastoralists was therefore strongly related to the local police and military administration systems.

When organising the search team, pastoralists recalled former indigenous self-governing collective practices. For example, the Dodoth referred to the practice and collective memories of their attacks on armed groups inside the Dodoth in 1988 when raided animals were returned to their owners among different peoples. The 1988 event occurred when some Dodoth raided large herds of cattle belonging to the Karimojong who had formed a collaborative herding camp with the Dodoth. The Dodoth believed that recapture of the stolen herds was essential for the restoration of security and continued pasture sharing and, therefore, gathered together with friends and young people from the same or neighbouring villages to track the footprints of the herd. A group of more than 400 pastoralists armed with automatic rifles arrived at the base of the group of raiders. They held a meeting in the surrounding pasture ground to plan the attack and clarify the role of each participant and were finally able to recover all the Karimojong cattle.

The search team for raided animals organised by pastoralists to end the military herding camp regime was called a ‘crowd’ (atukot), because it was organised autonomously against the armed group within the same ethnic group. The word ‘crowd’ is an old name that indicates a collective practice of coexistence by former shepherds. It was reused here as a label to cognitively establish the ‘new’ institutional and social organisation of the search team. Social and political issues generally change at a rapid pace that exceeds the capacity of existing institutions and organisations to respond (Lund 2006). The new system of articulating a search team crossing national and ethnic borders with the external hegemony was a counter strategy that was improvised to revive nomadism in rich pasture ground, which pastoralists typically desire. To surmount that strategy, the pastoral community selects materials that can be used for new situations from stocks of existing symbols and practices that can be used inside and outside of themselves and combine them with other materials to embody new systems of practices and thoughts.

The ideas and attitudes expressed by ‘the weak’ to synthesise a new system with ‘external’ concepts, and then transform the unjust situations experienced by pastoralists and animals as their co-citizens, both of whom are suppressed by the controlling power structure, resonates with the concept of conviviality used
by Nyamnjoh (2002) to understand the life practices of Africans who simultaneously use multiple political spaces, discourses and social relations. Nyamnjoh studied the Grassfielder society in the western and north-western parts of Cameroon. The study focused on the tactics of people behaving like citizens, as recommended by the modern Western European ideology of individual empowerment in relation to the state, while acting in other contexts as subjects of traditional authority, and described the process of context-specific integration and political behaviour using the concept of conviviality. In this improvisation process that emphasises the convenience of life, people cannot be bound by a singular form of political discourse or identity. The mode of political discourse or identity that causes multiple political people to act through multiple relations has priority. The characteristics of this life practice are well embodied in the attitude of pastoralists who do not deny that the state is a powerful subject with a clear intention, a strong degree of rationality and an overall project in the presence of the notables, and still self-create an ideal image of nationals who trust the state’s ability to execute.

During the meeting with the government, all the representatives of the pastoralists, including those from the Dodoth, structured their behaviour during their turn to speak; they delivered individual praise for the government’s disarmament and social development policies. Even shepherds who had family and friends killed in the complex violence immediately after ‘returning’ the gun to the government in response to the disarmament – everyone is an experienced person with this unreasonableness – said, ‘Guns take away our lives, and that is something that prevents us from living together. The government trying to eliminate them is good’. People put behind the history and logic of the practice of disobedience and resistance and behave like cognizable citizens who devote to the national community, which is a powerful tool to ingratiate themselves with the nation. Pastoralists would save the face of the representatives of the nation state and completely ignore them when they were absent, as is the case in collaborative herding camps formed in border areas where national rule does not reach. Through the practice of multiple parallel structures and alternative mechanisms (plural, collective decision-making systems, life security and communities), the concept of the unity of a singular national system and its rationality can be controlled.

Closing Remarks

For pastoralists, central government bodies pursuing the national isomorphism of politics, economics, culture and society have historically and routinely been viewed as no more than looters of animals due to their anti-
livestock policy. From the outset, pastoralists were deprived of the opportunity to assert equality logically under the nation-state system. Therefore, when compulsory disarmament and sedentarisation were promoted violently with global cooperation, the pastoralists in the Karamoja region did not appeal (uselessly) to the normative idea of citizenship, but developed their own citizenship practice from the standpoint of ‘second class citizens’. This has changed the context of the marginalisation of pastoralism, enabling them to sustain their lives.

Pastoralists in the Karamoja region, who have been confronted by the nation state as an attacker, know empirically that direct confrontation with such power structures can result in damage and unilateral violence. They have become aware that it is not a good idea to criticise the inconsistency and incapacity of national governance. They could not align themselves with a ruler’s assertions or allow their social order to be converted to that imagined by the state. In response, they have therefore developed a repertoire of multiple citizenship practices, which they use to respond sensitively but drastically to changes in social and political circumstances, and which also reflect the appeals and resistance of animals as co-citizens of the surrounding pasture ground. The mainstream concept of ‘nationals’, which is imagined by the isomorphism of the nation state, has consistently politicised pastoral subsistence since the colonial period, and has forced pastoral society to be abandoned or homogenised into the national system. Pastoralists who restored nomadism by abolishing the compulsory sedentarisation policy at herding camps under military surveillance, which were implemented as part of the disarmament policy, have claimed an ethnic citizenship that includes their animals. Through their resistance they have attained the right to remain heterogeneous within the exclusive definition of national identity. This has been achieved through the collaboration of hostile groups in a voluntary organisational form within the national hegemony.

Ohta (2016) conducted research to identify resources for conflict resolution that would enable coexistence in the 21st century based on case studies in Africa. The research took the position that knowledge, institutions and values created by African people for the purpose of dispute resolution, reconciliation, restoration of post-conflict societies and the regeneration of social order can be understood as ‘African potentials’, and made use of. He insisted that studies that attempt to understand the wisdom of coexistence by considering the actual practices of local people in Africa have the potential to expand these implicit premises in international peacebuilding activities, which are based on Western principles, and consider Africa to have a lack of agency. Matsuda (2016) found that at the core of this African cultural potential is the art of interface that enables others (not only human beings but also others in a broad sense,
including ideas, institutions, substances, animals and spirits). We found that one function of such an interface is to generate interdependence beyond mutual exclusion and to create a symbiotic order. As Matsuda also states, this can be paraphrased as the ability to connect different things in a heterogeneous mix, supplement them, negotiate with outsiders and develop the ability to tackle problems without being bound by essentialist dualisms such as ‘Africa/Western’, ‘Nature/Culture’, ‘Tradition/Modernity’, ‘Animal/Human’, ‘Invisible/Visible’, ‘Rational/Emotional’ and ‘Truth based on physical evidence/Truth based on empathy’ (Nyamnjoh 2001). The creativity of Ugandan pastoralists who construct, claim, operate and transform the civil sphere as social space by alienating, eroding and altering the governance system imagined by the homogeneity of the concepts of citizen and national shows that non-citizens’ process of assertion to citizenship (or the process of assertion to full citizenship by second-class citizens) has the potential to transform the character of citizenship itself. Resistance to inclusion (or the struggle against exclusion) mobilises public opinion and changes the categorisation of humans and citizens captured in the framework of completeness, which is derived from modern Western civil society, and transforms the citizenship regime based on ‘rationality’. The potential that Ugandan pastoral society has created for the achievement of conflict resolution and symbiosis is the realisation of this dynamic. The potential that Ugandan pastoral society has created to resolve conflict and realise coexistence is the essential power of this dynamic.

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Notes:

1 The then British International Development Minister declared the building of a fair and lasting peaceful and efficient democratic government to ‘stop the poor in Juba and Khartoum from becoming an organising foundation for international terrorists’.

2 Cattle raiding and a local arms race, proliferation of small firearms promoted by ‘cross-border crime networks’, inappropriate maintenance of security, and insufficient national security were identified as the main factors stimulating the violent conflict within the pastoral society in the Karamoja region. The disarmament of pastoralists was planned
to be part of a broader plan for regional disarmament, with the support of an
intergovernmental development organization.

3 The targets of the aerial bombing were villages and herding camps where individuals
suspected by the military of resisting the disarmament policy were living. The attack
proceeded through a cordon and search, in which soldiers surrounded the entire
neighbouring area, violently eliminated the inhabitants, and captured suspects. As a
rebellion against this, the local youths attacked and repulsed soldiers before their mission
was complete. Eventually the soldiers began to remove their uniforms and dress in the same
way as pastoralists for camouflage. The local young men began to wear a red cap without a
brim to distinguish them as ‘true pastoralists’.

4 The medicine song in the treatment of etukuri provides a history (ngakiro nguna
etakanuniyete: literally meaning ‘problems that happened’). This song is sung for the sick to
forget the events that they have experienced by superimposing the memories with the same
kind of state violence once experienced by other people who participated in the singing. In
January 2013, medicine songs were sung to a man who went mad after being taken to the
army barracks in a case of mistaken identity, where he was tortured. The songs also look
back on state violence from the current period to the colonial government. They include
the following incidents: (a) The herding camps were bombed four times, and the military
folly of bombing camp ground again resulted in it becoming mud after the evacuation of
pastoralists (2009). (b) The beginning of the ‘Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and
Development Programme’, a new strategy introduced by the government that was defeated
in the disarmament period from 2001 to 2005 (2006); (c) A military plan to assassinate
young pastoralists who refuse to disarm (2002); and (d) The collective suicide by drowning
of naked Jie and Dodoth women who threw themselves into a muddy stream during the
rainy season after being prohibited from wearing the traditional clothing of pastoralists
during the colonial government and Ide Amin regime (1950s and 1971).

5 Kaabong Peace and Development Agency (KAPDA), Kotido Peace Initiative
(KOPEIN), Lotus Kenya Action for Development Organisation (LOKADO)

6 In Nairobi’s Kangemi area, to protect families and property from post-election gang
violence, a self-help organisation, adapted to the actual living situation, was created by the
residents. They developed each element of their discipline and behavioural patterns from
international NGOs, the Kenyan nation, and ethnic group members. This included respect
for human rights, rational deliberation, return to traditions, patrolling, and mutual
monitoring systems. This policing continued until order was restored throughout Kenya.
Bibliography


Chapter 6

Reflexive Accounts on Uganda General Election 2016: The Agency of the Dead and Its Effect among Western Nilotes

Kiyoshi Umeya

Introduction

In this chapter, I argue that a series of the government reburial or commemorative ceremonies of great men who have West Nilotic origin, those who were murdered by then president Idi Amin, was a very effective strategy in campaigning for President Museveni’s re-election. I attempt to describe the attitude of the Western Nilote peoples in Uganda towards a series of events, and confirm how individuals with voting rights are inseparably connected to the identity and sentiments of their ethnic group. The reburials clearly show that modern presidential elections have an emotional aspect as well as a civic one. This series of events and the strategic effectiveness displayed calls on us to rethink the universality of the idea of the concept of citizenship. This concept, as with all concepts of Western origin believed to be universal, is interpreted and appropriated reasonably in the autochthonous cosmogony – it might be seen to be interwoven with autochthonous concepts in Africa and other areas after being imported from the West.

As a result of the series of events the people of Western Nilotic origin, at least those who can assert to have connected, supported the president who honoured the great dead men of their ethnicity. This time the reburial was an epoch-making strategy to address the issue and even successfully manage to integrate people on the basis of ethnicity even though the late Oboth-Ofumbi was not especially beloved by all his neighbours. The other issue is the role of religious and spiritual dimensions in people’s voting behaviour. The government’s honouring of the dead affected the people in neighbouring communities in a positive way. It can be said that the dead showed the agency to the living. Or the dead intervened in the living’s action. In a sense, they, ontologically the dead shared the social space with the living as the personhood. The personhood of people in Western Nilotes inevitably includes those who have already died. Consideration of the state of the dead can influence much on their voting behaviour. Citizenship, of course, is conceived as a part of the modern contemplation, aiming at universality to some extent. However much
modern concepts aim at universality, they are always appropriated and interwoven with the autochthonous and indigenous concepts on the spot – that is the universal situation. Throughout the discussion, I propose an intricate relationship between the autonomous concepts of personhood that incorporate a shared social space with the dead and the formal definitions of citizenship. Like other modern concepts, citizenship is appropriated and entangled with indigenous concepts reasonably by the logic of the area where it was implemented. It is a modern invention aiming at the universality, such as citizenship, but it is one of the possible variations shown at the point where it was imported and implemented. That suggests that humans are not individuals who never have complete freedom. The new possibility of negotiation between the autochthonous concept and the Western imported concept, brutally aiming at the universality, will be moderately revised after considering the situation.

Uganda General Election 2016

In the Uganda General Election held on 18 February 2016, in the presidential election, 5,971,872 votes (60.62 per cent voting rate) were cast and the election ended with the landslide victory of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by incumbent President Museveni, securing 293 seats (increase of 30 seats). The party that lost the most seats (loss of 4 seats) was the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), which was established by former president Apollo Milton Opeto Obote (1924–2005). This means that the long-term administration of President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (c.1944–), which has continued from 1986, will continue for a fifth term (subsequently, the presidential age limit of 75 years was also abolished). Since the 2005 referendum, Uganda introduced a multi-party system under the pressure of the international community.

In the background, there was a good reason to support victory. For several years before the presidential election, the Museveni camp was implementing circuitous but skilful election strategies. It is a commemorative celebration consisting of ‘reburial’ of famous people who had died a violent death under the Amin regime during the 1970s and praise of their accomplishments. Among them, the establishment of ‘Archbishop Janani Luwum Day’ as a national holiday on 16 February 2015 and the series of events before and after was a very effective strategy for the re-election of Museveni and the victory of the ruling party against the Nilotic group in particular.

The aims of this chapter are to present an outline of the historical ‘archbishop murder case’, examine the significance of the series of events related to the reburial and memorial ceremony on the election campaign, and consider
if the effect on voting behaviours can be called an agency of the dead. The concept and behaviours of ‘voting’ and concepts such as ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship,’ which comprise the basis for voting, are ‘modern’ concepts invented and popularised during the modern period. This article attempts to critically examine the process regarding what happens when such concepts are transplanted to the peripheral societies.

Official Visit of the President

President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, visited the mansion of the late Arphaxad Charles Kole Oboth-Ofumbi (1932–1977) in the savannah in Tororo District by helicopter.

The President was met by the wife, sons and daughters of the deceased, and he praised the contribution by the deceased to the state of Uganda and placed flowers on his grave. Local prominent persons such as local officials in the Tororo District, religious leaders from various denominations and school faculty members were in attendance, and Henry Kyemma (1939–), the author of the famous A State of Blood: The Inside Story of Idi Amin and colleague of the deceased as a minister of the Amin regime was also present, giving a speech concerning the fact that ‘Oboth-Ofumbi fought President Amin’s dictatorship while serving as a minister’. The situation was reported extensively by the state-run network, Uganda Broadcasting Channel (UBC), as well as by the domestic English newspapers New Vision and Daily Monitor. Based on the existing diary of Oboth-Ofumbi, the nine days during which he acted as acting president of the Amin regime were reconstructed, and his wife reported that the transport of the body of Mutesa II from the United Kingdom and funeral, which cemented Amin’s popularity in Buganda, was a proposal by Oboth-Ofumbi. It was a composition that was fitting for the Daily Monitor, which was read by West Nilotic ethnic group members, which included many UPC supporters. There was consultation regarding the visit of President Museveni in advance, but the final official announcement was made the day before the visit. Receiving advance notice, his eldest son Michael, second son Samuel, etc. returned home from exile in the Unites States for a one-month scheduled stay.

This occurred on 25 July 2015. The visit of the president to the Ofumbi residence was part of the reburial of Erinayo Wilson Oryema (1917–1977) that was held on 18 September 2014 and 38th anniversary of the martyrdom of Janani Jakaliya Luwum (1922–1977) celebrated on 16 February 2015. President Museveni declared 16 February to be a national holiday as ‘Janani Luwum Day’. It is a commemoration of the three people, including Oryema, who were
murdered on that day in 1977 by President Amin. Dr Olara Otunu, who was the party leader of UPC, a party closely related to Luwum and others while they were alive, published Luwum’s biography, but it appealed only to intellectuals (Otunu 2015).

Upon the rise of Obote’s son, Jimmy Akena Obote (1967), Otunnu retired as party leader in 2015 (Akena subsequently became the presidential candidate and was appointed as party leader on 1 June 2015). Otunnu did not run in the presidential election.

Oryema’s Reburial

Oryema’s reburial was originally planned as part of the 100-year anniversary of the Ugandan police force. Over the course of time, the ceremonies have expanded to memorial ceremonies commemorating the victims of the Amin regime, and have come to fulfil a larger function to gather votes. The fact that the bereaved family members of these three created a ‘bereaved family association’ and were considering legal measures against criminal acts of President Amin also provided support.

It was through Godfrey Yolamu Otiti Oboth-Ofumbi (1964–), the son of Arphaxad Charles Kole Oboth-Ofumbi, who was one of the three victims and was from my survey site of Padhola, that I found out about the reburial of Oryema. He was invited to the reburial of Oryema and described the scene as follows;

... There were no people around. It was a grave with only a small grave marker near a place like a national park where there were wild animals. The family of Oryema no longer lives there, and the area was desolated. ...The coffin had completely rotted and no longer maintained its shape. Regarding the corpse itself, which was wrapped in a cloth like a vinyl tent, it was only possible confirm part of the skull and a few bones that seemed to belong to the trunk of the body. It was wearing an ordinary military uniform without any medals, and most surprising was that the uniform was stained with blood, even though 38 years had passed. I did not know that the blood would stay like that for so long ...’ (Interview conducted on 30 August 2015).

Beyond the memorial ceremonies, only Oryema achieved ‘reburial’. The reason is that the tomb was reportedly too poor.

Only Oryema reached a state of ‘reburial’. There are several reasons for ‘reburial’, but it is well known as a countermeasure for curses. In eastern Uganda, the following rumour spread: ‘This election is expected to be difficult.
In order to achieve victory, the president is desperately walking around to borrow the power of the spirits of the great men of our communities.’

**Murder of Archbishop**

Among the enormous estimated number of victims (300,000–500,000) by the tyrannical Amin regime in Uganda, it is notable that the victims included celebrities in various fields such as politicians, religious leaders, journalists and scholars. Especially in 1977, Archbishop Janani Jakaliya Luwum (1922–1977) and two active ministers were murdered, shocking the world. All of the three victims were noted celebrities in Uganda at the time. The murder of the ‘archbishop’ as well as the current cabinet ministers had a major impact. Here, we refer to it as the ‘archbishop murder case’. As a result of this incident, many important persons selected to live in exile. There is an extremely high number of documentaries and books dealing with the incident, including those recorded on film.

The first report of the incident was the following story from Uganda’s state-owned Radio Uganda at 10:00 a.m. on 17 February 1977:

... The government spokesperson made a public condolence concerning the death of Minister Erinayo Wilson Oryema of Land, Mineral, and Water Resources, Interior Minister Charles Oboth-Ofumbi, and Archbishop Janani Luwum of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Boga-Zaire. It appears that they have died due to involvement in a car accident occurred [sic] in Kampala yesterday. The three were in the process of being taken from Kampala International Convention Center, with Major Moses driving, on the charge of being involved in a plan to plunge our country into chaos. According to a spokesperson, the three attempted to escape and assaulted Major Moses, leading to a collision. Major Moses was brought to the hospital and is presently in an unconscious state. ...

According to follow-up reports, the Range Rover (licence plate number UVW082) in which the three were riding collided with a Toyota Celica (UVS 299), and as a result, slipped out of control and rolled over. When the three were pulled out of the wrecked car, they had already died. Voice of Uganda reported on 19 February the report of confirmation of death of three people on the order of Vice President General Mustafa Adrisi in detail (according to reliable sources, including Kyemba (1977: 179–192), in fact, no autopsy was performed by a physician).

After the sad news of the motor accident in which former cabinet ministers: Erinayo Oryema and Oboth Ofumbi and the late Archbishop of Uganda, Rwanda,
Burundi and Boga Zaire, the Most Rev. Janan Luwum died, the Vice President and Minister for defence Gen. Mustafa Adrisi now also holding the portfolio of Minister of Internal Affairs immediately requested for post-mortem examination to be carried out on the bodies of the deceased. ...

The place of death of the three deceased was Nakasero on 16 February 1977 and at around 5.15 p.m. EAT. The presumed cause of death on the police form was fatal accident following head on collision between a Toyota car and a Range Rover.

On arrival of the bodies of the deceased at the hospital, post mortem examination was done and the medical officer gave his detailed reports or findings on each of the deceased on Police Form 48B and in triplicate.’ Report on late Erinayo Oryema: ‘... the post-mortem revealed a fractured skull involving mainly the left side of his face. There were also bruises on the abdomen end the chest [which] was found completely crashed. Cause of death: Extensive damage because of fractured skull and internal bleeding’. Report on late Charles Oboth Ofumbi: ‘... there was bleeding from the nose, ears and a fractured left forearm. The medical examination also found out that there was intra-cranial bleeding, raptured middle cerebral artery ... Cause of death: Intra-cranial bleeding due to internal brain damage’. Report on the late Archbishop Janan Luwum: ‘... there were bruises on his thighs, abdomen, chest and forehead. It was found out that there was extensive damage to the liver and gross damage to the lung. Cause of death: Raptured liver and lung.’

For some time, the tense relationship between President Amin and Luwum in addition to other officials of the church was evident. At Christmas in 1976, criticism of Christians by a military spokesperson was broadcast on state radio. Before dawn on 5 February 1977, soldiers under order of the president invaded the archbishop’s residence adjacent to Namirembe Cathedral. Several days later, Yona Okoth, the Bishop of Bukedi who lived in Tororo, was illegally arrested. On the day before the incident, the archbishop was accused of being ordered to perform a coup d’état by former president Obote and was charged with receiving weapons. Such reports were reported in Voice of Uganda, considered to be affiliated with the state, but most of the news sources were from the Amin camp.

It is said that the Range Rover in the accident belonged to Amin, and the Toyota Celica belonged to the State Research Bureau, the intelligence agency of Amin. In the first place, it is quite unnatural to force the archbishop and two current cabinet ministers into one car, and it is natural that many people considered this accident to be a cover up.
The United Nations ambassador from the United States instantly issued a statement of ‘assassination’ and the International Lawyers Committee also issued a statement that ‘we cannot be deceived by the pretense that they died as a result of a car accident’. On 21 February, Dr Leslie Brown, the First Archbishop of Uganda, announced that he had information that a bullet was found in both the chest and mouth of the Archbishop.

According to Kyemba, the corpse was placed in a barrack for a while after the autopsy and was buried by the army without providing time for the bereaved family members. It is said that in the vicinity of the place where the three were buried, the army was stationed for several months after the burial; gatherings were prohibited under the state of emergency declaration, making it difficult to hold ordinary funeral rites. It was reported that a burial ceremony was narrowly performed through negotiation with the military (Umeya 2018a: 575–583).

With the efforts of Namirembe (Protestant church), the ceremony was held without the body of Luwum. The body was taken back to his hometown by soldiers and is said to have been buried similarly in a fresh atmosphere. According to a Voice of Uganda article entitled ‘Accident Victims Reburied’ dated Thursday, 19 February 1977, the three were buried in their respective hometowns, that is Oryema in West Acholi, Oboth-Ofumbi in his house in Bukedi located approximately 20 miles away from Tororo and Luwum in his house in East Acholi. It was publicly reported by a government source that all expenses, including transportation costs, were covered by the government, and bereaved family members expressed gratitude for the consideration of the government. There were few people who truly believed the official announcement of the government concerning the ‘car accident’, but the official position of the government regarding the event as a ‘car accident’ continued until quite recently. The series of actions of President Museveni also undermined this official position for the first time.

**Concepts of Spirits among Nilotes**

All three were notable figures of merit in modern Ugandan history. For example, according to the custom of the Adhola, they were appropriate subjects of the special death ceremonial ritual called *okelo*. Because funeral rituals are not sufficiently performed, it is not surprising that there are fears of curse (*mwonjo*) among the people. For example, among the Adhola people, which form the majority of the Tororo District, the spirit of a person who was killed by someone is called a *tipo* and is thought to have a very strong dangerous power. Controlling the power of *tipo* is the key to ‘spiritual security’ (Ashforth 2005). Moreover, the
idea that a spirit buried without receiving sufficient ritual after death, regardless of the manner of death, becomes very aggressive and dangerous is widely held.

In the case of murdered persons, these curse attacks are thought to follow the perpetrators in many cases, but also may cause problems for unrelated persons. In the case of the Jopadhola, if a human being is murdered, the spirit of the victim tipo is believed to be activated and possess the perpetrator with the intention of revenge. In the case of a normal death, a spirit stays in the place of death, but in the case of tipo, it moves about in search of the perpetrators. The range of the attacks is wide, and it is thought that the pursuit of tipo extends not only to the perpetrators, but also to those who have participated in the harm, those who happened to discover the body and the owner of the hut that the perpetrator first enters. It was reportedly not rare to mistakenly be bombed.

One of the characteristics of tipo is their long-term influence. Even with the passage of time, there is no kind of statute of limitation with a murder case as a starting point, and it may take more than 20 years before the results of the attack appear. Among the Adhola people, the latter, that is, those that surface after the passage of time from a murder case are referred to as chien in particular (Umeya 2018a: 251–252).

There are strong and weak tipo, and it is thought that the desires of persons with strong tipo are easy to realise. It can also be seen from ethnographies that similar ideas exist in neighbouring ethnic groups such as the Acholi and Kenya Luo.

tipo implies the meaning like the Japanese term, kage, which means ‘shade’ or ‘shadow’ in an ordinary context. Tipo indicates the vision on the surface of water or mirror, shade of the object by harsh light, persons one might encounter in the experience in dream and illusion, and also the dead men ... The person who is born with a strong tipo is highly likely to achieve realization. In other words, such persons have the power of prophecy and ‘curse’. ... tipo of persons who died with anger and resentment are greatly feared because they are spirits of the dead who follow the living and attempt to bring them to ruin ... (Abe 1989: 214–215).

To expand this way of thinking, tipo of those politically or religiously strong at a certain time also evoke the fear of a very strong powerful curse.

One of the countermeasures against the curse of a spirit is to worship said spirit. As clearly seen in ethnographies of Langi, tipo became evil and became a chien that brought about a misfortune, and a worldview that stabilised the ancestors through enshrinement is depicted (Hayley 1947; Curley 1973). However, there are cases in which it is too evil and cannot be ritualised to
become an ancestor spirit, so it is sealed by ritual burning of the bones (Hayley 1947: 123).

One of the reasons why the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice ‘Lakwena (the name implies ‘messenger’ in Acholi)’ Auma (1956–2007) was supported was, it is said, to be the fact that creation of a policy of enshrining the chien of the many people who were killed in the Luwero Triangle as a result of the guerrilla warfare of the National Resistance Army (NRA) (Behrend 1999: 26–28).

After Amin, who is seen as the real murderer of the three persons in question, passed away in 2003, the curses of these spirits (mwonjo) were once again remembered as a concern of the people. While Amin was alive, the fact itself that the perpetrator Amin was unconcerned made it possible to consider that the curse of tipo was contained with some kind of magical power.

The reburials, memorial ceremonies and visits of Museveni gave the people who attended peace in a very spiritual sense rather than in the political sense. President Museveni’s attitude, as represented by the reburial of Oryema, was accepted as being sufficiently reasonable as a transaction with the spiritual world.

The Result of the Vote

As the result of the vote, although Museveni received 32.74 per cent of the vote in the Gulu District to the leader Warren Kizza Besigye Kifefe (1956—) with 50.67 per cent, he received 64,882 votes (41.57 per cent) in the Tororo District (the leader Besigye received 85,911 votes (55.05 per cent)). In the Kitgum District, he received 41.84 per cent of the vote (21,806 votes), succeeded in defeating 36.56 per cent (19,057 votes) received by the leading opposition party led by Besigye. Given the fact that he received 38.82 per cent of the vote in the Kitgum District in the 2011 general election and Olara Otunnu was a close second with 35.35 per cent of the vote, it was a victory as far as the Kitgum District was concerned. In Tororo District, the support rate drastically decreased from 59.29 per cent in 2011. As expected, he seemed unable to keep down the opposition party votes received by Besigye, but overall he succeeded in restraining the eastern and northern areas, where he experienced difficulty.

The Museveni camp was unsuccessful in incorporating the supporters of the opposing candidate Besigye, but succeeded in breaking down the West Nilotic group ‘right wing’ voters who tended to support UPC for ethnic reasons, and achieved partial success. Luwum was somewhat successful in gathering mainly the Protestant religious vote and Oryema in obtaining the police vote. It is expected that these will become support bases based on a plurality of relationships that can be used in the future if continuous care is made.
Furthermore, by criticising the Idi Amin regime through a series of commemorative ceremonies, Museveni has symbolically succeeded in expressing that his policies lie in the opposite direction.

Officially speaking criticism of the Amin administration, of which everyone had dark memory, gave voters the sense of solidarity that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. The Amin regime has a major significance as a stable virtual enemy that creates votes when mentioned, and the ‘archbishop murder case’ was used as a representative major politically resource.

Looking at the overall situation of the voters who refer to themselves as the West Nilotic group, it seems that as a result of the series of ceremonies, a percentage of those who were UPC supporters changed to support President Museveni. In other words, Museveni decided voting behaviours by honouring great men who shared ideal ancestors with the voters. A similar situation has been reported in the Kitgum District, which forms the majority of the Acholi region. There is no doubt that ‘ethnic groups’ in a broad sense play a certain role in politics. The reburials, memorial ceremonies and ‘ethnic groups’ functioned as a strategy to organise the issues for the election and became events to organise votes based on pseudo ‘ethnic groups’ at the time of voting. These examples are phenomena often observed in African politics (Bayart 1993, 2005).

VII Agency of the Dead and Its Effect on Voting

Another problem to consider concerns the religious and spiritual dimensions of the voting behaviours of people. It would not be that strange to say that the dead’s interference with the living is an ‘agency of the dead’. In a sense, even after death, the dead continue to interfere with the living in social relationships. In this sense, the personhood of the people involved in the voting and the ‘consciousness of us’ inevitably include the dead, the degree of the deceased’s intention (not necessarily the will itself) influenced their voting behaviours. One of those who voted for Museveni declared that he regarded this series of rituals as a symbol of the president’s kindness and found it to be a reasonable method of handling of the deceased (by him/them), which led the direction of his voting behaviour. Some feel relief that they need no longer worry about the curse. Some of the bereaved families appeared to be enthusiastic in supporting NRM since this incident. It is said to be a ‘feeling of obligation for indebtedness to the deceased’.

The agency of the dead in this case does not necessarily reflect the intention of the deceased, and the direction of the agency cannot be reduced to the relationship when they were alive. People voted for the president who did his best for their local great figure. When Oboth-Ofumbi was alive, he was not
loved by neighbouring peoples, and was rather an object of hatred based on misunderstood recognition (Umeya 2018a: 519–639). Therefore, it can be said that they believed that Museveni’s treatment of the dead was cosmologically correct and merely voted for cosmologically correct behaviour.

This is reminiscent of Yasukuni Shrine in Japan. Although it is unknown whether the spirits of the war dead, known as eirei, support the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), it seems that making an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine leads to votes for the visiting politicians. Moreover, it is unknown to what extent worshipping politicians seriously believe in the existence of eirei. It may only be that they know that doing so will lead to obtaining votes. In such a sense, the term ‘agency’ seems to be an effective term to express such a situation.

Fortes (1959) indicated that regarding ancestral spirits, the parent–child relationship when living changes (in particular, the aspect of authority is expanded). When discussing this ‘reburial’ commemoration ceremony issue, it can be indicated that there is a certain alteration in the way of thinking about the spirits of the dead. Among the nearby Iteso also, a different concept of spirits from the surrounding Bantu ethnic group exists. The spirit of the dead (ipara) born at the time of death in Iteso is merely iboro (i.e., ‘thing’), and continuity with the personality when alive is not presupposed. Even persons who are bound together by love during life become frightening when they become ghosts after death (Nagashima 1987: 214–217).

Even when a countermeasure is necessary and the will is not an object that can be examined, in this sense, it is an existence that is compatible with the concept of agency, making the existence into a patient who is forced to wander and be passive.16

Supporting evidence can be found in contemporary Ugandan history. Amin, who brought back the body of Mutesa II from the UK in the 1970s and conducted a state funeral, was enthusiastically supported the Baganda people. Ironically, despite it being Commander Amin who attacked the palace of Mutesa II and forcing him into exile in 1966 on the order of Obote, people completely forgot the grudge. If one were to completely anthropomorphise and speak of the spirits of the dead, Mutesa II is likely to speak of the grudge against Amin, but the Baganda people appreciated the consideration for the body of sekabaka (dead king) and turned to support Amin. Furthermore, there are still doubts about whether people voting for these NRMs voted on the basis of ethnicity in a formal sense. The boundary lines of ‘ethnic groups’ are considerably freely redrawn according to interests. In this case, it would be reasonable to think that it affected only those who cared about the abovementioned chien and regarded it as a countermeasure to Museveni. Rather than a concrete ‘ethnic group,’ it can be said that the cosmology and values, that is, the tipo of such great men, form
an agency that works only for persons who shared the idea that they should be properly ritualised.

Looking at these series of events and the fact that they have influenced the results of the 2016 Uganda general election, it seems to be necessary to question the universality of voting rights and the concept of citizenship that are indicated to be in the background of voting behaviours.

It seems to be necessary to question the universality of the concept of citizenship that is considered to be in the background of behaviours.

**Modernity and African Identities**

Naturally, citizenship in the formal sense of the often-cited ‘member of a nation state’ is said to be meaningless as an analytical concept. Citizenship in this sense, similar to many other Western-oriented universal concepts once imported from the West (e.g., ‘human rights,’ ‘political correctness’) seems to become quickly interwoven with the indigenous concepts of the people of Africa and other areas. For example, Bayart states that ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ in African politics are interwoven (Bayart 1993, 2005).17

As a modern state, Uganda has been forced to face the problem of so-called ‘ethnic groups’ for decades. Buganda Kingdom, which has a large number of Bantu languages as native languages of the people, its ‘ethnic groups,’ and the opposing political power of the Nilotic groups organised around ‘ethnic’ origin with Obote, who had served as president, as the first prime minister, formed the ‘instrumentality’ of ‘ethnic groups’.18 Therefore, when introducing the National ID card in 2015, similar to the statistics for ‘ethnic groups’ that were first abolished in the census and white papers at the end of 2002, the item of ‘ethnicity’ was carefully removed.19

Naturally, nationality and citizenship in the formal sense of the modern state should be considered officially separated from ethnicity.20 However, the part that cannot be understood only by such formal aspect is demonstrated in the examples noted in this chapter, and when considering one of the uses of citizenship as an analytical concept, an important issue seems to be added.

Doubtlessly the right to vote is formally connected with citizenship. If it is assumed that there is an agency of the dead working on the voting, then there is a possibility that it may be thought that the dead are included as citizens. In recent years, the concept of citizenship as an analytical concept is acquiring a wider semantic domain. For example, it is defined as ‘institution’ that mediates the relationship of rights between the subject’s politics and the form of government to which the subject belongs (Isin and Nyers 2014: 1). As an
analytical concept, there is also the possibility of including the dead, who demonstrate agency, as citizens.

Human beings, depending on where they want to be buried after death, may decide behavioural patterns of living, for example, taking permanent residence at the location of emigration, returning to the place of origin from the place of emigration, etc. For example, when discussing immigrants in Africa, Nyamnjoh states that people are not ‘subjects who make free reasonable choices’, rather than ‘magicians who manipulate identity creatively’ (Nyamnjoh 2001: 30). Many people are trapped between praising individual independence based on Western modernity, capitalism and materialism and minimising the power of society while contrarily attempting to respect the solidarity of society and the community (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 3; Nyamnjoh 2001: 30). In short, ‘We have never been modern’ as much as we think.21

**Conclusion**

Therefore, by introducing the concept of the ‘agency of the dead’, we set aside the futile disputes of several ethnographies such as whether people believe or do not believe in the existence of spirits, succeeded in observing the existence of the dead, who have great influence on the behaviour of living human beings. Moreover, it has become clear that in many cases, there was also a tendency that the will of the person who died is considerably neutralised and ignored. There is no way to confirm if Oboth-Ofumbi and Janani Luwum would support Museveni. It is impossible to see the will of the deceased of *Yasukuni* as in terms of the current status of the LDP’s politics. In any case, when we analyse society, it is not sufficient to merely analyse living members, but it is also necessary to consider how the agency of the dead works on living people.22 In that sense, it can be said that the dead still possess some kind of citizenship, even though they have passed on, even if that intention is connected with an image greatly distorted by the living.

What can be known through the cases presented in this chapter is that the dead can demonstrate agency with a presence as if they still share the same social space. This is the perception or phenomenon of the dead as if they were still around the living; even after death, they have a presence as influential persons. This indicates the existence of a semantic domain different from citizenship as a formal definition. As a matter of course, similar to other modern ideas, citizenship is unlikely to be settled literally without experiencing a unique shift in the indigenous cosmology. Even in this case, the emotional and affectional aspects of the deceased are deeply concerned.
The concept of citizenship is, of course, one of the modern era and, while there may be differences in degree, it has the property to aim for universality. However, it can be well understood, no matter how modern concepts are oriented towards universality, modern concepts are readily appropriated differently by the indigenous logic in the cosmology of the local area – this situation is rather common and can be observed universally.\(^\text{23}\)

Regarding modern concepts such as citizenship, to seek universality is a natural modern invention as a modern contemplation, but what we actually observe is only one of several possibilities in which the imported concept is manifested as the result of an appropriation and negotiation with the indigenous cosmology. The fact that this shows is, naturally, that mankind has never enjoyed complete freedom. It is likely that further examination of questions such as the possibility of appropriation and negotiation between the concepts of indigenous cosmology and those imported from the West and whether the trends regarding their structure and variation are recognisable will be performed after fully considering this situation.

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**Notes**

1. Election results are all based on the official announcement of the Electoral Commission; http://www.ec.or.ug/ (retrieved 13 November 2018).
2. Idi Amin Dada Oumee (c.1925–16 August 2003). There are various opinions concerning his year of birth. He is said to be from Koboko, West Nile District. Born to a Kakwa father and Lugbara mother, he grew up as a community called ‘Nubi’ that crossed ‘ethnic groups’ and was connected by Islam. He was enlisted in King’s African Rifles (KAR) and is said to have participated in the Burmese front and suppression of the Man Man rebels. During the Protectorate era, one of the only two Ugandan officers promoted to commissioned officer status by the British Empire. His self-bestowed title that he also
forced others to call him was ‘His Excellency, President for Life, Field Marshal Al-Hajji Doctor Idi Amin Dada, VC, DSO, MC, Conqueror of the British Empire in Africa in General and Uganda in Particular’. However, there is no record that Amin was ever conferred these awards. He was President from 1 January 1971 after seizing power from President Obote in a coup d’état, until 11 April 1979 when dismissed by the rebel army with the cooperation of the Tanzanian army. Subsequently, he went into exile in Saudi Arabia. He kept his promise and maintained his silence. In early July 2013, it was reported that he was on his deathbed. He weighed more than 220 kg and kidney transplantation was performed twice but with no success. Amin died at 7:00 am (East Africa time) on 16 August 2003. He was the only former head of Uganda not to receive a state funeral.


7 The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) estimated the number of victims might be from 80,000 to 300,000. Amnesty International estimated 500,000. Considering the population of Uganda then was said to be 2,000,000, the number is incredibly large. See also ‘How many people did Amin really kill?’, *Daily Monitor*, 28 September 2012. Jørgensen (1981: 310–312) and Umeya (2018a: 562–563) provide the list of the personal names of the victims.

8 First on the list of victims was Janani Jakalya Luwum, an Acholi born in Mucwini, former Acholi District. After graduating from Gulu High School and Teacher Training College in 1948, became a teacher. He studied at Buwalasi Theological College in 1949 and became a deacon in 1955. He became Secretary General of the Church of Uganda Church in 1966 and Bishop of the Diocese of Northern Uganda in 1969. He was the second Ugandan to become Archbishop (Third Archbishop, in office: 1974–1977). As one of the ten great martyrs of the 20th century, his statue is placed in Westminster Abbey. Erinayo Wilson Oryema was born into the Acholi tribe in Anaka Paila, Kilaka, former Acholi District. He graduated from Gulu High School and Buwalasi Teacher Training College. After training in the UK, he obtained employment in the Uganda Police Force in 1939. After enlisting in the King’s African Rifles (KAR) Regiment, he was promoted to Inspector of Police in 1951. After training several times in the UK and US, he was appointed as Deputy Inspector General of Police in 1963 and Inspector General of Police in 1964 (1964–1971). In 1958, he received a colonial police medal from the UK. When Kay Adroa and Amin were married (1966), he was trusted enough to serve as a groomsman to the bridegroom. After the coup d’état, he was appointed as Minister of Minerals and Water Resources (1971–1976) and Minister of Lands, Housing and Physical Planning (1976–1977). Arphaxad Charles Kole Oboth-Ofumbi (1932–1977) was a Japadhola, indicated to have been born on 12 July 1932 in Agululu Village, Tororo District, and was baptised on the same day in Mulanda. ‘Oboth’ means ‘a child born in a recently ploughed field’ (same name as ‘Obote’ among the Langi. Some people view this as a symbol of being linked by fate). He attended Kisoko Primary School (1942–1947), Mbarara High School (1948–1950) and Kings College Budo (1951–1953). He gave up going to university due to father’s death and found employment at Bukedi Co-operative Union as a cooperative assistant (1954–1958) and Bukedi District Commissioner’s Office (1958–1960). Turning to a local administrative position, he became Assistant District Commissioner (ADC) of Acholi
District (1963), ADC of Lango District (1963) and District Commissioner (DC) of Acholi District (1963). After independence, he was appointed as Assistant Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office (1963) and in 1965, the Chief Clerk of the Prime Minister’s Office. By 1971, he was Permanent Secretary for Ministry for Defence. With the establishment of the Amin regime after the coup, he served as Minister of State for Defence (1971) and following a cabinet reshuffle, Defence Minister (1971–1973). Except for the term (1973) when he served as Portfolio Minister of the Departed Asians’ Properties Custodian Board (DAPCB), he was always assigned to a main post in the Cabinet as Amin’s right-hand man: Finance Minister (1974–1976) and Interior Minister (1974–1977). He acted as agent for the President during foreign trips of the President (1972).


14 Concerning funeral rites among Jopadhola, *okelo* ritual, and the concept of *mwonjo*, Umeya (2018a: 417–515) provide detailed descriptions on them in general. Regarding funerals, *okelo* ceremonial rituals, and *mwonjo*, refer to this book. *Okelo* originally seemed to be a condition of longevity, but the conditions have changed due to the appearance of modern elite. The death of Oboth-Ofumbi discussed here is also regarded as death by *mwonjo*.

15 There has long been debate concerning whether to consider ‘ethnicity as either primordial or instrumental’, but as far as African ‘ethnic groups’ are concerned, the characteristic of ‘instrumentality’ is prominent. Both political parties and religions are heavily influenced by ‘ethnic groups’ and vice versa. However, as in the case of this chapter, because it is necessary to view both ‘ethnic groups’, which are fixed as described in the formal ID cards handled by modern states, and ‘ethnicity’ as an analytical term at the same time (this also applies to citizenship), care is necessary.

16 When comfortably driving a car, the driver acts as an agent, but in the event of a breakdown, the car has no will of its own, but the car itself becomes the agent and the driver becomes the patient (Gell 1998: 21–23).

17 As Sahlins (1981) discussed concerning the deification of Captain Cook and his subsequent murder, attempts to interpret outliers and phenomena in indigenous cosmology may be seen differently in any place around the world. Although the elements of both are observed, the problem remaining in regarding them as a ‘mixture’ is great. Speaking of a familiar example, it is well known that there are many mission schools in Japan, but this has not been linked to the increase of Christian believers. In Japan, where the influence of the West on the change of lifestyle is remarkable, as represented by most Japanese wearing ‘Western-style clothing’, considering the fact that believers of Christianity, which occupies a large position in the Western theory of cosmology, comprise only 1 per cent of the population (for example, in the case of Uganda, the figure exceeds 80 per cent), it can be noticed that this problem is actually a familiar issue.

18 Obote is nominally a Langi, but the Obote faction and supporters of UPC, which was founded by Obote, also include people who refer to themselves as Acholi: Alur, Kumam, Iteso, etc. The massacre of victims of the Amin regime also covered the Luo ethnic groups in the broad sense.
Also as a lesson from the Rwanda massacre, ethnicity is not listed on the National ID Card. Although this confirms the modern national consciousness in Uganda, it was an opportunity for subtle politics to manifest, such as intentionally misrepresenting ethnicity and registering the ethnic name of a powerful ethnic group. Ethnicity was not listed on ID cards during the protectorate period, and ethnic consciousness was relatively unfixed.

It goes without saying that one of the characteristics of modernity is a method of thinking that applies a case to specific categories based on certain postulates to construct fields and separate them from other fields.

Regarding immigration also, in selecting whether to end as a migrant worker or take up permanent residence and cut/minimise the relationship with the home country is dependent on whether it is an environment in which sufficient consideration is given to the afterlife (including rituals), and it appears to be influenced by the relationship with the hometown. Nyamnjoh (2012) notes the importance of emotional and emotional motivation as well as political and economic rationality in mobility (e.g., immigration).

Naturally, I believe that there must be many examples similar to the agency of the dead here in elections of modern Western countries also.

Even in Western societies, where modernity is indicated to have developed, the phenomenon of indigenisation from the places where the concept of modernity developed is observable if one looks hard enough.

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Buddhist Altars in Vacant Houses and the Citizenship of the Deceased

Toshiki Tsuchitori

Introduction

In contemporary Japanese society, depopulation and aging have long been major social problems. In rural areas, the number of vacant houses is increasing with the population outflow to urban areas centred on the young. What to do about the disposal of and measures to deal with vacant houses has been considered an urgent issue. The depopulation of this rural area, especially in village society, began after the period of high economic growth in the latter half of the 1960s. With the progress of urbanisation and modernisation accompanying high economic growth, local rural communities have been rapidly dismantled, and so-called traditional social structure and faith have also weakened in momentum (Iida 1994; Sakurai 1974).

Amid such circumstances, since Sado Island in Niigata Prefecture is remote, the traffic situation made it relatively isolated, so previous studies have reported that traditional things had been maintained until relatively recently. For example, the beliefs and practices of people related to Sado’s Mujina in the late 1980s and 1990s were reported (Umeya, Urano and Nakanishi 2001). Because of this background, when I was interested in folk religion, I visited Sado’s Mura (village) in 2013 to report on beliefs of Mujina and conducted a follow-up survey. However, compared to previous studies, people’s beliefs and practices of Mujina did not seem to have been retained. Also, as a subjective opinion, the local people indicated that ‘the faith of the present person is not strong compared with the past’. Thus, even in Sado, where traditional things had been maintained until relatively recently, waves of depopulation and aging are spreading. From this influence, most of the traditional things have been simplified or abolished.

However, as I continued on-site investigation of folk religion on Sado Island from 2013 onward, I began to question the explanation that a Mura’s belief in folk religion has ‘declined’. This story was shared with me by Mr. T, who runs an inn in Seki village in the northern part of Sado Island. Sado is an area where the population is decreasing by about 1,000 people every year, and the number of vacant houses is increasing. However, among them, there are many vacant houses regularly visited by people. In those vacant houses, it is said that
Buddhist altars (the altar on which Buddhist statues and the ancestors are worshipped) and mortuary tablets remain intact. In other words, people visit these vacant houses during the Bon Festival and the New Year and maintain houses with Buddhist altars and mortuary tablets while conducting ancestor rituals. Mr. T returned to Sado from Tokyo. In Tokyo, he worked as a cook in a prominent restaurant. However, after accepting the request of his father who named him successor to his parents’ inn, he returned to Sado. Mr. T suggested to the owners of vacant houses in Sado to sell to those who wished to move to the island or to offer them as guest houses to volunteers. He suggested that it would also help to invigorate the island if they did so. However, they turned the offer down and justified their decision by making statements such as, ‘because there are Buddhist altars and mortuary tablets …’ or ‘because it is an ancestral land and house …’.

Similar to Mr. T’s case, some people keep vacant houses and Buddhist altars for a long time in Sado. It would be reasonable to think that the Buddhist altar should be moved to a new house and the vacant houses should be sold, but homeowners do not do so. Why do they maintain vacant houses and Buddhist altars?

This chapter considers the citizenship of the deceased based on a case of vacant houses and Buddhist altars on Sado Island. Moreover, this is also a tentative assumption of people who keep vacant houses and Buddhist altars.

Overview of Sado Island

Sado Island is located about 67 kilometres from Niigata Port in the western part of Niigata Prefecture. The area is 857.21 kilometres square, which is the second largest island in Japan after Okinawa, excluding the main islands. (Mizoo 2007: 59). Sado Island has a shape formed by combining two islands – the northern part is Oo-Sado and the southern part is Ko-Sado. The area sandwiched between the Oo-Sado and Ko-Sado is a flatland, called the Kuninaka plain (Mizoo 2007: 59). On 1 November 2018, the population consisted of 55,559 people.¹ Sado City was established on 1 March 2004, by the merger of ten municipalities (Ryotsu, Aikawa, Sawada, Kanai, Niibo, Hatano, Hamochi, Mano, Ogi and Akadomari) (Sado City Planning Information Section 2005: 2–3).

Seki village which appeared in the introduction is located in the northern part of Sado Island called the Sotokaifu district. It faces the sea but, behind the settlement, are the Todono-mine and Chigyo mountains. Traditionally the main industries have been farming and fishing among various things. The local means of livelihood uses less land and fewer resources (for example, cultivation of rice
and vegetables, *Isonogi*, gillnet fishing, charcoal burning (later replaced by migration), etc. Currently, some people live by camping in inns and selling food, and working at city halls, etc.

As of November 2017, Seki village has had 28 *Ie* in which 59 people live. In Seki village, it is reported that Honma Shirozaemon (called *Ooya*) moved from Sawada with his brother, Ando Magozaemon. Following this, 11 people also came, and a village was made (Iwamoto and Takushima 1986: 1035). These 13-old *Ie* are called *Ju-Sannin* and *Omodachi*. They have a common ground (now used as a vacation village, Seki-saki ranch and a telephone company’s antenna base) and each of them enshrines the god. In Seki village, there were 43 *Ie* in 1986 (Iwamoto and Takushima 1986: 1035). Following this, the number of vacant houses and demolished houses has increased from the outflow of population, which leaves 28 *Ie* at present.

### The principles of *Ie* in Sado

Formerly, Japanese families aimed to maintain the link with their ancestors through their business with *Ie*, and to preserve it for the next generation.

The Sotokaifu district in the northern part of Sado Island and the neighbouring Aikawa district was no exception; people lived with the aim of maintaining and inheriting the family business with *Ie*. Therefore, in Aikawa, to live in each *Mura*, all family members share production activities and, in principle, all income obtained is deposited by the *Oyaji* (patriarch) and *Kaka* (housewife) (Iwamoto 1986: 181). In Aikawa, livelihood consisted of agriculture, but because there were few plains, there were many *Ie* which could not maintain the lives of all family members with agriculture alone. Thus, fishing and forestry (wood grinding and charcoaling) work in parallel with agriculture, and young people travel for migrant work mainly during the agricultural off-season, which means that it is necessary to earn cash income (such as *Fuyu-shobai* (winter businesses) in Sotokaifu) (Iwamoto 1986: 180–181). Such earnings are valuable funds for members of *Ie* to live by, so *Oyaji* and *Kaka* strictly managed them. As such, past families were collectives of different sources of livelihood, and they were roughly equivalent to a corporate management organisation like a company (Iwamoto 1986: 181). *Oyaji* and *Kaka*, as their presidents, were responsible for the family members by operating the financial resources gained through various forms of labour and guaranteeing the lives of the whole family (Iwamoto 1986: 181).

Thus, in the former *Ie* in Sado which is the group-sharing livelihood, *Oyaji* and *Kaka* were in a privileged position. *Oyaji* led the family, managed its business, preserved the rituals of *Ie* and externally participated in meetings, etc. on behalf
of the *Ie* (Iwamoto 1986: 175). *Oyaji* had more privileges than other family members. *Oyaji*’s privileges varied depending on the region. For example, they were allowed to use special dishes at mealtime. Also, while other family members entered and left the house from their door, *Oyaji* could use the main entrance normally (Iwamoto 1986: 175).

*Kaka*, conversely, were responsible for food management control. *Yome* (a successor’s wife) also joined meal making, but a *Yome* only helped, and could not use rice and miso freely. It is called *Nando-zakashi, Kura-zakashi* (*Zakashi* means to deal with or to make shift with) (Iwamoto 1986: 175–176). Also, at mealtime, it was also a *Kaka*’s job to serve rice in family dishes, which *Yome* could not do. This is called ‘holding a *Shakushi*’ (Iwamoto 1986: 176). As evident from examples of meal making and serving, the *Yome*’s position was unstable. If the *Yome* could not bear children, or the *Soitsure* (husband) died, the *Yome* was sent back to her homeland (Iwamoto 1986: 174–175).

Such a privileged position and authority possessed by *Oyaji* and *Kaka* in *Ie* were once passed down to the next generation – *Nire* (successor) and *Yome* – through ritual. In the Aikawa district, the assignment of the status and authority of *Oyaji* is called ‘*Kamado-watashi*’, ‘passing *Oyaji* ‘holding *Shinsyo*’, ‘delivering a wallet’, and so on. Additionally, inheriting *Kaka*’s position and authority (housewife rights) called ‘*Shakushi-watashi*’, ‘passing *Kaka*’, ‘*Nando* passing’ (Iwamoto 1986: 178). There is a regional difference when *Kamado-watashi* and *Shakushi-watashi* are performed; for example, they are handed down after death or at other times depending on *Ie*. However, in the Sotokaifu district, the *Nire* was supposed to be inherited on the evening of New Year’s Eve at 41 years of age. In the Iwayaguchi village of Sotokaifu, they first wrapped around five yen of money (about 30,000 yen in current value), a savings passbook and a seal with a paper. Moreover, it was a ritual of *Kamado-watashi* that got it on top of a bottle filled with rice and passed in front of the hearth (Iwamoto 1986: 179). In other areas, it was said that people also passed a squid during *Kamado-watashi*.

*Shakushi-watashi* was also held on New Year’s Eve. Firstly, *Kaka* washed a rice bin and a scoop and, when the rice was cooked, *Kaka* handed over the scoop to *Yome* and *Yome* served rice in a dish (Iwamoto 1986: 179). From the first day of the New Year, the son and his wife maintained their household’s cost and become involved in the participation in meetings and the ritual of *Ie*. *Yome*, who was in an unstable position in *Ie*, also became an official member of the *Ie* by undergoing *Shakushi-watashi* (Iwamoto 1986: 180).

In this way, the people of Sado used to keep *Oyaji* and *Kaka* as their leaders in *Ie*, and maintained and inherited the family businesses through *Ie*. Then, through the ritual of *Kamado-watashi* and *Shakushi-watashi*, *Oyaji* and *Kaka* were inherited by the next generation. In Aikawa, the eldest son is expected to be the
The eldest son is regarded as a person who should succeed Ie at an early age, for example, the second and other sons are called ‘Oji and Ossan’, while the eldest son is called ‘Aniki, Ankan, and Anchang’. The eldest son was considered unique (Iwamoto 1986: 199-200). However, in reality, there were cases where the first son could not succeed Ie because he died young. In the village society of the former Sado Island, even in the situation where the eldest son did not succeed Ie, there are several means by which to keep Ie alive.

If it is impossible for the first son to succeed Ie, it is usually expected that the second son will (Iwamoto 1986: 200). It was expected that male brothers succeed Ie, such as the third or fourth son if others are not possible. When the first son died after marriage, Yome of the eldest son and brother of the eldest son also remarried to secure succession to Ie. This is Otonto-naoshi (so-called levirate marriage) (Iwamoto 1986: 200). Furthermore, in the case of the death of Yome, sometimes the elder sister and Nire marry, a situation which is called Imonu-naoshi (so-called sororate marriage) (Iwamoto 1986: 200).

Also, in Aikawa district, there was a practice of setting guardians until the Nire became an adult if the Oyaji died when the Nire was too young. This practice is called Nakamochi (Iwamoto 1986: 200–201). If there was an older sister of the Nire, she married and kept Kamado until the Nire grew up. In the absence of an elder sister, a parent’s brothers or a couple who were unrelated were also used for Nakamochi as an adopted couple (Aiyoushi) (Iwamoto 1986: 201).

Furthermore, adoption of a successor occurred when there was no successor due to infertility or the death of the child. Adoptive children who were Makkee (relatives) were best. If there were no suitable persons, the heir was adopted from Makkee of the spouse. If it could not be done, the heir was adopted from unrelated people (Iwamoto 1986: 201–202).

In any of these methods, if the Ie’s successor was not sought, it was said that ‘Atoke has ended’ or has been ‘turned down’ in Sado, and that it would be impossible for the Ie to survive. Ie’s extinction is called Fusebi (turned down fire), Fusena (turned down name) and Fusemune (turned down by building) (Iwamoto 1986: 202). However, Ie which has extinct like this will not disappear permanently. Ie continues to hold the possibility of revival, contained in things like the house, the land, the house name, graves and mortuary tablets, all of which symbolise the existence of Ie (Iwamoto 1986: 202). Not limited to Sado, there are practices called ‘buying Fusena’ and ‘buying Namyoji (family name)’ throughout Japan. This is the practice of Shinkekamado (the second son and the third son create a house without parental assistance due to owning Shinghai (private property)), and migrants purchase Ie which have become extinct and take possession of them. They also purchase Ie’s relatives, the tomb of the

The background of such practices is the existence of *Mura* stocks. In Aikawa, there is *Mura* with an arrangement (*Kamado* restriction) to not increase their number of *Ie* more than by a certain amount (Iwamoto 1986: 207). In *Mura* which has restricted *Kamado*, unless they attain a *Mura* stock of *Ie* which became *Fusebi* or *Fusena*, they could not gain the right as a resident of *Mura*. Thus, in Sado’s *Mura* in the past, there were many means for securing succession in *Ie*. Moreover, *Ie*, which have been abolished, may be revived by someone taking over the house, the land, the house name, the grave and mortuary tablets, all of which symbolise *Ie*.

In the village community of the former Sado Island, of the things symbolising *Ie* mentioned above, the land is regarded as particularly important. The importance of land appears as well in *Shinrui*’s division. *Shinrui* has two meanings. In a broad sense, it means all those who are connected by blood ties and marriage ties, distinguished from others who are not related (Iwamoto 1986: 255–256). *Shinrui*, used in the narrow meaning, refers only those who are associated even among relatives or, even narrower, *Ie* in a specific relationship among relatives who are associated (Iwamoto 1986: 256). Among people in Sado *Shinrui* is usually used in a narrow sense.

In *Mura* of Sotokaifu and Takachi, *Shinrui* is divided into three types. The most important is *Omoshinrui*, followed by *Shinrui* and, then, *Hashitashinrui* (Iwamoto 1986: 259). In Aikawa, some places do not have this division, but *Shinrui* there is equivalent to *Omosinrui* (Iwamoto 1986: 271). There are four relatives of the relationship to become *Omosinrui*, *Ooya-inkyo*, *Diwakenoshinrui* (*Shinrui* which divided the land (Iwamoto 1986: 250)), *Ie* directly related by marriage, and brothers and sisters of married couples (Iwamoto 1986: 273). It can be said that these *Omosinrui* are relationships caused by the movement of a person from one *Ie* to another. In other words, it is a relationship caused by the ‘transmission of people’ (Iwamoto 1986: 273–274). About *Ie* directly related by marriage, and brothers and sisters of married couples, fifty years after the death of the person who moved, the relationship of *Omosinrui* disappears because the dead become gods through the Buddha. However, as in the case of *Ooya-inkyo* and *Diwakenoshinrui*, when ‘transmission of people’ is accompanied by ‘transmission of land’ (or even ‘transmission of land’ only), that relationship is maintained permanently (Iwamoto 1986: 274). Thus, the organisation of relatives in Aikawa consists of two principles, ‘transmission of people’ and ‘transmission of land’ (Iwamoto 1986: 273). Among them, ‘transmission of land’ is more important than the ‘transmission of people’.
In summary, people in Sado formerly lived to maintain and succeed to the Ie and their family business. In Ie, Oyaji and Kaka are in privileged positions, and their authority was inherited by the next generation through ritual. Even if a person who expected to be a successor failed to succeed Ie, there were measures to maintain Ie (Otouto-naoshi, Imouto-naoshi, Nakamochoi, etc.). Also, even if Ie was abolished, there was the possibility of it being revived through taking over the house, the land, the house name, the graves and mortuary tablets. Shinrui of Aikawa is composed of two principles, the ‘transmission of people’ and the ‘transmission of land’. Shinrui by the ‘transmission of land’ is regarded as a persistent relationship.

Past and present of K village in Sado Island

Here, I will describe the past and present situation of Sado’s village society, taking K village which I surveyed for 165 days from 2013 to 2017 as an example. K village is located in Sotokaifu district in a place facing the sea. A mountain spreads just behind K village, and there are rice paddies and fields in the mountains near K village. The number of Ie in K village may change depending on age by establishing a branch family, etc. However, the original number of Ie is limited to 24 (Cultural Property Protection Committee 1968: 130). This number is written in the document of 1840, including the temple in the village (Cultural Property Protection Committee 1968: 130). These 24 original Ie are called Honko.

In K village there existed the traditional hierarchy of Oome and Mizunomi. Oome is divided into Omodachi, Shin-omodachi and Nami-byakusbo. Mizunomi is divided into Kami (upper) and Shimo (lower). When arranged in descending order of hierarchy, it is Omodachi, Shin-omodachi, Nami-byakusbo, Kami and Shimo. Between Oome and Mizunomi, there were differences in village taxes and the size of Nakama-yama (shared forest), and the differences in economic treatment for each stratum were great (Cultural Property Protection Committee 1968: 130–131). Among Oome, Omodachi has the most superior right to speak and is a pioneer of K village. Shin-omodachi is Ie which was raised after Omodachi. Nami-byakusbo are considered to be branches of Omodachi or later migrants. Mizunomi is a new branch or a new immigrant (Cultural Property Protection Committee 1968: 131). However, among Nami-byakusbo, there were some Ie which were originally Omodachi and became Nami-byakusbo due to certain circumstances.

Traditionally, K village income is earned by semi-farming and semi-fishing. However, according to the statistics in 1936, they built a foundation of living in rice fields 187 tan (unit of land measurement; 1 tan is 991.736 square meters) and the fields 41 tan, and lived mainly on agriculture (Cultural Property
Protection Committee 1968: 127). The main product was rice, and other products such as soybean, buckwheat and Shouzu (adzuki beans) were grown. In order to make effective use of narrow land, the soybeans were planted on the banks around the rice fields, not in the fields. It seems that the fishery was not as aggressive as in the neighbouring community because there were many agricultural lands (Committee to compile the book on Ryotsu City 1983: 685).

In the survey record of 1936, Isonegi which catches seaweed, arame, abalone, turban shells etc., using square nets and gourd nets, the fishery processed product is recorded as fishery of K village (Committee to compile the book on Ryotsu City 1983: 685). When fishing with the net, people formed groups of four to five people. It was said that the fishery group was given Yagoh (the name of Ie) of the head in the group.

As a sideline to earning a livelihood, charcoal and timber were the main products of additional income. The production of charcoal, in particular, was favoured in K village (Committee to compile the book on Ryotsu City 1983: 684). The residents were also very successful in breeding cattle and horses, especially cows. It was said that there were many Ie in K village who mostly keep cattle. According to the story told by the local people, a person who came to K village from Kuninaka once saw the cow Maya (barns) around the rice paddock and misunderstood that Maya were houses in which people lived. In other words, it means that there were many cow houses, and according to this story it appears that the breeding of cows was keenly followed in K village. During the summer, which is the agricultural season, people grazed their cows in the pasture land owned and managed in Mura because they could not look after their cows. There were some Ie that won the prize in the national competition for the best cow and it seems that K village was also a place where people were enthusiastic about breeding cows. Cows were kept to aid with farming work, but at the same time they were also a means to earn cash income by Kotori (to bear calves and sell them on the market). In this way, cows combined with agricultural work assisted as a means of cash income, and they were important to the existence of people in the former K village.

K village consisted of Mura of 17 houses and 39 people in December 2016. The population of K village in August 1993 was 80 (Umeya 2001 (1994): 93) and it was pointed out that depopulation and aging had already become severe at that point (Umeya 2001 (1995): 134). However, now that about 20 years have elapsed since then, the population has halved, so depopulation and aging have become more and more serious. Below is the table showing that the number of all Ie residents in K village and the number of families of children under the age of 20, people in their 20s and 30s, as the youngest people among the residents, and elderly people aged 65 or over in December 2016. In addition, ‘0*’ in the
column of the number of people represents an empty home, but refers to the semi-empty house frequently visited by relatives.

Table 1: Residents of *Ie* in K Village in Sado City, Niigata Prefecture (in December 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Ie</em></th>
<th>Number of people</th>
<th>Whether the youngest person among residents is over 65 years old or not</th>
<th>Number of family members under 20 years old</th>
<th>Number of families in their 20’s</th>
<th>Number of families in their 30’s</th>
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<td>× (6 years old)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>× (60’s)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>× (40 years old)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Z</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>× (50’s~60’s)</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Currently, there are 26 *Ie* in K village, two more than *Honko*, but nine of them are vacant houses. Two of vacant houses, I and S, are semi-empty houses, and families managing *Ie* frequently visit them. The remaining seven *Ie* (C, E, K, N, Q, U, X) are vacant houses where people usually do not live. However, during seasonal milestones such as Bon Festival and New Year’s Day, relatives
from outside the village or the island come to visit. According to local people, most of relatives return home after Bon Festival in summer because the sea may be rough and the ship may be cancelled in winter.

There are five *Ie* (A, B, F, G, H) where elderly people aged 65 or older live alone. Also, *Ie* with a family in their 20s there is only P (22–3 years old) and *Ie* with a family in their 30s there is V only (37–8 years old, married). There are only two *Ie*, O and V, which have families under the age of 20. As of December 2016, there are five people under the age of 20 in all in K village. In O, there is one 15-year-old junior high school student. Originally there were three children in O *Ie*. However, the eldest son of 20 is a fixed-netting fisherman in Shirose and the 18-year-old daughter attends high school while lodging in Sawada, so they are not in *Mura*. In V, there are four children; the eldest daughter is 15 years old, the second daughter is 13 years old, the eldest son is 7 years old and the third girl is 6 years old. According to the mother of these children, she did not think that her children would remain in K village in the future, and she said they would leave K village.

In other *Ie*, live mostly older couples, brothers and parents in their 50s and 60s. In those *Ie* where there are young people who are expected to succeed *Ie*, they have all left the village or the island. Among such *Ie*, some young children who went away showed their intention to succeed *Ie*. For example, in W, the eldest son in his 30s who lives in Niigata intends to return to K village. However, according to the person in W, it was doubtful whether he would come back in future because he married in Niigata and built a house.

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About the traditional hierarchy of *Oome* and *Mizunomi* mentioned earlier, I interviewed residents of K village in 2015. As a result, there was no one who remembered the vocabulary of *Oome* and *Mizunomi*, but there were several people who said they knew about *Omodachi*. However, some people use *Omodachi* and *Omodanka* (important supporters of a Buddhist temple) as having the same meaning, so it seems to be words that are not used much now. According to the local people, because they are now democratised, there is not much difference in voice power or authority between the *Omodachi* and other *Ie*. However, the *Omodachi* has a large house and financial strength now.

K village is still basically part-farmed and part-fishery, but mainly agricultural. Rice is the main product, and other crops such as tomatoes and eggplants are cultivated for self-sufficiency. For fishing, recently there are few *Ie*
which fish using square nets. Some Ie are still concerned with Isonegi, and they are fishing turban shells and abalone etc. However, few people live only by traditional business. Most people, in addition to earning a livelihood, receive pensions or are engaged in work for which they can expect a cash income above covering the basic cost of living. A local person said that it is difficult to live by traditional living only now.

As for side work other than a livelihood, the residents once used to produce charcoal in the mountains. However, because it was hard work, it changed to working in Tokyo from about 1975. The first work away from home was civil work, but when it became less, it turned into a job at a car factory. The work at the car factory ceased around 1985. It is said that there are no young people now who work away from home. Regarding work related to timber, people planted cedar trees at the request of the afforestation public corporation in 1987–88, and received a daily allowance, but it has not been done since about 1994–95.

As mentioned before, cows were once an important means of survival, but there is only one Ie (R) who breeds cows now. In August 2015, K village residents had two cows. Depending on the time of year, there are a few calves in K village (the number fluctuates because the calves are sold on the cattle market in Takachi which is held three times a year (2 April, 2 July, 2 November)). The reason why the number of Ie which kept cows in K village decreased was that farm work was mechanised and it became unnecessary to use cows; therefore cow breeding became unprofitable. Currently, it costs about 100,000 yen only for animal feed until selling a calf for sale. But in July 2015, the sale price soared as few cows were exhibited and a female calf fetched 970,000 yen. Therefore, some people say that even now it is better than selling rice. People in R still keep cows because they like cows.

As you can see, the state of the current K village has changed considerably from the state of the former K village as reconstructed from documentary records and inquiring surveys. The declining birth rate and aging of K village have progressed, and the vacant houses also increased. Also, words representing traditional hierarchies such as Oome and Mizunomi are not used much. Traditional living in Mura was difficult to live by itself but its value declined.

**Relationship between Buddhist Altars in Vacant Houses and the Agency of the Deceased**

So far, I have extracted Sado’s traditional principle of Ie from ethnography, etc. and described the past situation of K village and the current state. The case of K village clearly illustrates that the traditional principle of Ie has changed.
About Sado’s traditional principle of *Ie* in K village, first of all, we can say that the means for securing the succession of *Ie*, such as adoption and *Otouto-naoshi* seen in the traditional Sado village society, is not currently functioning. In the village society of the former Sado Island, even if a child who was meant to succeed to *Ie* had disappeared for any reason, by taking various measures such as adoption, *Nakamochi*, *Otouto-naoshi*, *Imouto-naoshi*, the possibility of securing a successor was highly probable. In other words, the means for ensuring survival of *Ie* for later generations was properly maintained.

However, in K village, there are few *Ie* with young successors now, as the birth rate declines and aging and depopulation are progressing. One factor contributing to the declining population in K village is the outflow of young people out of the village and the island. However, in the traditional Sado village society, even if the population outflow of the young generation happens, that does not immediately lead to a decline in the successors to *Ie*, because there were various means of securing succession of *Ie*, such as adoption and *Otouto-naoshi*, with high probability. However, in the present K village, as the elderly live alone, there are *Ie* which are in danger of extinction in the future. In addition, there are only two *Ie* who have young children who can become successors. As far as the current state of K village is concerned, the means for securing succession, which once existed in Sado’s village society, is not currently functioning.

The fact that the means for securing succession is not functioning indicates that the importance of surviving *Ie* and maintaining livelihood have been diluted. The former family had been run for the purpose of surviving *Ie* and maintaining livelihood. The survival of *Ie* and the maintenance of livelihood were the top priority for *Ie* and its member families. However, as we can see, in the current K village, there are many *Ie* whose survival is endangered due to the decrease in successors and the cessation of the function of the means for securing succession. If survival of *Ie* was the primary objective, such a situation would not have arisen. Furthermore, there are nine empty houses in the K village. From this also it can be seen that the present *Ie* in Sado does not emphasise both the survival of *Ie* and the maintenance of their livelihoods.

Also, most of the rituals that passed on the authority of *Oyaji* and *Kaka*, *Kamado-watashi* and *Shakushi-watashi*, were almost abolished. According to the local people, even in K village 40 years ago, when the first son passed the age of 40, *Kamado-watashi* and *Shakushi-watashi* were done. In those days, people said ‘People in that *Ie* did *Kamado-watashi*’, but recently they had not heard such words. From this, it is understood that the importance of maintaining and succeeding *Ie* and the family business, which was the previous behavioural principle of Sado people, has been diminished.
However, the principle of traditional *Ie* has not completely disappeared. In K village, there was a case where relatives fought in court over the right to succeed to the empty house.

![Genealogy Diagram](image)

Figure 1: The genealogy of G, Q and U (in the figure is a person who could not confirm his or her sex)

It was Q in Table 1 that became a vacant house. It is G and U in Table 1 that contested the succession in court. Figure 1 shows the relationship between these G, U, and Q. As can be seen from Figure 1, these three *Ie* are in *Shinrui* relationship. Once Q had four children; however, the two who were born first died while they were young, the eldest daughter married U and the first son died of illness. As a result of this there was no successor to Q. Therefore, Q decided to adopt a couple as a successor. For the adopted couple, Q built a new house. The adopted couple had two children, d and e, but they both left the island. After that, the husband of the adopted couple died. Subsequently his wife Ms. c moved to another village on the island where her parents lived. Again Q became a vacant house. However, both d and e, who had been regarded as the successors, abandoned the inheritance of heritage. For that reason, it was an issue of who would succeed Q’s *Ie*.

The hearings on the inheritance of the vacant house in Q were held between Mr. a in G and Mr. f in U. Q was Mr. a’s aunt’s *Ie* and also Mr. f’s mother’s *Ie*. Also, Mr. a lived in K village, but Mr. f lived off the island. As can be seen from the above, both G and U had reasons to succeed to Q’s vacant houses. And it is presumed that both went to court because they wanted the inheritance. As a
result of this trial, Mr. f in U won and it was decided that he would inherit Q’s vacant house. Currently Mr. f manages Q’s property. The reasons for the detailed decision in this case were not disclosed in my survey. However, it is certain that a dispute over the succession of the house and the land occurred in K village.

Of those who fought in court, one lives in K village, but the other usually lives in Tokyo and rarely comes home. The principle of emphasising the house and the land, which is the traditional principle of *Ie,* stands since the person who lived in Tokyo insisted on the possession of a vacant house in the hearing. That means that although there are no intangible elements concerning *Ie,* the tangible elements partially remain. Similarly, in the case of Mr. T introduced at the beginning, it seems that the idea of emphasising houses and residential areas has been persistent among the people in Sado.

This continuation of the principle of emphasising houses and residential areas is important. However, people who keep vacant houses and Buddhist altars not only emphasise houses and land but, also altars and mortuary tablets. If only the houses and residential areas are important, Buddhist altars and mortuary tablets should be able to be moved and disposed of. However, this is not done. To analyse cases of vacant houses and people who maintain Buddhist altars, it is necessary to consider elements other than the traditional principle of *Ie,* that is, dead people symbolised by Buddhist altars and mortuary tablets.

In considering the dead, symbolised by the Buddhist altars and mortuary tablets, the concept of the citizenship of the deceased is important. Citizenship itself is a term that includes an extensive range of definitions, but recent studies have shown that citizenship is recognised in not only the living but also the dead. For example, the NRM (National Resistance Movement), led by President Museveni, ruled to ‘rebury’ a celebrity who died during the Amin regime in the 1970s. A ceremony commemorating achievement of the dead was performed, which led to NRM’s victory in the Uganda General Election held in 2016 (Umeya 2018: 277–278). Umeya (2018) stated in this case that the deceased’s agency interfered with the living and affected people’s voting behaviour (Umeya 2018: 278). Furthermore, since the right to vote formally is a factor of citizenship, the possibility that the dead exercise agency was also considered as an indication of citizenship (Umeya 2018: 279).

Considering the people who maintain empty houses and Buddhist altars from the viewpoint of this deceased citizenship, it is possible to see that the people in Sado may be affected by the citizenship of the deceased. That is to say, the people in Sado continue to maintain the Buddhist altars in vacant houses under the influence of the agency of the deceased. In Sado, residents maintain the idea of capturing the soul of the dead in material form from long ago. In
former Sado, when a young man and a pregnant woman died or a person died suddenly, there was a practice of going up to the roof, calling out the name of that person loudly and recalling the soul. This custom is called Tamayobi, Yobimodoshi, etc. in Sado (Hamaguchi 1993: 139). Also, in the village in northern Sado where I conducted my research, it is said that the soul walks outside when people die. The idea of materially capturing the soul of the dead is considered to have something to do with the agency and citizenship of the deceased in Sado.

Of course, the phenomenon of people maintaining a Buddhist altar in a vacant house can be observed even outside of Sado. However, the people of Sado tend to stick to Sado Island somehow, which is characteristic of the area. In Sado, people who live in neighbouring villages, and those who have moved away from the island, often maintain vacant houses and their Buddhist altars. They are not trying to escape Sado. It is presumed that the deceased maintain their citizenship, as evidenced by the Buddhist altars of vacant houses, which contributes to the attitude held by the people of Sado towards the island itself.

Conclusion

Until now, I have considered the empty house in Sado and those who maintain Buddhist altars from the viewpoint of the traditional principle of Ie and citizenship of the deceased. There is ample room for discussion of the cases we have seen so far regarding those who maintain Buddhist altars in vacant houses. Presently, we cannot give a definite answer as to why they keep vacant houses and altars. In this chapter, I have indicated the general direction the principle of Ie and citizenship of the deceased might take when considering this problem in the future. I want to continue my investigations to clarify why residents maintain vacant houses and their Buddhist altars.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

1 Sado City (2018). Website of Sado City, Niigata. [online] Available at: https://www.city.sado.niigata.jp/ [Accessed 13 November 2018].

2 In the coastal village of Sado, fishing with rods has been conducted alongside agriculture, and this traditional fishing form is called Isonegi (Ogawa 1964: 403). Isonegi use box goggles for seeing underwater – excluding the sea – such as Kagami and Garasu, piercing tools such as Yasu and Kama, hooks, clasps and rods (Ogawa 1964: 403–404). A boat with
one or two people who fish while using the box glasses and other gear according to their need. Ogawa (1964) discusses *Isonegi*: “*Isonegi*” is a fishery form engaged by farmers in Sado and it can be considered to indicate one production form of residents of disadvantaged islands trying to utilize natural conditions as much as possible (Ogawa 1964: 404).

3 *Ie* is a group of people who live everyday life and it is also a living space (Furuie 2009: 43). *Ie* takes a variety of forms and many controversies over it have occurred (Ueno 2009: 54). In a narrow sense, it has strong collective and economic cooperativeness, and has a patriarchal head of the family/branch relations. Conversely, it is also believed that the essence of *Ie* will be inherited beyond generations (Ueno 2009: 54–55).

4 ‘Limited Village’ is as follows. ‘Seniors aged 65 and older exceed 50 per cent of the settlement population, living alone elderly households have increased, so the function of the collaborative activities of the settlements has declined and it is difficult to maintain social common living’ (Oono 2005: 22–23).

5 The transformation of the traditional principle of *Ie* as a case in K village is also analysed in (Tsuchitori n.d.).

6 For example, Kimino town, Wakayama prefecture, etc. (Kawahara, K., Takeuchi, Y., Hirata, T. and Honda, T. 2012).

References


Chapter 8

Creation of Cooperativity through Memorial Rituals for the Dead: Ritual Citizenship among the Alur in the Republic of Uganda

Noriko Tahara

Introduction

Purpose and Social Background

This chapter discusses the cooperativity arising from the final memorial ritual for the dead among the Alur people in the Republic of Uganda. In modern society, most systems are built for the living; thus, it is rare for the dead to be taken into account in the discussion of civil rights and obligations. However, the dead and ancestral spirits profoundly influence our daily lives. Thus, this chapter aims to clarify the cooperativity that links the living and the dead in a memorial ritual for the dead. We focus on how people’s flexible and weak relationships in daily life can engender formal participation in final memorial rituals for the dead. Since such relationships do not comprise a permanent network, but occur temporarily in the ceremonial place, they are not regarded as important in the area of social sciences. This chapter describes the cooperativity constructed between the living due to the existence of the dead and the foundations for such cooperativity. It is hoped that the conceptualisation of relationships, including companions and interactions evoked by the dead as ritual citizenship, may open new horizons in the discussion of citizenship.

The Alur are a subgroup of a Nilotic Lwo group that migrated south along the Nile River from South Sudan. The anthropologist Southall, who wrote *Alur Society*, described the Alur character as rich in interaction with other ethnic groups and comprising a diverse and soft form of governance by kinship and ritual ties with the others. As a result of high mobility and interactions, the Alur maintain flexibility toward others and are accepting of other ethnic groups (Southall 1954). During the colonial period, the Alur land was divided into a British protectorate (currently the Republic of Uganda (Uganda)) and a Belgian colony (currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)) (Figure 1). Today, there are 985,000 people (2013 census) on the Ugandan side and 750,000 (2001) on the DRC side (Ethnologue).
In Alur custom, when an important person died, they performed a final memorial ceremony for the dead some years after the funeral, held through cooperation with other clans. This final memorial ritual is called myel agwara. In Alur language, myel means ‘dance’ and agwara means ‘(long wooden) flute’; thus, myel agwara means ‘flute dance’. However, this dance was last performed in Uganda in 1987 at a time of political turmoil following Amin’s coup d’état in 1971, and former President Obote’s return to power in 1979. Subsequently, from 1981 to 1986, civil war erupted due to the guerrilla activities of the current president Museveni, and the West Nile in Uganda, a part of the Alur land, suffered many calamities as a result (Leopold 2005). It can be speculated that the Alur were forced to enter a survival state following these tumultuous events.

Since 2002, I have conducted fieldwork on people of the Unu lineage of the Pamora clan.¹ Regretful about the imminent disappearance of the myel agwara, in 2009, I proposed that it be performed. While I was somewhat hesitant in making
such an approach as a foreign researcher, I received support from Wilson’s (2006) argument that in anthropological fieldwork, a distinction should be made between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, to ‘elide how richly detailed ethnography studies of human rights institutions and social movements can dialogically inform policy and political engagement’ (Wilson 2006 81). On this basis, I suggested to the Unu people that they perform the memorial ritual for the dead, which was at risk of disappearing. Ultimately, a simplified memorial ritual for the dead, rather than the full form (selewä) was performed.

This chapter is structured as follows. We first examine the incorporation of the dead into the concept of citizenship, using citizenship dynamically to express specific individual practices in modern society. By describing attempts to revive a final memorial ritual for the dead through the lens of the citizenship concept, we clarify the collaborative practices involved in Alur rituals. Second, we describe the significance of tipo (spirits), abila (apparitions) and jok (the source of life) in daily life with respect to the view of ancestral spirits of the Alur as the foundation of their memorial ritual for the dead, particularly the exchanges between the living and the dead in daily life. Third, we describe the process of reviving the final memorial ritual for the dead. While attempting to revive the myel agwara, the potential loose connections between clans emerged as an issue. Faced with various difficulties, they devised solutions using their network of relatives and neighbours, and the materials at hand. In this way, the dead revitalised the loose connections between the living. Fourth, we outline the nature of the revived myel agwara and demonstrate the cooperativity based on the neighbourliness of the Alur people. The myel agwara could also be called a bricolage of cooperation. Finally, we reflect on the attempt to revive the myel agwara, and elucidate how the living cooperate in their interactions with the dead through the concept of ritual citizenship. By describing such momentary cooperativity created by the existence of the dead, the aim was to open up a new horizon in the concept of African citizenship.

**Citizenship through Flexible Interconnection**

Since the 18th century, the word ‘citizen’ has been used to denote all free and equal people, and it has been viewed as self-evident that people are ‘citizens’ of some kind of organisation. Due to the spread of nation states during the 20th century, ‘citizens’ rights came to be considered ‘equal under the law’ in nation states, and citizenship supported by nationality became universal. Classifying citizenship by the three aspects of civil, political and social, Marshall defined it as a status afforded to full members of a community who are equal in the rights and duties granted to said status (Marshall 1993: 37). Here, status/position refers to what is legally and customarily defined by the public authority and power
Given. Marshall indicates that there is no universal principle for determining the content of rights and obligations, and the structure of social inequality can be approached through discussion of citizenship rights.

Since the 1970s, European society has promoted policies to ensure substantial rights such as multiculturalism-based education, medical care and welfare. However, since post-9/11, criticism of multiculturalism has increased, while the movement to ‘integrate’ immigrants has strengthened. Urry indicated that the root of citizenship is the prism of social governance, and rights and obligations are supported by humans and objects outside the boundaries of a particular society (Urry 2006). That is, the concept of ‘citizen’ continues to be updated through internal and external intertwining, and it is not a concept that is immune to historical development. Furthermore, together with globalisation, non-profit organisations (NPOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which operate across borders through development assistance, have created a type of counter-citizenship. With the expansion of consumer rhythms, the state has already been included in the structure of the market (Faist 2013: 1639). Thus, citizenship has been denationalised and altered to reflect the boundary between self and others.

Furthermore, in modern society, pluralistic boundaries such as gender, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation and religion have become manifest and the focus have shifted to the lives of people in various categories. As the universality of the concept of ‘citizen’ is debated, citizenship has been used as a dynamic and inclusive concept to represent attempts to overcome the boundaries between ‘citizen’/non-‘citizen’ and self/other. The British feminist researcher Lister stated that citizenship is a ‘momentum concept’ while citizenship’s inclusionary potential has been developed in various ways. Using this concept of inclusive citizenship, we can explore the citizenship of those who are marginalised and ignored in citizenship studies, such as people in poverty, people with disability and children. Moreover, ‘lived citizenship’ in everyday life facilitates understanding of how people negotiate rights and responsibilities, belonging and participation through the development of a multi-tiered analysis with a focus on the spaces and places in which lived citizenship is practised (Lister 2007).

African societies have been greatly distorted by the slave trade since the 15th century and sequential colonial rule through contact with Europe. According to Majima, an anthropologist working in the West African Dan Society, ‘the white skins’ arrived suddenly and inquired in various places: ‘Who exactly governs the land from xx village to xx village?’ (Majima 1999: 113). In French West Africa, people were categorised based on a language survey and in this process the ‘tribe’ concept was invented to facilitate colonial administration. In the British
East Africa Protectorate, regional peoples were regarded as belonging to the same tribe, and it was forbidden to change tribe. Such categorisation reflected the European framework of ‘citizenship’, which Europeans believed to comprise a universal category. However, ethnic groups in African societies, which have traditionally been characterised by free movement and group reorganisation, have transformed into ethnic groups with fixed territories and members (Matsuda 2014). The ethnic groups in Africa were tentatively created through the entrenchment and substantiation of European prejudice. Furthermore, they have continued to be reproduced as administrative units, cultural units for language, etc., and political organisation units, and have become significant groups for local people (Tsuda 2014: 116). In the 1960s, many African societies became independent nations based on divided regions while encompassing ethnic groups with loose boundaries. Thus, while the Alur people share the same language and customs, they have also been divided by the British Protectorate of Uganda and the Belgian Congo.

As previously mentioned, in modern global society, the concept of citizenship has engendered discussions that transcend various boundaries such as nation, religion, sexuality, etc. However, in the postcolonial debate, despite the current social problems due to political imbalances and economic exploitation of immigrants and minorities, they are naturalised as problems due to cultural differences, and the ‘culturalisation of politics’ for analysis of the framework of cultures has progressed (Lentin 2014). In Hazama’s chapter in this book, people who are exposed to the risk of political and economic conflicts of nation states create a space with their own living logic to maintain their foundation for living.

The Alur generally negotiate boundaries through marriage, migrant work, etc., while being included in multidimensional factors of lineage, clan, ethnicity and state, and they do not have a control system ruled by a single political organisation. Ndegwa indicates the tendency for the legitimacy of state sovereignty not to be recognised as a characteristic of African politics (Ndegwa 1997). One characteristic of African societies is that public areas are created through opportunities for cooperation that support daily life without the intervention of the nation state. Moreover, for the Alur, a good life is maintained through a suitable relationship with the dead. De la Cadena, who criticises human-centred ‘politics’ and researches indigenous movements among the Quechua in South America, states that ‘being in-ayllu, persons are not from a place; they are the place that relationally emerges through them, the runakuna and other-than-humans that make the place’ (De la Cadena 2015: 102). The Alur belief in ancestral spirits is also rooted in the land in which they reside.
In this chapter, we examine citizenship in the context of a memorial ritual, which means describing the intrinsic thought of Africa and may demonstrate its potential of the new concept of citizenship. By describing cooperativity in everyday practice, the aim is to relativise the concept of ‘citizen’ introduced during colonial rule and to present a citizenship that crosses the boundary between self and other.

**Research Area and People**

This chapter focuses on the Pamora clan of Unu lineage living in Gute North Village and Agonda Village in the Nyaravur Subcounty of Nebbi District, Uganda. The clan currently comprises 880 people in 196 households, whose principal activity is agriculture. Approximately 80 per cent are Christians, followed by believers of Lamtekwar (the Alur religion) and Muslims.

Pamora means ‘the place of Mora’ in the Alur language, named after its founder Mora. As shown in Figure 2, Mora, who became independent of his father Gisi in the 18th century, cultivated the area called Pamora Akeu. Unu, the fifth generation of Mora, left the Pamora Akeu region and cultivated the present area in the first half of the 20th century at a time when the government of the Ugandan Protectorate (1925–1961) forced all households to pay taxes and the West Nile Alur were forced to move to acquire cash (Southall 1954; Leopold 2005). It can thus be inferred that Unu’s migration was also driven by the need to seek land for cultivation. Unu cleared the land, took 16 wives, became the founder of the Unu lineage, and is said to have been the first person to bring Europeans to the West Nile. He died in 1946 and was buried on this land. Meanwhile, Oketa, Unu’s younger half-brother, remained in the Pamora Akeu area, and his descendants are called the Pamora Akeu clan.

Unu’s descendant, Cezario, was the father of my research assistant Jenaro and chief of the Unu lineage and Pamora clan, which oversees the six lineages of Pamora. Cezario was born on 13 July 1911, worked as a civil servant for 43 years, had a broad-minded outlook and was highly respected by the people. Over his lifetime, he had eight wives and fathered 46 children. On 13 March, 2005, he died at the age of 94. John (man, 70s), the eldest son of Cezario’s third wife, is the eighth generation of Mora and the current head of the Unu lineage.
Figure 2: Family Tree of Unu Lineage

Only the sons of Cezario mentioned in this chapter are featured in the diagram above.

All the village people, except children, participate in the elders group, youth group or women’s group. The elders group handles all conflicts in the village and communicates notices from the government, while the youth group works as a manoeuvring force in matters decided at village meetings. Finally, the women’s group holds literacy classes, maintains wells and discusses methods to raise capital, such as through small businesses. Each group meets regularly and works to allow villagers to perform the activities of daily life in safety.
Interconnection with the Dead

In this chapter, the Alur view of ancestral spirits is described based on a literature review of ancestral spirits of Nilotic groups together with my interview material.

Respect for the Dead – Kwir Tipo

One of the central concepts of the Nilotic view of ancestral spirits is tipo. Hayley, who investigated the Lango people during the 1940s, translated tipo as ‘spirit’ and regarded it as the source of life (Hayley 1947: 16). Toshiharu Abe (1989: 214–5), who investigated the Kenyan Luo during the 1970s and 1980s, explains tipo as follows:

Tipo is a word that has a meaning similar to shadow, ‘kage’ (in Japanese), referring to images that are reflected on water and mirrors, shadows made by light, people appearing in dreams and hallucinations, and deceased persons. However, that is not all. Although unable to be seen by ordinary persons, another figure, which is also called tipo, that is the same as the person, appears midway between the person and the shadow cast by the person on the ground, is visible to shamans and other mediums. The tipo are kind of spiritual entities that, while maintaining autonomy, also have a mysterious connection with shadows.

Tipo evokes the existence of a spiritual world that is closely connected to daily life. For the Alur people, tipo are the source of life and are regarded as having a relationship with the living world in the form of shadows and vengeful spirits (Tahara 2011).

An important element of Alur funerals is that the relatives of the dead sleep together for the requisite number of nights (four nights if the deceased was a woman and three nights if the deceased was a man), sacrifice goats at the grave, and that all members eat the sacrificed goats. A new tipo who has just lost its physical body views the burial from the sky, and unless buried correctly, will return to cause trouble for the living. Therefore, the funeral process is important for ‘kwir tipo’, which means demonstrating respect to the tipo. Kwir can be regarded as ‘a rule of prohibition in which something bad happens unless one keeps it’ (Abe 1989).

The pouring of goat’s blood into the grave is also to satisfy the tipo:

Unless the goat’s blood is poured into the grave at the time of burial, the deceased’s tipo will not welcome the new tipo, and each begins to hit and vex the
new *tipo*. The bullied *tipo* returns to this world in the opposite direction and will bring problems in order to obtain blood (man, 40s).

*Tipo* also send messages to the living through dreams, and sometimes cause sickness. For example, if a deceased person complains of being cold in a dream, it signifies that the *tipo* wants the grave to be cemented. By cementing the grave correctly, the *tipo* is satisfied and brings good things to the living.

Illnesses and difficulties are also messages from *tipo*. In such cases, the *tipo* is thought to be hungry and to desire a black goat. As *tipo*’s requests should be promptly addressed, the burial place is best situated in the area where the relatives live. However, many Alur people died on battlefields and in areas where they are migrants and were thus buried in said locations.

My grandfather died in 1964, but at that time it was difficult to carry his body due to the war [Congo Crisis]. Therefore, we buried him in that place. However, I experienced theft, poor harvest, and my life was not going well, so I went to consult with a witch doctor. This was around 1990. The witch doctor told me that the *tipo* of my grandfather was discontent with being ignored. Therefore, I went to the place where my grandfather was buried to collect the sand that was there and buried it in my house. After that, the situation improved (man, 50s).

While going back and forth between the world of the living and the world of the dead, *tipo* both threaten and protect the living; therefore, the living honour the *tipo* to improve the world of the living, in *jok* and *abila*.

**The Dead and the Living in Conversation – Jok and Abila**

Hayley speculated that *tipo* is the spark of power of the *jok* entering a woman’s body during sexual intercourse: ‘*Jok* is a neutral power permeating the universe, neither well nor badly disposed towards mankind, unless made use of by man’ (Hayley 1947: 3). The *tipo* can act as intermediary, approaching the power of *jok* and catering for the needs of the living; in this sense, the relationship between *tipo* and *jok* is central to ancestor worship (Hayley 1947: 17). Thus, *jok* are fluid beings that are generated in the functions of human life and death and expressed in daily life as *tipo*.

In order for *jok* to be connected with the living, a shrine called an *abila* or *jok* is constructed. Malandra reported that the Acoli, who belong to the same Nilotic ethnic group as the Alur, build small shrines called *abila* to worship their ancestral spirits (Malandra 1939). *Abila* comes from the verb *biilo* (to taste), and people are reported to offer daily bean dishes to *abila* as well as offering goats during ceremonies. Hayley also reported that ‘a man when translated to the
status of ancestor is in a position to utilise *jok* power for the good living of men. The individual will appeal to his own ancestors, that is to his family’s sphere of *jok* power, by building an *abila* (shrine)’ (Hayley 1947: 141). The lives of the living are thus left to the satisfaction of the dead. Moreover, Southall reported that each Alur chief made an *abila* to worship the ancestral spirits, priests performed rituals and participants ate and drank. Moreover, while only male ancestors are worshipped in *abila*, both male and female ancestors are worshipped in *jok* (Southall 1954: 100). Southall notes that Alur rituals involving these concepts vary between clans and are flexible due to economic factors and the influence of Christianity.4

Cezario, the head of the Unu lineage, appointed John, the eldest son of his third wife, and Luka, the eldest son of his fourth wife, as his successors. The duties of the chief of the lineage are to rule over conflicts and to promote safety and development. For that reason, Cezario had maintained the *abila* and *jok* in good condition despite the fact that, in this region, activities related to *tipo* are considered contrary to Christian doctrine. On his deathbed, Cezario agreed to be baptised but this meant abandoning the *abila* and *jok*. Thus, Cezario secretly entrusted John with the *abila* and *jok* and the *abila* was relocated into John’s house. The *abila* is still maintained by John today, and the *jok* by John’s wife. John explains that the *abila* are Cezario’s father and grandfather, while the *jok* is Cezario’s mother-in-law. The *abila* of the Unu lineage is an *ayomo* tree with three branches buried in the ground. It is protected by plants to prevent direct sunshine, medicinal herbs for maintaining health and guardian spirits called *askari* who live under stones. The *jok* has the power to support production as shown in pregnancy and childbirth.

To keep the *abila* and *jok* in good condition, seasonal foods (such as white ants) are offered and rituals are regularly performed with the pouring of goat’s blood. During such rituals, the names of the grandfather, great-grandfather, maternal grandmother, and great-grandmother are called out to, followed by the name of the hill or flowing river that surrounds the residence. In this area, the dead are buried so that the head faces the hill and, once buried, is absorbed by the land. De la Cadena noted that ‘the substance of the runakuna and other-than-humans that make an ayllu is the co-emergence of each with others’ (De la Cadena 2015: 102). Likewise, the foundation of Alur imagination regarding *tipo* is connected with the land. People speak to the *abila* and *jok*, prepare food, perform exchanges with the dead and cultivate a collaborative life with the dead.

On 14 June 2011, John invited eighteen elders from the six villages of Pamora to perform the ritual to renew the *abila* and *jok*. One goat was sacrificed to the *abila* and three goats to the *jok*, a white rooster was sacrificed to the *askari* spirit protecting the *abila*, and a feast was held.
The Process of Revival of the Memorial Ritual

As mentioned, *myel agwara*, the final memorial ritual for the dead, is performed from two or three to ten years after death. Several years after Cezario died, I inquired when the *myel agwara* would be performed, and John and Luka replied that it was very costly and thus not suitable for such a busy era. Although they did not mention it, 80 per cent of the village residents were Christians, and there must have been concern regarding religious acts related to traditional *tipo*. Concerned about the ritual disappearing, I continuously discussed it with John and Luka and they proposed asking the Pamora clan for their opinions.

The Ideal Myel Agwara

When asked what *myel agwara* is, most Alur people explain that ‘there is something called *ambaya*, and if the power of the *ambaya* is strong, even if you cook on the roof, the roof will not burn’. *Ambaya* is a magical tool made from the skin of a small animal called *losso* connecting a wooden whistle and medicinal herbs (Fig. 3). It is thought that *losso* has the power to drive away evil *tipo* and that ‘without *ambaya*, *myel agwara* is merely entertainment’ and ‘*myel agwara*, a ritual held by the power of *ambaya* controls the drums and *agwara*’.

![Figure 3 John’s ambaya (The length is about 60 cm)](image)

My research assistant Jenaro explained as follows:

*Myel agwara* is performed for crying. It is performed for my deceased grandfather. When *myel agwara* begins, even if someone dies it cannot be stopped. The reason is that the purpose of this ritual is to cry. All of us, both men and women, cry in memory of the person who died.
Myel agwara is planned by the clan (host) to which the dead belongs and other clans (guests) are invited to a feast for three consecutive nights. In 1949, the Pamora clan jointly performed myel agwara with the Cubu clan for Cezario’s father. The Cubu clan, which resides in DRC, was founded by Cubu, Mora’s younger brother (Figure 4).

![Figure 4 Participating Clans for Selewa](image)

Gute North village and Agonda village are located at ❶.

Because Mora and Cubu are brothers, it is taboo for members of the Pamora and Cubu clans to intermarry. In the myel agwara performed by the Angaba clan in 1987, the Pamora clan supported the Cubu and Angaba clans, and John and others from the Unu lineage participated. Myel agwara begins as follows.

The guests are supposed to arrive on Friday evening. But if the ambaya of the host is strong, the guests will not be able to find their way and will arrive the next morning. This means that the guests have lost. If the ambaya of the guests is strong, they will arrive in the middle of the night. This signifies that the host has lost. When the guests arrive at the host’s village, they find the drum that the host has hidden, hit it, and run away. When a guest is caught by the host when attempting to escape, the guest pays a bull to the host as a fine. If the host cannot catch the guest, the guest wins. The hosts set up a kajagi (pillar) in the place of dancing. The kajagi is unstable for the bottom of it is in the shallow hole. If guests’ ambaya are strong, they can rise to the top of the kajagi. This indicates that the guests have won.
The *kajagi* is a pillar set in the centre of the dance field to oversee the ritual. The host makes the ritual confusing on purpose, hiding drums and setting pillars that are difficult to climb. This display of competition is said to delight the ancestral spirits and enlivens the feast. Once the *myel agwara* begins, the hosts play *agwara* and drums with the guests and perform dances using *ambaya*. The drum on the side with inferior power of *ambaya* will not sound even when hit. When *ambaya* is wrapped around a large bottle containing *kwete* (beer), which is indispensable for ceremonies, many people continue drinking for three days and three nights. *Myel agwara* constitutes the final parting with the dead. The hosts show solidarity by crying together with the guests through the playing of the *agwara* and drums and dancing; they send the deceased *tipo* to the world of the ancestral spirits.

*Preparation for the Myel Arwara*

The first meeting regarding the *myel agwara* was held at Gute North Village on 6 February 2011, together with two members of the Cubu clan. Altogether, approximately 60 persons attended. Around eleven o’clock, a gong announced the beginning of the meeting and a goat was brought before the people, as is customary at Alur rituals and meetings. When beginning something important, the gathered people must cook and eat together, since ingesting something from the mouth is both an important and dangerous act. The Alur people are careful to avoid being poisoned, and eating together is an important procedure for building a relationship of trust to perform rituals together.

First, John greeted everyone as the successors to Cezario and introduced me as a frequent visitor and resident in the area who had studied Alur culture since 2002. I then explained the importance of restoring *myel agwara* for the following reasons: (1) It was necessary to show respect to the late Cezario, (2) it is important to pass on Alur customs to the younger generations, and (3) by creating a visual record, it can be shared with people who do not know Alur culture. Finally, I told them that I could bear some of the costs of the *myel agwara*. John then inquired what they thought about this opportunity. Cezario’s younger brother (Ermajildo, 80s) said, ‘This is our only opportunity to revive dying customs, so let’s join together with Tahara to revive the ritual’. The eldest son of Cezario’s first wife said, ‘The dance of *agwara* has not been performed for more than 20 years. If we miss this opportunity, we will lose a good opportunity for our late father’ (Orwothwun, 70s). Cezario’s younger brother Okaya and grandson expressed their approval. John then said, ‘To make this project successful, it will be necessary to house guests, cook food, carry water, gather firewood, provide goats and chickens, and in some cases bear the financial burden’ (Okaya, 80s). The second son of Cezario’s first wife, who
was the chief of Gute North Village, said: ‘Our grandfather Unu was the first person to bring Europeans by himself to the Alur land. At first, people slandered him. However, it was subsequently found that the guests filled us with joy. Neighbouring villages may be jealous of this village performing myel agwara with a foreigner, but are we not worthy of receiving that honour?’ (Sumeon, 60s). The approval of the women and young people was also obtained, and again Cezario’s younger brother Ermajildo emphasised, ‘Because this is a cultural matter, we must overcome politics, ideologies, religious differences, etc. and have all members of the clan take on the project’.

Finally, John proposed giving me the name of the eldest daughter of Unu ‘Anna Nya Unu’ and obtained approval from the participants. This naming was a necessary procedure for me to perform myel agwara together as a member of Unu lineage. It was decided that the myel agwara would be held from 2–3 March 2012 and that the Cubu clan would search for guests. Next, while people drank and prepared kwete and tea, the drums were sounded and singing and dancing commenced. The elders, women and young people all presented their dances, and the feast became even livelier.

Cooking and serving were permitted only for those of the Unu lineage. The youth slaughtered a goat and made soup in a large pot, while the women made kwen (kneaded bread made from cassava and finger millet). With earnest appearance, the youths served the kwen and soup to the meeting participants. They brought the soup containing the heart to John, as the most important person present, the soup with kidneys to Cezario’s two brothers and the soup with the pancreas to Cezario’s third wife, that is, John’s mother. Subsequently, everyone ate, and the singing and dancing continued past eight in the evening. Thus, the Unu lineage clearly displayed its position as host.

The second meeting was held in Gute North Village on 13 August 2011. The elders of the Cubu clan arrived before noon and the meeting began. Approximately 140 people, mostly from the Pamora clan, gathered. First, two goats were displayed and the discussion began.

John introduced the two Cubu elders, saying ‘They will search for guests for this myel agwara’ and the Cubu elders responded, ‘We have already found a guest. I would like the Pamora clan to wait optimistically. Do not worry either about persons who will beat the drums. We have many young persons who play the drums’. Then, the Unu participants swore to contribute to the myel agwara. A young man stood up and said, ‘Everyone is saying that they will make a contribution, but details are lacking. Why don’t we clarify what will be contributed?’ Thus, two problem points were clarified.

(1) How should each family contribute?
(2) How should agwara be procured since the Pamora clan does not have any?

The elders said, ‘Let’s take home the issues and decide concretely in the clan meeting’ and ‘our contribution can only be decided after the harvest. Therefore, let’s make a decision at the last meeting before March 2012’. It was also decided that the Cubu clan would take responsibility for searching for agwara. A feast followed with eating, drumming, and dancing.

The next day, John and Luka, along with Pepetwa, the chief of the women’s group, calculated that they would need 8,537,600 Ugandan shillings (approximately 2,500 USD) to hold myel agwara (Table 1). We decided to have another meeting in December when the contribution of each family would become clear.

Table 1 Estimated Items and Costs for the Myel Agwara

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>item</th>
<th>quantity</th>
<th>estimated price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>goat for ambaya ritual</td>
<td>4 heads</td>
<td>489,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cock</td>
<td>2 heads</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flour for kwete</td>
<td>1/2 sack</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goats for agwara players</td>
<td>15 heads</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flour for kwen</td>
<td>10 sacks</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cattle</td>
<td>4 heads</td>
<td>2,880,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flour for kwen</td>
<td>5 sacks</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>millet for yeast</td>
<td>1 sack</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dried fish</td>
<td>25 pieces</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>salt</td>
<td>1 sack</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sugar</td>
<td>3 sacks</td>
<td>750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tea leaves</td>
<td>3 cartons</td>
<td>21,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coffee powder</td>
<td>3 cartons</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gin (nguli)</td>
<td>6 jerrycans</td>
<td>270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>firewood</td>
<td>3 lorries</td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>papyrus mats</td>
<td>30 pieces</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paraffin</td>
<td>20 litres</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matches</td>
<td>2 carton</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soap</td>
<td>1 carton</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hiring empty drum for water</td>
<td>10 drums</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,537,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(unit: UGX, 2,400 1GX= 1 USD)
Written by Ocaya, 14 August 2011 (Sunday)
Various Obstacles

After the second meeting, various problems arose. First, no guests could be found. The Cubu clan was negotiating with the Angaba clan. When the Angaba clan had performed *myel agwara* in 1987, both the Cubu and Pamora clans had given their support, and therefore it was thought that the favour would be returned. However, the Angaba clan would only agree if the Pamora clan would shoulder the burden of the four cattle that the Angaba clan should provide. The Pamora clan objected to this since four cows had been offered to the Cubu clan at the previous *myel agwara*. Negotiations broke down in October 2011 and the Pamora clan then approached the Angal clan. However, they declined saying, ‘There is not enough time to prepare’. I proposed postponing the *myel agwara*, but John demurred, as did Cezario’s third and fourth wives and younger brothers. Therefore, it was decided to hold the third meeting on 3 January 2012.

At the third meeting, the elder, youth and women’s groups (approximately 30 people) of the Unu lineage participated. John reported that he was unable to find guests and that the purpose of the meeting was to consider an alternative plan. Cezario’s eldest son Orwothwun suggested, ‘Considering the benefit to our Unu Lineage and the Pamora clan, how about we perform a *selewa* over two days instead?’ Although *selewa* includes traditional aspects, no guests are invited.7 Cezario’s younger brother Ermajildo agreed that ‘it is appropriate to perform *selewa* as an alternative plan’. Okaya, Cezario’s younger brother, remarked that, ‘It is too costly to hold another meeting to find guests. We should probably discuss whether to postpone *myel agwara* or agree to perform *selewa*’. A member of the youth group said, ‘There is no need to be disappointed that we could not find a public cooperating partner. We should move forward and perform *selewa*. Preparation has been continuing up to this stage, and we are more motivated than ever’ (Ocaki, 20s). Pepetwa, the head of the women’s group agreed, remarking that ‘the content of *selewa* is the same as *myel agwara*, and only the length is different’ (Pepetwa, 40s). The youth said, ‘If *selewa* is as it has been explained now, we will not hesitate’ and ‘the young generation has never seen *myel agwara*. It should be a very valuable experience to see it’. It was then remarked that ‘the number of *agwara* should be discussed. In the case of *selewa*, we must all take the burden ourselves’, and the necessary items and costs were confirmed. The following day, the youth group discussed how they could contribute to *selewa*. The women’s group searched for cheap firewood and kinfolk who cultivate cassava. John went to the Cubu clan in DRC on 5 January and they agreed to share the cost for *selewa*. Subsequently, the elder, youth and women’s groups each promised to make strenuous efforts to hold the *selewa* in March.
However, in February 2012, they received word from the Cubu clan that the DRC Alur traditional chief had requested a cow as it was necessary for the Cubu clan to cross the border and for the remaining Cubu clan members to celebrate the selewa together. It was difficult for the Pamora clan to take on any further burden. Simultaneously, this request reminded John and Luka that when Cezario was still young and went to the myel agwara held by the Cubu clan, the sleeping cabin and drinking water given to Cezario by the Cubu clan were different from those for the Cubu clan. That is, the Cubu clan did not treat Cezario as one of their members. John and Luka thus rejected the Cubu clan’s request.

Because the Cubu clan would not participate, the agwara, which was dependent on the Cubu clan, could not be procured. John thought that 30 sets of agwara (240) would be necessary, but the Pamora clan had only three sets, which had been sold, damaged or lost. Pepetwa of the women’s group suggested asking the people of the neighbouring Angal clan to act as co-hosts. Her uncle Oreste (man, 60s) was an elder of the Angal clan and could reportedly use ambaya. Oreste accepted John’s request to cooperate with the selewa and advised him to seek a clan with agwara in Uganda. Receiving information that there were agwara in Erussi, a town on the border with Congo, John and Luka visited the Padyere and Payera clans there in February 2012 and succeeded in obtaining 12 sets of agwara from them.

However, 12 sets were insufficient as agwara are difficult to blow continuously for a long time. Therefore, players are divided into two teams, each blowing in turn. With 12 sets, only one team can be formed. Instead, the youth group decided to play ndara (xylophone) so that the music could continue while the agwara players rested. Originally, ndara was not an Alur instrument and was played at wedding ceremonies, etc., but never at mourning rituals. However, the elders’ group approved of playing ndara to compensate for the lack of agwara. For the ndara a hole approximately two metres in length was dug in the ground and fifteen boards were lined up on top of it. The ndara is played by seven people hitting the boards with sticks wrapped in old tyre rubber and can be made easily and for free. The youth group dug a hole in the evening, arranged the boards on the hole and, under the guidance of the local community, devoted themselves to practice. The elder group went to the Nyaravur Subcounty office and requested a public announcement concerning the implementation of the selewa ritual by the Pamora clan.

As preparations progressed, the shortage of funds became more serious. The cotton harvest that year had been poor and cotton prices had fallen. Therefore, it was decided to reduce the number of cows and goats for use in meals, not to add sugar to the drinks and not to use oil for cooking. To eliminate
the principle that only those of Unu lineage could cook at the ceremony and to incorporate all the village people as hosts, it was also decided to cook in the kitchen of each house rather than establishing a unified central kitchen.

Several quarrels occurred between the elder and youth groups before the problems were addressed. The elder group accused the youth group of not working systematically while the youth group criticised the elder group for deciding things only among themselves. Under these circumstances, the Pamora Akeu clan announced that they would form a band and participate. The Pamora Akeu clan are the descendants of Oketa, Unu’s half-brother. The people of Unu lineage were surprised by this offer, since, in the rituals to date, they had almost no recollection of cooperation with the Pamora Akeu clan.

It was the cooperation of the Pamora and Cubu clans that supported the traditional *myel agwara* ritual. This was a cooperativity based on historical kinship, as they shared the same ancestors. Moreover, while preparing for the ritual, the cooperativeness of the Pamora and Cubu clans was apparent, but ultimately, this cooperativity receded due to the border demarcation, while the cooperation with the Angaba clan also faded for economic reasons. Thus, the loose connections maintained in the traditional ritual failed to fulfil their function, confirming that the nation state and economic boundaries were solid. However, other clans in Uganda stepped in to cooperate.

**Revived Memorial Ritual**

In March, when the *selewa* was to be held, various participants arrived at the Unu lineage. Table 2 summarises the participants’ movements.

### Table 2 Roles of the Participants of *Selewa*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>20 to 20 February</th>
<th>1 Mar</th>
<th>2 Mar</th>
<th>3 Mar</th>
<th>4 Mar</th>
<th>5 Mar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elder group</td>
<td>Consulting the Papyura clan and publicising the <em>selewa</em> in Nyaravur subcounty.</td>
<td>Consulting the Padhyere clan.</td>
<td>Management of all procedures including the distribution of food.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women group</td>
<td>Buying food.</td>
<td>Preparing <em>kwete</em> and <em>nguli</em>.</td>
<td>Entertaining visitors, fetching water, and preparing meals and beds.</td>
<td>Eating together.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with ambaya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rituals of <em>kajagi</em> and <em>munyasu</em>.</td>
<td>Ritual of <em>nyabo</em>.</td>
<td>Ritual of <em>jojo vuru</em>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The Ritual of Ambaya (Magical Tools)

On the morning of 3 March, eleven people using ambaya (Pamora clan, Angal clan, Payera clan, Padyere clan) arrived. First, the ambaya were rolled around the kwete pots in the room where the ambaya players were, and they beat the room with their ambaya. This ritual began at approximately eleven o’clock and three young people and John’s wife participated as apprentices. The four rituals of ambaya are summarised in Table 3.

The first ceremony was a ritual to decide the place to perform selewa and set up the kajagi. According to Odongo (man, 40s), an ambaya player, the kajagi is the centre and heart of myel agwara. It is also the source of the power of dancing and protects the dancing place against conflicts. The kajagi was set up as follows.

First, the ambaya players encircled the candidate site. While hitting the ground with the ambaya and shouting ‘Hiya, hiya, hiya’, each one ran around the kajagi counter-clockwise, crouched down, and passed the ambaya from the back of the knee of the right leg forward and blew a whistle attached to the ambaya. They then repeated the manoeuvre, this time running clockwise. They again turned counter-clockwise, and on the fourth lap, swapped the ambaya from the right to left hand and repeated the manoeuvre. According to Oreste, an ambaya player, these behaviours let the tipo know what they are doing. ‘Hiya’ means ‘Are you ready?’, to which the other members reply ‘Hiya, hiya’, meaning ‘We are ready’. Next, Odongo, an ambaya player, gave kwete to four apprentices in a curious method whereby the gourd was held out behind them or sideways to them and then retracted (Figure 5). Odongo explained, ‘I did something that others cannot do. It is a cultural strategy, a sort of magic. As the people of the previous generation did so, we also follow their methods. It is also protection from evil people’.
Next, the head was cut off one white rooster and the body was allowed to run before it stretched out its legs and died. The death with its legs stretched out signalled that the ceremony could be performed in this location. A small hole was dug where the blood of the chicken was shed, and a *kajagi* was set up there with three stones placed at the base. After cooking the chicken, Odongo chopped its liver into small pieces, and threw the pieces into the air while calling the names of the surrounding hills, rivers, mountains, trees and lakes. This was a call regarding the ‘desire for you to help us perform rituals from now on’. The second ritual was *munyasu* to create a place to welcome guests at John’s house. Grass was spread out in the house, the goat was slaughtered on it and the *ambaya* players ate the goat meat with *kwen*.

At ten a.m. on 4 March, the third ritual of *nyabo* commenced at John’s house. Oreste explained, ‘It is a ritual to share the secret of the *ambaya* and a protective ritual from which the magical power to not be hurt by anyone is obtained’. First, they inhaled the *kwete*, goat’s blood and *palala* (red powder made from goat liver) from a small hole dug in the floor of the room and spat on the ground to signify that the *kwete* and goat had returned to the land. Next, they swallowed one grain of *otute*, a medicinal seed, to signify the swallowing of the secrets of *ambaya*. Through this ceremony, the *ambaya* players shared their secrets and were protected from evil attacks.

At around one o’clock, the *ambaya* players went to the place of * selewa*. The *agwara* players had returned to their cabin for lunch, and only the *kajagi* was standing. However, the *ambaya* players perceived an incident related to the *kajagi* and discovered the strip of an *ambaya* at the bottom of the *kajagi*. According to
John, this was evidence that someone had planned evil things. They repositioned the stones on the bottom of the *kajagi* and restored the *kajagi* to its original state by pressing their backs against it.

On 5 March, at John’s house, the final ritual of *ambaya, jobo vuru*, was held from 12:30. The grass and food related to the *ambaya* ritual were gathered to take to the *kajagi*. The *ambaya* players performed four rounds around the *kajagi* as in the first ritual, then toppled the *kajagi* and cut it into short pieces. A goat was slaughtered and its blood poured on the ground where the *selewa* was performed. They then left the place.

The four rituals of *ambaya*, in collaboration with the *tipo*, were rituals for safely constructing a place of ritual while expressing gratitude to the land. It was also the first joint ritual of the four clans (Pamora, Angal, Payera and Padyere). The deceased Cezario engendered this cooperativity between different clans through the magical tool of *ambaya*. Traditionally, *kajagi* symbolised the ritual of *ambaya* as the centre of *myel agwara*. However, as described in the next section, the participants kept some distance from the *kajagi* and danced around the flag set by the *agwara* musical group.

### Table 3 *Ambaya* rituals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of ritual</th>
<th>Purpose and performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-Mar</td>
<td><em>kajagi</em></td>
<td>Deciding the location of the <em>selewa</em> and setting up the long pole in the centre of the ritual place. Sacrificing the cock, tossing up the liver of the cock, and calling the names of the hills surrounding the ritual place to ask to help in the ritual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>munyasu</em></td>
<td>Building a place for the welcoming of guests with <em>ambaya</em>. Sacrificing a female goat on the grass in the house and performing rituals granting trainees the right to train in <em>ambaya</em>. Broiling the meat of the goat and eating it with <em>kwen</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Mar</td>
<td><em>nyabo</em></td>
<td>Sharing secrets of <em>ambaya</em>. Chewing herbs with all members of <em>ambaya</em>, sacrificing a goat, pouring the blood of the goat into four holes in the floor of the house, and putting palala (red powder made from the liver of a goat) and otute (red and black seeds harvested from grass) in the holes. Then, the inhalation of this mixture from the holes by trainees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Mar</td>
<td><em>jobo vuru</em></td>
<td>Disposing all things safely according to <em>ambaya</em> rituals. Carrying grass from inside the house, straw from the roof of the house, and leftover food to the <em>kajagi</em>. Running around the <em>kajagi</em> four times and cutting the <em>kajagi</em> into short pieces. Sacrificing a goat and pouring the blood of the goat on the site of the <em>kajagi</em>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Simplified Ritual of Selewa

At noon on 1 March, the cultural troops of the Pamora Akeu clan arrived, comprising 28 people in total: the head of the band playing the antelope horn, dancers wearing traditional Alur clothing, drummers, string instrument players and flute players. The women’s group received them warmly with *kwen* and bean
soup. The cultural troops had reportedly been formed one week prior to the selewa and participated until 5 March.

On the evening of 3 March, an agwara band composed of the Padyere and Payera clans from Erussi arrived at Agonda Village blowing the agwara. As they arrived down the hill after a four-hour trek, they were warmly received with kwete. When the sun set, the performers, consisting of the agwara band and dancers, went to the venue where the kajagi was set up. While walking counter-clockwise around the venue, they blew the agwara, the dancers danced around them and the ambaya players danced while waving the ambaya. The youth group dug a new hole somewhat away from the kajagi, created an ndara and began playing. The Pamora Akeu clan also joined and the feast continued until two a.m. On this day, a cow was served as a meal.

On 4 March, after five a.m., the blue flag of the agwara band was set somewhat away from the kajagi, and under it, three drummers began to play. The ambaya players brushed the drums, agwara, ndara, and performers with their ambaya to make the instruments sound better, to drive away evil and to imbue them with the power of ambaya. The agwara players began playing as they circled the drum, walking counter-clockwise. During the rest of the agwara performance, a group of youths played ndara. The performance and dancing continued until noon, when the sun was high. Then, the people returned to their cabins to eat lunch and rest. The incident related to kajagi mentioned in the previous section was discovered at this time.

The performance of agwara and ndara recommenced from approximately three p.m. and kwete and skewer stands were set up in the neighbourhood. Approximately 400 people from nearby villages also participated. The people dancing around agwara were united in a swirl, and the selewa venue was covered in a cloud of dust. Around five p.m., the people made a wide circle and stared at a boy aged 12–13 years who was sitting on the ground near the kajagi. They whispered, ‘When the boy tried to touch the kajagi, his body became paralysed and stopped moving’. A man using the ambaya had the boy lie down on the ground and struck him with the ambaya (Figure 6). The boy was made to hold the ambaya. Then, as he pulled the ambaya and made the boy stand up, he embraced the boy with one hand and turned his body three times counter-clockwise. The boy, who was supposed to be paralysed, ran away effortlessly, wiping away his tears. The people remained silent and observed.
As the sun was setting, everyone went to Cezario’s tomb, surrounding the agwara players. The walkers were spread across the road and, crowding into the graveyard, they sang along with the performance of agwara. All Cezario’s sons stood on his tomb to keep others from standing there. Finally, the song of the agwara poked fun at Cezario, who had missed the changing times and was unable to understand them. The Alur often use derision to show respect. While listening to this performance, some women sat around the grave and wept.

*Dhano nyang de ngo gimadho kongo kud arule.*
*Dhano nyang de ngo jebo nguli ku kwete.*
*Cezario nyany de ngo.*
People do not understand, why they are drinking beer in a cup.
People do not understand, there is no nguli (local gin) and no kwete.
Cezario does not understand. (Cezario lies quiet in the ground).

After the performance, everyone returned home and a cow was slaughtered for those who had participated in the selewa.

The next morning the cultural troops of Pamora Akeu and agwara band returned to their respective towns, and in Gute North Village, along with the women and youth group, they cooked a drum filled with meat, cow’s head, and leg soup boiled in a large pot, *kwen*, and ate together over half the day.

**The Stream Underpinning Cooperativity**
John and Luka reported:
Even with a limited budget, we managed to do it. At first, we thought about only agwara. However, the Pamora Akeu clan joined, the young men’s group participated with ndara, and the number of people gradually increased. All of this was unexpected and we were worried because it was out of our budget, but everything went well in the end.

The costs borne by me for the selewa totalled 3,401,000 Uganda shillings (over 1,000 USD) as shown in Table 4. Because the other expenses were borne by each of the hosting households, the details are unknown.

The creativity and ingenuity of the villagers were distilled in the attempt to revive the ritual. First, when planning the *myel agwara*, they gave me their name, thus including me in the Unu lineage. Due to their flexibility, others were included in the memorial for the dead. In preparing for the *myel agwara*, the Pamora and Cubu clans, which were divided by Uganda and the DRC, cooperated. The Cubu clan helped to invite guests and to procure agwara. However, ultimately, the Cubu clan could not cross the border due to the intervention of the DRC traditional chief. Thus, the memorial could not bridge the boundary between nation states. Instead, however, the Alur of Uganda cooperated to bridge this loss.

Cooperativity within the boundary of the nation state appears in various situations. The Pamora Akeu clan, which shares a great-grandfather in Uganda, formed cultural troops and cooperated, to the surprise of the Pamora clan who had no memory of previously participating in a ritual with the Pamora Akeu clan. Furthermore, the Angal, Payera and Padyere clans came with *ambaya* and *agwara* and enabled the *ambaya* ritual and playing of drums and *agwara*, in response to the request of the Unu lineage. While the Angal clan is geographically close and intermarriage exists, they did not cooperate in the traditional rituals. Erussi, where the Payera and Padyere clans reside, has a large market and women of the Pamora clan visit for small business. Thus, while they knew of each other’s existence, they had almost no daily contact. Nevertheless, it was possible for the two clans to cooperate due to the existence of the dead. In summary, the cooperativity based on the ‘kinship’ of the Pamora and Cubu clans was divided by the border, but the ‘neighbourliness’ rooted in the Alur area on the Ugandan border brought about cooperation.
Selewa also bridged religious boundaries. Christians maintain a negative stance toward tipo rituals. However, even Cezario’s fourth wife, a pious Christian, noted that ‘people’s hearts have become warmer as a result of the selewa project’ (Acen, 80s). The fourth son of the third wife, who works at an independent Christian church, said, ‘This is but the beginning of the authentic myel agwara. For an authentic ritual, 40 to 50 sets of Agwara are necessary. The youth group is now preparing an authentic myel agwara. It sometimes takes a long time of ten years or longer. But you will surely witness it in the future’ (Raphael, 50s). Through diverse cooperativity, the living mourned and interacted with the dead through crying, dancing and singing.

Table 4 Items and Costs for Selewa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>item</th>
<th>quantity</th>
<th>price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>goat</td>
<td>4 heads</td>
<td>489,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cock</td>
<td>2 heads</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flour for kwete</td>
<td>1/2 sack</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flour for kwen</td>
<td>5 sacks</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cattle</td>
<td>2 heads</td>
<td>1,440,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flour for kwen</td>
<td>2 saks</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>millet for yeast</td>
<td>1/2 sack</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dried fish</td>
<td>15 pieces</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>salt</td>
<td>1sack</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sugar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tea leaves</td>
<td>10 packets</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coffee powder</td>
<td>10 packets</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gin (nguli)</td>
<td>4 jerrycans</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>firewood</td>
<td>1 lorry</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>papyrus mats</td>
<td>20 pieces</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paraffin</td>
<td>5 litres</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matches</td>
<td>2 dozens</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soap</td>
<td>6 bars</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hiring empty drum for water</td>
<td>10 drums</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,401,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(unit: UGX, 2,400 1GX=UGX= 1 USD)

Written by Ocaya, March 2012
Instead of dancing around the *kajagi*, they danced around the flag of the *agwara* band, which was set up at some distance from the *kajagi*. Thus, the place constructed by the ritual of *ambaya* was not central to other persons who participated in *agwara*. The ritual of *ambaya*, as symbolised by the boy who touched the *kajagi*, was regarded as an act of manifesting the other world. Those who avoid *kajagi* evade actions related to *tipo* and this evasive action is likely related to the fact that the *myel agwara* had not been performed for 25 years. However, while divided into two spaces, the living performed the ritual with *ambaya* and also played *agwara* and *ndara* as they entertained guests, bidding farewell to Cezario, and sending the *tipo* to the world of the ancestral spirits.

The elder, youth and women’s groups each played their respective roles. While the use of *ndara* by the youth group was inappropriate in the mourning ritual, the elder group permitted it to compensate for the lack of *agwara*. The women’s group made the best of the situation with few resources. *Selewa* was thus a bricolage of cooperativity interwoven with the feelings of the living who thought of the dead.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, we discussed the connections among the living, who use the dead as intermediaries, and the cooperativeness that appears as a result. This cooperativeness temporarily surfaces in places where the living recall the dead. I invented the term ‘ritual citizenship’, referring to the intersection between the dead and the living, and the collective surrounding of death by the living, allows us to describe the dynamism of local and micro-cooperativeness and develop an argument concerning what underlies this cooperativeness.

First, there is cooperativeness due to ‘kinship’ based on the history of migration as manifested through the rituals for the dead. In the 1987 ritual, the DRC fellow clan crossed the border to participate, but in this ritual, they could not cross. Nevertheless, a weak connection between clans in Uganda appeared as if to substitute for the loss of cooperativeness due to ‘kinship’. This is a cooperativeness based on local neighbourhood connection. The elder, youth and women’s groups each consulted with other clans, entered into negotiations and repeated the dialogue for preparation of the ritual based on the regional context. By opening their difficulties to others with a weak regional connection, it was possible to obtain advice and jointly perform the *Selewa*. This cooperativeness from opening up to other regional communities comprises an openness that is already engraved in ceremonial practice, as *myel agwara* was originally performed through inter-clan cooperation. Thus, underlying ritual citizenship is the principle that problems are opened to neighbourhood clans, and this principle
also appears to be the feature of Alut, which Southall mentioned as unusual blend of lineage segmentation and the peaceful assimilation of groups (Southall 1954: 7).

Furthermore, in the traditional ceremony, the *kajagi* established by the *ambaya* ritual is the centre of the ritual, and the mourning instrument *agwara* was played. However, in this ritual, people danced to the *agwara*. Furthermore, to compensate for the shortage of *agwara*, the *ndara* was introduced by the youth. The living thus transformed the memorial ritual for the dead into a convivial place with a feast centred on music and dancing and not a place controlled by the *ambaya*. Furthermore, in accordance with the economic constraints, by allowing everyone to cook, the boundaries were opened and the number of people who could participate as hosts increased. As demonstrated by my incorporation into the Unu lineage, the principle of including outsiders is still functioning. This flexibility continues the versatility of the Alur as indicated by Southall, while also relativising the universality of ethnic groups premised on the concept of ‘citizenship’ that was introduced during colonial rule. Instead, ritual citizenship melts the boundaries between self and others. On this point future research is necessary

The cooperativity that appears through interaction between the living and the dead is distinct from the economic production activities that are prioritised in modern society. It was based on the relationship with the dead while being subject to the control of the nation-state. Activities related to death are not historically static and, in each case, the deceased are remembered through memories related to the name of the deceased. This was an activity supported by the shared universality of death.

The attempt to revive *myel agwara* ended in neither success nor failure. The *selewya* that was performed is an impromptu memorial ritual created by the living who straddle modernity and tradition. In this special feature, Nyamnjoh & Brudwig (2014) note ‘incompleteness’ as one of the characteristics of African societies and indicates the importance of living in convivial reality while being suspended in the dichotomous Western concepts of modernity and tradition. The incompleteness of this ritual is one of the characteristics of African societies, while the ritual citizenship conceived by this chapter is a manifestation of temporary cooperativity developed based on latent and weak connections. It is a potential citizenship, founded on transient characteristics of openness to the local community and the creation of cooperativity by including others. The ritual citizenship reconstructed through the routine practice of memorial for the dead thus revealed one way of envisioning African citizenship.
Acknowledgements

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Notes

1 I began my fieldwork in the village of Lake Albert in Uganda in 2001. The Alur people, who comprise 80 per cent of the village inhabitants, are immigrants from northwestern Uganda, and many frequently come and go from lakeshore villages to their home village. Therefore, in August 2002, I visited his hometown with Jenaro (man in his 40s), my research assistant. Jenaro’s father Cezario was the head of the Unu lineage, and as he served as chief of the Pamora clan, he possessed deep knowledge of Alur customs. Since meeting Cezario, I have been interested in the culture of the Alur people and have continued my fieldwork in the Alur land, both the hometown of the Alur and the lake shore.

2 Southall (1954) referred to the numbers four and three appearing in kwir as ritual numbers.

3 Umeya regards that tipo spread among the Nilotic ethnic groups as words approximate to ‘shadow’ and ‘spirit’, emphasising the two meanings of ‘vengeful spirit’ and ‘photograph’ as examples of tipo in everyday conversation (Umeya 2008, 2018). Abe defines jogi as ‘soul’ whereas Umeya defines it as ‘spirit’, but in the present chapter, the term jok is used as in the Alur language to include both meanings. The plural form of jok in the Alur language is jogi, and it is thought that the word is equivalent to juogi of the Luo in Kenya and Padhola.

4 According to my survey, jok is performed in the house or under a tree within the area of residence. Jok sometimes fulfil requests, aid pregnancies and heal diseases. They also predict the future to avoid danger and may conversely bring calamity (Tahara 2011).

5 Screenings of the video of the memorial ritual for the dead entitled Seven Songs for the Final Memorial Ritual for the Dead (59 minutes) were held several times each in three local villages from 2014 to 2015. Various comments were received from people in the village and are currently being revised.

6 It is a unit centred around the head of the household and also includes wives and unmarried children.

7 Selewa is a loanword from the Swahili chelewa, meaning that we will go first because the guest clan was late.

8 Although the purchase price of cotton was 2,000 UGX/kg in 2011, it dropped to 800–1,000 UGX/kg in 2012.


10 This focused on the discussion on the extension of membership, which is different from the discussion of community involving ceremonial rituals.
References


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**Web 資料**

Ethnologue, Languages of the World,
Chapter 9

In and Out of Family: Family Affairs and Deep Play at Nightclubs in Kampala, Uganda

Gaku Moriguchi

An Urban Legend: The Bad Spirit of Ange Noir

One day in 2007, when I was talking with Josephine, the Alur owner of kiosk near the N² market in Kampala, I told her that I had frequently been in Ange noir. Ange noir is one of the nightclubs in the industrial area, perhaps one of the oldest in Kampala. She laughed – perhaps I did not look like a dancing person – and told me, ‘Oh, you’ve been to the place where the bad spirit dwells’.

I did not understand what she meant by ‘the bad spirit’. ‘The bad spirit? What do you mean?’, I asked. Josephine replied, ‘You don’t know? Well, all right. My husband told me a funny story about it. He’ll tell it to you next time.’ An evening two weeks later, in front of Josephine’s kiosk, Michael, an Alur who works at one of the government agencies, told me the story of ‘the bad spirit of Ange noir’.

Well, this story happened to one of my brother’s friends who studied at Makerere University at the time. He was a good man, and also a smart boy.

One night he drove his car to Ange noir for a night of enjoyment. He had some drinks and danced with girls there, and it was a lovely night. After a while, he found a very nice girl. She was beautiful and danced well. He approached her, and they danced together. She was an excellent dancer; they danced for one or two hours in all, and he bought her a couple of drinks. After dancing, he took her to his place in his car, but his tragedy had already started. When they reached his room, he tried to switch off the light. Then, suddenly the girl’s arm extended to the other side of the wall and switched it off. It was weird, the boy thought, bewildered, but now it was time for fun.

In bed together with the girl, he found another oddity on her body. Her legs were like those of a goat. ‘That’s weird’, he thought, but he kept doing what he loved to do. He finished, and he was satisfied.

However, he lost his mind gradually. At dawn, he gave her a lift to her home. That was the beginning of his nightmare. He thought the girl was next to him in the passenger seat and that he was talking to her, but he was murmuring by himself; no one was beside him. On the way, at first, he dropped in at Club Pa Louis in
Ntinda for another drink, and at that time, he was still sane. At the second place, when he reached Fat Boyz in Kisementi, he was unable recognize whether he was talking to the girl or something else. At the third place, Stake Out in Wandegeya, he obviously behaved strangely. He started screaming in public.

When he reached the Sway Bar on Kampala Road, he no longer had the ability to walk. He lost consciousness and was brought to the Mulago Hospital. Two days later, he passed away.

That is the story of the bad spirit of Ange noir.

Like other urban legends, the story has been framed as ‘a true story’. On the other hand, the storyteller’s rendering tends to fall apart when one looks at the basic facts, such as the actual date, the man’s name and his acquaintances. And if you have spent time in Kampala, you know that the story has many variations. Sometimes, the bad spirit extends a finger instead of a weird arm or has the legs of a cow, dog or some other animal. However, the common thread uniting the variations is either that the beautiful girl in the nightclub seduced a boy or that a boy seduced her. The girl in the nightclub is the only consistent main character of the ‘bad spirit’ story.

Furthermore, if you are rather familiar with Kampala, you might notice that the variations of the story follow the geographical layout of nightclubs in Kampala. There is a large route for Kampala taxis, which are mini-vans that carry ten to fourteen passengers. The route starts in the middle of the Kampala Road on Nakasero Hill, the political and economic centre of Kampala. It leads to Jinja Road, running beside the industrial area, and reaches Nakawa, well-known for Acholi squatters. The taxis then head to Ntinda, using the Ntinda
Bypass and join Old Kira Road toward Kisementi. Next, the road goes to Wandegeya and joins Bombo Road, which again leads to Kampala Road on Nakasero Hill. The story takes place in a ring around the main centre of Kampala.

In Uganda, there are several horror stories not only about ‘bad spirits’ but also about ‘night-dancers’. In Luganda, night-dancers are called ‘abasezi’ (pl.), who usually steal dead corpses for eating; in the middle of the night; they suddenly visit houses and run away naked. However, the bad spirit in our story appears as a beautiful girl, initially seduced by a man, who in turn seduces him and makes him crazy. The story bears a significant resemblance to *Femme Fatale*. In an actual urban setting, the girl could be one of many girls who earn money from relations with multiple men. A girl of that type normally adorns herself with beautiful clothes and accessories, most of which are gifts from boys and men. As we will see, girls and women in Kampala are ambivalent seducers and seducees. With their sexuality and marginality, girls’ ambivalence is considered a social danger, as the story of the bad spirit suggests. In this chapter, I aim to take a close look at this theme.

**The Duality of Citizenship in Africa: Familial and Sexual**

This chapter, first of all, examines the bargirls’ subjectivity and citizenship in Kampala, Uganda, relating them to their sexual behaviour and practices. The image of the bad spirit applies to the image of urban women. As Ogden noted on the singlehood and motherhood of women in Kampala, urban women are regarded as ambivalent subjects in Kampala. If one marries and produces children, she also gains the respect of others. Ogden refers to this kind of motherhood as ‘producing respects’ (Ogden 1996). On the other hand, single women who live without family are considered prostitutes.

This image of womanhood represents a dilemma in understanding the actual sexual activities of women in Kampala. Are there two totally different kinds of women in Kampala? Or does this womanhood have two totally different natures inside it? As I will show later, this kind of duality of subjectivity and citizenship is a very sensitive issue even among people in Kampala. On the one hand, we have the idealised womanhood as the mother of the family, and on the other, we have the dangerous image of the bad spirit, seductive and sexual. In feminist theory, women’s subjectivity has also been discussed in examinations of the dilemma between the ‘subject’ and the ‘object’ (Moore 1988; Strathern 2016). In this sense, womanhood itself contains a serious duality in relation to the society to which women belong. In this chapter, I would like to mention that two kinds of citizenship lie beneath the dilemmatic images and
subjectivity of women. In order to explore their subjectivity and citizenship more theoretically, I want to consider two different perspectives: (1) women’s social status and their marginality in the urban settings of Africa and (2) the theme of subjectivity and agency in light of studies by Gayatri C. Spivak (1988) and Judith Butler (1990).

The duality of subjectivity and citizenship in Africa (especially from the female perspective) is a crucial issue for political studies in Africa, as Mamdani discussed in his prominent book *Citizen and Subject* (Mamdani 1996). Mamdani argued that the African modern state has a ‘bifurcated’ nature and that duality comes from urban and rural areas. Urban areas in Africa are ruled by civil law, while rural areas are dominated by customary law, both of which are set by the indirect rule of colonial government (Mamdani 1996, 2012).

Mamdani analyses the African duality (or, in his terms, the ‘bifurcated state’) as the dichotomy between one’s sense of being a citizen under colonial civil law and one’s sense of being a subject under the rule of kings and chiefs, two dimensions that grew historically in different ways. However, in urban Uganda, the idealised concept of citizenship – such as the idea of people being political agents of democracy – has been domesticated within the context of the rule of kingdoms and memberships in ‘tribal’ clan systems. Additionally, the long civil war from the 1970s to 1986 resulted in distrust of the state system; most social security depends on membership in a kinship, clan and lineage. Therefore, Mamdani’s idea of the bifurcatedness of the African modern state has been internalised within people’s subjectivity in African citizenship.

While the rigid duality of civil law and customary law in the modern African state exists, as Mamdani argued, there is another liminal space in urbanity wherein people recognise themselves through their own sexuality, play and flirtation (Yoshimi 1987 Manuel 2008; O’Mara 2013). In Africa, especially, there are two distinct spheres of kinships and sexual networks – the contrast of motherhood and the sexual ‘bad spirit’ is one example. I call the former sphere, which is based on kinship and clanship in Uganda, ‘familial citizenship’ and the latter ‘sexual citizenship’.

As case studies, this chapter presents ethnographic descriptions of bargirls’ activities in nightclubs in Kabalagala, Kampala – some of the research for which was done in 2016 and 2017 – through basic fieldwork on citizenship in Uganda that I have been doing since 2006.

The first kind of citizenship in urban African settings is the familial (and inclusive) one, which basically covers women’s security and life insurance; in that system, women play the role of wives, daughters, and mothers – the primary pillars of their families. In Uganda, that brand of familial citizenship has deep links to clan lineage groups. In poor circumstances, such as in the suburbs and
slums of Kampala, it may force girls – particularly those who have dropped out of primary school – to work for the family under patriarchal control. The distinction between being married and single also matters for women insofar as their economic independence is concerned. Although married women are quite relational in their status, they do become more stable economically by running personal businesses at local markets, which is usually possible with the financial support of their husbands. Single and divorced women, on the other hand, generally find it difficult to maintain their own businesses as their lack of marital status means no financial support from a spouse.

Secondly, sexual citizenship plays a particular part in women’s lives once they leave their original families by dropping out of school, running away from home, divorcing their partners or the like. In the urban setting of Kampala, being the target of others’ sexual gaze is something in the way of a social status for women. Women in Kampala, even teenagers, are keen on seeing and being seen for social recognition. In that context, sexuality, including motherhood, is a part of that recognition and the way in which women establish relations with others. As Foucault and Butler pointed out, sexuality has a hidden regime of sociality (Foucault 1978; Butler 1997).

Operating between those two kinds of citizenship, this chapter considers the theme of women’s subjectivity by examining scenes at local nightclubs in Kampala and critically reviewing the ‘deep play’ of bargirls. If women’s subjectivity is forged by societal structures (or citizenship), such as their paternal clan lineage and family, along with the desires and gaze of men and others, what kind of free will do they have in their life choices? Is there any possibility of their having their own choice, voice or sexuality in domestic and public domains?

As I have already mentioned, subjectivity is a dilemmatic word, especially for women in African urban conditions. According to Judith Butler’s idea of performativity, subjectivity can be divided into two parts: subjectification and subjection. In Butler’s terms, subjectification involves following one’s desires, exploring new dimensions of sexuality and constructing performativity in the way of subversion (Butler 1997). In that sense of sexuality, women as the agencies of desire disrupt familial citizenship through their existence via seduction, dance and (casual) prostitution.

My additional research in 2016 focused on the cases and life histories of seven bargirls known as malaya, or ‘prostitutes’. To create a more complete picture of the bargirls’ activities, the chapter cites five other cases that I encountered much earlier in the nightclubs and slum areas of the city between 2006 and 2011. In general, around the nightclubs of Kabalagala, Kampala, there are three types of prostitution. The first is the ‘stand’ type, in which girls stand
on paths next to nightclubs and wait for men to pick them up. That type of business earns the women less money but presents an easy method for newcomers. The second is the ‘room’ type, in which bargirls take a more professional approach to their business by keeping their own rooms in cheap hotels and wandering around nightclubs with drinks. They often have frequent johns but tend not to stay in the same place for more than a month. In most cases, bargirls falling into the ‘room’ type bargirl are divorced with several children to raise.

The last category of bargirl prostitution is the ‘dance’ type, whose practitioners, better dressed than the others, operate inside nightclubs, where they dance with male johns. Dancing is their main practice, and the Luganda word for ‘dance’ – ‘ku-zina’ – even means sexual conduct. Therefore, their activities at nightclubs comprise both dancing with and ‘hunting’ for men. In this chapter, I ethnographically describe their seduction tactics and methods, representing their subjectivity and agency of sexual citizenship in that domain, and also associate their desire with the other domain of familial citizenship, a membership that they previously held.

In and Out of Family: The Sexuality, Liminality and Familial Citizenship of Girls in Slum Areas

What kind of options does a Ugandan girl in Kampala have for her own life? Of course, it depends on which family she was born in. Most of the girls in Uganda, however, realise life is hard barring some exceptional fortune. This section describes how girls and women in Uganda try to maintain their ordinary lives and sometimes need to survive among domestic conflicts. For girls and women in Uganda, survival is usually harsh, especially in Kampala slum areas; not all people on welfare get ample support from the government. Most of the government agents, such as police, army, bureaucrats and politicians, are eager to rob property if they have the chance. Corruption on governmental issues is an everyday occurrence virtually everywhere. A good education is not very accessible without substantial wealth and the proper connections with the upper levels of society in Uganda. Health issues are even more problematic. Even if you have sufficient money to be seen at one of the more luxurious medical institutions in the country, patients are occasionally left for several hours waiting for the necessary medical procedures for no legitimate reason. If the individual is a girl or woman – married or not – the circumstances could be even harsher than male citizens in Uganda encounter.
**Gazes toward Women and Sexuality in Urban Spaces**

One of the notable things about the ‘bad spirit’ story is that an unmarried (young) woman is actively seen as a sexual object in an urban area of Kampala. In Kampala, married women show their marital status in a distinct way through their dress code and behaviour.

For example, a very characteristic type of dress is the *ggomesi*\(^8\) the garb is popular among Ganda\(^9\) women, who make up the majority of Kampala’s inhabitants. A *ggomesi* hides the wearer’s body lines and gives her body an ample look, thereby exuding an image of wealth and productivity. Through clothing and dressing, the urban space identifies which women are married: the *abakazzi*,\(^10\) who represent a different status from the unmarried. Women are always categorically divided into two categories: married with children (or, as the phrasing goes, ‘the mother of someone’) or singles, a status that often carries the implications of being a *malaya*\(^11\) (a prostitute, especially by men). The sexualities of these two types have entirely distinct appearances. In this sense, women’s bodies represent – willingly or unwillingly – their own sexuality and recognition on the Kampala streets.

On the other hand, pre-teen girls and students in primary school – and even secondary school – are considered asexual, called *abaana*,\(^12\) and cannot be seen as sexual targets.\(^13\) School regulations normally require female students to wear long skirts and cut their hair short as a form of ‘general morality’ to make their sexual appeal less obvious externally. Even after school, when they take off their uniforms, they are expected to wear similar clothes; anything remotely sexual must be removed. In their domestic spaces, their voluntary options for fashion are restricted, and certain forms of self-expression are discouraged. Being a good sister and being a daughter in daily life bind their behaviour to the house; their voices often ignored, these young girls live under the demand to be the good girls for their future. They are placed under the double-bound condition, which simultaneously inhibits their external sexual expression and pressures them to get married earlier, implicitly having another sexuality. For that reason, only the girls who drop out of school or female university students succeeding in the institution have the ability to adopt fashion choices like wearing jeans and having hair extensions. By doing so, they attract sexual gazes and attention on the streets – recognition not permitted in domestic and school spaces.\(^14\) Female college graduates have a bright future with their bachelor’s degrees, but single women have very limited opportunities to secure jobs with fair circumstances, even compared with married women. For example, in the slums and suburbs of Kampala, jobs for women without land (self-owned, husband-owned or family-owned) largely depend on commercial activities in informal sectors. However, many of the women are married women who run stores at the markets (katale)
in slums and city outskirts. As the tendency to regard single women as ‘less’ than proper members of society is rather strong, popular consciousness normally assumes single women working at shops to be hired workers, not shopkeepers. Most single women working at kiosks or other market shops originally came from rural villages to urban areas as housemaids for their close relatives. They are permitted to live in the houses of shopkeepers’ families for free, but they are not allowed to have a sexual lifestyle. As a result, many single women are engaged exclusively in domestic work and confined to the family house. Their tasks include doing their many brothers’ laundry, caring for their brothers’ children, caring for their fathers at work, preparing meals, dishwashing, watering and other miscellaneous household chores. For most single women and those with close relatives who lack capital and a local business in the market, the career path inevitably points to sexual industries.

**Women and Poverty Conditions in Slum Areas**

Some people in Kampala assume that most of the girls in slum areas are active in prostitution since they can easily find dosshouses around slum areas. Their recognition of the relationship between slums and prostitution, however, has serious misunderstandings. *Malaya* in the slums never sleep with their johns in the hotels in front of the slum, which would be too scandalous for the slum residents. Many girls from slum areas, however, are still found as bargirls and *malaya*. As they conceal what they do from their families and neighbours, they play billiards, drink alcohol at bars and sleep with men at hotels that are far away from their original dwelling places. There are also arguments on the correlations between poverty and high dropout rates (Davis 2000; Edlund and Korn 2002). With regard to dropouts at schools, however, there are a number of other social factors in play; the single factor of ‘poverty’ is not enough to explain dropout rates.

What I observed was that children who dropped out of school were separated from relationships that they had been building up there and then started to seek alternative relations outside the slum and school environments. Another factor was the constant demand of everyday domestic work, which led them to rush out and leave the house at night, partly due to clashes with other family members. They eventually grow accustomed to being in nightclubs as bargirl and, in some cases, behave as a *malaya* for their own economic independence.

As cases, I introduce two women whom I met as bargirls from N slum. They were spending most of their nights in Kabalagala, a red-light district two kilometres away from N, in the circumstances I mentioned above. One is Nina from the Acholi ethnic group, and the other is Betty from the Konjo ethnic
group, peoples of western Uganda.

It was around June 2007 that I met Nina at Capital Pub, a well-known nightclub in Kabalagala. At that time, she was eighteen years old and had recently fled to N slum from the civil war in Acholiland as an IDP (Internally Displaced People). She dropped out of school in P4 (fourth grade in primary school) soon after moving to Kampala because, she said, her family could not afford to pay the tuition fees. Seven people lived in her household: her brother (Oscar, 27 years old in 2007), his brother's wife, their two children and two younger sisters. Making matters worse was that her brother, the only mature male in the household, was unemployed. In addition, her parents were away from home with drinking habits; they only returned home once a month to get money to drink.

As Nina explained, her reason for going to clubs in Kabalagala was mainly dancing (not necessarily including sex) and drinking soda (not alcohol) which she usually asked her dancing partners to buy. Instead of earning money as a malaya, then, leaving her home and speaking to people outside was one of her biggest desires. Of course, other family members did not look favourably on her nightlife, but Oscar, responsible for her supervision, apparently never placed strict regulations on her activities. After two years passed, Nina got pregnant by her Cameroonian lover, whom she met in the club, and then he took her out of N slum in 2010.

Betty, a Konjo woman, was born in the Democratic Republic of Congo. She was 21 years old when I was conducting my research in 2015. She grew up in a low-income domestic environment with her father, two elder brothers, the wife of one of the elder brothers and two elder sisters. At the age of thirteen, she dropped out of primary school. After that, she ran away from home, got pregnant and gave birth at the age of 16. Then she disappeared again. While she was losing her grip on sanity due to the influence of drugs in the slum, she was found by family members in 2015.

According to her father, Baluuku, he was struggling to earn tuition fees for her school, but Betty ‘disliked school and also disliked housework’. As Baluuku’s primary source of income was his job as a night guard (askari), he was out of the house at night and unable to supervise her. In addition, Betty was unwilling to live in her brother’s house, which her father suggested instead. Leaving home and staying at her grandmother’s house was what she chose to do. Meanwhile, she started commuting to clubs in Kabalagala and had a boyfriend. After that, she delivered a baby with the assistance of her mother, who separated from Baluuku, but then disappeared again with her baby in 2013. That same year, the baby was taken away from Betty to a welfare facility, due to her inability to nurture the child. She did not return home; instead choosing to prostitute
herself in Kabalagala and move around the houses of her fellow prostitutes.¹⁶

Speaking about the runaway girls in Kampala, Josephine, the Alur kiosk owner, told me that running away from home is very common among both poor and ordinary, middle-class families. It is not boys who run out of the house – the runaways are always girls. Josephine went through the experience, as well. She had brought up her niece, Rose, the daughter of a deceased sister. A few years ago, due to Josephine’s strict attitudes about school and housework, Rose disappeared from Josephine’s house, yet to return. Several years later, in 2013, Josephine also divorced her husband, Michael. She abandoned her shop in the market and took their young daughter, leaving Kampala for her home region. Unfortunately, I lost her contact number; I have no idea whether she or Rose has come back.

The situation of teens dropping out of school and running away from home obviously has secondary connections with poverty problems. In the case of Nina, poverty was the direct cause of her school dropout but not the direct cause of her nightclubbing. The cases of Rose and Betty, however, suggest that girls may lose their relationships with society after dropping out (not at least for economic reasons) and, unable to find any place at home for themselves, leave school and home for the night domain.

**Marriage and Divorce: Clan Membership and Familial Citizenship**

Even though cases of runaway girls and divorces are common, these incidents are constructed on the bases of the master-narrative of marriage and women’s belief in being a ‘wife’ and ‘mother’. In Uganda, becoming someone’s wife (mukazzi) and mother (maama) means obtaining entitlements in society. Inside each clan, ethnic group or nation, marriage and reproduction are the ways to becoming a regular member of those societies and the means to gaining the civil rights of a ‘citizen’. Productivity as a mother in Uganda is another sexuality, different from that of youths. In Uganda, the sex appeal of a pre-married woman is her thin waist and limbs – but after marriage, sex appeal lies in a thick waist, large breasts and large buttocks, all signs of fertility. With those forms of sexuality, each individual’s social status in urban spaces becomes clear. Therefore, unless a woman is a ‘mother’ or at least a married woman, it is not easy for her to open up a store in the market near a slum and do business independently. Single women lack the proper social reliability in local urban communities.

According to Ogden, the notion of equating an unmarried ‘single’ woman with a social disorder (as opposed to the idea of a productive ‘mother’) originated in the urban regulations of Kampala in the colonial period (Ogden 1996: 170–175). Owing to the syphilis epidemic in the early 20th century and
the public health policy of Kampala, prostitutes and unmarried women have always been grouped together and subjected to harsher treatment (Moriguchi 2006). Several studies suggest that the patriarchal system and national policy have established a honeymoon relationship (Vaughan 1992), which pushes the sexual norms of women into their ‘motherhood’ containing the narrative of a good ‘mother’ (Ueno 1990; Murray 1991). In Uganda, this combination of patriarchy and nationalism also exists as a typical political landscape (Ogden 1996; Vorhölter 2017). For example, in the national general election in Uganda, elected woman members of parliament make speeches about their domestic affairs as ‘mothers’ and ‘wives’ first and foremost; they describe their motherhood as the main attribute that makes them suitable for a political role, without mentioning their political experience.17

In other words, in Kampala, women obtain their own citizenship in their family and husband’s clan only after they get married and become mothers, which Ogden called the moment of ‘producing respects’ (Ogden 1996). By being married and mothers, they obtain their voice for social participation and permanent social security, which I call ‘familial citizenship’ and which Lister (2007) paraphrases as inclusive citizenship. To that end, marriage (and giving birth) inevitably constitutes the essential condition for their happiness in Kampala’s urban society.

**Rumour and Neighbourhood: Sexuality and Marginality**

It is important that women obtain their familial citizenship by being good ‘wives’ and ‘mothers’ not only for the purpose of ensuring good reputations among their relatives but also in the context of maintaining a good position in the local community. Neighbourhood childcare is a kind of collaborative task in communal life such as that in the slum areas of Kampala. If you cannot be in that collaborative relationship in the communal neighbourhood due to your social status as a ‘*malaya*’, that would significantly restrict your activities and social life, even in terms of daily trips to the market. Additionally, children are humiliated and judged at school based on their mothers’ reputations, resulting in ostracism. As a result, the norm of the ‘mother’ and the life of *malaya* are mutually incompatible. Most prostitutes tend to discretise, making it very difficult to have their own community except for fellow prostitute friends (even when they have their own children). Another possible option is for a *malaya* to send her children to a dormitory school, which entails expensive tuition and board; some room-style prostitutes adopt that approach.

In that sense, for women, having a reputation as *malaya* and a drinking habit can be fatal even in the urban community. Meanwhile, even married women are the subjects of rumours in the city as a result of the development and
diversification of communication equipment (mobile phones, e-mail, etc.). They enrich themselves not only through their husbands’ income but also via their lovers’ contributions, such as expensive mobile phones, watches and clothes, and it would be a proud, wonderful achievement for a woman who receives such things (though no one would mention the circumstances surrounding the material wealth). In other words, ‘women’ are given fixed positions in their relatives’ and neighbours’ networks in urban spaces – but when they deviate from ordinary, familial life, society sees them as seductresses, sometimes ‘bad spirits’ capable of devastating normal society.

In that discourse, women find themselves living in the ordinary norm of ‘mother’ and ‘wife’ among relatives and regional communities. On the other hand, it seems as if they still have room for freedom in their minds (or economically), which corresponds to the story of ‘love’ in urban society. Their free, inner desire is often to be desired, which means that being an object is an expression of subjectivity. As women are objects of desire for men, they are treated as marginal and ambivalent beings. In the next section, I discuss the dancing in the club, which is ‘deep play’ in its ambivalent existence.

Dance, Pool, and Deep Play: Sexual Citizenship of Bargirls at Nightclubs in Kampala from Anthropological Perspectives

*At the Nightclub*

Whenever I enter a bar in the town of Kabalagala, Kampala, home to many nightclubs, some of the girls there always try to grab my attention and say to me, ‘I want to be escorted by you.’ Whether I agree or not, they follow me, sit next to me, and then start requesting some bottles of beer for their friends – and it all happens within five minutes of my entering the bar. Those bargirls are commonly called *malaya*, or ‘prostitute’, since they have a reputation for doing anything sexual for money. There are ordinary bargirls and also professional *malaya* in nightclubs at the same time, but Ugandan people do not make a clear distinction between the two groups because things are more complicated than they might seem. Firstly, some of them just come to these places for fun; they want to enjoy themselves drinking and dancing, doing things that lie outside the scopes of their daily lives in the slum areas where they reside.

Secondly, some of them are certainly professional but refuse to accept that they are prostitutes. Rather, they consider that their relationships with men are more private, as in the current Ugandan context, money is one of the most important factors attesting to strong ties.

Thirdly, this private relationship is always optional. It implies anything, depending on the context. Sometimes, bargirls are looking for nothing but
drinking and dancing in the bar because they are there for a good time only.

After a bargirl has known someone for as few as five minutes, the relationship is already private – and convivial – with that person. If a man exchanges words with a bargirl and has plenty of money (which the bargirl may assume is for her) but does not give her anything, he is considered selfish. Acting as a patron, he provides a service and funding to people in Uganda and contributes to relationships with women there – that makes this kind of nightclub relationship play into a local sense of power and citizenship for the recipients. In that sense, conviviality is something more than sharing. Therefore, if you have power and money, you are expected to distribute it to anyone who wants it. Otherwise, society sees you as someone too selfish to take care of others.

There are thus two ways of seeing how the structure of citizenship works in the privatised relationships at nightclubs in Uganda. One is from the perspective of inclusive citizenship, which critically connects women’s poverty and their survival practices in nightclubs. They demand conviviality at nightclubs from male patrons, since they routinely practice seduction as a survival strategy and reconnect to their inclusive citizenship through male patrons. Another angle is the ‘play’ perspective. From that standpoint, a game is simply a game to bargirls; their aim is not to survive but rather to enjoy their moment through sexual performativity.

By taking account of these contexts, this section looks at games at nightclubs in Kampala, Uganda, from anthropological perspectives. The main aim of this study is to perform a critical analysis of how bargirls (malaya) play and demonstrate the games of dancing and pool bargirl as their ways of seducing occasional partners as male patrons.

**Dance, Pool and Deep Play in Kampala**

In the nightclubs of Kampala, dancing with someone is an optional matter. You can dance by yourself, of course. If you want to dance with a female, however, you need to approach her in the proper manner. First, you exchange glances with her; you cannot approach her unless she shows her agreement. She also ‘sizes you up’ with some glances while you dance and assesses your rhythm – how it might work with hers.

When you successfully dance beside her, both of you slowly start moving in the same rhythm. In this process, taking the same steps is not very important. Rhythm, smooth hip movement and appropriate, dynamic changes in the distance between you and your partner motivate the dance.

In local Luganda terms, dancing is *oku-zina*, a word that also implies ‘to make love’. Actually, this way of dancing is one of a powerful representation not only
in its sexual connotations but also in social contexts. Dancing itself is a performance of love and a presentation of enjoyment. Therefore, dancing together in a nightclub is, on the woman’s side, a way to estimate how she could enjoy a night with her partner and whether she could construct a good relationship with him.

Nonetheless, this relationship is not stable – not even during the dancing. It is quite normal for the girl to switch partners and start dancing with him, flirting with both. She could very well behave as if a particular person had no sense of ‘ownership’ over her, as well. Men can also behave in the same manner. In dancing, seducing and flirting with others are essential to the excitement of the act. All the same, women’s social lives of partnership have contained seduction and flirtation with others in order to excite their monotonous lives.

*Dancing and Pool as Deep Play*

Geertz once depicted Balinese cockfighting and showed how the play sometimes connotes another deep dimension of society (Geertz 1972). Moreover, Baudrillard has discussed that seductive agencies disrupt the gender order and the dominant discourse of sexuality (Baudrillard 1990).

In this chapter, I have suggested the importance of a woman’s agency, which moves from within the family to nightclubs and then back to the family through her encounter with a future husband and her (re)marriage to him; the crux of the argument was women’s dual subjectivity.

On the one hand, outside of nightclubs, women are supposed to be good subjects of urban society as mothers or daughters. On the other hand, bargirls and *malaya* play a role of seduction, the subject of sexual performance. One can say that both of their functions tie into conviviality in Africa (Nyamnjoh 2015), but clarifying the nature of this duality remains a challenge.

In the Ugandan context, the path to a woman’s local sense of citizenship, a civil status, or a right to access wealth and power in public space always goes through either a male patron or another male from a local patriarchal system, such as a husband or being a concubine. The problem in this context is that the gaining of ‘citizenship’ is as privatised as all Ugandan relationships are. Ugandan women, especially those with no prominent educational background, are always objectified in their private relations with males, a part of patriarchal society.

However, they are not simply subalterns or subjugated others, whom Spivak explained in her famous paper ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ Bargirls in Kampala have somehow retained their options with sexual subjectivity, performativity and agency by dancing and playing pool. That is how dance and pool remain their marginal – and valuable – spaces for subjectivity.
**Seduction, Subjectivity and Citizenship**

The games of seduction, such as dancing and playing pool, suggest how the structure of local citizenship in Uganda has been swayed and recaptured through sexual communications between male patrons and bargirls, although we may interpret that the bargirls’ strategy of dancing and playing pool could have roots in their class struggles and identification in the term of ‘inclusive citizenship’ (Lister 2007). While Spivak clarifies the local contexts of Indian women’s representation, it lacks the sense of enjoyment as a manifestation of desire. The stoicism of postcolonial critiques sometimes lacks the sense of enjoyment and sexuality despite their aims of targeting the concept of ‘desire’. Therefore, I find myself asking the questions: ‘Can they dance?’ or ‘Can they be the simple subjects to local citizenship?’

In the context of nightclubs in Kampala, women occasionally need love and sex as well as their civil status and wealth because they can achieve social security only through ‘privatised’ relationships and love affairs. Therefore, the answer to the question: ‘Can the bargirls dance?’ can be ‘Yes, they can dance, with certain subjective options’. On the other hand, the answer to the question: ‘Can they be the simple subjects to local citizenship?’ is ‘No, they are not subjective parts of the local structure they belong to – but they use their seducing agency to untie relationships and structures; they are the anti-subject.’

In this context, woman citizenship has a dual meaning in nightclubs as ‘convivial spaces’. Citizenship is not only inclusive but also conditional. One is subjugated in the house, while the other is seductive and rebellious outside the house – that, I would say, connects with ‘playfulness’ or ‘conviviality’ that allows women to adapt. Deep play at nightclubs functions to maintain this duality of woman citizenship and provide women with marginal spaces for ‘conviviality’ to untie and reshape the social relationships and structures. At the same time, perhaps importantly, moments of deep play release women from the bonds of the solid subjugated subject, as Spivak claimed, and give them performative options for their own well-being, enabling flexibility in pursuing their next convivial moments.

**Bets on Pregnancy and Marriage**

Asking whether bargirls plan to continue their work, most say, ‘I want to quit, if possible’. However, they often lack that option: ‘There is no other way’, they say. That is because women of the ‘room’ type have no better economic options for providing their children and families with reliable support. On the other hand, the fear of AIDS (HIV), violence at the hands of their johns, service without payment and physical exhaustion are real concerns. The fear of AIDS is particularly tangible; one informant, Charity, pointed out that most room-type
women were HIV positive. Moreover, violent sex acts are frequent and repetitive in Uganda, as one of the informants, Chris, mentioned. Bargirls can usually gauge which men might be violent and start beating them while they enjoy dancing and playing pool. Sexual conduct, however, normally takes on violent tones, with men severely hurting their partners. Meanwhile, the women are not passive subjects to the action; they try to respond actively. Therefore, calm and quiet sexual conduct is very rare.

However, even in such situations, there are cases where bargirls have intercourse with johns without condoms or other contraceptives, normally johns who are regular customers. As they continue their relations with the same girls, johns will want to have sex without protection. Some bargirls require them to bring certificate papers proving that they are HIV negative. Most men without certificates, however, ask the girls, ‘Why don’t you trust me?’ Still, it does not seem that bargirls and malaya completely dislike sexual relations without contraceptives. It often depends on the relationship with the individual john, one of the informants, Mary, explained. If a man pays a lot of money and the relationship deepens thanks to that contribution, there is a possibility that he will engage in sex without a contraceptive. This reflects the thinking that money leads to a longer relationship, which could lead to pregnancy and then stability. Mary, in the third month of pregnancy, told me that the same assumption led her to her current situation. She had lost touch with the father of the unborn child, and now she was looking for a partner who would take care of the baby. She told me that she and her man did not use contraceptives because she felt she could not disappoint him.

It is the life with no family that they are most afraid of, rather than being caught in diseases such as AIDS. As I have suggested above, that kind of life is obviously a social disadvantage for single women. Mamdani also notes that obtaining family equates to constructing social security for lower classes of people (Mamdani 1972). Therefore, in fact, women – especially the bargirls – eagerly seek someone to marry and have a child for. Three out of five informants said that sexual intercourse without the use of contraceptives is frequent and even a desire for female partners. Two informants also suggested that the preference for unprotected sex also stems from expectations of pregnancy. Women in the stand- or room-style categories can keep their business up with frequent commuters on a continuous basis; that pattern, however, makes it difficult to construct a reliable, lasting relationship. They certainly have some reasons to adopt the club-dance style for their business. It is not only due to the expensive rewards and self-approval that they derive from dancing and dressing up but also part of their processes of choosing – or ‘betting on’, in a way – a family partner through the game of pool. The ‘bet’
entails the risk of hunger and the need to create the pretence of a coincident meeting.

Of course, one could very well assert that having sex without condoms could just be for pleasure or to avoid breaking the sense of ‘trust’ with a partner. Still, unprotected sex is a consistent means by which girls who slip away can finally come back home; they successfully return as married women with their husbands and children, finally becoming ‘adults’ after a prolonged absence. Residents of slums imagine long-absent women as *malaya*, but no one asks any questions about a returnee who comes back with a husband, child, or both. In that sense, marriage and childbirth actually work for them as indulgences, paving the way back to familial citizenship from sexual citizenship, one of the circumstances of social inclusion.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I first took up the Kampala urban legend of ‘*Ange noir*’ and pointed out its connection to women’s sexuality and marginality in Uganda. Next, while depicting partial links between slums and sex workers in Kampala, I described how bargirls in Kabalagala go about the act of seduction. The social status of women in domestic and communal relationships marginalises them within slum areas in Kampala. The establishment of familial citizenship involves the concept of ‘married women’, the acts of dancing with and seducing men in nightclubs, and non-contraceptive sexual relations, which sometimes lead to marriage. Additionally, I noted the idea of sexual citizenship, which secures the economic independence of women and leads to their own identity formation and self-determination.

Finally, I would like to comment on bargirls’ subjectivity in Kampala – one of the main themes of this chapter. What makes bargirls dance and what modifies their subjectivity were the key questions in this chapter. One could argue that the girls’ subjectivity was the natural product of many social environments (the domestic environment of poor households, self-approval through sexuality in an urban society, etc.), and their self-fashioning process (Greenblatt 1980) was not necessarily their own choice. However, they actively make choices on their own behalf by dancing, playing, seducing, negotiating and having affairs with men, all potential steps toward pregnancy and giving birth. Childbirth gives them recognition as social entities and earns them welcome into society as women with the entitlement of *mukazzi* (Ogden 1996). In other words, sexual citizenship is a social infrastructure for women and separate from familial citizenship, which is the subject of Africa’s customary legal society. Their desires as individual subjectivity and agency take shape in the moment of
dancing and seduction.

Of course, as Spivak points out, it is condescending to make women speak, though they are not structurally able to speak. However, by taking responsibility for their sexual representation and capturing every single moment of their subjectivity in ‘dancing’, they shake off their perceptions as forms of sexual consumption for men, like the urban legend of ‘Ange noir’ suggests.

I would like to conclude this chapter by pointing out that bargirls’ dancing and seduction are practices that involve men actively and commit themselves to the patriarchal society, though often unconsciously and ambivalently. While inclusive, familial citizenship for women in urban Ugandan society rests on networks of relatives and neighbours, popular consciousness sees women as very passive subjects whom divorce or the absence of childbirth would render void. Women, however, secure their faint subjectivity, keep niche spaces between family and economic structures, and secure themselves by flirting and seducing (or dressing, playing and laughing). In other words, women dance and act in that fleeting moment in an active mode. Furthermore, even after getting married or remarried and securing familial citizenship, their desires and sexual subjectivities, which men have seen as the ‘bad spirit’, never cease – they always wander and threaten the patriarchal domain in urban spaces. In that sense, conviviality in Kampala is a negotiation between the two citizenships of the familial and the sexual, fulfilling women’s citizenship in an incomplete – but complementary – fashion in urban spaces.

Acknowledgement

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Notes

1 Alur is one of the Nilotic peoples of Uganda. Most of their population lives in the West Nile region, which is located in the north-west part of Uganda.
2 ‘N’ stands for a certain slum area in Kampala. This is for the purpose of making the events and people I refer to in this paper anonymous.
3 *Ange noir* is a French phrase meaning ‘black angel’ in English.
4 Makerere University is one of the five national universities in Uganda, and the institution used to be called ‘the Oxford of East Africa’.
5 Mulago Hospital is a national referral hospital affiliated with the Faculty of Medicine at Makerere University.
6 This story was told by Michael O. in October 2007. As people in Kampala know, the
story has an enormous number of versions. There are other analyses of this urban legend and stories about the otherness of women. See Kiyimba (2001).

7 The Acholi are one of the major ethnic groups of northern Uganda and speak a Nilotic language. Most of the population suffers from the effects of insurgencies by the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

8 Until the 1990s, these garments, which feature shoulder decorations, were worn by married women. Nowadays, unmarried women also wear ggomesi as formal attire.

9 Ganda is one of the major ethnic groups in Uganda, belonging to the Bantu language-speaking group. Most of their population lives in the central regions, such as Kampala and Masaka, and accounts for about 25% of the country’s total population (Mutibwa 2008).

10 The word abakazzi (pl.)/mukazzi (sgl.) in Luganda normally means ‘women/woman’ in domestic terminology, so it simply connotes ‘wives/wife’. ‘Mukazzi wange’ means ‘my woman’ or ‘my wife’.

11 According to Davis’s paper, single women in Kampala were called in various ways, such as ‘free women’ abanakyeonbekedde (pl.)/munakyeonbekedde (sgl.) and ‘town women’, abakiresese (pl.)/mukiresese (sgl.).

12 Abaana (pl.)/mwanaa (sgl.) means ‘children’ in Luganda. It is a neuter noun, so it can also refer to boys and babies.

13 When girls become teens, of course, they are implicitly targeted in many ways by boy acquaintances, male schoolteachers and so on. Girls are expected to be asexual in public though they are actually not.

14 This case recalls Butler’s quotation from Luis Althusser (Butler 1997). Butler sensitively argues how subjection develops as an implicit power. She uses the analogy of a police officer calling you and you replying. She suggested that simply in the moment of the reply to a police officer lies the beginning of ‘subjectification’ of the state ideology. The moment of being called and replying also corresponds to being gazed at and embodying a sexual identity on the streets in Kampala. When someone gazes at you in a sexual way and you respond, sexual subjectivity begins.

15 The Konjo people belong to the Bantu-language ethnic group. The population is located on the very west side of Uganda, around the Rwenzori Mountain areas, which cover both sides of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). On the DRC side, the ethnic group is called Nande.

16 Betty’s life history partly comes from two interviews with her in August 2015. Other parts of her story were reconstructed by her parents’ and siblings’ interviews, which were also done in August 2015, especially my conversations with her father, Baluuku, who is also my personal friend.

17 For the Uganda parliamentary election, each district it obligated (in principle) to elect a woman as a member of parliament (Woman MP). As a result, there were 112 women among the 426 parliament members in Uganda in 2018, most of whom belonged to the ruling party (National Resistance Movement). Figures are from the Uganda National Assembly’s website, accessed on 17 August 2018.

18 At the time I interviewed her in September 2009, Chris was 23 years old. Her father was from Ganda and her mother was a Rwanda immigrant.
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Chapter 10

The Miracle in Misfortune:
South Africa Belongs to All Those Who Can Afford It

Olivia Joanes

Introduction: Eat your Constitution

It was a rather ordinary day with an extraordinary experience. This was probably the second week of my fieldwork, and I was tired. As Mary and I were doing her laundry I could not help but wonder what happened on days when she was sick, or simply exhausted. When I asked her this question, although I was not awaiting a particular response, her response hit me like a ton of bricks.

She turned to me and explained that having a Down syndrome-afflicted daughter and a mentally ill brother would not allow her to get sick or even feel tired. She explained that she is basically their life support and without her no one would take her place. Then she turned to me and said: “Olivia, you know this question you just asked me keeps me up at night but not in the ways you think. I often pray that God would take them away before me, because I know that I am all they have”

Many times I close my eyes and can hear her saying that to me with tears in her eyes it further haunts me as she had disclosed that she has asthma and diabetes. This is the story of a citizen from our great democratic nation, but it is also the story akin to that of many other citizens’ in the same nation state. Women who, like Mary, are mothers, caregivers, friends, wives and; entrepreneurs, and take on so many other tasks. Despite their efforts to follow the strict rules of society, many South Africans remain in the margins when it comes to accessing citizenship rights beyond constitutional provisions. During my time in the field I witnessed my participants struggle to join the elite ranks of the real, recognised South African citizenry.

As a result I watched as participant Faith’s son and husband fell victim to drug and alcohol abuse. She blames herself for her son’s addiction, yet all I could think of was how did the government allow it to get to this point? The fall of apartheid brought rise to a people-focused vision of the new democratic South Africa. Runciman (2016) argues that during apartheid, inequalities were prescribed by law. As a result the African National Congress (ANC) focused on the remaking of South African society in order to create a new form of democratic citizenship.
The South African Constitution is central to this idea and is often praised by the rest of the world for its protection of social, political and civil rights, yet South Africa remains one of the most unequal nation states to live in today. It is faced with a great deal of gross inequalities. In one part of the country people may stop having takeouts because of an economic downfall while their neighbours face the possibility of not eating at all. South Africans find themselves in a web of theoretical promises enshrined in their Constitution, which, as a document, in fact does nothing more than paint an attractive picture of democratic citizenship. This is problematic because it compromises the ability of the marginalised South Africans, who had previously been deprived by apartheid, to claim tangible citizenship (Dawson 2010). Tangible citizenship is defined here as the individual’s ability to comfortably afford living expenses of a decent standard.

The materialisation of citizenship comes at a very high cost which most South Africans cannot afford. It is therefore hard to accommodate the idea of a governing nation state where citizenship is limited only to those who can afford it financially. Yet this is the case for a society like South Africa, barely 24 years after the political and legal end of apartheid, a period when even being equally human, let alone being a citizen was limited to a minority white population (Runciman, 2016). The black majority in all its configurations in South African terms (Indian, coloured and African) was excluded. The apartheid system had devalued the humanity of blacks to the point where they had little or no tangible citizenship. In other words, they were wasted lives, wasted humanity, regulated by pass laws and to be mobilised to render their labour but not so much to claim rights and entitlements the way minority whites as politically and legally protected citizens were able to.

The marginalised majority was there to provide service and servitude. In a post-apartheid South Africa all too conscious of the machination that could undo your citizenship and undo your humanity, there is a need for an understanding of citizenship predicated upon affordability in financial and economic terms. This is the real material basis of citizenship one that gives concrete meaning to the constitutional provisions assured by a government. Taking this angle further, this study is interested in how citizenship as a constitutional provision is translated into the lived experiences of those who, in democratic South Africa, would be counted and accounted for as citizens. Furthermore, to what extent have the coloured residents from Bonteheuwel actually graduated from the margins into meaningful citizenship (politically, culturally, socially and especially economically)? This is an ethnographic study that focuses on the coloured community of Bonteheuwel.
**Setting the Scene**

Bonteheuwel is a Cape Flats community in Cape Town, which was reserved for coloured people during the apartheid era. This community was created in the 1960’s in response to the introduction of the Group Areas Act (Fuller Center for Housing, Western Cape; 2018). Fifty-eight years later, Bonteheuwel remains defined by the same borders imposed by the Group Areas Act of the 1960’s. There are many South African citizens residing in Bonteheuwel who cannot afford decent accommodation, good health, food, education, etc. With that being said, it is evidently clear that in terms of ticking the boxes of citizenship – in terms of material, social and political equality, for instance – many of the community members would merely be scratching the surface of promised citizenship benefits. This proves that citizenship does not only make sense within the pages of the Constitution or with the physical documentation, but it should translate itself materially in the lives of people. In other words, citizenship should focus on helping the previously marginalised graduate from the margins socially and especially economically. This study examines what citizenship means in post-apartheid South Africa and how citizenship is materialised in the Cape Flats with a particular focus on Bonteheuwel. In doing this I will demonstrate how inequalities and the lack of democratic citizenship continues to marginalise and exclude the poor from tangible citizenship. One of the biggest problems in democratic South Africa where citizenship is promised to all people born on South African soil is the unequal access to the country’s wealth and resources. It is for this reason that I am interested in how people in Bonteheuwel experience citizenship beyond the constitutional provisions. This study thus sought to answer the following question: How do Mary, Faith, Anna and Karen, residents of Bonteheuwel, experience citizenship beyond abstracted constitutional provision?

**Shifting Meaning in the History of Citizenship**

Twenty-four years ago, citizenship was nothing but a dream to non-whites in South Africa. Democracy was never for sale, yet our forefathers paid for it with their blood. This is why the essential stakes of citizenship are deeply embedded in South Africa’s racial history. Systematic violence was used to capture the minds of people, making them believe that even though they came from African soil they did not belong to it, so they had no right to call themselves citizens, let alone claim any rights. The magnitude of this period in which non-whites had no sense of belonging, living in a world where citizenship belonged to the ones who constituted it, is central in the debates around citizenship.
Mamdani (1996) provides an insightful account on the legacy of colonialism. He describes a colony as a divided power mediated by racial domination through tribal reorganisations of inhabitant populations. It reproduces racial identity in citizens and ethnic identity in subjects. Colonialism could be understood as either direct or indirect rule with apartheid being the third variant. The fall of apartheid brought rise to conversations around a way forward for South Africans. The African National Congress (ANC) finally got an equal seat at the ‘grown-ups’ table and became the voice of the ‘people’. With a reflection on Mamdani’s account on Africa being a despot, Harris and Valji, and Hamber and Ernest, cited in Valji (2004), provide an analysis on how loud the voice of South Africa’s racial past was, making it rather tricky for the ANC to fully use their given voice. With that being said, one can only imagine how much more difficult this task would be for the people who now had to unlearn racial ideologies which had been engraved in their being.

The apartheid government enforced the idea that racial identity was something that replaced the blood in our veins; because of this race and citizenship are two extremely difficult concepts to unpack in post-apartheid South Africa. Harris and Valji, and Hamber and Ernest cited in Valji (2004) argue that race and citizenship overlap the notion of reconciliation, reparation and justice, even though they have different histories. As a result, it creates another dimension of complexities, because race and citizenship can be expressed or silenced to serve particular interests. This overlapping idea of citizenship and race also feeds into certain forms of violence, which include hate crime motivated by race or ethnicity like xenophobia or the more recent black and coloured conflicts. Harris and Valji, and Hamber and Ernest cited in Valji (2004) echoed the words of Mamdani- by saying that apartheid created racial groups as a mechanism for violence. After fifty years of institutional racism and seeing the world as ‘other’, how does one really transition the minds of the people from being a subject to suddenly a citizen?

Citizenship can be a very vague theoretical concept, but for the sake of this chapter I will provide basic assumptions of the term, however problematic. Nyamnjoh’s (2007) definition of citizenship forms the backbone of my chapter. He describes a citizen to be a rights-bearing individual who enjoys total freedom of rational choice in a legal and political sense, and who is answerable to none other than the Constitution as supreme law of the land protected by a minimalist enabler state. The idea of citizenship in South Africa raises questions of what it means to belong to a particular society and what kind of life is possible to live in this form of society. Citizenship in South Africa has always existed, long before the adoption of democracy in its current liberal form.
Prior to the 1996 Constitution the concept of citizenship did not account for much because of the segregation laws, which governed at the time (Klaaren 2010). Although many of the anti-apartheid discourses were focused on the terminology around the rights of citizenship, it was the practice and implementation of a better democracy rather than the citizenship status that was considered a priority. Enslin (2003) argues that the emerging conception of citizenship in South Africa has to be understood within the framework of the negotiated transition to democracy and the struggle against apartheid that preceded it. This is problematic because the notion of citizenship is still constituted by the apartheid laws with a few polished democratic terminologies. This is because citizenship is not a new concept to South Africa. What is new is a democratic account of citizenship which means that, post-1994, an alteration to an inclusive right of citizenship had changed but the laws somewhat remained.

The early post-apartheid period was a time of extraordinary liberalisation of South Africa’s segregation laws. During the early 1990s and immediately post 1994, South Africa undertook to bridge the gap of inequalities and overcome historical divisions in a spirit of euphoria and reconciliation (Burk 2005). As democracy became more natural, the spirit of equality and equity became an individual fight and the previously marginalised once again received the bones of the steak. Domingues (2017) provides an account, which explains the sudden change of heart. He argues that in the last decade a different ‘need’ of social life and social policy came into play, which strayed away from the basic ideals of citizenship and socialism.

This grew closer to liberal or rather neoliberal conceptions of citizenship. As neoliberalism emerged, the state stepped away from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and moved closer to a neoliberal market economy. As the country received more pressure from Western partners like America to drop trade tariffs, the country ended up in a situation where there were political rights but economic rights were not linked in the same way. This once again created a shift in the meaning of citizenship to a whole new dimension, because now people have political rights but not economic rights. Immediately citizenship looked very different or as Valji (2004) suggests, it was in a crisis. This new shift in the concept of citizenship threatens the genuine reconciliation, which started through processes like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). This crisis is undeniably evident in ordinary citizens who find themselves questioning where they belong in this new South Africa. Another aspect which is brought to light suggests that our job in the quest for consolidating the process of reconciliation; as well as a sense of materialising citizenship as it is stated in the Constitution, is not done.
How Do People Experience Citizenship beyond Constitutional Provision?

Twenty-four years later and still the legacy of apartheid continues to haunt South Africans, because history has shown that that legality is a matter of power, beyond justice. It is for this reason that Mamdani (1996) was interested in questioning power and how it affects society. The adoption of neoliberalism changed the framing of citizenship to a point where the state could not keep up with all the promises made within the Constitution. It is no secret that post-apartheid civil and political citizenship may have reduced racial inequalities on the basis of citizen and state, however its legacy leaves the marginalised majority on an unequal playing field, making it hard for them to reap the benefits of citizenship.

Dawson (2010) argues that while the scarcity of resources may be predominately an economic issue, gaining the right to access resources and the right to claim accountability is a political project with citizenship at its core. Mary explained that while other communities have access to recreational government-funded programmes, Bonteheuwel has nothing. She enjoys arts and crafts and would like to teach this to kids in the community to keep them off the street. When I asked her why she has not approached the government with her idea, she explained that she does not know where to start or how to contact them. Her comment suggests that sometimes access is merely knowing which channels to use and residents may not even have that. Supporting Dawson’s claim, Runciman (2016) suggests that for as long as capitalism continues to inform social, political and economic transformation, the idea of citizenship will lack any meaning and depth for the majority of South Africans. In conversation with this, Hendricks (2003) argues that citizenship in this neoliberal state reinforces class inequalities by perpetuating unequal access to constitutional citizenship rights under capitalism. It would seem that capitalism acts as an unwritten law on who enjoys tangible citizenship and who does not.

The township and Cape Flats areas were not designed with the intention to promote integrated living (Runciman; 2016); this is why Bonteheuwel still looks like a Group Areas Act community. This is a clear indication that the townships and Cape Flats were designed as dormitories for underpaid labourers. Many people residing in Bonteheuwel live below the breadline and cannot afford to access citizenship rights; as a result many residences become backyard dwellers, because the cost of land in Cape Town is exceptionally high. The problem with this is that the government chooses to build multi-billion-rand stadiums (which are empty most of the time) while its citizens are languishing in poverty. This is an instance of skewed values; it illuminates the very shift from citizenship to capitalist underpinning of citizenship. According to Runciman (2016) the
Reconstruction Development Programme (RDP) was central to the democratic government’s plan to create a ‘better life for all’—the ANC’s election slogan.

The excitement of democracy led to very ambitious targets by the government to right the wrongs of apartheid. The first priority of the RDP “is to begin to meet the basic needs of people—jobs, land, housing, telecommunication, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care and social welfare” (RSA 1994: 7). For the majority of ordinary South Africans, the slogan by the ANC captured the essence of their hope that the RDP would somewhat balance the inequalities (Runciman 2016). Yet the valued neoliberal framework does not have room to accommodate the majority. As a result, many people have citizenship on paper, but remain foreigners in terms of accessibility to the country’s wealth and resources. The neoliberal development prioritises economic growth, which reified inequalities. This is why citizenship has to be studied outside the borders of the Constitution, because what is promised in the Constitution does not materialise in real life experience for many South Africans. The citizenship within the Constitution promises food security, housing, employment, good health care and free education for all citizens. Yet this is not people’s reality, so what is the point of this glorious Constitution? What is the point of a citizenship that promises protection for private property when a large majority of South Africans cannot afford it? What exactly is this law protecting? The argument made in this chapter reveals that it is good to have constitutional or legal provisions, however it is even better when those legal political provisions are translated into tangible terms where everyone has equitable access to citizenship benefits.

\textit{Race - Class Nexus}

The absorption of the capitalist market value system moves away from a racial divide to a more classist nuance, where personal success and fulfilment meant personal enrichment at all costs. Lemanski (2017) argues that race and class are connected in the subjective experience of class as well as in the life of imagination and what Appadurai (2004) has called ‘the capacity to aspire for economic freedom. Neoliberalism moved the concept from racial to class nexus, because the idea of a free market favours a particular class. Iheduru (2011) argues that the boundaries of citizenship are being negotiated as a result of globalisation.

This proves that the change in the policies is a strategic response to the economic crisis in Africa. The failure to take into account the living histories of the marginalised is the result of an elite perspective which is incapable of thinking beyond the silences of the Constitution (Naicker and Bruchhausen 2016). Thus, it is unable to see beyond capitalism in hopes of finding an
alternative system which favours the majority. Globalisation over the past two decades has pushed ordinary citizens further into the margins as ‘outsiders’ came in and gained access to what was supposed to be exclusively for citizens.

Nyamnjoh (2007) suggests that globalisation and citizenship are highly hierarchical and promote inequality, which in turn affects individuals and communities differently according to race, ethnicity, class, gender and geography. This idea of the ‘other’ having access to the exclusiveness of citizenship is a core reason to the ongoing racial attacks amongst black and coloured people as expressed by participants. This form of violence, as I came to understand it, overlooks historical benefits of the marginalised groups coming together to fight for the same course. It also overlooks success stories of a new understanding of the relationship between citizen and subject, which suggests a new more flexible account of citizenship, which emphasises inclusion (as stated in the Constitution) and conviviality as well as celebrating difference. Nyamnjoh (2007) argues for a more open and inclusive definition of citizenship.

Instead, a narrow focal point on legal and political citizenship leads, which has resulted in a concept of citizenship which lacks meaningful economic as well as cultural representation. Indeed, there are no clear differences of lifestyles between South African ‘blacks’ and ‘coloureds’ marginalised citizens within the lower economical class. Instead, the marginalised seek justice by attacking the ‘other’ instead of the elite few who actually benefit from global capitalism.

As the majority of ordinary citizens are yet to have meaning of citizenship, it is particularly problematic for them to find a situation where wealthier others can buy themselves into the same opportunities that the poor could only dream of. In the case of South Africa, you have the Gupta example, which has been highlighted in the media recently. However, they are not the only ones who bought their way into a nation state. If it has been made clear that the documentation of citizenship is ‘for sale,’ what are the main indicators of citizenship for ordinary South Africans who traded their lives for equity? Even the notion of belonging which is a basic human value is embedded within the paradigm of neoliberalist capitalism. This means that complete freedom is dependent on economic capacity. Looking at the landscape of Bonteheuwel, it is clear that many citizens are unable to tick the boxes of citizenship. This is because they remain in the margins and live in the same Group Areas in which they were placed during the apartheid era. The things used to measure what citizenship translates to are non-existent, because South Africa has a great deal of gross inequalities.
The Democratic Apartheid of Post-apartheid South Africa

**Fiction or Non-fiction, You Choose**

There is a powerful group of people who run the world. The ones who play God without permission; it’s a club where a particular DNA gains you access. Their bodies are the minority, yet they have the majority vote. This group of people has shares in the darkest corners of our world; they don’t have faces, yet their name captures the very essence of our being. They have more than one name, but the name everyone echoes is capitalism and or free-market trade. They often present themselves as a solution to all problems, claiming that their way grants everyone an equal and/or democratic opportunity to reap the economic benefits offered in a country. But what they don’t tell us is, just like their discreet club, their system does not work for everyone, and that not everyone matters as far as they are concerned. In fact it was designed for an elite group of people in the hierarchy of wealth. The majority of people live in their shadows, at the mercy of those in the light.

You will mainly hear the success story of the things they have done while they do everything in their power to bury the stories of the ones who despite all their efforts remain at the margins, virtually dead to them and their salvationist recipes. No one speaks about these failures, because from time to time they ease their consciousness with their little charities for the poor, framed as ‘giving back’ and ‘saving souls’. Sometimes they take it a step further and use their idea of reason to create theories, which shifts the ‘blame’ by painting the marginalised in an incomplete picture. Allow me to show you the other side of the coin by taking you on an ethnographic journey of four women residing in Bonteheuwel, a Cape Flats community in Cape Town South Africa. This chapter presents the lived realities of Mary, Faith, Karen and Anna, while concurrently addressing my ethical considerations.

**Up syndrome Made Me a Woman**

“My life started when she came into the world.” My first encounter with Mary was mind blowing – she taught me more in three hours than I had learned in three and half years at university. I entered her home extremely nervous, because I had no idea what my gatekeeper had explained to her about my research project, as she was one of my snowballed participants. We sat in the lounge and I introduced my research and myself. Halfway through my presentation I heard someone call, ‘mammie, mammie’ and it was her daughter, Kate. I do not think she was expecting to see anyone, because she was rather shocked when she saw me and immediately her tone changed as she replaced speaking with hand gestures. Her mom introduced her to me and asked to be
excused as she went to attend to her daughters’ need, and that is how our journey began. Even though she did not have a conventional job, I do not think I have ever met a more hard-working person. Mary was 19 when she received her ‘accidental’ blessing, her daughter.

Mary explained that she was born on a farm, however she does not remember her time at the farm as they moved to the city when she was four years old. Her parents moved to Cape Town because there were not many job opportunities and that is how she ended up in Heideveld, a Cape Flats community about 10 minutes away from Bonteheuwel. Heideveld was her home until she had completed matric and decided to return to the farm to visit her family. Initially she had gone there for a short holiday, but as fate had it she fell in love and decided to stay for a while. At 19 she was pregnant and that became her reason for staying.

On 23 September 1998, she gave birth to a beautiful baby girl, who changed her life forever. She only found out that her daughter had Down syndrome when she was about a year old, as she noticed that her daughter was not developing like other children her age. When I asked her how the doctors did not pick this up during her first few check-ups after her birth, Mary’s response immediately spoke to my research curiosity. She said, “you know how it works in public hospitals, the doctors don’t really see you because you are getting the help for free, so it is easy to miss small things that later become big things, like in my case.”

As she was speaking I noticed how she began playing with her fingers and her voice became shaky, that’s when I knew that she was holding back her tears. Despite my better judgment, the pain in her voice stirred rage in me, but I quickly reminded myself of my positionality in the space (Ross, 2005) as I paged through the ethical files in my head. As a result I was able to collect myself before risking a moment of taking away from Mary’s experience, because I gave her and all my participants my word that they would narrate their own story. I would merely put it on paper.

The Anthropology Southern Africa Ethical Guidelines (2005) recognises that, between researchers and participants, ethnographic fieldwork is infused with power dynamics. The feelings that surfaced quickly made me realise that these power relationships come as a result of positionality, the innumerable identities which the researcher embodies, as well as the discourses which underpin these identities (Narayan 1993). With this in mind, instead of asking Mary a follow-up question I allowed her to steer the conversation into the direction which made her most comfortable. She began to tell me how difficult it was not only to adjust to the news about her daughter’s disability, but also how much her life had changed. Mary explains that she knew nothing about
raising a Down syndrome child, so she gathered as many books and pamphlets as she could from the day hospital and began to educate herself. When Kate was three years old, Mary sent her daughter to the local school for special needs children, because she realised that she needed to get a job. It was not too long before she took Kate out of the school. She explained that she really wanted Kate to be at school with other children, but she realised that the school was understaffed and because all the children had different disabilities, she feared that her daughter would not be well taken care of. As a result she decided to leave her low-income farming job and become her baby’s keeper.

A few years later, her brother was in an accident at work and became mentally unstable. None of the other family members in Cape Town wanted to take care of him and because he was not married, Mary became his only hope. His company bought him a 2-bedroom house in Bonteheuwel as compensation for the accident and she moved back to Cape Town with her daughter and husband. Her brother became her second unpaid job while her husband struggled to find a stable job, because he did not have a matric certificate and only had experience working on a farm. She explained that he tried getting a job in factories, but failed, but he often finds ‘piece’ jobs gardening. In a nutshell, this family of five survives on two disability grants and a part-time gardening income.

On 2nd July I accompanied Mary and Kate to Tygerberg hospital for Kate’s check-up. It was 4:00 am and my alarm went off; every bone in my body was begging me to stay in bed as it was raining that morning. When Mary invited me she warned me that it would be extremely early and she would not be offended if I decided to sit that one out. I was reminded of an ethical element raised by Narayan (1993) who argues that positionality can either hinder or facilitate the research process, which would shape and influence the manner in which the researcher and participant interact. With this in mind, by 4:30 am I was in front of Mary’s door – I wanted to experience every part of the process. At first she was very hesitant to delegate, so I asked her what I could help with, and she asked me to make porridge, while she helped Kate get dressed and ready. As soon as she was done helping Kate, she began to pack our lunch while simultaneously marking her brother’s food for the neighbour who later came to stay with him while we went to the hospital. We left her house at 6:30 to catch the only Tygerberg bus, which was scheduled for 6:50. On our way to the bus stop she explained that even though the bus is really early, she preferred to use the bus because it is the safest and cheapest public transportation to the destination. As an ex-resident from Bonteheuwel, it did not surprise me that there was so much movement in the odd hours of the morning, because when I was 18 years old I worked at a factory in Montague Gardens and there were
only two buses passing through Bonteheuwel in the early hours of the morning. We arrived at the bus stop and waited for about 15 minutes before the bus came, I had money to pay for myself but Mary insisted that she paid - I agreed on condition that she would allow me to pay for our trip home.

Although Kate had an appointment, we spent five hours waiting because there was no other means of safe and cheap transport, which could drop us at the hospital closer to Kate’s appointment time, at 10 am. Mary never complains, but I could see that she was tired so instead of speaking to her I decided to entertain Kate because she had grown fond of me. Our appointment was scheduled for 10 am, however we only managed to see the first doctor at 12 pm. While we waited for the doctor, Mary continuously apologised for the wait. She explained that waiting this long was normal, but still felt bad for me. I assured her that I was fine and she need not worry about me as I continued to entertain Kate. When we entered the doctor’s office, the doctor excused herself for a minute and Mary turned to me with a smile on her face and said, “today we get the ‘real’ doctor and not the student.” After the doctor’s check-up, Mary began questioning the doctor on things she had read about in connection with Kate’s skin problem and she explained how she uses the medication given for a particular area of the body and how she alternates and uses it for something else as well. The doctor was really impressed by Mary’s research and said even though it is the generic medication that they gave Kate; it works really well on Kate because of the mixture her mother makes. When we left the office, I asked her how she figured out the mixture. Mary explained that she could not afford the original cream because it is too expensive and they do not provide it at public hospitals. As a result she consulted doctor Google and asked in her Down syndrome Whatsapp group chat for advice and that is how she discovered this remedy. By 3 pm we had seen all the doctors and received the medication, so we waited in the parking lot for the bus to arrive at 4:30 pm. The entire trip to the doctor was from 4 am till 4:30 pm and this was considered normal.

_Her Story was Written before She Even Entered the World_

Karen was my host. Even though I had only been with her for five weeks, she became like a mother to me and I learned a lot from her. She lives in her father-in-law’s house with her husband, her son, his two sisters and their family and her husband’s father who passed away in the last week of my fieldwork. She explained that she left school in grade 5 due to circumstances. Her first job was at a printing company; thereafter she worked as a cleaner for a few years until she started working in a shoe factory. She explains that working in that industry is exhausting because they work very hard, but reap very little of the benefits. “Those cheapskates keep putting us on short time and they know that they pay
us little to nothing. I mean we have families to support, just like they do.” I remember her being at home for most of my time in the field, because if she was not on short time they were striking for better wages.

During my time in the field Karen was going through a divorce, but both her and her husband were happy and were more in love than they were before the divorce as she explained. Puzzled, I smiled and before I could ask a follow-up question, she explained that nothing would change between them. They had agreed that she would continue residing in the house and he promised that he would never kick her out of his house. I could not wrap my mind around this idea, but I did not want to come across as judgemental, nor did I want to make her uncomfortable to continue sharing her story. She explained that they were married in community of property and the divorce would grant her half of everything he owned. Every day when she saw me, she would tell me, “Oh Olive I’m going to be a rich bitch soon” and it often ended with her promising to bless me when the money arrived. I am grateful that the anthropology ethics seeks to understand legal arrangements less in legal terms than in terms of interaction and relationship (Ross, 20015). With this in mind I could rest assured that her identity would be protected as I had given all my participants pseudonyms from the very beginning, so even if someone should look at my raw data they would never be able to single her out.

With this being said, I had the responsibility to ensure that my work does not incriminate Karen. The Anthropology Southern Africa (2005) prepared me for this by stating my responsibility to protect my participants and anticipate harm. The money she received from the divorce, she explained, really helped her to settle all her debt, because she is getting old and soon would be on pension. She realised that she had not been able to save all these years because her salary never allowed her to. She did not want to enter into her pension years with debt, nor did she want to become a burden to her children and that is why she decided to get the money the only ‘legal’ way she had.

**Her Legacy is Everything She Touched**

Faith was born a leader. What makes her great is that she believes that she has been set apart and is destined for greatness. She is the youngest of six children and on her eleventh birthday, she received the worst gift she could ever ask for - her mother passed away. She explained that at the time her eldest sister was 25 years old and had promised her mother that she would take care of her children. This is not foreign to me, because I grew up in similar circumstances and I know that it is common amongst ‘Africans’. When I asked her whether the government assisted her family after one of the breadwinners passed away, her response echoed the lack of materiality of citizenship beyond constitutional
provision. She explained that during this time her father became ill and the responsibility fell solely on her eldest sister. In her explanation, she took it a step further by explaining that her eldest sister had been going back and forth for government assistance and failed at every corner, because she could not provide all the paper work they required. She explains that her mother’s death was sudden; as a result she could not answer to every question from government. Despite all her efforts she gave up and decided to wait on her dad’s pension to assist her in raising her siblings. Sadly her father passed away before he could receive his pension.

Faith explained that her sister worked extra hard for the family because she wanted to honour the promise she made to her mother. She even joked that perhaps that is why her eldest sister never got married. Her sister sent her to school on a factory worker’s salary.

“I was in grade 9 and then she told me one morning she can’t afford to send me to school anymore; it’s shoes, it’s clothes and all that. And so, I forced and I stayed at school till grade 10. That time it was like a matric certificate.”

After completing grade 10, Faith began working at a shoe factory for 10 years and 7 years in a different factory. After her second job she started her own family and moved into someone’s yard in a Wendy house. It was not too long after the birth of her son that her partner walked out on them and she became a single mother. She explained that it was extremely challenging raising a boy by herself in Bonteheuwel, as she knew the lifespan of a young man in the community was not very high. Desperate to give her son a better life she became very strict. A few years down the line she met her current husband and they had two daughters. Faith explains that in the beginning of her marriage her husband did not treat her son very well, but for the sake of her marriage and having a second income she was silent when she knew she had to stand up for her son.

As a child she always knew that she was destined to help people, particularly old people because she did not get the opportunity to take care of her parents. She started off by doing short courses as a home-based carer. She took it a step further and decided to do a course in counselling families with alcoholics and drug abusers. The main reason for this choice was personal as her husband is an alcoholic and her son is a drug addict. With this she decided to help other families struggling with the same issue, by training to become a facilitator. It was through this that she became more and more involved with her community. Faith is a very well-respected ‘sister’ and prayer warrior in the community. There was a period where many people would complain to her about their living
circumstances as ‘backyard dwellers’ - this is the term used in Bonteheuwel for people residing in Wendy houses.

As someone coming from similar circumstances she could not turn a blind eye to the needs of the people and she decided to do something about it. She joined forces with her sister and they formed a committee and they decided to take matters into their own hands because government had made too many promises during the elections period and would never follow through. She made a list of all the backyard dwellers and they began looking for funds to paint the Wendy houses with anti-burn paint. In 2014 a child died in a fire which started in a Wendy house, this is when M&H, a company which supplies the paint they needed, decided to sponsor the community with funds and paint. She explained that they only sponsored enough paint for 75 houses, but she was happy that it provided jobs for unemployed members in the community for two weeks.

When I asked why the government did not match the donation they sourced for themselves, she looked at me and smiled. She explained that the government has a list of all the people waiting for houses, however that list has not been updated for years. Many people on the list are deceased. Faith explained that her committee decided to create their own list and sent it to the ward councillor in Bonteheuwel who is meant to liaise with government on their behalf. Interested in this topic I took the question a step further and asked what the plan was with the list. She explained that government has set aside R80 000 million for houses in Bonteheuwel, however they are just sitting with the money because there is no space for development in Bonteheuwel. When her committee suggested that they take some of the money (while they wait for available land) and paint the remaining Wendy house, they were told that the money was for houses and nothing else.

I admire the fact that despite the amount of ‘no’s’ they receive, she does not stop trying.

“To the government our community may be a dumping site for the poor, but there are people living here and we deserve the same respect we are given when they come and beg for our votes.”

When I asked her why she doesn’t run to become the ward counsellor of Bonteheuwel, she responded by saying that it was her ultimate dream, but not to be famous or anything. All Faith wants is to do right by her community and make the government see them.
**Hope is Stronger than Fear**

“So much of my baggage was attached to him abusing me. I have done okay despite circumstances. I have found a man who wanted partnership, rather being a dictator. But most of all my children reminded me of my voice.”

Anna holds a special place in my heart; because she is living proof that circumstances should not define you. Anna lives in a Wendy house with her husband and two children, in her husband’s family house. She longs to have a house of her own, as she expressed,

“Living in a shack is very unhealthy and it is not the best living condition to raise your children. I mean we have to go inside the main house to use the toilet, is that right Olivia? We are decent people but live like animals, while certain people is there at the top watching us suffer.”

As I reminisce on Anna’s words I am reminded of Clifford and Marcus (1976) who point out that research like my own involves people in the margins. I was concerned with the politics of representation. Anna expresses a lot of emotions towards the current government, whom she believes only sees the ‘blacks’ as poor and suffering. Till this day I can still hear her tell me,

“Olivia, you know us blacks and coloureds have the same history. We share the same clinics, jobs, our kids go to the same schools, but we hate each other because government has always been playing us against each other.”

When I asked her to explain what she meant by this, her response was simply they get everything, because when you drive through a township the first thing you see are their shacks, but when you drive through a Cape Flats area you see brick house. However that is only because coloured shacks are in the backyard instead of upfront for the world to see. “We are decent people, we would not just see an empty space and put up a shack.”

Growing up Anna explains that she cannot remember much of her childhood, because her father was very abusive. As a result she blocked out so many memories to a point where her earliest memories are from the age of 15. Anna says that she grew up in Bonteheuwel with her parents and five siblings. She was the youngest. When she reached matric, her mother became ill and, because she was the youngest and the only one that was not working, she became responsible for taking care of her mother. She explains that in a family where everyone needs to work in order to eat, she had to contribute to the
household and that became the philosophy she lived by. When I asked her what she wanted to be when she was still in school, she explained:

“When I was growing up there was no such thing as dreaming. You become whatever was available, but me I secretly wanted to be a police woman, but my mother’s illness decided what I would be – her carer.”

I asked her if during the time she was taking care of her mother, whether the government gave her any form of assistance and she replied:

After months of travelling back and forth to the main offices in town, my mother was given R250 for two months as grant, thereafter she received nothing more.

Anna says that years later, after her mother passed away she wanted to join the police force, but was rejected because of her age.

With regards to protecting the dignity and integrity of my participants who are not very different from me, I was sure to represent them in a way which would not reduce them to a single stereotype and metanarrative of poverty. With that being said, Anna is a hard-working woman. Her first official paying job was at a hotel where she was cleaner, there after she worked in a factory. When she fell pregnant with her first child, she could not go back to work immediately and as a result she lost her job and has struggled to find work ever since. She explained that when the world would not grant her an opportunity and she was forced to become creative to contribute and help to, in her words: “Put food on the table.” When I asked her what that means she said, “I mean, my husband doesn’t earn a lot, but he also doesn’t earn a little.”

Her greatest wish is to live in a house of her own, but not only can they not afford it, her husband has to work for his aunt who raised him. As a result they live in a Wendy house in the aunt’s yard, while two families lived inside the house, one family per room. She explains that it is crowded, but they have no choice and her husband is hoping that when the old lady passes away the house will be given to him as he is working for it now.

She explains that because her husband does not earn a lot of money, she works hard behind the scenes in the hope of providing for her family. She says that she does everything from baking and selling bread to making rotis to ensure that her family always has food to eat and clothes on their back. She is passionate about arts and crafts and at every market day she makes things to sell. Her dream is to work in the community and teach young people in the community how to create beautiful things from nothing. She explains that Bonteheuwel is often
painted in a self-destructing manner. She says that too many children drop out of school, become gangsters, abuse substances and many girls fall victim of teenage pregnancies and stand in long SASSA lines for R240 per month as their only source of income. Being a mother of a teenage daughter and son in this community pushes her to work extra hard in hopes of showing her children that circumstances should not determine your goal in life.

Another thing she does for extra money is take care of her friend’s brother, who is mentally ill, when she has to work. She explains that this friend introduced her to art and also showed her that ‘the Blacks get everything’. Anna says that her friend works in the townships, teaching children arts and craft, and she often wonders why the government does not have those same recreational projects in the Cape Flats community. She expresses in many ways that coloured people suffered equally during the apartheid era, but today only the black marginalised population experiences the very few benefits of democracy.

**How I Read These Accounts**

Reflecting on the lived experiences of each of my participants leaves me questioning the very nature of democracy and what exactly that means. Their stories provide a different narrative of the marginalised, because when you type Bonteheuwel into an internet search engine, what you find is the single stereotype of the people residing in the community. When I entered the field, I was prepared to work with anyone who was interested in my research, and it is interesting how all the ladies I ended up working with go against all stereotypes made about Bonteheuwel. As Faith once told me:

“Well, Bonteheuwel is a tough place. I come from a low-income family. You have faith, you have passion and you have instinct that is what you need to survive. You master poverty, the only thing you have to make sure of is how to make money.”

Their stories make me question which of the large variety of theorisations we should embrace when we are interested in illuminating interdependent inequalities in a community such as Bonteheuwel and global inequalities that in so many ways affect South Africa. Which of the accounts allows us to critically assess current inequalities in a way that is mindful of their many complexities? This is one of the questions that we have to think about when breaking down the barriers of the manifold of inequalities.
It’s a Third World Problem with a First World Constitution

Democracy is Suffocating Me

Should the South African Constitution be rewritten in favour of a more equitable idea of citizenship, rather than the language of democratic equality it is currently written in? With inequalities being a prominent issue, South Africa is among one of the most unequal countries to live in today. Apartheid being the successor to colonialism, the history of South Africa has played a huge role in making citizenship read well on paper but inaccessible in tangible terms. This has resulted in the majority of South Africans who were previously marginalised remaining in the same circumstances. Faith captures this perfectly when she said, “I started my family as a backyard dweller and my eldest daughter has started her family in the same way.”

Her experience captures the essence of my research curiosity, because it shows that even though her daughter was ‘born free’, her reality is not very different from her mother’s experience who was born during the apartheid era. Simplistically, one may assert that residents in Bonteheuwel find it difficult to access tangible citizenship because of a history of inequalities.

According to Lemanski (2017) neoliberalism moved the concepts of citizenship from racial divide to class divide. However, this is not the reality for my participants, because they continuously spoke about the black communities ‘getting everything.’ Suggesting that even though they have a shared history, in post-apartheid South Africa it is believed by participants that the black communities reap the most benefits. With the lived experiences of my participants, I argue that in order for all South African citizens to enjoy citizenship beyond constitutional provision, the country needs to explore ways of complementing a democratic citizenship, which promotes equality, with a more equitable idea of citizenship.

According to Brayboy, Castagno and Maughan (2007) both equality and equity are concepts used to bring fairness. While equality asserts that you should treat everyone the same, equity whispers that everyone’s needs should be provided for. Watching my participants in their everyday life, their stories and reality show me that South Africa’s democracy provides equality. This is not bad, but equality can only work if everyone starts at the same place, which is not the case for my participants. Therefore I argue that their lived realities lead me to a complementation of equal access with, a more equitable access of democratic citizenship. This chapter seeks to illuminate the failure of our Rainbow Nation in making tangible citizenship accessible to all South Africans.
Our Struggles are the same, they are just structured differently

In 1950, before we crossed over and began celebrating what we now call the ‘Rainbow Nation’, classified black and coloured bodies were sentenced to a life on the outskirts of South Africa. It was a system of divide and rule (Mamdani; 1996). The apartheid government pushed those who they did not really want as equals into peripheries. The plan was to push classified black and coloured people completely out of the city. The ruling speaks to a larger issue of justice, because not only was this decision violently imposed, no black or coloured people were present during the trial. Yet a judgment was passed and gave every black and coloured person 25 years to life imprisonment. If you were categorised as black you would live out your sentence in the townships, while the coloured population was sentenced to the Cape Flats. In most cases, the only thing separating these two ‘concentration camps’ is a main road and the preferred ‘Coloured Act’, which was a clever distribution of resources and privilege based on skin colour.

The idea of the preferred ‘Coloured Act’ came to life in a comment made by Anna when I asked her what she means by the ‘blacks get everything’. She explained that her friend is part of a government organisation that teaches children in the township arts and crafts. She proceeded by telling me that when her friend asked to run the same programme in Bonteheuwel (as she is a resident of Bonteheuwel) the person in charge lectured her on how funds are distributed. On these grounds Anna feels that the ‘blacks’ get everything because their ‘brother’ is in command. This suggests that in her reality the ruling party favours their classified racial group. This is problematic because her comment speaks directly to what the apartheid government sought to do when they categorised people according to their skin colour (Runciman 2016). Also her comment filters into what Karen mentioned in one of our interviews when I asked her whom she votes for. She explained that she grew up voting for the National Party (NP) because that is whom her father raised her to vote for and continued by voting for the Democratic Alliance (DA). Karen who is now 51 years old explained that during the apartheid era Bonteheuwel had many recreational programmes for children every day after school; at present, Bonteheuwel has nothing. With this in mind and Anna’s experience of the townships getting these recreational programmes while Bonteheuwel has nothing, suggests that my participants feel that there is a reverse privilege of the ‘clever distribution’ that was once given to Bonteheuwel.

Furthermore, Bonteheuwel (a Cape Flats community) where I conducted my research is directly opposite Langa (a township community). What separates these two spaces is Vanguard Drive, a main road dividing a number of marginalised communities on its way. These communities have a shared history
and in most cases like for Bonteheuwel and Langa, they share the same constitutional provisional resources as my participants cried time and again. Anna expressed this in one of our interviews:

I mean, we work together, we have the same history, we share a day hospital, our children go to school together so all of us need the same things so why would one get more than the other? Or the one get better, the other get less, you know – Anna.

When she said this to me, I could not help but wonder where the white population falls into this democratic equation. I wondered if maybe they were not included because history has always favoured their kind. With a reflection on history, one can assume that the white population can afford to pay for tangible things such as land. Conflicted on whether to ask this question, I decided to ignore it. Now I regret not asking my participants, because it would have given me a better understanding on the subject matter. They easily compared themselves to the black population but never made reference to the white population. Thinking about it now, I realise that the racial categorisation by my participants shows that, even though apartheid is a historical event, the impact of what it had done continues to live on 24 years after its death.

Reflecting on my research, I found that no matter how hard and tirelessly my participants work, the cost of tangible citizenship will remain inaccessible to them. Throughout my five weeks, I noticed that there is a question of who deserves things and who does not. A question of ‘why am I being overlooked’ which they have attributed to race. This makes race a huge theme to come out of my data. In other words, to my participants it is not so much about citizenship; rather it is citizenship located within a context that has deep traumatic history, based on separating the different shades of African. The manner in which my participants use discriminatory racial slurs to describe black people is an example of how successful apartheid was in contemporary South Africa.

*My Government Does not Work for Me*

The lived realities of my participants echo a discourse of government as a maternal entity. It somewhat sits in contrast to values of neoliberal autonomy, making it rather impossible for government and citizens to be on the same page. According to Runciman (2016) the Reconstruction Development Programme (RDP) was central to the democratic government’s plan to create a ‘better life for all’, the ANC’s election slogan. The excitement of democracy led to very ambitious targets by the government to right the wrongs of apartheid. The first
priority of the RDP was to begin to meet the basic needs of people – jobs, land, housing, telecommunication, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care and social welfare (RSA 1994:7). The above mentioned is a tangible representation of citizenship and none of my participants can say they have access to even half of the things listed.

This is not to say that these things do not exist in South Africa, because they do. They are just inaccessible to the women I worked with. For example, Mary took Kate out of school because Kate was three years old and the special needs school was understaffed and all the children attending had different disabilities. She feared that her daughter would not receive the care she needs. The school being understaffed suggests that there are not many special needs schools in the surrounding area. In fact the school Mary found for Kate was not even in Bonteheuwel. It was in Athlone, a neighbouring community. According to Mary there is a total of eight schools in Bonteheuwel and none for special needs pupils. She explains that there is an entire community of disabled people, yet the government does not see the need to accommodate these people. Also she makes reference to there being only a limited number of schools for disabled people.

This shows that the government provides these services; however they are not presented in an easily accessible manner. As a result, Mary had to forfeit working in order to take care of her daughter. The government does not see this as a job, yet I have watched her work harder than many people with conventional jobs. Her reality brings me to intersectionality, understood to constitute or account for the simultaneous experience of categorical and hierarchal classification including, but not limited to race, class, gender, sexuality and nationality. By this definition, Mary finds herself in an intersection of wanting to work, however, in doing so she would have nobody to take care of her daughter and brother. She explained that if her daughter were in school she would be able to apply for a part-time job, because she cannot afford all her monthly expenses. The government disability grant amounts to R1,700 per month and; as she is living with two disabled people, she is granted R3,400 per month. Considering the increase of prices in just about everything, Mary and her family of four people, live on a budget for a student living at residence.

Another issue that comes out of Mary’s story is the issue of transport in Bonteheuwel. As I explained previously, our trip to the hospital took an entire day, because there is only one bus coming in and out of Bonteheuwel to Tygerberg hospital. This speaks to a lack of yet another tangible service, which residents in Bonteheuwel cannot fully claim. Although I enjoyed my time with Mary and Kate, the hours spent in hospital presented a set of concerns. Mary and her husband are both unemployed, the only other means of transport to
Tygerberg hospital is taking four taxis as Mary explained. This means that if we missed the bus, there would be no other reasonably priced means of transportation, meaning that Kate would miss her appointment. This highlights the fact that residents in Bonteheuwel have to work extra hard to access services. They are simply not easily accessible. Moreover, everything Mary does qualifies as a job, however she does not get paid for doing what the government is indirectly supposed to do. Many other parents are able to work because their children are in school during the day. Surely the government should consider seeing an unemployed parent with a disabled child as worthy of receiving a monthly grant? This is another example of intersectionality.

One of the biggest representations of tangible citizenship to my participants is home ownership. Through my interviews with Faith, I discovered that there are many residents in Bonteheuwel who live in shacks. Runciman (2016) argues that for as long as capitalism continues to inform social, political and economic transformation, the idea of citizenship will lack meaning and depth for people in communities like Bonteheuwel. Suggesting that in order for citizenship to translate into tangible terms, the government has to find a way to open the narrow version of citizenship and make it more inclusive as Nyamnjoh (2007) suggests. Faith provides an interesting way of making Nyamnoh’s idea of inclusivity a reality, by suggesting that the government should renew the shacks of the people while they wait for their homes.

When Faith told me about her idea, I immediately thought of Anna, who would benefit tremendously, should the government agree to this. My fieldwork was conducted in the heart of winter. I remember having a meeting with Anna on a rainy day and I watched as she placed plastic bowls and pots on the floor to prevent damage to her furniture because the rain was pouring in. I could see that this embarrassed her, because while she was placing these bowls on the floor, she asked if I preferred we go into the house. To ease the tension, I told her about my experience of living in a shack and gave her the option of choosing where she preferred our meeting to be. She decided that we could stay.

Through this experience, I learned that in order for my participants to even begin thinking of tangible citizenship, the government needs to move back to the promises made in the name of democracy, the period during the early 1990’s and immediately after 1994, when South Africa undertook to bridge the gap of inequalities and overcome historical division in the spirit of reconciliation (Burk 2005). The majority of South Africans cannot afford the global social order of neoliberalism and if the government wants to provide meaningful citizenship, a restructuring has to take place. Aware of the fact that perhaps South Africa cannot afford to grant all citizens meaningful citizenship, a model has to be created to at least try to bridge the gap of inequalities. With all the recent strikes
in South Africa, it is only a matter of time before a possible civil war breaks out. However, this can be avoided if we stop using a first world Constitution for a developing country.

To place the abovementioned into context, I would provide an account of the strike I attended in Bonteheuwel with my participants. Weeks after existing the field I was summoned by my participants to join the community’s ‘illegal’ peaceful strike. Residents were tired of the ongoing gang violence in the community and a lack of police protection. Many felt that the only way the government would take them seriously was if they disrupted the ‘natural’ order of the day. So, on 29th August at 5 am residents blocked all entrances leading to Bonteheuwel; no one could get in and no one could get out. Standing in the cold, we watched as the police came out in numbers to stop the protest as they were blocking Vanguard Drive, making it difficult for people outside of Bonteheuwel to get to work. Faith turned to me and said, “I wish they came like this when our children are being killed.”

Her comment suggests once again the lack of basic services provided in Bonteheuwel. When police opened fire on the residents, I was reminded by a comment made in 2015 during the student protest by the then Minister of Higher Education, Blade Nzimande, who said: “If the students don’t accept this, we’ll start our own movement. Students must fall.”

Although he brushed this off as if it was a joke, the irony lies in the actions taken by the police during this peaceful protest. This proves that even something as simple as your right to strike is limited to what the state allows. The response of the government as Karen expressed it: “Joh here we are striking for peace and the government is teaching us that violence is what will win. So how can you ask me if I benefit from this country?”

She indicates that the residences were ruled to silence. Supporting this idea, Valji (2004) argues that citizenship can either be silenced or expressed. I agree with Karen, because the police opening fire takes away the very essence of democracy. As I watched the protest unfold I wondered what the difference was between apartheid strikes and now. Because as I stood there moving away from the teargas, I realised that all the residents wanted was peace, something I would assume democracy would be in favour of. The protest was a mere request for protection, but even that is too much to ask for from this democratic state. Through the experiences of all my participants, I have come to the realisation that tangible citizenship is not given. To my participants in Bonteheuwel, citizenship beyond constitutional provision means nothing because they have nothing but a green identity book as an indication of being born on South African soil.
Conclusion: You are because I’m not

With inequalities being a prominent issue, South Africa is amongst one of the most unequal countries to live in today. Apartheid, being the successor to colonialism, the history of South Africa has played a huge role in making citizenship read well on paper, but inaccessible in tangible terms. This has resulted in the majority of South Africans who were previously marginalised to remain in the same circumstances. Simplistically, one may assert that residents in Bonteheuwel find it difficult to access tangible citizenship because of a history of inequalities.

Therefore I argue that instead of maintaining equality, we should move towards a more equitable idea of democracy. Democratic equality does not allow us to reimagine our city, because as highlighted in this chapter, the government continues to build houses in the same Group Areas Act spaces – in the name of neoliberalism. As a result we merely prescribe apartheid ideas of what the city should look like, instead of fully liberating the previously marginalised. This compromise is what we have; however it is not democratic for all South Africans. Therefore, I propose we create a system to help reshape the country’s landscape, by providing an equitable democracy. It is difficult to consider a country like South Africa free, because people like my participants, have never fully tasted the benefits of tangible citizenship. As a result we allow the oppressor the enjoyment of the power of history.

Understanding citizenship beyond constitutional provision in post-apartheid South Africa requires an individual to understand the variety of tangible benefits, while simultaneously understanding the history of South Africa. Through watching my participants in their everyday life, I have learned that to occupy the margins means to occupy the hidden spaces of society. These women, despite their resilience, are not being seen, acknowledged or heard. In many ways, the government is responsible for service delivery and maintenance of communities’ infrastructure and safety. Instead, my participants have taken responsibilities that do not belong to them in addition to their personal struggles thereby making tangible citizenship seems like nothing more than a dream they wish for their children.
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Chapter 11

From Amakwerekwere Car Guard to a South African Citizen: An Autoethnographic Account

Kongo Minga Mbweck

Introduction

This chapter is an autoethnographic account of Congolese car guards in Cape Town that is informed by my experience as a former car guard from 2000 to 2002. In addition, it presents a longitudinal approach from 1994 to 2016, by exploring a group of Congolese refugees who came to South Africa after the first democratic presidential elections in 1994. I drew my data from six Congolese car guards, who settled in Cape Town either before or after the 2010 FIFA World Cup. They have found themselves in social environments in which their opportunities of living decent lives are insignificant. Many of the car guards I interviewed argue that are trying to shape their lives by using different strategies in their attempt to generate meaningful incomes for themselves and their families. The chapter investigates some of the dynamics behind the issues of their immigration, work and citizenship, by exploring the ways in which these Congolese car guards earn a daily living, and how their social exclusion and the struggles to get legal documents impinge upon their life choices. The chapter employs the qualitative research method to get deeper insights into the subjectivity created by citizenship and mobility within South Africa. I methodically document my fate in this South African society through a focus on the situation of ‘kwerekwere’ who cross borders in flight from political and economic challenges in my own land of birth the DRC. The chapter argues that amakwerekwere have agency; yet, their agency has been trampled on because they are perceived as people who still need to conform to citizenship norms and customs.

The chapter demonstrates why some adapt and conform to citizenship in South Africa, while others fail. Furthermore, the chapter maps the ways these young men navigate space by trying to escape the confining structures, and refers to these attempts to reconfigure their lives. The chapter also demonstrates the processes through which an individual’s identity is constructed through citizenship and rights. The chapter concentrates on the intersection of two
aspects of contemporary mobility: the flow of people, capital and goods, pushed across national borders and the growing crisis of citizenship in South Africa.

The recent socio-economic transformations in South African society after 2010 have led to major changes in the lives of car guards because they cannot earn enough money as they used to. The most evident changes are the South African economic crises and immigration policies, which have weakened the position of refugees.

This chapter uses the concepts of citizenship and mobility. These serve as the basis for both the theory and argument presented herein. Mobility as a concept underscores citizenship in South Africa, amidst necessary alteration in its daily reality. Citizenship and mobility capture the activities that surround the necessity for change as a result of people’s movement. It determines the people’s experiences of the environment and postulations as they grapple with the reality of space. On this note therefore, these two concepts are significantly relatable to this chapter.

This chapter draws on my own experiences as a former refugee working as a car guard in Cape Town and concludes that *amakwerekwere* agency has been trampled on because they are perceived as people who still need to conform to citizenship norms and customs.

My Personal Narrative as a Car Guard

I relocated to South Africa because of the political instability that escalated with the arrival of President Joseph Kabila at the end of 2000. I had just completed a degree in biomedical sciences from the University of Lubumbashi. My ambition was not to stay in South Africa but to be a bush faller who travels to Canada like many other young Africans who want to pursue greener pastures (see Nyamnjoh 2011). I was stirred in my ambition by the letter of admission I had received from the University of Alberta. However, my assumption felt incorrect; I felt stranded. Since circumstances under refugee status did not allow me to prosper, I felt compelled to become a citizen. Citizenship allows me to live like an ordinary South African, study, and work and access to the banking system. Citizenship allows me to not only be at the receiving end but contribute to South Africa in the same way, by cooperating and adapting myself to customs and conditions. By doing so, I am not denouncing the land of my birth, but I become a good advertisement for the country in which I was born. More than that, I prove myself a worthy citizen of South Africa, the country I have made my home.

It was in the morning that I arrived at Johannesburg Park Station at 08h18. I struggled to find where the train station was with my little knowledge of
English and the fear embedded in me. My English was poor; it was almost impossible for me to ask for directions from any stranger because I was warned of criminal activities in Johannesburg. I had in my pocket a mini tourist dictionary with all the necessary sentences translated from English to French. From Johannesburg I moved to Cape Town. On my arrival, I wanted to improve my English. I went to Inlingua a language school where I spent three months learning English. I knew that wasn’t enough but due to lack of funding it was difficult to carry on with lessons. The person who encouraged me to go for an English course was my late friend, Ngongo. Beside the fear embedded in me, I wanted to integrate and mix with local citizens to acquire English skills, but it was not easy at the beginning. I attended Cape Town library a lot, watching different tutorials, from English to maths, chemistry, biology, physics and more. The library also helped me learn a lot about South African history and culture. In my early days I remember waking up 5h00 in the morning to go and stand at the parade in the City centre Cape Town in search of work. The change of environment caused me to catch flu. After recovering from the flu, I started exploring Cape Town by foot. About two months later, I remember walking alone after midnight from town to Woodstock, the area where I lived, steadily, anxiously and wearily in search of work.

It was difficult to find a job and to get a bank account due to my status as a refugee. During my time, the only place that accepted refugee’s status was the post office that had post bank. I banked with post bank; I used to bank every weekend. Most banks allow their customers to close their bank accounts through the mail as long as the account is in good standing, send closing instructions to your bank and to request a cheque for your remaining balance, if any. My account was in good standing. I wasn’t given a letter to confirm that they would deactivate my account but a verbal notice to withdraw my money when I went to deposit R1900 cash earned in my car guard job during the festive season. I was told that the post bank no longer accepted refugee documents. I asked, ‘Since when?’ The teller told me she was just implementing what her superior told her to do. I asked to speak to the manager who came and confirmed that it wasn’t personal, but a decision taken by the post office management. I had R1,500 in my account at that time. I was given back the money. I was very disappointed. I got home and decided to take my mattress cut a slit into it to insert my money into it. That was my new bank. The experience did not only leave me with questions about the politics of insiders and outsiders but the right to citizenship in the country in which I live. I realised how difficult it is for one to maintain one’s dignity and identity when one’s status has been compromised (especially as a refugee), and when there are no viable options for making a livelihood.
I worked as a car guard with refugee status and it took me nine years with many obstacles to become naturalised as a citizen. Many early years of being a refugee in South Africa made me a victim and at the same time a spectator of discrimination and xenophobic sentiments. From my experience xenophobia and racial discrimination more often involve black South African citizens and black foreigners (as opposed to white) African foreigners. Nonetheless racism is defined by Banton (1996: 8), as ‘a dimension by which persons assigned to another group are kept at a distance because they are considered racially inferior’, it is quite ironic to see that many black African immigrants are subjected to racist treatment though their oppressors are also black. Neocosmos (2008) found problematic the way South African nationalism has been diverted for anti-African sentiments in the country. He indicates that during the apartheid era, black people did not have much value and were forced to live on the periphery of urban areas. ‘What was once the rural/urban binary divide in the post-apartheid government progressively moved to an Africa/South Africa binary so that South Africa is measured ‘urban and modern’ while Africa is perceived as ‘rural and backward’ (2008).

I was born Christian and did not have any family members, yet in my early years in Cape Town I was part of a Muslim community. I attended salah frequently and later moved to a Christian congregation again for a sense of belonging. Many of the car guards belong to a Christian church for a sense of belonging too.

**Human Prejudice**

While working as a car guard in Cape Town, I experienced and witnessed repeatedly the human prejudice against foreigners, particularly refugees. Behind the face of the person considered so repulsive was an intelligent and sensitive individual, conscious and sympathetic to the people around refugees. I went through unpleasant experiences as a car guard – I remember yawning and rubbing my eyes under the strong sun and yet I do strongly believe that in every man or woman of every sort the ‘better self’ lives. The worth of our human contacts and relationships depends upon whether we can appeal to that better self in strangers or people whom we know. Some can do it easily and often, but some can do it rarely. They leave behind them new impulses of courage and of hope. While working as a car guard sometimes people would look at me as if I did not exist. I remember that in Camps Bay, which is a white suburb, I was offered expired food, which I never ate. I took it out of respect and later threw it in a bin. The food was given to a domestic lady working at the house where I was stationed as a car guard. The domestic lady was a friendly coloured woman, middle aged and dressed in a checked baby blue uniform. While working as a
car guard I was given leftover food by a young Indian couple at night. The food was not fit for human consumption as it had bones and left over scraps from the plates. I was shocked and devastated that night. The interesting part of this was that the couple who gave me the food expected me to eat the food in front of them. The husband said to me, ‘Please eat’. I politely thanked him and said that I was not allowed to eat on duty and that I would eat it after work. After work I looked at the food and I said, ‘may the blessings be, I throw it to the rubbish been’. While approaching the rubbish bin, one of the street beggars asked me for something to eat. I said, ‘I don’t have. I throw it.’ I quickly ran to the shop and bought him half a loaf of bread and gave it to him. He was grateful.

As a refugee in a foreign country, I realised that things are not easy in the world today. But were they ever easy? Were they ever meant to be easy? My observation as a car guard was that people who have had sheltered and easy lives don’t come out of them very well. Too often they are cold and hard and inconsiderate. How can they be otherwise if they have never known sickness or sorrow or want? These were my teachers who taught me about life, who taught me to think there is something better in life than what I think or there is a better way of treating a human than that. I didn’t like their manners, but I learnt a lot from them. I don’t know if courage and fortitude and patience and sympathy can be learnt in any school? I doubt it. Yet I live to learn these things! If not, why live?

**The Turning Points**

I was frustrated at my life and concerned that I would not make it. The other concern was how my family would react if I died. One day while working as a car guard, I saw a white woman with a nine-year-old girl who went to eat at one of the restaurants. I stood watching over her car under the sun which burnt my skin. I can remember that my skin peeled off because of the heat from the sun. Some parking attendants did not even have the courage to look at me as a human being. Some would just greet me and go. Some would give me the fake smile and go. Some would look at me with an angry face and go. I kept asking myself what I was doing there. Within my heart, there was a little voice telling me, ‘You can do better than this, Minga.’ When these thoughts came into my heard, in my own opinion I would say that this is a professionalised begging service. Whenever I thought of my level of education, I cried and I asked myself so many questions as to why I had to go through such experience. I had so many questions to ask God. This woman came out of the restaurant after five hours. I kept a record of this time as I was good at timing people. The more people came through and the less time they spent, the more I could make money. But that day was a bad day for me. I remember making only 50 cents from a client
who made me so upset in that he unfairly treated me as rubbish me by throwing the fifty cents at me. But I told myself to persevere and this was some of the motivational words we used to give to each other. I had so much hope from this woman because she was so friendly and full of smiles when she parked her car and even said to me that she would see me later. But to my surprise, when she returned to where her car was parked, she offered me R1 with an unfriendly face and I just said thank you. The interesting part here was that she threw the coin to me, but I failed to catch it and the coin fell on the ground. I picked it up and said thank you. Her little nine-year-old daughter stood next to me and refused to move. Her mother called her: ‘Honey let’s go!’ The little girl pulled her shoulder up and said to her mother ‘no’. But I did not know why the girl refused to go and what she meant by no. The girl had a little bag around her waist; she then squeezed her little fingers into the pocket of her bag and brought out R10. She gave it to me and ran towards her mother. I stood perplexed without words. That gesture touched my heart and I felt bad to see how a grown-up woman was so insensitive towards me, but as a stranger the little child had the ability to see humanity in me. I asked myself the question as to why I was doing the car guard job. Nevertheless, I did what is said in Swahili ‘kyakupewa akinamaongezo’. That is, one cannot demand more when he has been given something for free or as charity. It was a turning point in my life in that I left that job and started to search for a good job. The search for a new job led me to almost the same job, but this time a legal one called a security job. I have always been a strong believer in the saying ‘everything happens for a reason’. I would say that this is linked to my faith and belief that the supreme deity and my ancestors are watching over my life and have a higher purpose for me. When things do not necessarily go the way that I plan, I remain optimistic by reaffirming that there is a better plan for me somehow. I say all this because my million crossroads life experience made me more than positive.

Out of my silences come most of my great ideas, the great discoveries and the great reformatons. And we make far too little effort of our common humanity, whereby underneath the surface and appearance of things we are together for the grace of life. After all what I discovered, is that we are very much alike in our joys and in our sorrows, in our needs, in our hopes and in our fears. How strange it is that we should be so ignorant to realise our deep and essential companionship!

**Mobility**

Mobility is fundamental to our existence and understanding of the world, whether it is in Africa or elsewhere. As a human being, one must be mobile.
Furthermore, African mobility has an extensive history; archaeological finds put forward that substantial movements of population from the Nguni languages and cultures date back to the third century AD (Conevin 1979: 77–95). Adey (2010) indicates that ‘Without mobility we could not live. Without mobility we could not get to work or nearest to source food, neither could we stay healthy and fit’ (p. 1). Mobility is unavoidably complex. When talking about mobility, we are not only concerned about physical mobility but also ideas, values and materials. This is what Appadurai (1990) calls ‘flows’ – the flow of people (ethnoscapes), ideas (ideoscapes) and money (financescapes). Crush et al. (2015) indicate that mobility within urban areas plays an important role in the dynamism and operation of the urban informal economy and vital element of the informal operatives of business strategies who work spaces within niche markets (p. 3).

While physical mobility is based on people and things across physical borders, social mobility comprises movement and flows within social systems which are often not considered within a given context. In agreement with Adey (2010), however, indicators of citizenship as conferred on ‘autonomous individuals’ do not understand mobility that is constituted through communal relationships. The rhetoric of rights is dominated by a narrow-minded neoliberal’s concept with emphasis on the individual and yet does not consider most African realities of agency and personhood (Nyamnjoh 2010). Citizenship, too, barely defined as remedies of empowerment and rights of independent individuals does not emphasise mobility as transformative of relationships with communities.

For some people, physical mobility across national or international boundaries in the past was relatively regulated due to cultural differences. Appadurai (2008: 47) indicates that cultural mobility was limited in the past due to ecological, religion and geographical boundaries. However, today these boundaries have been eroded due to globalisation and mobility is being subjected to regulation. Because of the regulation of mobility across many states, many powerful states, especially in the West, have now moved to acquire cheap labour beyond their borders. For instance, these states have initiated programmes that hire students as live-in caregivers or recruit professionals such as doctors, nurses and engineers who are willing to relocate to their countries and work. In this regard, it can conclusively be said that mobility is a contributing factor to intercultural encounters. However, the element of citizenship within mobility is very crucial as it is a barrier to most foreigners who move to take up employment or studies or other kind of residence beyond their countries of origin.
Citizenship

I became a South Africa citizen after nine years of perseverance – my application form for citizenship disappeared from the Department of Home Affairs three times. In Africa, the distinction between ‘citizen’ and ‘subject’ emerged along with colonial and postcolonial boundaries and dynamism of land dispossession (Mamdani 1996). He indicates that the colonial system politicised ‘race’ by distinguishing between ‘master races’ or settlers, and ‘subject races’ or ‘natives’ and ‘non-natives’, which civil law govern what made the settlers and their descendants full citizens. In their attempts to establish meanings of European-ness and English-ness, these regimes shunted ‘non-natives’ in and out of colonial notions of ‘native’ and ‘civilised’. This system of categorising people was used to govern social differences in ways that approved and reproduced inequality (Holston 2008). The colonial and apartheid systems of divide-and-rule constructed and enforced a discourse of ‘native identities’ restricted by physical and cultural geographies. The distinction goes beyond ‘natives’ and ‘Europeans’ to include categories between ‘native citizens’ and ‘native settlers’ among ethnic communities within the same colony.

The ethical and moral relationship that comes with the languages of citizenship is eminent basically from the fact that citizenship is an attribute exclusively for human beings; people who have acquired humanity. Thus, there is a distinction between citizen and population which is much more insensitive. However, we say it is the fact that population is data and citizens are those one deals with or relate with on the bases of ethical, moral and political text. What we find in immigrant families is that the variety in the quality of the lived experience of the refugees begs the question, ‘Where they do feature?’ They feature as population – ‘nameless data’. Consequently, many do not qualify to be citizens because they are perceived as outsiders, (see Nyamnjoh 2010).

The element of citizenship subjects me as refugee to the rule of exclusion. For example, in South Africa, South African nationals can easily open bank accounts and they can have full scholarships or other kinds of sponsorships in universities across South Africa, while their foreign counterparts, notably refugees, are excluded from these opportunities. This is because the opportunities that are available to South African nationals are more available than those available to foreign nationals. This rule of exclusion is widely applied today across the globe and even in countries of the north. In South Africa, the exclusion rule is even applied to businesses, public healthcare facilities and government departments such as the Department of Home Affairs that handle immigration and refugee matters at the expense of foreign nationals, some of whom have lived in South Africa for decades.
There is no doubt that the beginning of the 21st century seems to be characterised by ‘new’ migration patterns that bring questions and new academic challenges. South Africa represents an interesting case in point. For the past few decades, South Africa has attracted migrants from all over the world: the end of the apartheid regime marked the beginning of a new era and more intense migration flows from within the African continent. As a result, immigrants from DRC, Cameroon, Somalia, Nigeria and even Pakistan have settled in the Western Cape Province.

There have been four waves of Congolese migrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to South Africa. According Kazadi (1999: 14–22), the road to South Africa opened to Congolese migrants in the 90s when the South African regime under former President De Klerk created a bilateral relationship with the Congolese regime under the late President Mobutu. The first wave of Congolese immigrants came from 1990 to 1992 and was made up of middle-class citizens. The second wave included Congolese of all social categories and classes leaving Katanga after tribalism between people of the Katanga region (in the south of the DRC) and Kasai region (at the centre of the DRC and north of Katanga), in which my family was victim of such tribal violence. This wave benefited from the opportunity to obtain refugee status with the end of apartheid in 1994. The third wave of immigration unfolded from May 1997 with the end of the Mobutu regime. The barons of the old regime, their families and allies fled from the DRC. The fourth wave of Congolese migrants comprises young people, mostly academics, enjoying the context of the conflict (1996–2001) to search for refugee status, of which I am part. The exact number of Congolese living in South Africa is not yet known, which makes it difficult for the South African government to distinguish the legal and illegal Congolese in the country.

Profiles of Congolese Car Guards

Justin aged 39, from Kinshasa, has been using an asylum-seeker document for the past four years. His wife and three children are still in DRC. He came to South Africa via Angola in 2013 and stayed in Johannesburg for nine months before relocating to Cape Town in October 2013. He started working as a car guard in November of that year. Justin earns R2,000 a month. From this amount, he pays R1,300 for rent and is left with R700 to feed himself and his family. He lives with his brother-in-law and two friends in an apartment in a
white suburb. Justin says that rent in the suburbs is very costly, but he has no other option. Justin is illegal in the country as he explained in Lingala:

I have a problem because the Cape Town refugee office refused to renew my permit … every month I used to go to Musina to renew my permit. It is impossible to make it, the money we earn here with family responsibilities. I must spend at least R2500 per month as transport fees. Then I saw that I could not do it anymore; I refused to go and renew my paper at Musina. I am currently illegal.

Luyeye aged 27, is from Kinshasa, where he lived with his wife and two children. He relocated to South Africa in September 2013 and arrived in the country via Zimbabwe. Luyeye is a welder by profession and a qualified electrician. The lack of electricity in the DRC made it difficult for him to solicit and retain clients, and so his business collapsed and he decided to move to South Africa. He hopes one day to be able to make use of his skills in South Africa.

Luyeye lives with his brother’s wife and children in a suburb named Southfield, where they rent a two-bedroom flat. Luyeye earns between R150 and R200 – sometimes R250 on days when business is good. Because he is not permanently stationed at the site, he is compelled to give R100 to the owner of the spot every day, besides the sum of R17 that he pays as rental on the spot. If he makes R250 and pays the sum of R117 for rent, Luyeye only takes home R133. From his earnings, Luyeye and Justin both remit to their children in DRC every month via a Congolese agency.

Luyeye is currently illegal in South Africa and does not possess legal documents granting him the right to live in South Africa. All his documents, including his passport and refugee papers, were burnt in a house fire. He reported the incident to the Department of Home Affairs, but they refused to assist him with new documents. He went to the police station to lodge a report but received no assistance. At this point, he had to bribe a police officer to give him papers that would allow him to move freely without being arrested. When he got these, he decided to go to Musina to explain his condition but still received no assistance. However, he is fortunate to have certain documents offered to him by a human rights lawyer.

Prince, aged 29, is from Kinshasa. He holds a bachelor’s degree in arts but became frustrated because his skills could not be used in DRC. He came to South Africa in 2012 via Zambia and Zimbabwe, without knowing anyone in the country. He had only enough money to reach Beit Bridge, at the South African and Zimbabwe border, and spent a month there. He managed to cross to the South African side with the help of a truck driver with whom he could not communicate with as he had little knowledge of English.
Prince slept outside on the street in Johannesburg. Sometime later, he was given a place to sleep by a Congolese pastor who felt sorry for him. He was invisible in Johannesburg and did not have papers to sojourn in South Africa as a legal refugee. Frustrated, Prince decided to move to Durban where he knew someone from his home country. He spent three months in Durban without a job and decided to relocate to Cape Town to search for job opportunities. He arrived in Cape Town in late 2013 and currently lives with friends in Wynberg. In Cape Town, he faces the same problem of documentation.

Despite disappointing experiences with an employer who offered him work as an artist in a suburb called Constantia, Prince is happy with what he has, compared to what he had when he was in DRC, and he is grateful for the job as a car guard. He does not see the need to go back to DRC. He would prefer to travel overseas one day if he gets the opportunity, but he lacks knowledge and citizenship as to the way forward.

Although there are commonalities between my own experiences and those of the individuals I interviewed, the Congolese car guards living and working in Cape Town are not homogeneous. Rather, they are fluid. They present the premises that are not only informed by their fighting spirit and mobility, but by their mannerisms that are informed by their social exclusion characterised by triumph and challenges that consist of experimentation, of improvisation and of great creativity. Because of their fighting spirit, they adopt a range of survival strategies to cope with the daily challenges in their lives during a time of uncertainty. Amongst these strategies are car guards, Stokvel, social network and kinship, belonging to a church. In addition, they maintain their identities and networks that fulfil and sustain their mobility during times of uncertainty, by keeping their home lineage eternally active.

Levels of Education

Most Congolese car guards are Francophone, were well-mannered, educated and skilful. They turn to self-employment due to frustration around their goals of integrating into the society in which they live (Salaff et al. 2002) and so they become car guards, due to language barrier. Although South Africans complain about immigrants taking their jobs, Groot (cited by Timberg 2005: 7) explains: ‘I don’t think that refugees are taking jobs that would otherwise go to South Africans; they are starting little businesses and employing South Africans more often.’

Various studies and representatives of NGOs have confirmed that immigrants have comparatively good education and skills. Ngwema (1998) argues that at least 30 per cent of immigrants have completed tertiary education
and about 80 per cent of immigrants have completed their secondary school education. His findings were confirmed by the Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town during the project of building the awareness around human rights for refugees. Timberg (2005) cited the UN assessment that many asylum seekers or immigrants are well-educated and comparatively skilful, with two-thirds having a secondary school diploma or further education. Despite their education or experience, there are few employment opportunities for immigrants (Kalitanyi 2007: 2). Among the six car guards I interviewed, two had finished tertiary education, two dropped out of university, one had finished secondary school and one had dropped out from secondary school.

Compared with these car guards and job seekers, the refugees who came and went through the English school system in South Africa sounded more fluent than those who prioritised employment on their arrival to Cape Town. Through my fieldwork, I also found that the children of Congolese migrants who are studying tend to be bilingual: speaking English-French or Congolese local languages with the parents at home, and then mixed English, isiXhosa and/or Afrikaans among themselves at schools or in their peer groups.

**Reasons for Coming to Cape Town**

Like many other fast-growing African cities, Cape Town can be both a place for new opportunities and a harsh and stressful environment. The total number of interviewees left their home country because of political instability. Some confirmed that their lives and those of their children and spouses were vulnerable. They argued that children cannot receive a good education in a war zone. The best option was to move out of their country to avoid stress and trauma. However, this dream is not achievable because many of the car guards have left their families back home.

Many car guards who moved to Cape Town before the year 2012 argued that that their reasons were based on the hospitality, opportunities and multicultural nature of the city, where migrants could study and work, or even have refugee papers so that they could build a better life for themselves. They consider Cape Town as a city of hope in terms of job security and better living conditions. Other participants prefer the city as a place of safety, because it is relatively more peaceful with lower levels of xenophobia-related violence than other cities such as Johannesburg or Durban, where there are high levels of xenophobia and it is difficult to find work. Some are in Cape Town because their friends told them to come and live here.

Many Congolese immigrants choose South Africa as a transit country; their destination is Western countries such as the United States of America (USA),
Britain or Canada (Sumata et al. 2004). When all opportunities to leave the ‘rainbow nation’ i.e. South Africa are closed, the transit place becomes the permanent destination for some. This was my fate, as well as that of many Congolese refugees I interviewed. Other Congolese who come to South Africa are misinformed or are brought by their relatives and, more particularly, by human smugglers known as ‘*tindikeurs*’.

Others consider Cape Town to be a city where car guards can earn a better daily living due to the white majority. As Justin said: ‘In Johannesburg, there is no way to meet whites close by town. You must travel far! When I first came here, I was impressed with the number of white around the city and tourists, ops!’ Yan, a Congolese car guard had a different belief about the city of Cape Town, which he compared to European cities such as London, Paris or New York City. ‘When I arrived here in 2009, I thought that I was in Europe as my friend told me, but … there is not much I can say now’, he said.

More specifically, the presence of Congolese refugees in Cape Town is due to the improvement of language skills for job opportunities, which in this case is English. Five out of six participants, who are Lingala speakers, mentioned that they came here because they heard that the Western Cape provincial government helps migrants to learn English. Justin said: ‘In Johannesburg, we greet in Lingala or in isiZulu. No possibility to learn English. There are many English centres here ... I already did my first and second level English. I hope to do more so that I can be able to talk fluently with clients and maybe find a decent job. If you speak English here, you can find a good job.’

Despite their education and experience, many Congolese refugees find work only with great difficulty and they are grossly exploited due to lack of documents. Frustrated in their goals to integrate into the host society, their education skills translate into entrepreneurship and, for some, car guard work (Kalitany 2007).

**Car Guard as an Entrepreneurship**

Car guards have gradually become a common sight everywhere in Cape Town and other metropolitan centres around South Africa; however, the career hardly existed two decades ago (McEwen and Leiman 2008: 4). As an economic activity, car guard work began unexpectedly and has grown without government assistance at any level, local or national. The activity is now not only well-known, but also gradually being formalised. In exchange for watching the parked car, the car owner gives the car guard a tip, which I consider as a gift in exchange for a service. It is informal work that is performed for an employer without the rights associated with formal employment such as sick leave, paid leave or
formal contracts (Bernstein 2003; McEwen and Leiman 2008). Car guards spend long working hours in public spaces day and night under bad weather.

The Congolese diaspora has developed a new dictionary related to specific work or when trying to construct the ‘other’. In South Africa, the work of a car guard is referred to as ‘ebende’ meaning ‘steel’; in Europe, it is called ‘cailloux’ meaning ‘stone’. The term refers to the fact that the money given to a car guard is mostly coins and these coins are made from metal called alloy.4

Most car guards work to support themselves and their families; their wages depend on the tips they receive from clients that often provide food and accommodation, as well as schooling for their children. The work of car guard is a ‘survivalist’ hustle, providing cash money daily that allows them to survive but not to prosper. One client told Robert that: ‘I will never prosper because I don’t have a source of income that will allow me to save. What I need to do is to find another job that can give me a basic salary so that I can have a better plan.’ For these Congolese men, working as a car guard is the only option due to the scarcity of formal jobs. All the car guards admitted that they do not like being a car guard – they are only doing it to survive.

**Do Car Guards Provide a Service?**

From my personal experience as a car guard, yes. Most of the car guards that were interviewed agree with my response. They do provide a service, such as assisting clients who cannot carry heavy loads, directing them to specific parking bays, making sure that no one scratches the cars and returning shopping trolleys to the supermarket for the client.

The service provided by car guards comes at a price sometimes. There have been cases where car guards have confronted robbers and have been summoned by the court to give evidence about their role in preventing car theft (McEwen and Leiman 2008: 5). Patrick aged 27, stated that he has had a knife pulled on him several times by people who want to work as car guards. The threats faced are not necessarily related to car theft, but to the threatening, violent behaviour from the local homeless who compete with them in trying to beg from drivers on the parking site.

**Obstacles to Integration**

Social integration is the process whereby people with different cultures, values and norms depend on each other and fulfil functions contributing to social order (Bosswick and Heckmann 2006; Turner 2006). The central characteristic of social integration is the organisation that exists in the public to unite. South Africa is still in the process of developing this organisation at all
levels. In general, there is conflict between the local population and Congolese refugees when integration is concerned. South Africans have a strong belief that refugees escape economic situations in their home countries and that they come to South Africa to take their jobs. Some believe that refugees are problem to the South African economy (Peberdy and Crush 1998).

Landau and Jacobsen’s (2004: 17) illustrate that some of the challenges faced by African refugees are due to the refusal to provide identity documents, prohibitions on work or papers demonstrating professional qualifications, discriminatory hiring practices and the inability to access banking services, either savings or credit.

**Deception of Citizenship**

Many car guards feel embarrassed to tell their loved ones back home that they look after people’s cars, because this type of job does not exist in the DRC and would be considered begging. These car guards all claim they would never do this in their home country; it is the same as begging on the road and ‘people are just feeling sorry for us’. Justin told me: ‘My wife keeps asking about the kind of job I do in South Africa. Most times I fail to reply, but to satisfy her curiosities my reply to her is: “I’m working in a workshop, without giving her more details.”’ Patrick said: ‘My family is not aware of what I am doing here, but they would be very disappointed if they knew the kind of job I am doing.’ The above view by both Justin and Patrick are contrary to mine. In my case, I was honest with my family about what I was doing and was not ashamed, because they knew my goal.

The Congolese car guards argued that Cape Town is not a place for job opportunities as they thought before they came; it is not a place to enjoy life since their skills are not applicable in the city where they could work and study or raise their children in an inclusive society; it is not a place where they can easily obtain refugee papers. What I discovered in the analysis of Congolese presence in Cape Town in South Africa is that their migration and thereafter the process of their mobility has barely changed, because of several obstacles they face due the African National Congress’s (ANC’s) restrictive measures towards the influx of immigration in the country. Because of the new immigration policy legislation and the high level of unemployment, many of Congolese choose to leave the city.

Several data sources were used to identify the reasons for the Congolese immigrants leaving the country, including the Trauma Centre, a human rights organisation specialising in the healing of survivors of violence and torture. The Trauma Centre indicated that it was daily receiving an increased number of Congolese migrants in need of help travelling to Europe, Canada, USA, China
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The 2014 South African statistics showed a total fall of over 35 per cent Congolese into Cape Town from the previous years or 22,241 immigrants in 2014, compared to 28,840 in 2010.

**The Department of Home Affairs and Documentation**

I had difficulties in obtaining my citizenship; amongst them were my documents which disappeared from the Department of Home Affairs at least three times and lack of communication between Home Affairs officials and the Police Department in terms of police clearance. Most Congolese car guards expressed deep troubles with the legal system at the Department of Home Affairs; none of them have had a pleasant experience. Many of them renew their papers every two to six months. This has a serious impact on their income earning, as they spend each day standing in long queues in order to renew their documents, often leaving without being served or being given an appointment. Queuing at Home Affairs means being absent from work and therefore not making an income.

Furthermore, a refugee is required to travel to Pretoria or Messina to renew the refugee papers, where they must pay an amount of R2,500 as transport fares, while those who cannot afford to renew are subject to arrest and detention. This is all due to some immigration officials’ attitudes and poor service delivery. As Justin explained: ‘I have a problem in renewing my refugee document I used to travel every to Musina to renew my paper, but due to cost, responsibility and family commitment, it’s becoming difficult to travel. I need to spend at least R1,500 to go. I realised that I cannot do it, I refuse to go renew my paper, so now that I’m talking to you, I am illegal.’

There is also arbitrary rejection of refugees, where the Department of Home Affairs grants a ‘Must Leave Status’.5 Luyeye was assigned this status: ‘I have been in the country for the past three years, but early this year I was given Must Leave. I am illegal and frustrated and thinking of going to get refuge in other country.’ Not only are informal foreign workers vulnerable because they are unprotected by law, they have also become susceptible to arrests, deportations and harassment due to the inconsistency at the Department of Home Affairs (Bemstein 2003).

The 2014 report by the Scalabrini Centre Cape Town (an NGO that offers basic assistance to refugees by providing food, clothing, shelter, counselling and English language teaching) observed that the number of Congolese who were seeking such basic assistance had decreased, because many of them have now left the city.

In addition, the Department of Home Affairs provides statistics on documented immigrants in South Africa. Department staff members explained
the difficulties they experienced to determine the number of Congolese migrants in the late year, for various reasons. Even the Congolese High Commissioner to Pretoria (October 2014) defended that 18 out of 60 (30 per cent) of Congolese received a month to be granted a travel documents, of whom around less than five Congolese have acquired the permanent residence document per year. One could point out that this number is very low due to the South African proficiency conditions policy, mostly for the African migrant applicants.

*Language Barriers and Uncertainty*

Being a francophone refugee in a foreign country poses a few problems, especially where the issue of language is concerned. Due to language barriers, refugees are not able to find appropriate jobs, such as production workers in the manufacturing sectors, or to get admission to tertiary institutions, where English and Afrikaans are mainly used as educational languages. This also creates barriers to communicating with the local community. Because of the language barrier, a substantial number of refugees must tell their stories in languages that have to be translated by an interpreter. Sometimes they provide crucial contextual information which might be misunderstood or disqualified as irrelevant. To overcome this challenge, it is imperative for francophone refugees to learn South African languages, which I was compelled to do with a lot of anxiety.

Barna (1994) stresses that anxiety is among the main obstacles when a person does not know what to anticipate and so one tends to focus on one’s feelings instead of the actual event. However, the inability to explain the other’s attitude, feelings or behaviour comes from uncertainty (Gudykunst and Hammer 1988). Gudykunst and Hammer (1988) refer to anxiety as the feelings of being nervous, overwrought, troubled or apprehensive.

I was uncertain about my future and many of the Congolese I interviewed seemed to be anxious and uncertain about their futures too. Neuliep (2014) argues that if uncertainty is reduced when two people from different cultures meet, then the level of miscommunication and misunderstanding will also reduce either before or after the interaction with that individual. For example, during field work, I was first introduced to the Congolese car guards, most of them were reluctant to talk to me, but when I changed the communication from English to Lingala, they were anxious to know who I was. In most cases, it is through anxiety that people make mistakes and behave awkwardly. Anxiety has induced a lack of confidence in most Congolese car guards I spoke to and limits their interactions with others. Being illegal and trying to survive in the country causes much uncertainty and anxiety among these men.
Stereotyping and the ‘Outsider’

As a car guard, my repertoire has led me to a new identity as an affiliate of ‘foreigners’ in South Africa and to see myself as an ‘outsider’. An ‘outsider’ is a general status given to a ‘non-citizen’, ‘alien’ or ‘stranger’ within their host communities. During that period, I observed patterns of prejudice and stereotype in the communication taking place between me and South Africans. For instance, it is a common belief that the more eloquently one speaks and communicates in English, the higher the moral ground one occupies and more civilised one is. It is also believed that someone from Africa who cannot speak or communicate efficiently in English is poor, uncivilised and uncultured and is of lower moral ground. These are common stereotypes and social constructions that we get from the media; these stereotypes tend to shape the way that we look at the world and individuals we encounter.

The negative stereotypical views of the ‘outsider’ have emerged and, to an extent, are maintained because of the lack of adequate communication between insiders and outsiders. This lack of communication or the attempt to know or understand the plights or intentions of the outsider has led foreigners to be imagined and re-imagined in ways that fuel negative images of them by their ‘reluctant South African hosts’ (Nyamnjoh 2006: 14). This logic, however, is not exclusive to South Africa (Geschiere 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff 2009; Wright 1998; Stolcke 1995).

Julius Malema, the chief commander of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), is an example of the current politics of exclusionary nationalism and citizenship. According to Malema, white South African descendants of Cecil Rhodes and Paul Kruger – the amakwerekwere of yesterday – are insider enemies. White South Africans themselves bear a history of exclusion as, during the Rhodes period, Afrikaners were amakwerekwere who left Europe and, once they were adequately naturalised, referred to the more recent entrance of British immigrants to South Africa as Uitlanders (‘outsiders’). Those obvious outsiders were then able to transform those native people into foreigners within the same country.

In March 2012, Helen Zille, the then leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA), referred to the people from the Eastern Cape province as ‘refugees’, therefore referring to forms of understanding people’s movement within the country. Yet, what remain continuously problematic, a point of contestation and questioning by those who claim indigeneity to South Africa is whether Zille as a white woman and descendent of amakwerekwere of yesterday with a status as, to some extent, an outsider within will ever become an insider. This creates a challenge: ‘Who is a real South African citizen?’
**Xenophobia**

In 2005 just three years before the 2008 xenophobic violence, I was ambushed on duty while working as a security guard in one of the buildings in Cape Town CBD. There was a worker strike that occurred that led to the ambush. I was very much aware that xenophobia has been under the skin for long time and it was nothing new and had only taken on a physical form on a large scale in 2008. Among worker’s concerns was the issue of the assumption that foreigners were taking South African jobs. Castle and Miller (1998) define xenophobia as the ‘irrational fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners, or what is strange or foreign’; its characteristic is often violence and physical abuse. The provocation of diverse responses from several parts of the population is mainly based on the emphasis of cultural differences, for example, in South Africa during the xenophobic attacks of May 2008 (*Cape Times*, 13 May 2008). Immigration has become a global revolution that is reshaping societies and politics around the globe. One of the most predominant difficulties most governments are facing is how to integrate foreigners into a host society (Lynn and Lea 2003), as immigrants and refugees are perceived as a danger to living standards, lifestyles and social cohesion. South Africa has been no exception (Campbell 2003). In a country that is known to have one of the most progressive constitutions in the world, xenophobia is a threat to the democratic principles of human rights and tolerance.

Xenophobic attacks range from name-calling, attacks against the homes and businesses of foreigners, and even violent attacks resulting in the death of foreigners (*Cape Argus*, 15 May 2008). Xenophobia stands in jarring contrast to the democratic principles that the new South Africa stands for and to the construction of a post-apartheid ‘rainbow nation’ (Sinclair 1998: 339). The attacks are completely counter to former President Thabo Mbeki’s vision of Africa as a unified continent on a quest to eradicate poverty and human rights abuses and to promote sustainable growth and development through regional and continental cooperation and integration (Mbeki 2001). Because of the xenophobic attacks dated 17 and 21 May 2008, today the largest proportion of the Congolese car guards can be found living in white or coloured areas.

Justin said he is supposed to be living in the township with his black brothers, but his black brothers are not friendly towards those from other African countries. He said sometimes they attack and kill foreign African nationals. He narrated how he had escaped the townships during the xenophobic attacks to live in the city with ‘white people’.

In South Africa, as well as Botswana, *Makwerekwere* is a common name or term used to identify African foreigners (Nyamnjoh 2010, 2006; Matsinhe 2011; Itmann et al. 2010; Sichone 2008). In South Africa, for instance, public narrative
refers any (black) African from outside of South Africa’s borders as the *Makwerekwere* or the ‘bogeyman’ (Matsinhe 2011: 295). In South Africa, the term has been used often when referring to African foreigners, irrespective of ‘being legal’ or ‘illegal’. Apparently, the term *amakwerekwere* is said to have occurred based on what foreigners’ speech patterns sound like to South Africans (McClendon 2010).

There are numbers of studies done in South Africa that look at the causes of xenophobia. However, these studies focus on the causes of xenophobia and ignore the roots that cause the hostility. The fact that many South Africans have not achieved the sense of national identity and are still experiencing racial discrimination and exclusion from economic resources is part of the problem. The situation becomes hostile if South African nationals who are struggling to survive perceive the refugees as job takers. The lack of access to resources results in violent actions. The main issue linked to problems with social integration can be traced back to the apartheid period. During this period, the system created division of classes and ethnic groups and made people suspicious of each other. This has continued to manifest even after 24 years of democracy. Thus, the lack of social integration can be regarded as one of the causal factors of conflict, violence and xenophobia in South Africa (Crush 2001).

**The Banking System and Stokvel as a Coping Mechanism to Save Money**

South Africa is a country that welcomes refugees, with asylum legislation that integrates all the basic values of a refugee’s right to work and to have access to a bank. However, refugees encounter many obstacles to enjoying these rights because of the lack of communication among public institutions and their refusal to recognise their permits as a result of irregularities in implementing certain policies related to refugees.

Most Congolese car guards I interviewed keep their money in the house because most of the financial institutions across the country deny them access to banking, compromising their livelihoods and safety. According to Patrick, ‘Personally, I don’t have a bank account number because I don’t have the right papers, then the banks give us problem. I keep my money in my house. What we do before going home, we try to change money to avoid walking around with coins in your pockets because of being attacked.’

The Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) are working together to regulate refugees’ needs, whereby the DHA provides banks access to people’s profiles to verify the authenticity of permits issued in terms of the Refugees Act (No. 130 of 1998). Despite this collaboration between the banks and the Department of Home Affairs, many
Congolese car guards still find it difficult to access basic banking services. Many car guards are being turned away from banks and if they are accepted to bank with any of them, once the permit expires the bank has the right to hold onto the account until proof of a new permit is produced.

The few Congolese who are legal or have their papers in order do bank their money and withdraw the whole amount before the expiration date of the permit, but many of them are involved in social clubs such as a Stokvel. Stokvels are like social clubs where Congolese car guards help each other in terms of monetary assistance, as well as social interaction. In a Stokvel, every month people contribute a set amount and take turns in receiving the funds from all members of the group. The history of Stokvel in South Africa is attributed to the legacy of apartheid where almost all black businesses in townships did not have access to the apartheid banking system, as there were no banks in the townships. Congolese car guards are using the same formula to assist one another financially due to the difficulty of accessing basic banking services. Verhoef (2001) argues that ‘there is no official recognition given to Stokvel in statistics which contributes to the underestimation of their importance both as savings institutions and as mechanisms of poverty alleviation and social advancement’.

**Social Network and Kinship**

What the car guards also have in common is their fighting spirit that allows them to negotiate access into different and frequently unknown social spaces for them to be visible in a social field, which shapes their identity and in the same way that it contributes to shape them as individuals. To get access to these fields, these car guards acquire new knowledge through kinship like I did. I had a friend from Rwanda who introduced me to car guarding. These car guards’ main challenge to succeed in their lives is to find ways to act out new knowledge and behave in ways that are acceptable within the context of local principles for respectable identities. The presentation of their stories focuses on aspects of life careers, with an emphasis on processes of negotiation. These car guards are faced with a dilemma between taking opportunities due to the lack of documentation, and many of them live with a high level of uncertainty.

Congolese car guards’ shared experiences of suffering in South Africa make them live in solidarity. Although they speak different languages, their new environment has forced them to come together using one common local Lingala as lingua franca. Each person wants to have a sense of belonging to a group. Rousseau et al (2004: 1099) state that: ‘For the Congolese, the family is the most highly invested form of social organisation. It evokes filiation, common places and property, but also a feeling of belonging that translates into affection,
faithfulness, cohesion and common defences against outside forces.’ Though social exclusion and experience, many car guards are forced to become more receptive to religion and actively involved in church activities. Networking is a means for many refugees of survival, acquiring skills, training and experience – improved livelihoods frequently depend on access to social and kinship and the kindness or generosity of others.

**Church and Sense of Belonging**

The main motivation and purpose of the church is to provide a sense of belonging for Christians who have newly arrived in the country, are still struggling to find their way and do not yet understand English. Most of the Congolese car guards I interviewed knew God already, but they needed a place of spiritual growth and fellowship. In the context of racism and xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa, the church is a favourable platform for the evangelism of these marginalised Congolese communities. French and Lingala serve as the language of worship and communication in this church. Church is a gathering of Congolese, including car guards, for prayer and to share the word of God. Congolese car guards are cognizance that the church belongs to God and it is a place for spiritual strength. Many Congolese car guards agreed with Prince, who told me that ‘It is only God who knows our sorrows and the pain we endure in this country.’

Edinburgh explains some critical issues that Christian communities in postcolonial contexts have to address throughout Africa and the world, such as ‘Xenophobia, suffering, racism, poverty, identity, gender and marginalised communities; Christianity and socio-political action; the interface of migration, HIV/AIDS, diaspora and ethnicity; and globalisation and the reproduction of hierarchies’ (Edinburgh 2010: 175). Edinburgh (2010) has in a broad context measured and treated the themes that covered the critical issues in today’s globalisation. These issues are not only limited to the African continent but are happening in all continents.

**Identity as Determinant of Citizenship**

There is an assumption that human beings should be collected and discernible in one piece; if that is the case, then humanity will be a disappointment. As a human being, I never exist as one piece because of the composure that doesn’t allow me to be present everywhere at the same time – the omnipresent. People cannot have one face or identity; we have many facets. So, then, what is identity? Identity becomes situational; identity gives
relationships that mobilise what I need to be or what I need to bring to the fore. For example, there are ways that I mobilise certain sense from the repertoire of possibility of being. Wearing a car guard uniform in those days was a way to claim my identity as someone working on the street to sustain my livelihood. Identity cannot be monopolistic.

Thus, the legacy of polarisation of identity in South Africa is still affecting the communities, both local and foreigners. Many of the structures, political, social, economic and linguistic patterns, attitudes of separation that characterised the apartheid era remain vibrant and continue to shape the majority of the experiences of life in the post-apartheid South Africa. Due to my identity as a refugee I experienced discrimination at banks and while working as a car guard with refugee status and each of Congolese car guards interviewed have experienced discrimination at the workplace.

However one needs to draw a distinction between racism and racialism. Racism is based on status, on law but reinforced by the police and the courts, eventually by the army; whereas racialism is in fact when you and I discriminate against one another for whatever insubstantial reason and the fact that it is still very much of south African society is seen in BEE, affirmative action and also the outbreak of xenophobic violence that we currently experience. The xenophobia just consolidated that point that pulse of racism and racialism is alive and well, in fact, in South Africa. Racism prevent people from defining who they are.

‘Boundaries divide individuals and groups of people, but they can only do so if the groups so divided share a common belief about what criteria and what rituals constitute a boundary. People must believe that it is important to ‘be a South African’, ‘to be kwerekwere’, ‘to be a man.’ It seems that being human guarantees that some set of identities will always be important in some way. These identities overlap and often conflict with one another. They almost never correspond with other identities, however, in a way that would justify the belief that each ‘people’ has a uniquely different culture.’ (Thornton 1988: 27).

Jenkins (1996) states that identity is a negotiation between notions of self and how we are ‘read’ socially. For many people the way that they are embodied (gender/sex; phenotype; ability/abled) dictates the way that they are read, and it makes no difference how they would like to be in the world. If, however, Jenkins is correct in his statement then one can say we activate various layers according to the context we are in. This concept of identity can bring about debate and ask one to think of an instance where an identity layer was activated against one’s will? Can we as individuals think of an instance where one has activated an identity layer in resistance to the context? This is a time that we can all do a retrospection to think of some moments in our life when one has ‘felt’
his or her nationality. What did it feel like? What was the occasion? In addition to the above question is do we always identify as X nationality? Is our nationality always a relevant part of our identity?

Conclusion

The chapter has explained the subjectivity created by citizenship and mobility and challenges resonating in South Africa, using my own experience and that of the Congolese car guards. This chapter highlighted the challenge one encounters in being an outsider or *amakwerekwere* and how being an outsider influences people, and their perceptions of ‘our world’ and the people who live in it. The chapter demonstrates how society seems to expect people to conform, but when this does not happen, we instead tend to ask the others to change, whereas we should be changing our ideologies, behaviours and attitudes for the benefit of everyone. It further provided insight into how and why concepts of citizenship and mobility are challenging for them. Findings reveal that there is commonality between my experience and those of the car guards and it becomes difficult for a *kwerekwere* to live a decent life. Congolese car guards face many challenges, which may explain why these car guards are being deceived. This in turn makes it critically important for the reader to understand why some Congolese car guards find it difficult to access resources. This chapter, therefore, provides improved intensity of information on the car guard experience using the citizenship and mobility concept. When it comes to citizenship, people always tend to blame others who are real citizens, instead of trying to identify common ground of what make us human. This chapter is an original and perceptive study of issues that resonate in South Africa. As citizenship and mobility become a profound reality in the bodies of people in transit, citizenship, mobility, identity and belonging are subjected to stresses to which few societies have devised a civil response beyond yet more controls. It is therefore advisable that outsider undergo a course where they can learn the necessary skills for interpersonal benefits in a multiracial and multicultural space like Cape Town.

Notes

1 Names of participants: Justin, Luyeye, Prince, Robert, Yan, Patrick.
2 Singular form of *amakwerekwere*.
3 ‘*Tindikeur*’ is a Lingala name that comes from the word ‘*tindika*’ meaning to push or send (see also Atma 2004, p. 31).
An alloy is a combination of metals with another element. Alloys are distinct by a metallic bonding character. Examples of alloys are steel, solder, brass and bronze and they are used in a wide variety of applications such as jewellery and making of coin currency.

Meaning a person is undesirable and he or she must leave the country.

References


*Cape Times*, 13 May 2008.


Congolese High Commissioner to Pretoria (October 2014).


Refugees Act No. 130 of 1998.


Vesseling: Discursively Negotiating Citizenship and Belonging in Post-apartheid South Africa

Zuziwe Nokwanda Msomi

Introduction

In an attempt to understand how it is that the privileging of whiteness continues being produced and reproduced discursively, whiteness studies, which the larger PhD project is located within, have extensively explored what is referred to as white talk (Steyn 2003; Steyn and Foster 2008; see also Bonilla-Silva 2014; Conway 2016; McIntyre 1997). White talk has been defined as:

a resistant and flexible set of ideologically charged discursive strategies which attempt to perpetuate privilege into the new dispensation while paying careful attention to self-presentation (Steyn 2003: iii).

Elsewhere the same leading author in the field of whiteness studies in South Africa has defined whiteness as:

a set of discursive practices that attempts to manage the intersectional positionality of white South Africans to their greatest advantage, given the changes in their position within the society (Steyn 2005: 120).

Put plainly for the purposes of this chapter white talk is a way of talking (inclusive of what has also been referred to as discursive strategies, semantic moves, discursive tools across different studies in the field) which have the effect of reproducing racial domination and white privilege – albeit not necessarily always consciously (Steyn 2003; Steyn and Foster 2008; Bonilla-Silva 2014; Conway 2016; McIntyre 1997). White talk as is apparent from the definitions above has primarily been studied in connection to white people specifically. However, this chapter is particularly interested in exploring what can be learned about whiteness when we don't limit certain ways of speaking, acting and living to particular types of bodies. Are there possibilities, for example, of challenging and dismantling the privileging of essentialisms such as whiteness which continue to preclude full citizenship in social institutions such as higher education as discussed by the other contributor (Msakha Mona) to this
book which are not yet as apparent due to the focus on particular types of bodies? Rather than whiteness being stable, and fixed with bounded boundaries, is there for example, the possibility that part of the power of whiteness may be its very illusion of stability, fixedness with bounded boundaries? Perhaps through shattering the illusion of stability, and fixedness with bounded boundaries upon which exclusion and inclusion often rely within historically white institutions, the basis of exclusion from one of the key areas in which a citizen may take part in the society’s social institutions may begin to be shaken. Revealing the illusion for reality is assumed in critical theory work to open the way for social change as the power of ideologies relies on the illusion of stability, fixedness with bounded boundaries. When the basis of exclusion and inclusion is revealed as an ideological illusion it is possible then to begin to explore more inclusive forms of citizenship within South African higher education institutions – (i.e. full citizenship in feeling that historically white institutions are homes for all peoples in South Africa rather than some). The purpose of this chapter then is to begin to explore this shattering of this illusion and thereby open up space for discussions for more inclusive citizenship not based upon the illusion of stability, rigidness with fixed boundaries upon which exclusion relies. The chapter does this through the exploration of the discursive strategy of vesseling found to be present in the narratives of students’ descriptions of their raced experiences at a historically white institution.

This chapter aligns its conceptualisation of citizenship with that defined in the earlier chapters of this book. However, for the purposes of this chapter, there is reference to a participatory citizenship, a key component of which is the right of every citizen to freely participate in its key social institutions, including areas such as higher education. That is, as set out by Mbembe (2015), not just being able to attend the university, or be accommodated or assimilated into the institutional space but to feel that it is home, and one’s own as much as the next person’s. That is a place for everyone not only in reference to material aspects such as curriculum but the sense of whether one feels one belongs or not, can and does contribute to the institutional culture of the institution or not. A participatory citizenship as defined within the confines of this chapter means enabling all members of the South African citizenry to feel like the institution is a place for everyone rather than a place for those who are easily able to fit into historically white universities due to their successful white socialisation.

**Whiteness across Racial Boundaries**

White talk has often been researched specifically in regards to white people only due to the shift to the dominant group in the study of race and racism.
Bonilla-Silva (2014) is one of the few studies that explores white talk beyond white bodies only. Bonilla-Silva’s analysis of white speakers’ narratives finds white talk to be present not only in white speakers but also in black speakers’ narratives. However, he argues this similarity between white and black peoples’ discourses in speaking about race can be expected due to the hegemony of white discourse and ideology within racialised societies. Thus while he includes aspects of black speakers’ narratives in his analysis of how whites speak about race, these examples are primarily used to indicate that black people are not as vested in the protection and privileging of whiteness as the white speakers in his study. The examples of black speakers using similar discursive moves as white speakers, in other words, is specifically aimed to show how black speakers’ discourses are somewhat different in intention and investment in whiteness from white speakers rather than exploring the implications of similarity – as thin as these similarities may be. As correct as Bonilla-Silva may be as to this similarity being due to the hegemony of whiteness in his dismissal of the similitude, and perhaps even in the assumption in that whites are not as vested in protecting white privilege, the dismissal also arguably does not enrich understanding of whiteness beyond what has extensively been written about in white studies literature. Rather, it merely enforces what is already known about whiteness, i.e. that whiteness is powerful, and that white people benefit from and protect whiteness. Moreover for the purposes of this chapter, the dismissal does little to challenging and dismantling the essentialism and boundedness upon which whiteness relies upon for almost exclusive rather than participatory citizenship as discussed in the introduction section above in regards to higher education in South Africa. While not disavowing the work of Bonilla-Silva and others, the chapter does however pose the question of what would happen if these similarities in the way that whites and blacks speak about race are explored. Rather than dismissing the similarity – albeit it small, this chapter rather suggests that these spaces of similitude may be spaces of conversation and exploration for further gleaning of possibilities for disintegrating and dismantling the ideological power of whiteness, and thus the basis for full citizenship within higher education institutions.

Alongside research such as that of Bonilla-Silva which focuses on white people in our attempts to understand whiteness, there is however also research that has turned to primarily focusing on the social construction of whiteness. Research such as that by Twine (1997) reveals that there are social aspects or indicators of whiteness – lifestyle interests, language, socio-economic wealth, for example – that are not limited or associated with the white body only (see also Bashkow 2006). Twine’s (1997) research on young women of Asian and African descent who have acquired white identities argues that socialisation
plays a key part in creating racial identities. These ‘Brown Skinned White Girls’ as Twine (1997) refers to them are treated and considered no differently from their white peers as they share the same interests and lifestyles. If whiteness is produced through socialisation as research on whiteness indicates then these young women of Asian and African descent are white – except that they are darker skinned than their peers who have physical features associated with whiteness.

This process of socialisation is made possible by sharing the same physical and socio-economic position alongside their white peers: middle-class predominantly white suburbia and schooling. Twine’s (1997) paper then suggests that whiteness is not limited to phenotypical essence as is often implied by the focus on white peoples in much whiteness studies research. More importantly, Twine’s (1997) paper takes seriously that whiteness is a social construct that may be acquired across racial boundaries due to socialisation rather than innate phenotypical essence. The point here is not to suggest that race does not matter, nor for that matter that whites and blacks are treated exactly the same in racialised societies. Rather the point is how do researchers begin to challenge the core logic of whiteness through the centuries: the illusion of the stability, fixedness and boundedness, and essentialism of whiteness upon which it relies for exclusion for what has been described here as participatory citizenship. One of the ways that has long been ignored in whiteness studies literature is to explore the possibility of insights being provided in spaces of similarity. This chapter therefore contributes to the limited work in whiteness studies such as that by Twine which takes seriously that whiteness is a social construct – by not needing to explore whiteness specifically in connection to the white body only.

Within South Africa, whiteness studies have had increasing nuance. However, studies have taken a similar stance to Bonilla-Silva by focusing on white bodies as primary informants on whiteness. Broader race studies, however, such as the early work of Walker (2005), and Dolby (2001), provide further evidence that race in general in South Africa has long been moving beyond strict apartheid era constructions of race to include for example lifestyle and interests. While these studies importantly looked at racial construction across white and black discourses, and started to explore race beyond phenotypical essence the two studies none the less do not push the boundaries of how race is constructed and understood as much as Twine’s study does – taking seriously that whiteness is a social construct beyond the apartheid era categories that bind race to particular types of bodies. Moreover the focus of the aforementioned studies continues to be difference, rather than an
exploration of how similarities may possibly challenge the idea of particular types of bodies providing key information on whiteness.

Of Vessels and Containers, and Socialisation

Bodies exist on the physical, material plane in as much as they also exist on the social plane as has already been implied in the discussion of Twine’s work (1997). That is, bodies are both phenotypical essence – those physical features associated with whiteness, blackness etc. in as much as they also have social aspects or indicators associated with whiteness, and blackness. While the physical body cannot be changed (excepting the use of skin lighteners, and tans, surgery, etc.) the social aspects or indicators of whiteness are not as limited to the physical plane (Twine 1997) (see also Bashkow 2006). Rather, bodies, in light of the insights of Twine’s work may be envisioned as containers or vessels, which can acquire different types of contents informed by the process of socialisation (Warnier 2007a, 2007b). Thus one who has the physical features of a white person may be socialised Chinese or for that matter African American. Similarly, Twine’s (1997) study of ‘Brown Skinned White Girls’ reveals how young women of Asian or African descent may be socialised as white due to the spaces they occupy – predominantly white middle class neighbourhoods and schools. The internal contents of the body are therefore determined by the environment enabling a specific type of socialisation rather than being pre-determined by the type of vessel (i.e. phenotypical essence). Thus it is that ways of speaking and acting need not necessarily be bound to particular types of bodies – including discursive strategies.

It is this social aspect of whiteness that allowed the British Empire to spread as the social aspects were used to bolster whiteness where there were limited numbers of white people in the colonies. Macaulay’s (1835) ‘Minute on Education’ for example is particularly worth mentioning in this regard. Educated in the same elite English universities as their white peers to understand all things English as superior, the British education policy created a class of British Indians – English in every way but phenotypical essence – to further the interests of the British Empire in India (Reilly 2016). This creation of British Indians would be critical for indirect rule for the British. This policy alongside the work of authors such as Twine (1997) suggests that vessels (used interchangeably with envelopes or containers) socialised in the same space may have the same content – regardless of what the container or vessel looks like from the outside. This suggests then, that aside from phenotypical essence socialisation is a key aspect of not only the construction of whiteness, but one of the key ways through which whiteness is bolstered within racialised societies.
beyond phenotypical essence. This enables whiteness to be connected to both phenotypical essence in as much as a social construct. These two aspects provide differential means to claim access to power, opportunity and privilege depending on the context, and speakers’ own access to the aforementioned.

**Explaining the Theory of Socialisation?**

Bourdieu provides some insight into how the process of socialisation may create what Twine (1997) refers as ‘Brown Skinned White Girls’. Moreover Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and field also provide insights into how one may take action that has wider social implications beyond the speaker’s conscious reckoning. Bourdieu argues that the individual’s action is informed by the capital, and habitus held by the individual. Habitus refers to: ‘a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures’ (Bourdieu 2013: 72). Elsewhere habitus has also been defined as ‘deeply interiorised master patterns’, ‘mental habit’, ‘mental and corporeal schemata of perceptions, appreciations, and actions’ (Swartz 1997: 101). Human beings are born into groups that occupy specific places or structural locations – whether it be social, political, racial, economic locations (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant 1992; Sullivan 2006; Swartz 1997).

Through early socialisation children learn not only what it means to be black, white, etc. but also what is possible and associated with particular types of bodies within racialised society. Not only is there learning of race in regards to phenotypical essence but also of social aspects of what it means for example to be white, as defined by Twine. Socialisation provides an internalised map of how to navigate the social landscape to pursue the best possible outcome within a competitive and unequal society.

The concept of habitus also implies that systems of inequality and oppression are not always due to deliberative conscious action but rather guided by internalised maps of what the world is like. Ever carrying this internalised map of the world, actors pursue their interest as best as they can to attain the best outcome for themselves. However, individuals may not always be aware of their pursuit of the best outcome as they negotiate the world around them may have wider social implications (Swartz 1997; Wetherell 2003).

In addition, actors will often have to acquire the capital valued in a field or game in order to be heard or seen – even if it is to disagree or disband the game (see Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant 1992; Swartz 1997). This acquisition of recognised and valued capital in order to play the game however paradoxically reinstates and legitimates the game itself as it implies that the game and capital is worth having. Those who enter the game, but complain about the rules of the
game, the game itself or even the capital required thus find themselves producing and reproducing that which they do not necessarily agree with in order to be seen or had within the game. This implies that speakers do not operate in vacuum but within a larger socio-politico landscape, and within a historically white institution. If students are to attain the desired degree, and its associated access to privilege, opportunity and power then this requires to some extent acquisition of recognised capital within the historically white institution. With varying degrees of access to the capital recognised and valued within the institution, this means varying degrees of success dependent upon successful socialisation with white students or access to the most amount of capital associated with whiteness.

What for Stability and Rigidness in Whiteness?

If whiteness may be defined at least partly by its social aspects or social indicators such as interests and lifestyles as suggested by Twine’s study, then there must be other reasons for the reification of whiteness – that is whiteness as understood as being connected to the white body only and thus fixed, stable and bounded.

Reilly’s (2016) study on racialisation reveals that whiteness reified to being about phenotypical essence (i.e. stable, fixed and bounded as the grounds for full citizenship) is a product of wanting to claim or preserve access to social goods to the select few. In England, the segregation and racialisation was defined by class. With the spread of the empire to South Africa, and thus a larger cheaper labour source, racialisation became connected to phenotypical essence. This would ensure that black and whites did not align together in their common struggle of poverty against the few wealthy elites in South Africa. The creation of race – including whiteness – has always been about exclusion and limitation of social goods to a select few, the boundaries of which may shift to be social aspect or indicators as much as phenotypical essence dependent upon the context and location of the speaker. At times, as revealed by Reilly (2016), this may require construction of race as being connected to phenotypical essence, and at times not necessarily connected to phenotypical essence but rather social indicators such as wealth, or lack thereof.

Concerns for Belonging in South Africa

The production and reproduction of race – in particular whiteness has been revealed to historically be about preserving privilege, opportunity to a few – using phenotypical essence, and at times social aspects or indicators of whiteness
(Macaulay 1835; Reilly 2016). As the socio-political landscape has shifted to allow black people into spaces that were once the preserve of whites only, the meaning or indicators of whiteness have increasingly become more complex in postcolonial, post-apartheid South Africa (Nyamnjoh 2016) (see also Dolby 2001; Walker 2005). Social indicators of whiteness such as wealth, lifestyle interests and ways of speaking, for example, are increasingly not limited to the white body only. The boundaries of whiteness in this sense have become increasingly blurred (see for example Dolby 2001; Walker 2005). So blurred are these boundaries of whiteness that when one does not know the phenotypical features of the person on the other side of the telephone one may easily mistakenly assume that they are speaking to someone who is white when this is not the case (see for example Burton 2009).

The power of whiteness lies in the allure it promises those who invest in the aspects often associated with whiteness (Nyamnjoh 2016; Ignatiev 1995; Martinot 1996). Like a good magic trick, the investment in aspects associated with whiteness promises access to privilege, opportunity and power which is limited to a few people only. In the competition for limited resources in democratic South Africa, where survival is often about how well one was able to acquire the markers and indicators of success (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 1–2), the issue becomes how does one use those indicators one has acquired in comparison to another who might have the same, less or more of the markers or social indicators to claim the biggest right to access to the limited power opportunity and privilege. This claim and competition for limited opportunity, privilege and power does not take place in a social vacuum but rather within a larger socio-politico landscape where race continues to be an important aspect of claiming and negotiating the rights of citizenship and belonging in South Africa (see Matthews 2011; Nyamnjoh 2006).

For white South Africans the pursuit for the best possible outcome occurs against the need to carefully negotiate increasing criticism of white privilege and the historical association of whiteness with oppression and unearned privilege (Steyn 2003; Steyn and Foster 2008). Young white South Africans, unlike their parents not only have less of a connection to the metropole, but without laws and politics to enforce and inform the white identity they have to be nimble-footed enough to be both white and African (Matthews 2011; Nuttall 2001). There needs to be a careful balance between recognising and problematising unearned white privilege on the one hand, but not extending this recognition and problematisation to the extent where one’s belonging in post-apartheid South Africa is completely undermined on the other hand (see for example Matthews 2011; Nuttall 2001). There is also the reality of being within a historically white institution where in order to successfully negotiate and fit into

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the institution requires holding some aspects of whiteness.

For black South Africans, in a society where whiteness is beginning to be blurred enough for black political elites to be constructed as white boers and thus open up space for racialisation rather than blackness as essence only (Goebel 2015: 173), blacks who are socialised white have to carefully balance ambitions associated with whiteness while also being nimble footed enough to not be labelled white in a climate where whiteness due to its historical association with oppression and unearned privilege is being increasingly critiqued. Here also, there is the reality of being within a historically white institution where in order to successfully negotiate and fit into the institution requires holding some aspects of whiteness.

However, even as some are able attain to some aspects of whiteness, whiteness defined and limited to phenotypical essence creates frustrations at the exclusivity of whiteness – especially when one has invested in, and acquired the indicators of whiteness as a black person (Nyamnjoh 2016). Citizenship then is not simply being born in South Africa, but bears with it the complexities and nuances of attempting to prove and claim ones belonging and citizenship informed by history, the current socio-politico landscape and the context within which full participation is sought, and the means which people have to participation in the aforementioned context. Using vesseling this is further explored below.

Findings

The data revealed that students use a discursive strategy that is referred to in this chapter as vesseling. Borrowing from Warnier's (2007a, 2007b) concept of the human body as a container for social meaning and properties, students decanted what they perceived to be too much proximity to whiteness in an effort to nimbly negotiate belonging in South Africa while also nimbly facing the reality that whiteness is rewarded and recognised in places that privilege whiteness such as within historically white institutions. Vesseling allowed students to dexterously and carefully balance these competing interests by constructing whiteness as partly distanced from the speaker, while not completely discounting or undermining the fact that they themselves need aspects of whiteness to succeed, and attain the power, opportunity and privilege promised by attaining a degree from the historically white institution. Specifically, through different indicators of whiteness for different speakers, vesseling allowed the speaker to limit the degree to which they may be implicated in whiteness while also allowing the speaker to recognise and decry the dominance of whiteness, and unearned white privilege.
As each speaker points to an aspect that he or she either does have or does not have in the quantities suggested by the speaker, this enables whiteness to always exist elsewhere. Where every speaker can always point to an aspect of whiteness they do not have, the chapter argues that whiteness is rather revealed to be a means to negotiate the best possible outcome for the speaker in the context of the changing socio-politico landscape, and the speaker’s location within a place that has been critiqued for privileging and rewarding whiteness. This suggests then, like the days of old, that whiteness is a resource to negotiate access to resources. However, in the postcolonial post-apartheid South Africa where racial boundaries are becoming more blurred, the positioning for access to social resources is ever more complex, and less bounded to phenotypical essence than it was under apartheid and colonialism. Citizenship in South Africa is then in reality ever increasingly complex, as speakers navigate both phenotypical essence and social aspect, to pursue the best possible outcome within a historically white institution where whiteness is valued, recognised and privileged.

Two interconnected aspects of vesseling were revealed in both black and white students’ discourses: firstly, whiteness as economic excess; and secondly, whiteness as social excess.

**Whiteness as Economic and Social Excess in White Students’ Narratives**

In many ways whiteness is associated with opulence and wealth and even today that still pretty much is the case anyway. So I’m thinking about it from that perspective.

Just like how especially guys and girls who came from elite private schools … they all seemed to act in the same kind of sort of culture, and those from boys’ schools and multi [racial] schools, that sort of kind of thing. That’s where I quite sort of noticed this whole bunch of white men being drunk, talking about rugby. That sort of stuck a lot. That was very white. (Andrew, white, male)

By defining the bounds of whiteness as being about economic opulence, marked by elitism and access to the best schools (private and multi-racial schooling), the speaker’s own possible complicity in whiteness is made less implicit. This is because the speaker (Andrew) has specifically defined whiteness in his narrative to be about that which he either does not have in his opinion, or that which he considerably has less of in his opinion in comparison to the bodies that he constructs as holding more whiteness: those who have attended elite private or multi-racial schools, and he associates with wealth and opulence.
These ‘opulent’ whites as indicated by their ‘elite’ private schooling sets the indicator of whiteness way beyond Andrew’s more humble positioning economically, and socially in relation to the elites. It is also these elites – who epitomise the institution’s drinking culture – that seem to have the power to not only enjoy the drinking culture but also truly revel in it as they have the economic means to. In this way Andrews creates some distancing from whiteness because of the way he has defined whiteness in the excerpt above. This is particularly pertinent for Andrew whose phenotypical essence is considered a physical marker of whiteness in South Africa, with its association with unearned privilege. While phenotypical essence cannot be changed, and indeed it may not be desirable to do so in a society that still rewards the association with whiteness the social aspects of whiteness provide a means of negotiating the interests of distancing, and the reward of whiteness within the historically white institution. Whiteness defined as excess is used to negotiate belonging in post-apartheid South Africa where unearned white privilege is being challenged as the basis of belonging. Yet as whiteness is still privilege, rewarded and necessary for one to successfully attain one’s degree, it is also arguably also necessary for Andrew to recognise the continued power of whiteness.

It is a dilemma that Josie similarly needs to negotiate.

I was on financial aid for the first two years of university and I was one of the few white students that I knew that were [on financial aid]. It was very clear that some races were more likely to have resources than others – race was a classed experience … (Josie, white, female).

This definition of whiteness as economic excess in relation to the speaker is also exemplified by Josie, who despite acknowledging her own whiteness, there is an implied limit to the degree of implication or proximity in whiteness in the indicators of whiteness as being about relative excess. Distance is made possible by the fact that she had less economic wealth than other whites. Where whiteness is defined by wealth and unearned white privilege, she on the other is slightly different, as she did not have access to the wealth other whites have. The point here is not to ridicule or disprove her whiteness but rather to highlight how systems of exclusion and inequality rely on ever-shifting sands and contexts – real as they are – to continue to produce and reproduce inequality. Whiteness in this way is produced and reproduced because it is flexible enough to stretch its borders to suit the speaker and context. The point for each speaker in a society based on competition is to seek the best possible outcome where people have been located in places within society.
This definition of whiteness as excess privilege in comparison to the speaker is also mirrored by Desire.

but I didn’t find Rhodes to be this happy little bubble where you just came and you were completely independent and you didn’t have to pay for anything. Like I worked throughout university, funded myself” (Desire, white, female).

Similar to Josie, Desire limits her proximity to whiteness by pointing to her having had to work to put herself through university. This differentiates her from the common sense understanding that whites are wealthy. Rather she had to work for what she has, and thus the implication is that there is no unearned white privilege here (i.e. in her case). Whiteness once again is carefully mediated between the distancing from whiteness to some degree while also being within an institution that has been criticised for privileging and rewarding whiteness. In addition there is the need to negotiate the association of whiteness with unearned privilege on the basis of physical features.

When I say a culture of whiteness – it is drifting with labels, it is driving an expensive car … I mean I didn’t have a car … people who had cars will go to Port Alfred for the day, or go to P.E for the day. Or if you had a friend who had a car, you could get out, that is what people like to do, you could go buy McDonalds. It enables you to do so much more. I say all of this because I couldn’t do things but it was seen as an aspirational item. You wanted that car because it enables you to do other things (Betthany).

Like Josie, Betthany is critically aware of her white privilege. However this acknowledgement is also limited in how she defines whiteness as it also enables some distancing from whiteness. Whiteness when defined by access to a car specifically symbolises more whiteness than that which Betthany holds as she explicitly states that she does not have a car. The car invokes mobility and freedom associated with whiteness (see Bashkow 2006) that Betthany does not have. In this there is some distancing from whiteness while not necessarily undermining the fact that she is located within and must attain a degree from the historically white institution and what some claim continued privileging of whiteness, and its promise at graduation of power, opportunity and privilege.

It is also worth noticing here that indicators of whiteness need not necessary be limited to economic markers of excess but social excess as well: from having economic means (i.e. a car) to social means – freedom, and mobility. In this, whiteness is defined not necessarily just by the car that Betthany does not have, but whiteness is also defined by mobility, and freedom associated with being
white which in the construction of her narrative she did not have (Bashkow 2006).

Indicators of whiteness as defined by relative access to wealth and social capital are not limited to white students only. Importantly, like the white students, how whiteness is defined in the narrative is also connected to a degree of careful negotiation between needing to navigate the historically white institutional space and, some claim, is the privileging and rewarding of whiteness, while also not placing oneself in the undesirable position of being implicated in whiteness in a society where unearned white privilege has been increasingly challenged and critiqued. For black people in South Africa, there is also the pressure of not all being black enough to belong in South Africa as Nyamnjoh (2016) warns in regards to the position of the South African black who has acquired social indicators associated with whiteness.

**Whiteness as Economic, Cultural and Social Excess in Black Students’ Narratives**

My experience at Rhodes was less about race, but more about class. I found that, especially in residence, one’s experience was determined by one’s socio-economic background for instance. [One] spent some time with whom they shared similar socio-economic realities with’ (Lindani, black, male).

Lindani defines whiteness to be about one’s access to relative wealth (i.e. class) and its associated interests and markers. While it is socio-economic background specifically that is mentioned here – the importance is what the socio-economic background provided access to the social, cultural capital that is valued within the historically white institution. Parents who have sufficient economic capital to enable access to schools, neighbourhoods and lifestyle interest which are valued and recognised within the historically white institution. This in turn allows access to social and cultural capital valued not only by the institution but amongst primarily white peers as well: who could similarly fit into the Rhodes University or not due to their access to social and cultural capital. This turn to intersectional positionality in whiteness studies literature has been interpreted as enabling some distancing from race in whiteness as the discussion moves from the focus on race to class (see Kruger 2016; Moon 1999 in regards to the race–class negotiation). In this instance, for blacks who may be perceived to be too close to the proximity of whiteness there is a need to negotiate what apparently is the presence of the black body within the institutional space that is often understood as a white space; and moreover the extent to which some black students are able to feel so at home within the institutional space that are
also able to successfully form friendships with white students. For the black South African this may potentially require explanation of how this relative inclusion in whiteness is possible without necessarily losing traction to the claim of blackness, as the speaker is clearly phenotypically black. This is made possible by constructing and understanding whiteness to be more about relative access to wealth (i.e. ‘class’, ‘socio-economic background’, ‘similar economic realities’). Race becomes less salient, and through this some distancing from whiteness is achieved as the discussion shifts from phenotypical essence to class. South Africa is still highly racialised where white privilege is not only critiqued, but in essence continues to be important to define one’s legitimate belonging in post-apartheid South Africa (Matthews 2011); and the degree of access to privilege, opportunity and power. As the country has a capitalist economy however, issues of class and merit, though highly contentious, are more acceptable as grounds for differentiation than race. Thus belonging as a black person within a historically white institution is explained by the turn to the topic of class, socio-economic background that is potentially less polemic than race – even wealth in reality is racialised in South Africa. Thus belonging is negotiated to be more about socio-economic background; whether one has acquired the ways of doing things in the institution that will allow one to succeed and thrive. This turn to merit and class has also been found in what has been described as white people’s discursive moves to protect white privilege. What is often described, as white talk may thus also be present – albeit in talk which is not connected to the white body specifically only. It may indeed point to the power of white ideology. However it is argued here that it is also unintentionally connected to the need to carefully negotiate the socio-politico landscape, being at a historically white institution while also pursuing the best possible outcome for the speaker.

… I’m supposed to shape up and behave in a certain way in order for me to gain acceptance or adapt to a space. It wasn’t something overt, I can’t say that someone called me a kaffir or someone did something offensive related to race, but the feeling of being in a space where you have to conform, you have to behave a certain way, you have to interact with people a certain way, including fellow black people …’ (Edwin, black, male).

Even among other black students in the university, those that exhibited a style that was accommodated by fellow white students tended to be closer to them than us. You would not be comfortable either with them because they would see you in no different way than the white students (Lethu, black, male).
The careful negotiation of being black enough while also being in a white institution is also apparent in the excerpts from Edwin, and Lethu above. Unlike Lindani, however, the careful negotiation is from the position of feeling excluded and alienated within the institutional space rather than explaining his relative success as Lindani does. Whiteness here is defined in terms of having the social skills or capital to move and act in certain acceptable ways within the historically white institution – that which the speakers clearly did not have due to not fitting into the institutional space. Yet, as pointed out earlier on in the chapter, to be within the historically white institution and successfully acquire one’s degree (as Edwin does) requires some assimilation. Thus while the speakers point to other black bodies that have assimilated; they in turn are also arguably forced to assimilate – to attain some markers of whiteness in order to successfully graduate. However, as this is a form of forced assimilation in order to attain success within the historically white institution the focus on other bodies’ assimilation enables the speaker’s own careful negotiation between being at a historically white institution, while also retaining traction in the black identity. Moreover the focus on how other black bodies are able to assimilate as defined by excess economic, or social and cultural capital, is not similarly followed by reflexivity on how the speaker was able to navigate the institutional space to attain his degree (despite being a more alienating experience than others). In other words other means through which one is able to acquire the capital needed and recognised in order to attain the degree may go unchallenged. Ultimately, the recognition, and valuing of whiteness within the institutional space necessitates some acquisition of the recognised capital in order to attain the degree.

The point here is not to blame blacks for assimilation or for that matter to martyr whites – even when they acknowledge their whiteness. Rather it is to explore the way that means of exclusion such as race co-opt and thus continue to be produced – in all its undesirable variants – including the ability of ideology to work across racial boundaries.

I know there were some people that didn’t feel comfortable there, you know, but I think also it all has to do with how you grew up and where you grew up, you know, for example like I had a friend who grew up in the township and she felt like Rhodes University was just not for her (Goddess, black, female).

My experience of Rhodes University was not raced in any way. Just to give a brief background of myself. I grew up in a multi-racial community and went to a multi-racial school. As a result of that for me being around people of different races makes no difference to me (Lifa, black, female).
The issue for the speakers in the excerpts above (Goddess, and Lifa) is that there is still a game to be played – one is located within a historically white institution where certain forms of capital are recognised over others. Rather than race per se being an issue it is whether one has acquired the capital necessary to succeed within the institution. In this way the polemic of race – being able to negotiate the institution being explained in racialised terms is avoided. Rather the more innocuous issue of schooling, neighbourhood become means of explaining the black body within the institution, and the successful negotiation of whiteness. In this there is some distancing from whiteness – as a means of explanation for successful negotiation of the historically white institution while also not necessarily failing to be cognisant and responsive of the fact that the student has to attend, achieve a degree from the historically white university.

**Conclusion**

This chapter explored how a discursive strategy referred to as vesseling may be traced to not only to white speakers but black speakers as well. The presence of vesseling in both black and white speakers’ narratives enabled closer analysis, and understanding of the function of whiteness as an ideology within South Africa’s racialised society. That is that whiteness as an ideology serves to limit social goods to a select few. In a competitive neoliberal society all are placed in competition to access the limited power, opportunity and privilege. Vesseling suggests that each speaker therefore must focus on those aspects of whiteness that will enable him or her to access the limited privilege, opportunity and power. It is arguably for this reason that speakers construct different markers of economic excess and social excess as indicators of whiteness.

Yet these different indicators of whiteness do not occur in vacuum but within larger society where whiteness is critiqued, and where being perceived as belonging in post-apartheid South Africa means distancing ones whiteness, and its historical association with unearned privilege and oppression. In as much as there is the need to distance from whiteness there is also the dilemma of being within a historically white university where whiteness is recognised and valued. Students arguably have to acquire some aspects of whiteness in order to attain their degree – that paper to provide access to the privilege, opportunity and power to a few. Not all have acquired or have in desired amounts the requisite whiteness but all need some aspects of it to attain the degree. In this dilemma students had to negotiate the distancing from whiteness and the reality of being within a historically white institution at the same time. The result was that each student pointed to aspects of whiteness they did not have – decanting some
whiteness as a means of attaining distance from whiteness. At the same time however this would – imperceptibly and unconsciously – leave intact the ways in which the speaker was forced to assimilate into the historically white institution as the speaker’s attention is not necessarily on the ways that he or she may have been co-opted into whiteness.

This chapter, however, is about citizenship, specifically what vesseling reveals about citizenship in connection to South African higher education institutions. The above insights suggest that at the heart of vesseling – as found in both white and black students’ narratives – is the suggestion that where citizenship is based upon exclusion and limitation, actors will in turn practise exclusivity and limitation as they are forced to jostle for the best possible outcome for themselves. Context will determine the form of jostling but exclusivity and limitation as the basis of citizenship invariably forces actors to not pursue and act in inclusive ways, but to pursue the exclusivity due to its value and worth in the society. Moreover vesseling bears within it the warning of assuming that only particular types of bodies can exclude. Systems of inequality rely on co-option in small minute ways – which include part of the need to negotiate the context to pursue the best possible outcome in a society where the access to privilege, opportunity and power is limited. As long as South Africans pursue the idea of exclusion being always the product of actions always elsewhere rather than co-option of all to varying degrees and benefits, an inclusive citizenship will continue to be ever out of reach, while inequality is reproduced. Full participation in key institutions such as higher education will continue to be a challenge, as the unconscious imperceptible ways in which actors are co-opted into the game of exclusivity remain occluded by focusing only on particular types of bodies as being sites of information and insight into how exclusionary systems continue.

Finally, while this chapter has focused on whiteness and historically white institutions as one of the means through which citizenship is limited, vesseling has bearing in terms of thinking about what other forms of exclusion which appear fixed, stable and bounded are actually in reality constantly shifting, and co-opting people in small unconscious ways to exclude and limit full participation in the institutions of the society.

Vesseling therefore suggests that there needs to be a rethinking of how citizenship is studied, and approached if it is to be made more inclusive and participatory: not assumed to be limited to particular types of bodies; and moreover, focusing at the individual level to explore the small unconscious ways in which people may be co-opted into ways of bounding and excluding rather than fostering inclusivity and full participation.
Notes

1 A term borrowed from Nyamnjoh re: being socially nimble enough to pursue across varying social boundaries or contexts in order to survive as best as possible. See (Nyamnjoh 2013) for further discussion of this concept.

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Chapter 13

Opening Up Academic Citizenship for Students from Previously Excluded Groups: The Case of a Foundation Course at the University of Cape Town

Msakha Mona

Introduction

I conducted this study at a time of crisis in South Africa’s higher education (HE) sector. The recent events and debates in universities between 2015 and 2017 have shown that participants are not content with the status quo, and universities have therefore been wracked by protests. A prolonged uprising, led by student movements such as #RhodesMustFall (#RMF) and #FeesMustFall (#FMF), has come to characterise the daily life of the university. What these movements highlight, among other issues, is the fact the universities are sites of contesting citizenship and representation. Among a number of issues raised in the protest, ‘students were [...] critically questioning the neoliberal policies and their erosive impact on their student lives’ (Ndlovu, 2017: 38).

The Humanities Education Development Unit (HUMEDU) programme in the Humanities Faculty has been particularly challenged by students. It has been accused of stigmatising disadvantaged students, since majorly black students from poor(er) socio-economic backgrounds are enrolled in the Extended Degree Programme (EDP). DOH1009F forms part of the Extended Degree Programme offered by the Humanities Education Development Unit (HUMEDU). The programme, which forms the focus of this study, seeks to provide academic support to South African students who were excluded during the apartheid period and who continue to experience the effects of coming from a background of second class citizenship.

I therefore wish to problematise the concept of inclusivity and decoloniality in the University, particularly in the faculty of Humanities. The purpose of this exercise is to assess and evaluate, as a case study, the EDP core course, ‘Dealing with Concepts in the Social Sciences’ (DOH1009F). DOH1009F attempts to engage with the challenge of recognition and inclusion of citizens who have been historically ‘othered’ in the curriculum. In assessing DOH1009F, I focus on the curriculum, particularly the textual aspect rather than the pedagogical act of teaching and learning. The latter may arise in addressing the textual analysis of the course.
The challenge presented by the students towards the HUMEDU, and DOH1009F in this case is that, as a site of education, it remains encumbered by issues such as whiteness. They acknowledge the efforts of the University to deal with the legacy of apartheid, but question the approaches that are being taken, and furthermore insist that there is still need to problematise the conditions within the institution. These leading questions that students argue will sustain this problematisation are: Into what environment, is the university providing access? Is their ‘blackness’ recognised as cultural capital in its own right? What recognition is afforded this blackness in the curriculum? How, more specifically, does DOH1009F work with its own contradictions – that of using race as its criterion for admission, when it is the very problem of race that it is seeking to respond to? Kessi and Cornell (2015) argue that the racialised environment at UCT, ‘left unaddressed […] creates the conditions for isolation’ of black students.

Through observation (attending some classes), reading the course material and interaction with students in the course, I sought to explore the extent to which DOH1009F opens up the space of academic citizenship to previously ‘disadvantaged’ groups of students. Moreover, by using DOH1009F as a case, I sought to examine the extent to which curriculum could be developed in ways that are socially, culturally and historically relevant to the society in which UCT is located and particularly to the students targeted for this course.

While UCT is a world-class university, it is situated in South Africa, a country that still faces major challenges with regards to diversity of culture, race, class and gender. As Mahmood Mamdani reminds us:

South Africa is not an industrialised European country, but a developing African country with a minority whose European living standards are at the expense of a majority whose living circumstances are more African than anything else. Yes South Africa is not Uganda, but it is certainly more like Algeria than Holland or England. For those who cannot do without a European parallel, it resembles more Hungary or Czechoslovakia, than it does any Western European country (Mamdani 1993: 13).

Following Mamdani’s caution, as the profile of students changes, so too must the institutions of higher learning. These institutions must lose their rigidities and traditions, and avail themselves to not only more inclusive student ratios, but in more inclusive courses where different epistemologies and identities are recognised and engaged.

The South African picture revealed by Mamdani is one that many black local students have experienced and continue to experience. While these students are
at UCT, they may be bringing a form of cultural capital that is not ‘valid’ in the Western world, the world that seems to inspire curricular choices at UCT. Therefore, Mamdani’s observation cuts across the issue of inclusivity.

Patric Slattery points out that just as the curriculum is affected by social conditions and values, so can the curriculum also help to reshape or preserve those conditions and values. The relationship between society and the curriculum is reciprocal (Slattery 1995: 36). What then is the relationship between society and the curriculum at UCT? While social influences are indirect, the university on the other hand, is in a direct position to reflect and plan how it can respond to and influence society. An obvious way of engaging with society and disadvantaged citizenship would be for the university to start with the very students in the classroom, for these students are from the society concerned and they bring with them issues that the society holds. If a student comes from a rural Swati society, they bring that rural Swati-ness as a form of citizenship with them. This could be an opportunity for the university to engage with the rural world; by creating an environment where the student can contribute his or her knowledge and experience without having to assimilate into the dominant cultural environment of the university.

I consider race to be a concept that has shaped human perceptions, interactions and a sense of their capabilities in Africa, particularly in South Africa. I seek to problematise race, as Leonardo has suggested, as ‘not a biological entity, but a social one […] what “it” [race] means, how it functions, its complex connections to other dynamics of differential power. All of this requires not simple slogans but disciplined and careful historical, empirical and conceptual analysis’ (Leonardo 2009: ix). It is imperative to understand how race has been used through colonialism and how it has become embedded in the curriculum in South Africa. I then sought to look at ways in which the curriculum can be understood and restructured. It is crucial to note that:

[Pedagogical reform as an important political and cultural tool, helping frame a moment in South African history in which traditional forms of authority, apartheid socialization, and racialized ways of understanding the world could be challenged and new potentially liberating alternatives could be explored as well as implemented within post-secondary institutions (Anderson 2002: 9).

DOH1009F stands as an appropriate case study as it caters largely for students who come from ‘previously disadvantaged’ groups. ‘Disadvantaged’ in this regard has a lot to do with race; hence the programme is designed to cater only for Indian, coloured, black and Chinese students. However usage of race remains problematic and challenged, as I will show later.

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Background to DOH1009F

UCT, formerly known as the College of South Africa as an educational institution was established in the colonial era in 1829, with the aim of realising colonial ideals which led to only white people studying or teaching at UCT (Ritchie 1918).

It is worth acknowledging, however, that while UCT today is not what it was in its earlier years (see UCT Equity Policy 2004), many (#RMF; #FMF) agree that there remain outstanding issues which require attention. It is, therefore, argued in this work that decolonial theory offers a useful framework for working with those elements of coloniality that are still present in the institution. Given UCT’s history as South Africa’s first institution of higher education, there is a need to confront the reality of its colonial genesis. Soudien makes the point that, ‘At the point of the unveiling of the formal education project, there is only one script, and that script is the Western one’ (Soudien in Pinar 2010: 22). Soudien’s argument is critical in dealing with coloniality in education, and if it is admitted that formal education still bears the marks of this colonial genesis, then the question of its continued presence in the contemporary university must be raised. It is this that makes DOH1009F important as a case study. If DOH1009F was created to correct the historical injustices perpetuated by the colonial education system, how successfully is it fulfilling its mandate? The study speaks directly to the institution’s battle with the question of curriculum relevancy. The course realises the need to be responsive to the targeted students. In this, it seeks to directly address the questions of the link between knowledge, curriculum, and identity – particularly racial identity. The course is perhaps taking a ‘decolonial’ approach in that it disturbs the traditional ways of curriculum formation. But how well is it doing this?

Considering that education is generally ‘a violent process involving the fundamental displacement of local knowledges and local identities’ (Soudien in Pinar 2010: 22), then the longer we live without reviewing and revising it, the more damage is done to the subsequent generations. It is precisely reasons such as these that motivated the establishment of a course such as DOH1009F. Academics behind the course were aware of the colonial origins of the university.

There is a growing awareness that UCT had to come to terms with the fact that it existed in South Africa and in Africa, in a reality which is very different from that of Europe on which the institution was modelled. In terms of this, as already noted above, the university has made progress in moving away from direct colonial approaches to actually address coloniality. However, whether this
has been done to the level where all members can feel included without having to assimilate into another culture would need to be examined.

A course such as DOH1009F presents itself then as an appropriate case study for understanding how the university is managing its commitment to change. While UCT needs more spaces to accommodate non-traditional forms of knowledge, this course is an example of such a space, as it centres on the identity of the targeted students.

DOH1009F deliberately encourages students to not take academic knowledge as a given, but to actively take part in the process of knowledge production. According to DOH1009F, students should therefore understand the following:

- A university is a place that makes new knowledge – a factory that produces knowledge rather than a supermarket that sells it
- Your lecturers are training you to be a person who can make new knowledge, not a person who repeats back the ‘facts’ they’ve been given in lectures or readings
- They are trained to be more critical thinkers, who question texts and ideas but use evidence to do so

(DOH1009F, 2015: lecture slides).

By making such an inviting statement to these ‘disadvantaged’ students, the course acknowledges that the students are not too ‘disadvantaged’ to be active participants in knowledge production. I argue that this qualifies as a postcolonial way of dealing with knowledge, in that the teaching approach does not impose fixed knowledges that the students must simply live by. Moreover, such an approach allows for power sharing between student and teacher unlike in a colonial approach where the boundary between master and servant is wide. In the current approach, the lecturer, who is white, shares power with black students. This means that the teacher is not all powerful, but approaches the task at hand as a facilitator who allows students to take charge of their liberation (education). Such an approach directly destablises colonial power patterns that might still exist in the educational process.

Decoloniality can simply be used as a lens to see how the university’s colonial past is impacting on current affairs in the university and in society. Therefore, decoloniality as a discourse simply offers one way of thinking about reformation, thus the challenge of inclusivity could still occur even if colonisation had not taken place.

It is popular to see ‘decoloniality’ being used alongside ‘Afrocentrism’, as I observed during the campus protests. The relationship between the two terms,
however, must be treated cautiously because to be ‘Afrocentric’ in curriculum may not actually lead to inclusivity. Africa is not a homogenous and uniform community. It is therefore unlikely that a perfect ‘Afrocentric’ curriculum can exist. In fact, it is possible to end up with a kind of colonisation by aiming for perfect Afrocentrism. There are parts of Africa that are more prominent than others, and such parts would most likely have more influence in the ‘African’ curriculum, thereby ‘colonising’ those parts of Africa that are not accounted for in the curriculum.

Data Analysis and Presentation of Findings

Introduction

This section brings to the surface the major insights gained from the study. The section will be broken down into different segments. The ‘analysis of course readings’ segment analyses the readings in the course using the aims of the course to explore whether the readings contribute to achieving what the course is set to achieve. The ‘choice of authors’ is to be read with continuation from the preceding section. This segment discusses whether the authors selected in the course contribute to decolonising the curriculum. ‘Multilingualism as a vehicle of inclusion and relevancy’ will discuss the role of multilingualism in the course; in shifting the power dynamics and allowing students to draw from their socio-cultural backgrounds. The segment, ‘does the ‘Africa’ matter in the curriculum?’ looks at the overall question of local relevancy and reflexivity with regards to the course being offered in an African university that operates on global standards. The analysis of class survey, lectures and interviews looks at how students and the lecturers respond to the course and to the questions raised by this study.

An analysis of course readings

It is worth noting that the course services students who are not sufficiently prepared academically. The readings in the first week of the course offer a quick guide and orientation for first time university students. The readings focus on helping students position themselves as active participants in the knowledge production process.

The readings are key in that ED students are likely to be first generation university students and might lack a strong sense of how the university functions as far as their learning is concerned (Boughey 2014).

Since the study has established that students’ socio-cultural backgrounds have an impact in their learning processes, Boughey addresses these challenges that are likely to be faced by first generation students.
The link between Boughey’s (2014) and Hutchings’s (2010) reading is worth noting, as both authors directly address issues that students are likely to struggle with upon their early encounter with the university environment. While Boughey focuses on the social aspects of the academic environment, Hutchings gives practical tools for students to apply when studying. Hutchings includes tips on how to cope with lectures by discussing things that students can do before and during lectures. Hutchings also provides guidelines on how to write an essay. With regards to writing essays, Hutchings encourages students to not simply repeat what they are taught, but to actively question what they are taught.

The ‘Essay Writing’ chapter (Hutchings 2010) also gives a detailed breakdown of steps towards writing an essay. For example, understanding an essay question is a step on its own, followed by planning the actual essay, among other steps. The chapter includes structural aspects of an academic essay, such as introduction, argument and evidence (p. 58). Key words in essay instructions are included (p. 67) in three languages (English, IsiXhosa and Afrikaans).

The chapter on ‘reading’ (Hutchings 2010) aims to equip students with various strategies towards reading. The reading highlights for students the need to consult sources based on purpose and subject. The different reading strategies are broken down: preview, overview and in-view (pp. 48–49). Hutchings’s basic reading fits in well in the foundation course. For, given the schooling backgrounds of most ED students, it is likely that these students may not have been properly equipped with reading skills.

The multilingualism in this reading is likely to be empowering for students, not only because it simplifies the learning process, but also because more students can ‘find’ themselves represented in the course material. This reduces the epistemic violence and displacement that is likely to result from alienating course material.

The academic orientation is continued in the second week through Seligmann’s (2012) reading, which contains the chapter on ‘Identifying Genres or Text Types in Academic Writing’. The reading equips students on the different genres that exist in academic writing. The genres covered include argumentative essay, research article and book review among many others. This reading is important in that it helps students prepare for their written assignments. Knowing the format for each genre means that students can have a checklist whenever they have assignments that fall within a particular genre. The reading equips students to look at text in terms of purpose, audience, context and message (Seligmann 2012: 34).

The Parker et al. (2003) reading, as the title suggests, is an introduction to the basic toolkits of Social Sciences. Parker et al. (2003) come in the second week of the semester, and the reading sets the foundation for introducing
students to the Social Sciences. Students are challenged to look at the interaction between the ‘five fundamental concepts’ (Parker et al. 2003: 5): individuals, nature, culture, action and social structure. This reading therefore gives a good foundational structure given that first year students may not have been exposed to the various Social Science disciplines, except in the basic education curriculum, the level of which is very different from the university one.

In the third week, Macionis and Plummer’s (2008) book, *Sociology: A Global Introduction* 5th Edition is introduced. From this book, the course uses those chapters that are key to the objective of the course. For example, the chapter on ‘Identity’ lays a good foundation in preparing students for the topics that follow in the course as identity seems to be at the centre of the course. This book therefore provides students with an academic framework on the sociological concept of identity.

The section on ‘Becoming social: the process of socialisation’ (Macionis and Plummer 2008: 208) also plays an important role, particularly in helping students deal with their socio-cultural backgrounds. Giving students the tools to understand the process of socialisation helps them make sense of who they are and equips them to tackle areas of identity that are usually naturalised, such as race. The section on ‘race and racialisation’ (ibid: 350) is another important aspect that lays a good foundation for what the course is all about. This section of Macionis and Plummer explains how biological features become markers of race, in an attempt to deconstruct this taken-for-granted phenomenon. The link between this book and Alexander’s (2013) ‘Thoughts on the New South Africa’ is that the latter offers a more practical and local illustration of the concept of race, by building on the theoretical foundation offered by the former.

Neville Alexander is used to lead the class in discussion around the issues of race and racialisation in South Africa. In the chapter, ‘Has the rainbow vanished?’ (Alexander 2013: 156), Alexander problematises how the institutionalisation of race in the new South Africa may be perpetuating what people were fighting against in the apartheid era (being forced to fall into a racial category and using such categories as basis of wealth distribution and so forth).

The chapter, on ‘Race in South Africa’ (Alexander 2013: 115), provides a brief history of race within the Southern African context. In this chapter, Alexander further touches on how Europe began to assume superiority over other nations. It is worth highlighting that before race was used as a main social categorisation factor, religion was employed (ibid: 117). This validates the call to move away from treating race as natural, as any other phenomenon could have been used. This chapter, I argue, should have come earlier in the course reader. This chapter continues to give an account of how race ended up being readopted by the new democratic dispensation in South Africa.
Moreover, Alexander highlights the shift in the usage of race within the socio-economic realm of South Africa (ibid: 129). This highlights the fact that race is less to do with biology and more to do with material access to resources, and therefore a type of lifestyle afforded by certain groups. Moreover the use of local phrases such as ‘umlungu’ (Alexander 2013) likely makes the text more accessible to the students.

Steve Biko comes in on the fifth week of the course. Given that the previous readings (Parker; Alexander; Macionis and Plummer) laid the foundation with regards to identity, socialisation and race, students are equipped with theoretical frameworks to read Biko. It is against that backdrop that the class is likely to comprehend Biko’s problematisation of race.

It is worth noting that Biko’s approach to writing is masculine and he mostly, if not always, refers to ‘man’ instead of ‘people’ or ‘humans’ in his text. In one of the classes students problematised this ‘sexism’. This also highlights that Biko is not sovereign and flawless, although he raises very valid issues.

Biko, in ‘We Blacks’ problematises how black people are stripped of their being, which echoes Fanon’s theory of ‘petrification’. He therefore writes to encourage black people to validate themselves on their own accord and not by imposed ‘white’ standards. Biko cautions against assimilation to whiteness, a copying mechanism that is also highlighted in Kessi and Cornell (2015).

In ‘The Definition of Black Consciousness’ (Biko 1978: 52-57) Biko echoes some significant parts of what DOH1009F seeks to do, as well as what this study has highlighted earlier; that race is not a mere factor of pigmentation. While blackness ‘is a reflection of a mental attitude’ (ibid: 52), Biko also argues that by identifying as black, one makes a commitment to a process of emancipation. Here Biko suggests that being black can come as a result of a choice towards resisting whiteness. While this suggestion is problematic given the fact that blackness is actually an imposed colonial identity, it does play an important role in boosting the self-esteem of those who have known themselves to be black. Therefore, it is appropriate then to argue that this definition of blackness allows for students of colour to embrace who they are, especially given that race has been one of the primary identity markers in South Africa. A critique of Biko’s approach to race is that he centres race as perhaps the main marker of identity, which might be a perpetuation of what was used to marginalise people in the colonial and apartheid eras.

Graaf (2001) and Feldman (2011) introduce students to the disciplines of Sociology and Psychology, respectively. In Graaf’s ‘What is Sociology?’, Students are introduced to the aspects that make up Sociology. While helping students understand Sociology before they choose their academic disciplines,
the reading also has the immediate effect of equipping students with the vocabulary that is generally used in the Social Sciences.

By using Feldman (2011), the course uses a particular aspect of psychology to introduce students to the discipline. Feldman’s reading only included the chapter on ‘Prejudice and Discrimination’. This reading builds effectively on the preceding readings in that it looks at stereotypes that are based on identities such as race, gender and religion among others. The reading explains how stereotypes can lead to prejudice against people who are categorised into particular identity groups. This is a necessary reading, especially in the context of South Africa’s diversity, where identity markers range across race, to religion, and to migration among others. South Africa has many examples of situations where people get discriminated against on the basis of their collective identities. For example, during the xenophobic attacks, people were discriminated against on the basis of being immigrants among other reasons. By providing students with a framework within which to understand the factors behind society’s behaviour in certain ways towards certain communities, the course enables students to engage with local issues.

The reading goes as far as providing a neuro-scientific explanation of the process of prejudice. This explanation looks at the amygdala, the structure in the brain that relates to emotion-evoking stimuli and situations. This is helpful in explaining why certain feelings towards particular groups seem to be deeply entrenched in people’s psyche. This reading concurs with the argument that race is a ‘constituent of the […] psyche’ (Winant 1994: 23).

Giddens (2002) is used to problematise the usually taken-for-granted concept of ‘tradition’. This is a concept that every student fairly grapples with in one way or another, given South Africa’s demographics. The reading teaches students that traditions are not natural and timeless. The reading provides lessons that students can use to engage with their communities. Given that there are instances where tradition is used as validation for the abuse of people, it is appropriate that students are equipped with the knowledge and framework within which to understand and problematise tradition. This reading is therefore a good example of socio-cultural relevance. The examples used in the readings, such as the Scottish kilt, might not be the most effective for South African students, but the principles remain applicable. Moreover, this reading fits in well with the theme of identity that is evident in the course, as tradition is a major part of how people identify themselves and their communities.

Hook’s (2007) Critical Psychology is used to take the universal discipline of Psychology and make it locally relevant, to South Africa and Africa. The reading does that by using Steve Biko and Franz Fanon who are concerned with psychological emancipation as a basis for external emancipation from racism.
and colonialism. The chapter chosen for this course, ‘Franz Fanon, Steve Biko, psycho-politics and critical psychology’ is adequate in as far as it fits in with the theme of the course.

This reading teaches students to critically speak on a topic by linking scholars who wrote on the topic; here Biko and Fanon do the interaction and help Hook articulate his argument(s). Moreover, the reading further criticises both Biko and Fanon in their alleged sexism. Here students are given an example of how to read and still apply one’s observation, and how one does not have to agree with everything one reads.

Reddy’s ‘Black Consciousness in Contemporary South African Politics’ (2008) further narrows the focus to the South African context. This chapter looks at how ideas of black consciousness have come to re-emerge in the post-apartheid South Africa. Although the main organisations such as Azapo, which were driven by black consciousness, have weakened, the reading traces the re-emergence of black consciousness in the new socio-political environment and among black middle class and youth (p. 85).

The reading also offers an account of how black consciousness was used in learning institutions to fight systematic racism and encourage the emancipation of black students. Perhaps this part of the reading becomes even more relevant given the recent events in South African universities. Students are then equipped with the historical background necessary to understand the call by recent student movements to ‘decolonise’ tertiary institutions.

Andile Mgxitama et al. (2008) complement Reddy’s reading extensively. Mgxitama et al. paint a picture of the current South Africa using the vocabulary of black consciousness, through which the socio-economic and political set up of the country is questionable. The reading problematises programmes such as BEE that benefit only a few black elites, without any effective transformation of wealth distribution structures. The reading argues that there is still ‘the black majority for whom the formal ending of Apartheid has not yet altered circumstances in any meaningful way’ (Mgxitama et al. 2008: 18).

The selection of readings in the course serves four purposes, as far as this study is concerned. First is that students are equipped with the practical tools to cope with the academic enterprise. Secondly, students are introduced to the Social Sciences as well as to Social Science concepts that are relevant to the African and South African context. Thirdly, the combination of readings, encourage students to critically engage with the authors as the readings speak to one another without necessarily always agreeing. Finally, the readings encourage students to bring in their local experiences and knowledge because of the localised nature of those readings by South African authors. However, the
contents of the readings speak to the need to open up the ED to the wider student population – non-ED students would also benefit from these readings.

**The choice of authors**

Students have expressed appreciation that the course uses mainly African authors. Following the argument that ‘epistemological decolonisation, as decoloniality, is needed to clear the way for new intercultural communication, for an interchange of experiences and meanings’ (Mignolo 2010: 31), the choice of African authors is in itself a political statement. A 20-year-old female student confirms that ‘The course had more African content and encouraged me to draw from my personal experiences’ (student interviews 2016).

However, the class survey indicates that some students find Biko to be problematic in the course. One student, responding to the question of what was found ‘least useful or interesting about using Biko’ (DOH1009F class survey, 2015: 6) says that ‘Biko speaks only about black and white people, which is understandable but doesn’t give an overall view of all South Africans’ (ibid). Such a comment suggests that the selection of authors needs to be representative of South Africa’s diversity, the possibility of which is a challenge. The lack of other authors, who complement the curriculum, I argue, does not detract from the positive role that the use of Steve Biko brings into the course.

It is worth noting that the number of students who responded positively regarding the usage of Biko is about three-times that of the students who responded negatively. Sixty-nine per cent (27 students) agreed that they ‘found it useful to use Biko’s *I Write What I Like* as a key text in the course’ (DOH1009F class survey 2015: 5). On the other hand, 15 per cent (6 students) answered ‘no’, while another 15 per cent (6 students) were ‘not sure’ (ibid) of how the reading was useful to them.

DOH1009F does not write off non-African authors, but the course tries to find a balance between the two worlds. Alongside authors such as Graaf, Alexander and Biko, the course uses ‘global’ authors such as Macionis and Plummer. This approach provides a platform for students to find the link between the kinds of epistemological approaches that exist. Moreover, the course is thus not encouraging students to reject non-African knowledge. Students are therefore protected against binary-opposition thinking, where one might have to choose either African or non-African knowledge.

The course ensures that students interact with both African and non-African authors by making both categories of authors requirements for the course assignments. This approach to author selection is effective in that:
The text is able to provide a perspective that centralizes and legitimizes the importance of black experience, it is able to work as a text that destabilizes the usual hierarchies of knowledge to which students are introduced in their first year of university (Morreira 2015: 11).

Multilingualism as a vehicle of inclusion and relevancy

It is noteworthy that the aim for DOH1009F to be socio-culturally relevant is thoroughly evident in the design and delivery of the course. In this course the convenor’s position regarding socio-cultural relevancy is visible. Moreover, the course encourages students to interact with the content at a personal level by breaking the language boundary. The following supports this assertion:

After the week’s lectures, tuts and reading, you are required to type up these concepts and define them IN YOUR OWN WORDS, in English AND, if English is not your mother tongue, in your home language (DOH1009F 2015: 9).

Such a task encourages students to really own their learning process. It would be problematic for students to ‘know’ a concept yet not be able to comprehend it in their home language. It is worth appreciating that there may not be a direct indigenous language equivalent for every single Social Science concept. However, this language approach is still justified if students are to be empowered to be comfortable in who they are.

Perhaps the sustainability of the multilingual approach would be problematic since there is no guarantee that there will always be a lecturer or tutor for every single language. However, this could contribute to the basis for an academic development unit to have multilingual teaching staff, especially if it is established that language is a significant part of the teaching and learning process.

Since the course deals a lot with the concept of identity, language is also relevant, given that South Africa is divided into language groups. The significance of language in a postcolonial university is also reflected in Mamdani’s (1993: 11) caution that ‘a linguistic curtain that shut the people out’ exists in a context where the university used a ‘language that the majority of the working class people could not even understand’ (ibid). For as long as English is the superior medium of instruction, language is likely to remain a pedagogical challenge. The course convenor further validates the significance of multilingualism in the course and in the university in general:

Take language, for example. Most of our students are multilingual, but the university only values English. So there’s no room for a very powerful resource –
the ability to speak multiple languages – to be recognized. Instead, the students are seen as ‘deficient’ if their English is not academic enough. So that’s why we’d do something like a multilingual glossary assignment – to recognize and value different skills that students bring (Morreira, Interview 2016).

If previously excluded knowledge is to have a place in the university, then the language issue needs to be problematised further. For ‘it is in these languages, spoken by at least 90 per cent of us, that our histories, cultures, and indigenous knowledge rest’ (Prah in Makgoba 1999: 39). Language is therefore a significant tool to recover these displaced histories, cultures and indigenous knowledge.

**Considering Culture**

Guillory (1993) has argued that, in the context of cultural capital, sometimes the students’ cultures simply do not fit into the culture of the institution. Guillory’s stance could in the context of UCT be summarised as; UCT is a westernised institution, and any other culture does not fit in. However, DOH1009F breaks the boundaries that Eurocentrism creates and gives marginalised cultures a chance to thrive in the institution.

Morreira (2015), responding to the question of culture in the interview, gives a good example of how treatment of culture has a direct bearing on the students’ learning process:

So, for example, my students would go to the Eastern Cape for three weeks to go to a funeral and fulfil all the necessary obligations and rituals, but then not know how to explain that to university structures when they returned. They’d feel like it wouldn’t be accepted as a valid reason, and so end up being DPRed [Duly Performance Refused] for non-attendance. It’s also partly structural, right, because if you’re going to the rural Eastern Cape you can’t keep up with assignments via email or Vula, for example. So the structure and the institutional mechanisms of control like DP or extension forms end up disadvantaging people who have a different cultural approach to family responsibility than does the university.

Here Morreira uses her experience with indigenous students to demonstrate how one’s cultural approach outside the classroom has an impact on one’s learning.

**Does the ‘Africa’ Matter in the Curriculum?**

The study has already established that it is not the best idea to seek the use of one single approach in teaching and knowledge production (Morreira 2015;
It seems clear that the mass of Africans do not understand what our universities are about [...] Many people are impressed by the learning of academics [...] But they hardly look up to the universities to provide answers [...] And when they do look up to the universities on these problems, they rarely get answers that they can understand or find relevant to their predicament (Ayayi in Yesufu 1973: 12).

Ajayi (1973) highlights a disconnection between the ‘African’ university and the African people. It is therefore worth exploring the factors that serve as a link between the university and indigenous communities. Although Ayayi made this argument about 40 years ago, the question still remains relevant today, given that indigenous communities are now a direct part of universities.

One student, replying to the question of what students found ‘most useful or interesting about using Biko’ (DOH1009F class survey 2015: 10), made an interesting link between identity affirmation and motivation for change: ‘It told us about South Africa’s past and made me aware of how taking ownership of an identity can motivate a whole people to make a significant change’ (ibid: 6). This student’s response solidifies the argument that it is important for the curriculum to be reflective, inclusive and relevant to the immediate community it serves.

Concerning identity, the course redresses the fact that African identities have been excluded from the academic environment, hence, some participants opt to assimilate into other identities (Kessi and Cornell 2015). Although this is not an ‘Afrocentric’ course in that it does not rely on ‘African’ material solely, I find that the course is still Afro-sensitive.

The course is Afro-sensitive in that it teaches ‘universal’ concepts while deliberately creating space for ‘Africa’ and ‘South Africa’ to be studied and embraced. While this course seeks to have a somewhat flexible (in terms of Africa, or global) approaches to teaching, some activists argue for a complete Africanisation (Zerbo in Yesufu 1973: 20). While Zerbo concurs that there is a need for more focus on Africa in the curriculum, the idea of an ‘Africanised’ university is in itself problematic. This is because of pertinent questions such as: will such a university be divorced from ‘Western’ approaches that are in fact plausible in their specific disciplines? Are ‘African’ authors being selected based on their geographical location, racial identities or the extent of their work’s relevancy to Africa? Therefore what happens when there is a ‘non-African’
author, theory or practice that is relevant to ‘Africa’? Perhaps the definition of ‘Africanisation’ still needs to be problematised further. In the face of the uncertainty in terms of what counts as ‘African’, it is perhaps wise for DOH1009F to be impartial about ‘Afrocentric’ approach and advocate for an ‘Afro-sensitive’ approach.

Moreover, there needs to be a further problematisation of the extent to which students’ idea of ‘Africa’ is common. Does a coloured student from the Cape Flats in the Western Cape view ‘Africa’ the same way as a black student from Mtubatuba in Kwazulu Natal? Both social settings are considered to be ‘disadvantaged’ but the experiences are not the same.

It is obviously beyond the scope of this study to dwell into the complexity of what actually constitutes ‘African’ and what does not. However, the point remains that even a course that is somewhat advanced in its treatment of ‘Africa’ such as DOH1009F does need to be founded on some fundamental constitution of ‘Africa’. I, therefore propose that practitioners who aim to be Afrocentric or Afro-sensitive, whether partly or wholly – need to deliberately involve themselves in the process of determining the factors that inform the approach.

**Analysis of Class Survey, Lectures and Interviews**

At the end of the semester, students are invited to complete an anonymous online survey, where they give feedback about the course. The survey is both qualitative and quantitative. ‘This student feedback questionnaire is based on UCT’s Teaching & Learning Charter which guarantees minimum teaching standards to students’ (DOH1009F Class survey 2015: 2). Students are therefore invited to ‘provide honest and thoughtful responses that can be used to improve the course’ (ibid).

The word ‘Biko’ is among the words that are most frequent in the survey. Students’ usage of ‘Biko’ indicates that Biko is regarded as an instrument in the learning process, as well as a figure to learn from. However, there are contexts where ‘Biko’ is used negatively, especially where students express their opinions that this figure is overused in the course.

The frequency of ‘Biko’ is followed by the theme of blackness and black consciousness. The data analysis found no negative usage of the theme of blackness and black consciousness. This finding potentially highlights the liberating purpose of this course and of using Biko as the leading author. ‘Learning about Biko showed me mainly the reason for pride of being black and black consciousness’ (DOH1009F class survey 2015: 6). Such responses are evidence that this course goes beyond teaching students to cope with their
academics. The restoration of dignity for previously excluded citizens is highlighted in the survey.

The following question has been key to the core business of the course: 'Rate the purpose of this course: The course has been beneficial for my other courses in Humanities and/or will help me in my future courses in the Humanities' (DOH1009F class survey 2015: 3). The survey responses show that 42 per cent (20 students) of the respondents agreed with the statement, while 15 per cent (7 students) strongly agreed. 31 per cent (15 students) were neutral, 10 per cent (5 students) disagreed while 2 per cent (1 student) strongly disagreed.

More than 70 per cent of the students responded positively regarding the course’s relevance to the local context (ibid: 7). This finding highlights relevancy as one of the major issues raised in this study. Moreover, 35 per cent (17 students) responded positively about the course’s relevancy to their interest, lives and experiences, while 54 per cent (26) were neutral and only 10 per cent (5 students) were negative.

The survey reveals that students generally ‘appreciate it when lecturers draw on African content in their courses’ (DOH1009F Class survey 2015: 7). Although 27 per cent of students are neutral, I argue that the neutral students do also benefit from the ‘African’ content, particularly in the use of local examples.

I invited DOH1009F students for interviews by posting an announcement on Vula. Seeing the lack of response from students, a follow-up announcement was made, to which only two students replied and participated. The suspicion is that the poor turnout is due to student’s fatigue, especially after a year that was full of transformation activities, including protest action. Moreover, the timing was another disadvantage in that there is a whole semester gap between when students took the course and when they could be invited for the interviews due to protest actions. The two students who completed the interview questionnaire generally responded positively regarding the course.

The course had three tutors, two Masters’ students and the course convenor. While one tutor left the university, the other one never returned the interview questionnaire even after a number of follow-ups.

The interaction with the course convenor took the form of in-person conversations, emails as well as a formal typed out interview. Upon requesting permission to interview students, the convenor highlighted a concern that students may not respond, which was indeed the case.

The interview with the convenor revealed that she was also critical of the unit in which she teaches. Her critical position seems to do with the institutional framing of ED at UCT and across South Africa. Racialisation of ED is one of the themes that came out of the interview and general interaction with the
course convenor. The course convenor highlights that, although ED is doing work that is duly informed by progressive ideas, there is still a great need of transformation in terms of how stakeholders think about ED.

**Summary of Key Findings**

DOH1009F is offered under a structure that is already under scrutiny and criticism, especially due to its perceived racialisation (DoE 2008). Besides the racialisation dilemma, I propose that DOH1009F is a course that could be offered in the mainstream curriculum. There are aspects of this course that the larger undergraduate student population can benefit from, especially if the university is serious in its curriculum transformation goal.

In the mainstream curriculum, the demographics are different from those of AD. Therefore the question of audience relevancy becomes even more problematic. However, those methods of the course that encourage epistemological liberation can still be replicated into the mainstream. Since the mainstream curriculum also has international students, methods such as multilingualism are likely to be limited to South African students. Such would be a reasonable limitation, given the kinds of resources required to meet the needs of every single student. However, it would be disadvantageous to not attempt to service those South African students in the mainstream curriculum in order to be attractive to the international community. This challenge speaks to the question of the extent to which UCT as a ‘global’ institution has to be relevant to the society in which it exists.

DOH1009F, on the basis of its funding requirements, can account for who its target students are. Therefore, the course can be planned intentionally to meet the needs of the imagined students. Perhaps the greater university needs to be intentional in answering the question of who the imagined student is. This is particularly important in the faculty of Humanities, where identity has a direct bearing on student’s learning processes. The fact that, for example, the DP requirements for DOH1009F try to accommodate students based on their socio-cultural needs (Morreira, Interview 2016) is a good model. However, students in non-AD courses also have their socio-cultural needs, some of which are the same as those of AD students.

It seems that only funding limitations make a course such as DOH1009F limited to the AD programme. If the course itself cannot be availed to all students, it would still be a worthwhile attempt to replicate some of the key methods of this course into mainstream courses. These key methods include:

- Multilingualism (limitations already noted).
- Use of local examples in the classroom.
• Including readings by South African and African authors.
• Create a curriculum framework through which students can interrogate and understand their own socio-cultural backgrounds.
• Sensitivity towards DP (duly performance) requirements on the basis of student’s socio-cultural backgrounds.
• Be explicit on challenging students to question what the curriculum contains.
• Be explicit on encouraging students to be active participants of the knowledge-making process.
• Lay a foundation of key Social Science concepts to help students with the rest of their university career.
• Have the early few readings and lectures focus on integrating students into the university environment.

This is not to say there are no other courses or teachers at UCT that try to be responsive to students’ socio-cultural needs. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to give such an account. Moreover, the need for such courses has been constantly articulated and if there are already similar courses, they are probably not very accessible or well known.

There is therefore a question that must be entertained by the institution at large: what and how are other courses taught, especially with regards to socio-cultural relevancy? What measures are put in place to ensure that every course reflects in its approaches the need for such relevancy and redress? What rules are shaping the rest of the courses in UCT’s faculty of Humanities? There is a need to review the extent to which curriculum might still be informed by colonial and apartheid approaches. Slattery cautions against playing by ancient rules ‘that no longer make sense in the postmodern world and that repress the dignity and identity of students’ (1995: 126). The danger that Slattery points out is that ‘curriculum will continue to be a meaningless technocratic endeavour removed from human experience’ (ibid).

Slattery validates the view that there has to be a deliberate link between the curriculum and the human experience. This is highlighted in DOH1009F, as the course is designed in a way that seeks to validate students’ experience in their past and present. Past experiences are interacted with by deliberately dealing with South African history especially in as far as race and identity are concerned. Present experiences are then interacted with in as far as the course recognises the socio-cultural needs and socio-cultural capital that students bring into the learning process. The multilingual learning approach is one example. Moreover, DOH1009F redresses ‘issues of self-identity, not only to improve education but also to promote justice and compassion in society’ (Slattery 1995: 26).
This, therefore, speaks to the need for curriculum in general to interact deeply with societal needs and confront historical injustices. Such a task cannot be left to only the Academic Development Programme. Ideally, every department that teaches would have to speak to how it intends to address the issues raised by Slattery.

There is no doubt that more students would benefit if the approaches employed in DOH1009F could be used in more other courses. It would therefore be worthwhile for the university to explore the possibilities of applying some of the methods employed in DOH1009F to other courses. One of the students interviewed in this study thinks that the course should be widely available:

I think the course should also be available for mainstream students because the material with which we engaged was very relevant, however because of the stigma attached to foundation courses, students were much likelier to feel as though the content of the course was not important (Student interview, 2016).

The student here raises two important points: (1) the need to avail the course to mainstream students, and (2) the stigma that is likely to affect how students receive the course. Therefore by doing (1), there is the likelihood of (2) also being addressed. There is need to shift from DOH1009F being a course for black disadvantaged students to being a course that addresses previous socio-cultural injustices and that is widely accessible. Currently, the course is designed for black students and this would be an exclusionary design if the course would be opened to white students. The convenor and lecturer confirms the potential of the course to exclude white and ‘privileged’ students:

This course is designed for ED students, who, because of state funding, are classified as previously disadvantaged, which means our students are all students of colour. It’s also primarily designed for students who didn’t go to a private high school and don’t have the social and academic capital that brings. It asks hard questions about how race and privilege work in SA. So, it might be experienced as a disempowering space by white students from privileged schools. But we don’t have any of those students in our classes, so I don’t know for sure. It might rather be useful for those students to have privilege interrupted in that way, and to learn a bit of historical nuance about SA (Morreira, Interview 2016).

The limitation to which Morreira points out is the fact that the course is deliberately designed to accommodate a very specific identity group. Morreira’s
view also confirms the claim that the course is empowering to students of colour. Moreover, this view points out to the fact that it is possible that a method that empowers one group might disempower another.

While the AD programmes might be designed to elevate ‘disadvantaged’ students, ‘deficit thinking’ (Morreira, Interview 2016) gets in the way of how such programmes are received. Regarding DOH1009F and AD in general Morreira submits that:

At UCT (and probably in most ED models across the country), we’re struggling against deficit thinking – the idea that students on ED programs are somehow deficient and need to be brought up to speed. This comes from within the university – from HODS, and high up faculty management to lecturers, tutors in departments – but it reflects more about the university value structure than it does about the students themselves (ibid).

In the interview, Morreira makes an important observation that ‘deficit thinking’ is perpetuated more by the university’s value system than by the students themselves.

Conclusion

I undertook to assess the possibility of developing and using a socio-culturally relevant curriculum as a means to address epistemic displacement, inter alia. By using DOH1009F as a case study, I identified some issues that are critical to achieving such a curriculum. These include race, culture, canon and coloniality. The study illustrates, that a curriculum that seeks to be inclusive in a post-apartheid and postcolonial university in South Africa will have to intentionally respond to these issues.

While racialisation is a negative factor in that the black students can easily be painted as the ones who have the problem, it points to a bigger problem that faces South Africa. This problem is, to use Harry Garuba’s words (see Chapter 15, this volume), the bad death that colonialism had undergone. I say colonialism has undergone a bad death in that its ghost still haunts us, as we can see from the racial classification system that has been inherited from the colonial era.

In terms of moving forward, I think that the time has come for universities to confront the reality that the African is a legitimate citizen on the African campus. For those who are not sure where to start to make the necessary changes, I hope that the case of DOH1009F gives you some key points which you can start to consider. If more and more departments and institutions...
seriously review and make the necessary changes as pointed out above to their curricular offering, we might well be able to subdue coloniality that overshadows higher education institutions in South Africa.

**Glossary**

Imbizo: a gathering where pressing issues are discussed. The phrase originates from the Nguni languages.

#RhodesMustFall: a student movement that sought to decolonise higher education institutions in South Africa.

Coloniality: traces of colonialism that remain in the modern human experience (Maldonado-Torres 2010).

Race: a social categorisation of people based on their physical appearance (colour).

Apartheid: the segregation of people based on their skin colour.

BSocSc: Bachelor of Social Sciences.

#FeesMustFall: a student movement that called for abolishment of fees.

Genotype: the genetic makeup of an organism (Van Eenenennaam 2009).

Black consciousness: a concept that seeks to liberate black people from racism and inferiority complexes (Biko 1978).

Amakwerekwere: a derogatory phrase used in South Africa to refer to foreign nationals from other African countries.

Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF): a South African emerging political party.

Afro-sensitive: being sensitive to the needs of Africa as presented or represented by typically African people.

Vula: an online platform where course information is distributed. UCT courses have Vula sites assigned to them.

**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

#RMF: #RhodesMustFall
AD: Academic Development
ADP: Academic Development Programme
Azapo: Azanian People’s Organization
BEE: Black Economic Empowerment
CAS: Centre for African Studies
DoE: Department of Education
DOH1009F: Dealing With Concepts in Social Sciences
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Chapter 14

Mental Mobilities and Belonging to the Hip-hop Nation

Marlon Swai

Introduction

This chapter situates the Cape as a locus and nexus for Afro-cosmopolitan contact that amounted to a challenge to colonial and apartheid conceptions of space and place and its attempts to limit and restrict those of the subjects it attempted to control. By showing a continuity of contact, I aim to situate the emergence of hip hop in South Africa on the long timeline that symbolises an ongoing cultural exchange across the Atlantic. This long history of contact and exchange was not only a back-and-forth trading of production values for various performances or musical styles, but more importantly, a lot of the art (for lack of a better word) directly served the purpose of politicisation, resistance and social justice struggle. On several shores of the Atlantic, artists and their listeners drew inspiration from each other’s freedom struggles and that inspiration translated into possibilities for movement and mobility in the material and psychological sense. This material and psychological mobility ultimately has meant an extension and expansion of citizenship for thousands. The chapter explores the links between citizenship, movement and mobility by providing historical flashpoints illustrating hip hop’s heritage as part of a long tradition of resistance. The chapter thinks about the ways in which hip hop and its forebears instantiate an alternative belonging that drove at the heart of exclusionary regimes, providing its followers not only avenues to move outside of the strictures of colonial mapping, but also platforms for creating a truly global collectivity forged by resistance, but elevated through art and humanity.

Vagrancy laws, master/servant ordinances, pass laws, forced removals, Bantustans, racially differentiated labour regimes and education systems – the tense relationship between citizenship and movement in South Africa comprises an endless list of political manoeuvrings eventually entrenched in a litany of policies that attempted to regulate every aspect of social life, for the indigene and the settler alike. For those resisting the colonial project’s chronic and calculated obsession with the control of people’s movement and mobility, every step toward liberation has demanded (and continues to demand) instances of intense creativity and tenacity when it came to staking out ways of circumventing borders and boundaries, whether terrestrial or psychological.
This essay focuses specifically on mobility as a crucial aspect of social life, or life more generally, and how the relationship between movement/mobility and citizenship has unfolded in the two decades since ‘democracy’ from the perspective of someone whose childhood took place during apartheid, but whose adolescence was enmeshed with the shock-doctrine-related upheaval the whole country experienced post-94. Like everything else to do with citizenship in South Africa, my positionality matters so much that it must be stated up front. So let it suffice to say that the apartheid regime mapped me male and coloured and that the majority of relatives in my father’s and mother’s generation experienced forced removals. They were presided over by identity documents that dictated who they could marry, where they could live, work, play or go to school, all of which culminated in the tightest prescriptions for how they could imagine themselves as citizens in and of the world.

Long before the era of mass media, resistance movements such as abolitionism, anti-segregationism and black nationalism circulated from shore to shore, port to port and city to city, drawing the inhabitants of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban and others into a transnational conversation about freedom. Before the internet, television or radio, radical messages travelled through the precarious yet relentless sojourn of black bodies. The turn of the 15th century saw enslaved and manumitted sailors and stowaways, scholars and journalists, fortune seekers and prospectors hailing from bustling metropoles like London and New York and from plantation economies like Jamaica permeating Southern Africa under the guise of labour or entertainment. With them though, they brought news of others like us, who similarly under the yolk of Euro-American colonial rule, were waging wars of resistance against racial oppression. I think of historical figures like African American musician, entrepreneur, journalist and activist Orpheous McAdoo who toured the colony for five years with his Jubilee Singers in the late 1800s. He used his publications to spread news about the similarities between black struggle in the US and South Africa. On the other hand, Sol T. Plaatje, one of the founders of the ANC, travelled to the UK and the US in his mission to build solidarity against the grave injustice of the 1913 Land Act.

Some scholars have recognised in this circuit and circulation of exchange a distinct ‘Black Globality’ (Edwards 1998), others have identified it as a branch of Pan Africanism (Decker 1993; Alridge 2005), and others still have preferred to think of it as a modality of Afropolitanism (Selasi 2005; Mbembe 2016; Adjepong 2018). Though preceding the transatlantic slave trade and colonial contact by centuries, this circuit and circulation of people and ideas across borders of varying kinds, intensified in response to these historical catastrophes. Because they broadened the scope for how black people imagined their position...
in and connectedness to a larger, indeed global, collectivity, these circulations inevitably promised/threatened to remind people that they belonged fully to the human race, even though they were being excluded from participation as full humans in the lands of their birth or the territories they desired to call home.

**Cross-Atlantic Contact**

Artistic and cultural production thrived under South Africa’s repressive apartheid regime despite, and to some extent because of, its draconian censorship measures. For decades before and during apartheid, artists functioned as activists, freedom fighters and whistle-blowers. As such, they drew inspiration for their resistance from each other, but also from a constant dialogue with the wider African diaspora and its various civil/human rights movements around the world. This awareness of the global black struggle informed anti-apartheid and anti-state art, and it also offered necessary alternatives to the kind of education that was available through state-controlled institutions of learning and knowledge production. Hip hop has emerged as one such alternative and today, more than ever before, it represents a major venue of transnational exchange as it remains an unparalleled cultural force in its appeal and influence on youth everywhere. In South Africa, hip hop is at once a host for Americanisms and a vehicle for Africanisms that sometimes sit in tension with one another and at other times they coalesce radically.

The approach of this chapter necessitates viewing the South Bronx, the birthplace of hip hop, as a ‘diasporic space’ (Perry 2008) with its complex intersection of influences all rooted in African expressive practices. Jamaican toasting repurposed gave rise to emceeing, Latin American and Caribbean leisure and spiritual dance forms, re-contextualised, formed the basis of breakdance; a combination of ancient and distinctly modern and urban traditions of public mark-making provided the blueprint for aerosol art; and several overlapping practices connected to sampling, intertextuality in storytelling and archiving intersected with young people’s re-fashioning of existing technologies to form the DNA for turntablism. Paul Gilroy’s (2003) *Black Atlantic* advised researchers to approach music and performance as an especially relevant public arena in which artists have literally performed debates about modernity and democracy. From the very beginning, hip hop’s prime movers, notably Afrikaa Bambaataa and the Universal Zulu Nation, or DJ Kool Hurc, insisted on the inclusion of knowledge of self as a fifth element which highlighted their acute awareness of the movement’s potential for wielding its pedagogical power toward instilling in youth a strong sense of civic responsibility. Therefore, hip hop’s ability to facilitate alternative avenues
toward membership and belonging, toward physical and mental movement/mobility is very much linked to its role in anti-state art in South Africa, and the freedom struggle overall. When hip hop first began to develop during the brutal and bloody years that are now referred to as the ‘State of Emergency’, it had to be public and disguised at the same time, resulting in one of the most fascinating systems of public education as it employed a spectrum of code languages, lyrical wit and an interpretation of black consciousness that dialogued distinctly with black masses in other parts of Africa and the Americas.

While it’s fairly clear how America features in the imagination of South Africans, it might be more obscure how South Africa figures in the imagination of Americans, Caribbean people or Africans on the continent. Scholarship by the likes of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (2009), especially his Something Torn, Something New, somewhat surprisingly positions South Africa as a ‘mirror of the emergence of the modern world’, pointing to Adam Smith’s assertion that the so-called discovery of America and the mapping of the passage to the East Indies by way of the Cape of Good Hope are the two most decisive events in the history of the modern world. A century before Ngugi, Marx and Engels already suggested in the Communist Manifesto (1848) that these twin events gave an unprecedented thrust to commerce, navigation and industry, which in turn, gave rise to a revolutionary impulse that delivered the final death blow to the floundering dominance of the feudal system.

South Africa’s political and cultural engagements with the black Americas, particularly with regards to various forms of resistance to oppression requires a distinction between ‘Americanisms’ and ‘African-Americanisms’ which scholars such as Hazel Carby (1988), Laura Chrisman (2003) and Paul Gilroy (2003) have complicated in generative ways. But while the aforementioned have focused largely on US/UK, Caribbean/UK and US/West Africa connections as routes/roots of exchange, Robert Trent Vinson (2006) builds on the work of scholars such as Manning (2001) and Harris and Shepperson (1993) to refine what we mean by African diaspora. Trent Vinson redirects the concept of diaspora to draw attention to processes of intra-African movements. Carole Boyce Davies (1994), Brent Hayes Edwards (2003) and Ifeoma Nwankwo (2005), among others, also expand the historical scope with which we approach African diasporic subjecthood. I draw from this rich archive in order to scaffold my argument that hip hop’s global dissemination is contingent with a tradition of global flow and exchange that has circulated cultural, socio-political and spiritual influences around the black world for centuries. Ideas around the nation, transnationalism, citizenship, imagined communities and other formations and formulations of belonging are called into question when considering contested cultural expressions such as minstrelsy (Erlman 1994),
jazz (Coplan 1985) and political/spiritual movements such as Ethiopianism and Rastafarianism. Hip hop came into being thanks to inner-city youth from places like the Bronx, but it caught on internationally, because a fertile landing ground had been prepared in places like South Africa for many generations. Before getting to the core of this chapter, I would like to showcase several historical crossroads that illustrate the long continuity of this global flow/exchange of ideas via Atlantic space.

The Americans

‘We’ve got a lot of kids dropping out of school wanting to be Americans – but I say no. They must go to school … We Americans are educated’, he said, as two fellow Americans nodded in agreement. ‘If you want to be an American you’ve got to have the facts.’ (‘Africa’ – leader of The Americans gang in Manenberg, Cape Town, 1993).

(Eddings 1993)

‘The Americans’ are one of the largest, fiercest and most organised street gangs in South Africa. Their membership runs into the thousands and their appropriation of US national symbols and patriotic iconography has gained such exact meanings that being caught in ‘American’ territory while wearing red, white and blue gets you in trouble if you are not an affiliate. When you see the star-spangled banner at the annual Cape Minstrel Carnival, you know that ‘The Americans’ are represented. When you hear the words ‘Hos Ja! Is nog American!’ you may either have been saluted as a soldier, provoked as an enemy or dismissed as a nobody. Although no scholarship has, to date, attempted to trace direct links between the modern-day ‘Americans’ of the Western Cape and ‘The Americans’ that operated in Sophiatown and in the mining compounds of Witwatersrand in the late 1800s, there seems to be at the very least a discursive and symbolic connection between the two, which would mean that young men of colour have organised themselves around the symbolism of ‘America’ for more than a hundred years in South Africa. The Americans (re)emerge as a force in the wake of the South African 1950 Group Areas Act, which inflicted severe social upheaval by forcefully relocating millions of black and coloured people. These forced relocations uprooted communities and one of the consequences of this was the galvanisation of gangs in urban centres like District 6 in Cape Town. Their considerable symbolic and material power has inspired the allegiance of thousands and to this day The Americans dominate a wide variety of criminalised activities including, but not limited to, the illicit fishing economy, money counterfeiting and laundering, police corruption, prostitution

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and illegal drug and alcohol trades. Considering the names of the Americans’ fiercest rivals – ‘The Russians’, ‘The Dixie Boys’, ‘The JFKs’ and the ‘Kasbah Kids’, it becomes even clearer that a perplexing import of American symbols and signifiers took place. This serves as a reminder to refrain from stereotyping or simplifying America’s cultural exports, for often the first thing that comes to mind when mentioning Americanisms is McDonalds, Coke and Disneyland.

It is not merely an irony that ‘The Americans’ are the biggest gang in South Africa. There is clearly something more to this intense example of US/SA relations. When speaking of ‘relations’ here, I do not primarily mean a political relationship, but rather a cultural relationship in which symbols and iconography transfer from one location to another without there necessarily being a reciprocal transfer, i.e. it is to a large extent a ‘one-way street’ and most US citizens may have no clue whatsoever to whom they are exporting their sounds and images. However, when it comes to ideas about social justice, the mutual awareness dynamic shifts and both cultural groups express a politicised consciousness about each other. The ‘Americans’ signify only one marker on a spectrum of creole cultural formations to emerge in South Africa. These formations incorporate and sometimes subsume an imagination of ‘others’ while also creating a vigorous cosmopolitanism as a side product. Sometimes they activate a direct dialogue with US social justice struggles and at other times the dialogue transmutes into a monologue. It is important to acknowledge ‘The Americans’ in an investigation of the role that American cultural forms have played in South African history because they capture not only the political, but more importantly, the cross-cultural imaginings of ‘America’. This comprises the psychological as well as the socio-political relationships, especially with regards to transnational and Pan-African forms of alliance. ‘The Americans’ are by no means an isolated example, but merely one of many instances that exemplify cross-Atlantic meaning making that continues to be generated by a centuries-old conversation. In spite of South Africa’s pariah status, which lasted much of the 20th century, transnational alliances formed and sustained themselves. Hip hop only shows up at the latter end of this long history of contact, but when it does, it creates an unprecedented vehicle for cross-cultural communication and imagination.

*Daar Kom die Alibama* (There Comes the Alabama)

The song ‘Daar kom die Alibama’ (There comes the Alabama) is one of the earliest and most explicit aural/oral records of SA/US contact. The song attests to the Cape’s dynamic geopolitical history and exemplifies how people of the Cape have documented historical experiences of cross-cultural contact through
music. The chorus details the approach of the US Confederate ship *CSS Alabama* during the peak of the American Civil War. The descendants of Malay and Indonesian people enslaved by the Dutch adopted the tune in the Cape Malay choral tradition and it is now a canonical piece, not only in the Cape Malay Choir repertoire, but also in Cape cultural memory overall. Marching bands in street parades and children on school playgrounds recite it regularly and it is a song one would hear in a diversity of households. South African hip hop producers and DJs have sampled and recontextualised it, thus reinforcing its status as somewhat of an anthem. Perhaps the most significant reason for the song’s staying power is its association with the annual Cape Minstrel Carnival where it is exuberantly sung as a standard.

The Carnival itself is yet another striking instance of SA/US transfer of symbolism. Also controversially known as The Cape ‘Coon’ Carnival or more affectionately as the *Kaapse Klopse* (Cape clubs) has taken place on 2 January (also referred to as Tweede Nuwe Jaar – 2nd New Year) for at least 126 years. As many as 13,000 performers participate in festivities that attract crowds of thousands each year (Martin 2000). New Year’s Day was the most important holiday in the Cape Dutch calendar. The enslaved had to work on 1 January, but they were given a free day on the 2nd. The 2nd of January became their New Year’s Day and they marked it with a carnival-like parade through the streets of Cape Town. As with the carnival traditions of the Caribbean, the *Kaapse Klopse* temporarily suspended all social norms propagated and enforced by the colonial apparatus. Colonially constructed conceptions of space and comportment, as well as strict societal norms around what it means to be a ‘civilised’ public and inhabit a ‘docile body’ were momentarily turned on their head. When slavery was abolished on 1 December 1834, the January 2nd carnival gained an additional meaning as participants commemorated their freedom struggle during the festivities.

Ideas, sounds and images proved to be portals of contact that no censorship machine could fully control so that even dance styles like the charleston, lindy hop, jitterbug and the swing, all nurtured during the Harlem Renaissance, took root in South African townships such as Sophiatown and Soweto. During the 1950s, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Albert Luthuli developed a friendship through those exchanges about their respective struggles. Miriam Makeba’s involvement with the Civil Rights movement in the US had an astounding impact on connecting the plight of black South Africa with oppressed people throughout the diaspora. Her position as a musician and ‘cultural ambassador’, especially after appealing to the UN in 1963 to put an end to apartheid, globalised the message as never before. Like musicians such as McAdoo, The African Choir, Solomon Linda, Paul Robeson, Johnny Dyani, Abdullah
Ibrahim, Hugh Masekela, Ladysmith Black Mambazo and Harry Balafonte, Makeba helped establish an international platform for dialogue and action around the atrocities occurring in South Africa. In 1969, Makeba (who was eventually granted 11 honorary international passports while being denied access to her home), left the US for Guinea-Conakry after Carmichael parted with the Black Panthers and linked the Black Power movement in the United States directly to East and West Africa. Carmichael became an aide to the Guinean Prime Minister, Ahmed Sékou Touré, and a student of the exiled Ghanaian President, Kwame Nkrumah. He later took on the name Kwame Touré to commemorate the independence leaders. At this time, Makeba was appointed Guinea’s official delegate to the United Nations. In her music, she demonstrated a Pan-African consciousness by singing in numerous African languages, including Swahili, French, Arabic, Spanish, isiZulu and isiXhosa, thereby connecting the struggle for liberation across the borders of several African nations. The impact that Makeba and all aforementioned artists and activists had on the subsequent decades of anti-oppression struggle is immeasurable.

By the time hip hop was emerging in the South Bronx in the 1970s the impact of Makeba’s generation was in the water so to speak. Lance Taylor was a DJ who was inspired by his parents’ record collection, which hip-hop historian Jeff Chang (2005) noted included Makeba as an important figure (Chang 2005). Taylor would eventually change his name to Afrika Bambaataa after seeing the 1964 Michael Caine war epic, Zulu presenting a British-slanted perspective on the Bambatha Rebellion of 1906. He also transformed the Black Spades gang into the now world-famous Universal Zulu Nation which is credited as having spread hip-hop culture globally. In mounting a movement around the concept of the nation, Bambaataa recognised the power of an alternative belonging. The concept of the hip-hop nation profoundly permeated the budding hip-hop generation as it was influenced by various black nationalist struggles, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Black Panthers, The Nation of Islam, the Pan African consciousness movement, the Black Power movement and the entire international anti-apartheid movement. Perhaps most famously, Public Enemy reinvigorated the possibilities of a radical secessionism (even if just cultural) with statements like *It takes a Nation of Millions to Hold us Back* (1988) and *Fear of a Black Planet* (1990). But countless artists riff on the concept of hip-hop nation, including Ice Cube, Black Thought, The Coup, Ludacris, Atmosphere and KRS ONE. In 2016, the hip-hop world was rocked when Bambaataa relinquished his position as leader of the Universal Hip Hop Nation after multiple child sexual abuse allegations dating back to the 1970s. If there is anything to learn from Bambaataa’s fall from grace, however, it is that while the
The nation is a powerful organising mechanism, even when infused with the lessons learned from generations of struggle and wielded in order to foster alternative avenues of inclusion, it should not be mistaken as being impervious to corrosion, corruption and exclusionary politics. The critique of the embeddedness of patriarchy, gender-based violence, heteronormativity and the objectification of women within the movement has been there from the very outset. In fact, as more and more revelations of abuse and gender-based violence within black nationalist contexts, and within hip hop’s most revered circles of influence emerge, the debate rages on whether patriarchy and toxic masculinities can in fact be disentangled from any form of nationalism. These critiques demand a serious process of soul searching within hip hop but also caution against a blanket glorification of its achievements. The question remains, alternative avenues of inclusion for whom?

This somewhat lengthy introduction is, in fact, an extreme reduction of the cross-Atlantic contact I have in mind. Nevertheless it is necessary to amplify the longevity and intensity of this contact before turning to my analysis of several contemporary artists who apply hip hop as intervention to exclusionary state-centred (masculinist) conceptions of the nation and citizenship and, in so doing, promote inclusion and belonging. Two major components of belonging to the nation are rights/privileges and responsibilities/duties. Within these two components, the following three dimensions of citizenship play out: citizenship as legal status, citizenship as political agency and citizenship as membership to a political community that furnishes a distinct platform on which identity formation occurs. The remainder of this essay thus divides into two parts.

A particular duty that is of great interest to me is the duty to represent. To be more specific, the duty is to represent those who, for some reason or other, do not have literal access to a mic, an outlet, a publishing industry or international attention. In this context, I highlight songs by Rosey die Rapper, Youngsta CPT and Gebaste Rhymes as examples of artists who promote subaltern subjectivities through the creation of ‘Hometown anthems’ which bring to the centre marginalised localities and sidelined, if not underestimated, cultural sensibilities. To exemplify the privileges of belonging to the hip hop nation, I then take a closer look at how artists like Prophets of Da City and Soundz of the South provide their constituencies with a sense of protection and inclusion (staying in), but also with mental resources, for lack of a better term, to become mobile in both mental and physical ways (getting out).
Kaatography

*Kaat* translates from the Afrikaans word ‘*kaart*’ literally as ‘card’ and is used in Afrikaans in a figurative sense to mean a joke or witty quip. It has been adopted in Afrikaans hip hop quite extensively to signify a punchline. So entrenched is the notion of the *kaat* in Afrikaans hip hop, becoming an almost standardized function, that stalwart lyricist Isaac Mutant adopted the nickname Jimmy Kaate, playing with the name of the former US president to establish his verbal dominance. I propose the newly coined term, ‘Kaatography’, as the pursuit of ‘putting something or someone on the map’ through the display of lyrical dexterity. I engage Garuba’s challenge to scrutinise the coloniality of mapping by playing with the notion of cartography or the science of map-making and the ever-present concern emcees have with putting things, people and places on ‘the map’. I suggest that taking up the responsibility of representing, i.e. putting their hometown, block, township, hood on the map and representing subaltern subjectivities in time and place, the emcee contributes to a global resistance to the historical overlays of mapped territories and a re-mapping of the world that allows for inclusion and visibility of the subaltern.

It is no accident that maps and metaphors of mapping abound in postcolonial studies, because colonialism as a regime of power was largely organized through spatiality and subjectivity: spaces to capture, subjects to control. To capture the land, it first had to be explored and mapped, literally and figuratively. For the subject to be controlled, she first had to be contained, not only in terms of physical containment within subject territories – colonies and protectorates for example – but also contained in ‘tribes’, territorially demarcated, defined and culturally described. Physical containment was necessary to circumscribe the natural mobility of the body (in space) and discursive containment served to define the limits of the cultural (identity) mobility available to the subject. To appropriate the subtitle of Carole Boyce Davies’s book (1994), colonial mapping rested on the denial of ‘migrations of the subject’ (Garuba 2002).

It is through the lens of reclaiming the right to migrate, physically, but also metaphorically and mentally, that I would now like to analyse some major contributions to hip hop from the Cape. To resuscitate the right to move, it is necessary to reinvent the map, so to speak. I suggest the term ‘*kaatography*’ to signify how Cape-based artists, in particular, metaphorically, but also literally, engage in redesigning maps of South African space. In the most literal sense, this has occurred through the renaming of towns and cities (a most recent example would be the re-naming of Grahamstown to Makhanda), but also
through the act of ‘putting on the map’ spaces and places that have been marginalised, underestimated or obscured.

**Rosey die Rapper – *My Naam Hoor* (Hear my name)**

Rosey die Rapper (Rosey the Rapper) is an emcee from the small town Porterville, in the Western Cape Province, about 155 km north-east of Cape Town. In late 2018 at the age of 19 she released her debut music video to a song called *My Naam Hoor* (Hear my name). In the opening moments of the song, as images of people and landmarks of the town are richly framed by Kris Kets and Adrian Van Wyk’s cinematography, Rosey can be heard saying: ‘Not much happens in Porteville and I want to put Porteville on the map. It’s just that I grew up here and people must see that talent can come out of a small town like this. Out of a small town, people can go far …’. The song then explosively bursts into the chorus with a dreadlocked Rosey seen in various iconic shots of the town. With an aggressively confident delivery and visual support of three dynamic dance crews – Swag United from Atlantis, the Unexpected Flames and the Tutu Girls from Piketberg – she rhymes:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Wanne jy my naam hoor,} & \quad \text{When you hear my name} \\
\text{Moet jy lain,} & \quad \text{You better beat it,} \\
\text{Moet jy scatter want ek kom om} & \quad \text{You better scatter cos I came to murder,} \\
\text{te vemoor,} & \quad \text{Wherever I show up, I run things like the law.} \\
\text{Ooral waar ek kom slat ek wed.} & \\
\text{Ek het niks om te verloor,} & \quad \text{I got nothing to lose, when you hear my name} \\
\text{wanne jy my naam hoor} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

There’s a saying that in Africa a good name can take you a long way. The emcee’s name is her identity document, her calling card and her passport. And with this name Rosey aims to project her hometown onto the mental landscape of the broader hip-hop and arts community. This puts her debut effort in a category of storytelling that is so ubiquitous in hip hop that it almost constitutes a subgenre in its own right – the subgenre of ‘hood anthem’, or more specifically within that, the ‘hometown anthem’. The drive to put your town on the map, or in African American Vernacular English (AAVE) parlance, to ‘rep your hood’ is something that is arguably a prerequisite for any emcee’s repertoire. In fact, if
citizenship is defined as membership to a political entity with all the incumbent rights and responsibilities of that status, then for the emcee, ‘repping’ is one of our principle duties of hip-hop citizenship. We place so much emphasis on the hometown anthem because it is one of the highest achievements of one’s artistry as an emcee. Achieving the anthem signals one’s status as a true poet laureate, for the anthem will only go viral if it is brilliant and makes one’s locus stand out. Artists cannot themselves decide if a song is an anthem or not; an anthem becomes an anthem because the people elect it as one. And in order to create an anthem, there is no better way to campaign for votes, so to speak, than creating a song that acutely captures the sensibility and reality of the place people come from. The artist strives to capture the essence of a place through words, music and/or images that have a broad appeal and activate a shared understanding, memory or experience amongst the people from the place and its immediate surroundings. As many people as possible have to say, ‘Yes! I remember that!’ or ‘Yes that represents me’ and once a critical mass identifies with the representation, the song achieves its anthem status. It then often (if not, usually) goes viral. Going viral, in turn, means going global.

It remains to be seen whether Rosey’s song gains enough momentum to become an anthem, but given she is the only emcee out of Porterville to have come out with a music video, her song will be recorded in history with some significance, not least because of its pioneering status. While the lyrical content of My Naam Hoor does not necessarily capture the essence of Porterville by describing the geographical space, she is making her cartographic/kaatographic contribution through the space she is claiming for her own name. Paired with the video’s cinematography, her lyrical skill proves that Porterville is worthy of being more than a blip on the radar of the global hip-hop nation. As an ambassador, she invokes one of the hip-hop generation’s most pervasive metaphors for competence, which is to murder, to kill, or to slay – doing something so well that there is nothing left to say about the matter. Having her wordsmith skillset firmly in place ensures that she will be heard and/or seen in the right places, which consequently means that her name, and by extension the name of Porterville will ‘go far’. Within a few weeks of posting her video to Youtube, hundreds of comments from Porterville natives underscore the pride that Rosey’s contribution has already inspired.

In a way, being a pioneer is also an enduring theme in hip hop and usually affords those carving out pathways the status of ambassador, or as I am calling it, prime kaatographers. Rosey then also takes her place among esteemed crews like POC for being the first from her hometown to do it. Among other firsts, POC were the first to record a song, ‘Dhala Flet’, in Afrikaaps, thereby putting the Cape Flats on the map linguistically. Since it is beyond the scope of this
chapter to expound the term ‘Afrikaaps’, suffice it to say that it is the Cape Flats vernacular Afrikaans, and thus an interesting parallel to AAVE. Rosey’s authentic and unapologetic use of her mother tongue speaks volumes about her commitment to representing not only place, but also language and culture, as is. Her video lovingly portrays farm workers and the spaces they like to inhabit for leisure, the all too familiar coke-red clad café against the backdrop of open space and dusty expanse associated with the forgotten ‘outskirts’ of urban centres like Cape Town. However, it is on these outskirts, the fringes, the periphery and the margins that one senses an enormous sense of cosmopolitanism and integration into a global community of sorts.

Kyk, daar’s a tyt vir als Look!
Daars n tyt vir tengo en n tyt vir wals
Ma ek doen als gelyk
Ek mop en ek stryk
En as jy my roep sal ek die
selle tyt uit kyk

There’s a time for everything
A time for tango and a time for waltz
But I do it all simultaneously
I mop and I iron
And when you call out to me
At the same time, Ima look out to/for you

Here Rosey references two dance styles often thought to be outdated and she reminds listeners that they each have their time and place. The juxtaposition of this line with the hip-hop inspired dance routines in the video suggests that hip hop holds it all. The emcee herself embodies this ability to hold and contain worlds of contradiction. She brilliantly follows up by making front and centre the kinds of activities – mopping floors and ironing clothing – usually associated with blue collar workers and usually women of colour. She restores dignity to work associated with a lack of choice and opportunity by elevating it as worthiest of being brought along with her on this journey out of Porterville. So when she ends the phrase by speaking directly to someone in the first person, the accompanying imagery of young girls surrounding her posse-style indicates she has in mind young women and girls much like herself whose destinies and life opportunities may have been somewhat predetermined by history, politics and economy, but who she is pledging to look out for – uitkyk being a clever play on words in Afrikaaps as it is in AAVE meaning both to peer out while at the same time to support i.e., to look out or to have someone’s back. I return to the notion of hip-hop artists having our back in the next section which focuses on the privilege of protection.
Gebaste Rhymes: ‘Kaap issie Bom’

In the song, ‘Kaap issie Bom’ (Cape Town is the bomb), I was not aiming to create an anthem. My primary intention, as I penned and recorded this song, was to compose a light-hearted celebration of the sights, sounds, smells and tactile experiences I grew up with. I wanted to sketch a number of scenarios that are emblematic of life in Cape Town from the perspective of marginalised youth. I also wanted to capture a unique sense of humour, which somehow revolves around life imitating art and vice versa. Listening to it when it first aired on the local radio stations in Cape Town was exhilarating because so many people resonated with the shared experience that I had captured. It is only after listeners’ responses that I realised how much I had embedded a transnational, and transatlantic, conversation in the song. Throughout the song I use semantic wordplay to marry names of Cape Flats townships with recognisable cultural icons from the US – icons with heightened significance in the South African history of struggle for democracy. I released the song ‘Kaap issie Bom’ under the alias Gebaste Rhymes, playing with the word ‘Gebaste’ which means to be mixed in Afrikaans, often used in a derogatory way to imply bastardisation. Throughout the song I subvert and reclaim this view of being mixed, not only through mixing of American and South African imageries and symbols, but also through a mixing of languages that achieves multiple meanings within any given line of the song. Approximately 50 per cent of these multiple meanings gets lost in translation.

Ek snipe nou n Karate flik  I’ve just seen a karate flick
Dans ek Bruce Leroy  Now I’m Bruce Lee Roy
met n stuk monkey trick  With a monkey trick
is ek n woes bboy;  I’m an ill Bboy
of Jekkie Chen as ek Summies Skiet  Jack Chan doin’ summersaults
opie grewel petch  On a gravel patch
in my mangatjie  In my boxer shorts
bete ek jou met n Bunnielik  I battle you with a popsicle
Shaolin PAndiet  Shaolin Bandit
Dies Harre Kop Gamfu  This is Hard head Gam Fu

‘Bruce Leeroy’ was a nickname mockingly given to the lead character in the 1985 classic Kung Fu film The Last Dragon. The film’s protagonist Leeroy Green trains tirelessly to achieve the same level of mastery as the legendary Bruce Lee. The film’s antagonist, Sho’ Nuff, a self-proclaimed ‘Shogun of Harlem’, mockingly names the protagonist Bruce Leeroy, thus revealing a comedic self-
reflexivity in the black community around the practice of mimicry and mastery. I felt that this strikingly articulated a tension ever present in the Cape Flats identity formation. It seems to me that both, in South Africa and the US, communities of colour celebrate and ridicule our own inclination to uncannily mirror the outside world, while also adding our own spin to it. Heavyweight New York rapper, Buster Rhymes, would later also craft a persona based on the film's Sho' Nuff character, lifting memorable scenes from the film into his music video to his ‘Dangerous’ (1997).

Through ‘Kaap issie Bom’ I wanted to show that mimicry is not simply about copying or imitating, but rather a creative process that can actualise a sophisticated theoretical position while also expressing unique cultural standpoints on well-established debates and conversations. Instead of simply imitating Americanisms, successful mimicry, I wanted to argue, requires a high degree of mastery – mastery of wordplay, technological skills, sometimes choreography, mime, speech acts like code-switching or convincingly portraying a particular accent, and more. Like the practices in the repertoire of the Kaapse Klopse, for instance, a heterogeneous array of possibilities for political agency is embedded within the act of mirroring. The following verse exemplifies this well:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Line</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is Reberta Flats die,</td>
<td>This is Reberta Flats chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marvin Gatesville</td>
<td>Marvin Gatesville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En Kanye Westridge</td>
<td>And Kanye Westridge on a Gatsby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>op n getsby</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Rocklands Smaak Vir</td>
<td>Chris Rocklands’s feeling Natalie Portlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netalie Portlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray Charlsville toe</td>
<td>Ray Charlesville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raak Randy in Crawford</td>
<td>Getting Randy up in Crawford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce Spring Steenburg</td>
<td>Bruce Springs Steenburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>met Berry White Rookie</td>
<td>With Barry White smoking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariah proe</td>
<td>Mariah tastes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim se Kerry en sy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PavaRooti</td>
<td>Jim’s curry and his Pava Roti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This verse displays the invocation of neighbourhoods created as a result of the 1950 Group Areas Act and merges them with Hollywood and Motown names. Roberta Flack and the Cape Flats become Reberta Flats, which ironically is also the name of a notable apartment complex in Cape Town’s city centre. Marvin Gaye and Gatesville become Marvin Gatesville – a neighbourhood, bordering Athlone, which became a major site to which forcibly removed
people, designated as ‘coloured’ during apartheid, were moved to. Westridge and Kanye West become Kanye Westridge, which is a reference to a section within Mitchell’s Plain, the largest ‘coloured’ township around Cape Town. Similarly, Rocklands and Portlands are also specific sections of Mitchell’s Plain, and the play on words in Natalie Portland activates the hugely popular Star Wars films in which Natalie Portman starred as a queen. Many a youth had a crush on her upon seeing the films – a highly specific shared experience amongst a certain generation of Cape Flats youth. ‘Ray Charlestonville’ plays with both phonics and semantics. ‘To ry’ (pronounced ‘ray’) in Afrikaans means to ride. Ray Charlestonville thus translates to riding to Charlestonville, which is located on Cape Town’s major highway, the N2, bordering Valhalla Park and Bonteheuwel on the North and Gugulethu on the South. Furthermore, Ray Charles and Barry White were, and perhaps still are, staples in the average ‘coloured’ household, especially on Sunday afternoons when various radio stations promote an atmosphere of relaxing and enjoying family and community over traditionally made koeksisters and coffee. In such ways, the song highlights the mobility of these cultural markers across borders and boundaries that were originally demarcated to contain and control ‘black’ and ‘coloured’ bodies during apartheid.

‘Kaap isse bom’ became the resident opening song for the biggest poetry slam in South Africa, the InZync Poetry Festival. I was away in New York while all of this was happening, but according to the event organisers who also used the song as a teaching aid in their poetry workshops, one of the lines that resonated most was ‘Heel jaar jop se pay, vir een dag dop en vleis’ (a whole year’s salary for one day’s meat and wine) referring to the end of year celebrations that continue to act as a pressure release valve for working class communities, who, in the thousands, enjoy the beach during the few days of relaxation afforded us between Christmas and New Year.

Finally, the chorus, which says ‘In Africa, is gatmaak ’n artform’ (In Africa we take laughter seriously) tightens the focus on humour, which, in turn, signals a self-awareness and ultimately highlights a sense of audacity around our ability to laugh in the face of the hardest conditions imaginable. This ability also connects us to communities on the margins everywhere.

**Youngsta CPT: Young Van Riebeek**

Youngsta CPT is a great example of a contemporary artist who also highlights humour as a coping mechanism, and who refuses to ignore the hardships of working class communities. He entered the fray in 2012 and recently dropped his 30th mix-tape. With an equally impressive number of
music videos, he has established himself, at just 26 years old, as a young and hungry artist with a formidable work ethic. He also quickly built his brand as a fervent promoter of Cape Town as the CPT part of his *nom de guerre* indicates. He is famous for ‘bigging’ up his neighbourhood, the working class ‘coloured’ community of Wynberg, with songs that zoom all the way into the particular trainstop of his neighbourhood, Wittebome, as well as songs that ‘rep’ other parts of Cape Town.

For many, Youngsta represents something of a counter-narrative to an old tension between Cape Town and Johannesburg hip hop. A self-perpetuating mythology exists that Cape Town emcees are authentic and highly skilled, but they don’t get any shine from the industry which somehow favours artists from Johannesburg. The story goes that because so many artists in the Cape rhyme in Spaza³ and *Afrikaaps*, they don’t adhere to the image of a commercially viable brand. For most industries in South Africa, Johannesburg is the financial capital. Youngsta CPT strategically links Cape Town’s position in the Western Cape to West Coast hip hop in the US with a tribute to Dr. Dre’s banger ‘The Next Episode’, for example, in which he rhymes: ‘it’s the W-E-S-T-S-I-D-E, La la la la la la, It’s the one and only C.P.T.’ (instead of D.R.E.). His version has definitely become anthem-like; at his live performances, crowds of thousands echo back the words and letters with gusto. After proving that a Cape Town emcee has the hustle and industry savviness to compete and after winning the South African Music Award prize for Best Lyricist in 2018, he cleverly celebrated and amplified the victory by taking the trophy on a Cape Flats schools tour, making a concerted effort to show young people in the city that their cultural resources are not only, *NOT* something to be ashamed of, but, in fact, worthy of such praise on the national stage.

Youngsta CPT, like many, has progressed in his career trajectory from an imitation of American (AAVE, to be precise) in his earlier work toward a more distinctly Cape Flats accented delivery. Additionally, it’s clear that he is also beginning to search for content that deals with some weightier issues. He has explored his distinct Cape Malay positionality, for instance, in the song ‘Arabian Gang$ter’, featuring Maloon TheBoom. In this song he sketches out the complexity, contradiction and intersectionality of being part of the global Muslim *ummah* while also connecting localised stereotypes of Cape Malay/Muslim criminality and criminalisation with the narrative of radical Islam in the international (Western, Judaeo-Christian, conservative) consciousness:

> I know killers who’s disguise was a Salaa top (prayer robe) …
> Wearing koefias as criminals taking no time off
> Its 24/7 sht Taliban 9/11 sht
They claim that Iraq had provoked the attack but they still haven’t produced no evidence And they still have the same image now of us In Cape Town there’s eight hundred thousand plus A lost population we starting a nation …

Again, this shows the prevalence of the concept of nation. History has shown that all nations seem to begin in balkanisation and bloodshed. The founding of nation states has typically been a violent affair because of the installation of borders and the politics of inclusion/exclusion that come with it. Could it be that hip-hop artists are trying to found alternative nations – transnational nations? If we view Youngsta CPT’s opus through such a lens of nation founding, we step into unchartered territory in terms of our discourse around citizenship. It is indisputable, yet intangible, how Youngsta’s music galvanises a ‘lost population’ into a cohesive entity, leave alone a nation. What would patriotism look like? And how does one join this nation? Is it through listening to music? Or does one attend concerts? Is Youngsta CPT suggesting some type of secession then from the South African nation, or perhaps even the universal ummah? I don’t think so. I think he is pushing us to think of multiple and interlinking citizenships. However, this new nation is an absolutely necessary organising principle because it affords the opportunity to correct and reinvent narratives of nation that systematically whitewashed or erased the subaltern.

In his latest song called ‘Young Van Riebeeck’, Youngsta CPT proposes a radical re-writing of the founding of the nation story. Through a period piece-styled music video, Youngsta CPT subverts images of Dutch VOC employees and colonisers as well as the Malay slaves, who escape captivity by the end of the song. By appropriating the name of the colonial administrator, Jan van Riebeeck, Youngsta does two things: Firstly he repurposes the legacy of the Cape’s first governor and exploiter par excellence in order to claim his own dominance in the hip-hop game. This is a classic hip-hop move but also reflective of subaltern appropriations of dominant power structures. Secondly, bending the name of Van Riebeeck to his own devices can be seen as an act of bricolage that destabilises the power of the troubled historical figure. The song opens with a staccato voice stuttering ‘Jan Van Riebeeck/Young van Riebeeck’ over and over again, quite reminiscent of how the name is shoved down our throats wherever we look. Statues, street names, schools, squares and all kinds of public spaces are named after him. Let’s have a closer look at the opening verse:
A lot of mense (people) is hating but that’s not surprising
The hip hop game is like a country I am colonizing
This is my call of duty I’m not even pocket dialling
When I stiek uit (appear) it’s like the British and the Dutch arriving
When they landed at the sea shore
And they thought the Cape was just a detour
Educate yourself read more
Before they signing your deceased forms
I can’t tell you how this feels yoh
This the city I would bleed for
But I’m at the bottom of the seesaw
Hoping praying for a beanstalk
Cape Flats or Sandton uh
I be lifting every sanction uh
Since the segregation happened uh
Why I feel like this the anthem uh
[…]
You’ve been brainwashed to the chaos
Same cut not the same cloth uh
Talking up to God a lot, on my knees I’m in the mosque
Taking Jan van Riebeeck to the barbershop and cutting off his whole moustache
You was worried about the waves, I was worried about the slaves
Now you standing there amazed
Go tell the mense what’s my name

Unlike most national anthems that sanitise the vision of nation, Youngsta CPT is explicit about the corrupt and ugly beginnings of the South African nation. Surprisingly, he steps into a coloniser’s role himself by suggesting that he is colonising the ‘hip hop game’. He clearly signals domination here, but if one pays attention, one goes back to the topic of mastery – the ultimate skill of the emcee – something that is larger than talent, something that can be learned, but not really taught. If wordsmithing, clever semantic word play, and fluid delivery are the means through which the emcee dominates and colonises, then we must recognise this as a non-violent and deeply intellectual conquest. This is an intriguing and essential way of rewriting history; ultimately he elevates his concern about the slaves to the same founding-the-nation narrative as the well-known stories about storms and shipwrecks around the Cape. Internationally, the story of the Cape is still told in terms of ‘the waves’ rather than the slaves.
For many youngsters in the Cape Flats as well as the international audience, this song might be utterly unintelligible if it wasn’t for the accompanying music video. ‘Taking Jan van Riebeeck to the barbershop and cutting off his whole moustache’ is portrayed through notably efficient video-editing in a way that activates an important debate about who Van Riebeeck truly was. One way in which Van Riebeeck’s reputation was distorted is the way he was painted over the years. Later paintings of the man made him out to look much younger, more attractive and masculine through a thick moustache.

When Youngsta CPT takes Van Riebeeck to the barbershop, he symbolically takes him to a space, which men of colour have almost universally claimed as a territory where a degree of sovereignty can be exercised (albeit temporarily), even when the context outside of this territory is riddled with hostilities that render men of colour vulnerable. After imposing the forced removal of the Dutchman’s facial hair, a clear encroachment on his masculinity and cultural sovereignty even, Youngsta completes the symbolic inversion of power by inciting his audience to chant his name, a reaffirmation of his now self-styled, self-liberated passport.

**RIGHTS/Privileges: Performing Protection**

Around the world, hip-hop artists have demanded accountability from those in power through a variety of performance platforms. A long legacy of pointing out corrupt individuals, policies and entities by name – in short, speaking truth to power – has always been an integral aspect of hip hop. We can create several categories within this speech-act of speaking truth to power and holding
authorities accountable; the one that concerns me in the context of this chapter is the act of out-maneuvering surveillance systems that panoptically confine bodies in mapped spaces in order to limit or control mobility. As Mos Def (now Yasiin Bey) put it, ‘The streets is watching, I watch back that’s the policy.’ In South Africa’s historical context, it is impossible to overstate how severe surveillance systems and censorship imposed a sensation of constantly being watched. The irony here, of course, is that on one hand bodies of colour were constantly being watched, but on the other hand the actual subjects were invisibilised beyond recognition. With this I am referring to the subaltern again – the submerged and ‘covered up’ subject. And again, there is a literal dimension in the history of disappearances, murdered victims that, to this day, and in spite of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, were never recovered, leaving behind friends and family who still look for bones and unmarked burial sites all over the country. And then there is the metaphorical dimension of the submerged and ‘buried’ subject – a subject whose location does not appear on legitimised maps, a subject that moves underground, behind the scenes, in the shadows of society. Hip hop has demonstrated its potential for protecting the rights of its constituencies – in particular, the right to freedom of movement and mobility (mental and material, physical and spatial), the right to cultural representation in the public domain and the right to feel safe and secure within a given societal setting.

Under the definition of citizenship as legal status, defined by civil, political and social rights, the citizen is the legal person free to act according to the law and having the right to claim the law’s protection (Cohen 1999; Kymlicka 1995; Carens 2000). This protection necessarily should cover the rights of one’s body, the sanctity of one’s name and the integrity of one’s property (material and intellectual). However, in the face of racist, sexist and classist hegemonic corporate and neoliberal regimes, what does a counter-cultural hip-hop nation have to offer in the way of the protection? To conclude this chapter, I focus on the way hip hop achieves and communicates protection within members of its nation, and how it deals with the irony of needing protection from the so-called protectors, whether that be police or government.

In the Spike Lee-directed Malcolm X biopic, the scene in which Malcolm is arrested exemplifies what it might look like when communities take it upon themselves to protect their own. A highly organised crowd, marching in military formation ready themselves for engaging in battle with the police and the police chief. Dozens, perhaps more than a hundred, immaculately dressed men silently line up outside the police station. With as little as a facial expression, Malcolm signals to the crowd to stand down, which they obey immediately and without question. The police chief then says, ‘That’s too much power for one man to
wield.’ The Nation of Islam understood the power of performing unity, militancy and organisation. During the same period that Spike Lee directed classic films like *Do the Right Thing* (1989) and *Malcolm X* (1992), Public Enemy was leaning into the power of America’s *Fear of a Black Planet* (1990). Their combination of audio and visual performance including their live stage act was a clear and conscious building on the lessons of the leather-clad and shotgun-wielding performativity of the Black Panthers. Their S1Ws, the military style dance crew, sent an unmistakable message to the ideology of white supremacy: we will achieve liberation … by any means necessary.

Prophets of Da City, (POC) South Africa’s pioneering hip-hop group, still stands as a towering example of the transferability of the lessons learned from the Nation of Islam and the Black Panthers. The group was founded during a state of emergency, when censorship had reached its peak and police brutality was the modus operandi in all of South Africa’s cities. In spite of this oppression, POC members grew up around a culture in which freedom fighters and those in the resistance movements forged creative ways to share information. Critical prose and poetry had to be in code and even then it was a dangerous affair. Hip-hop artists like POC made compelling contributions because of the way they referenced musical and political history through sampling. In the act of reshuffling the context and juxtaposition of each sample, they reinterpreted the actual content of the sample for new audiences. The song ‘Understand Where I’m Coming From’, for example, featured a sample by Mzwakhe Mbuli, also known as ‘the people’s poet’. Mbuli was one out of many persecuted, imprisoned and tortured artists. Featuring his voice on the *Age of Truth* (1993) album introduced many young hip-hop heads, myself included, to his poetic mastery and his radical message. POC members relayed that their inspiration for sampling Mzwakhe Mbuli or Mandela’s speeches (e.g. on the song ‘Never Again’ off the 1995 *Universal SoulJaz* record) came from hearing Nation of Islam affiliated artists like Big Daddy Kane, Public Enemy and Rakim sample from Malcolm X, Louis Farrakhan or Martin Luther King Jnr.

When I first listened to the POC album *Age of Truth* (1993), I knew immediately that they would get banned. So did everyone else. The album opens with the voice of an African American civil rights leader (Louis Farrakhan) saying … ‘The Government does not care if Black men and women die, they have already planned to go to war …’ This is followed by the voice of an apartheid leader brazenly justifying segregation, saying ‘We have every right to maintain our identity as whites.’ A synthetically added reverb contributes to the dramatic, yet ridiculous, nature of his speech. Then a menacing drone steadily increases in volume. An anti-apartheid voice then comes through, igniting a crowd with the liberation struggle battle-cry, ‘Amandla!’ which continues to
echo throughout the intro. A phat kick-snare combination comes in and builds the tension in the increasingly busy, but well-mixed cacophony as we hear a crowd approaching, swelling, vocalising the ‘United We Stand’ call. Apartheid’s voice is drowned out. Louder and louder the throng of voices calls out ‘United We Stand, Divided We Fall, an Injury to One is and Injury to All’ over and over and over. The National Party statesman hopelessly faces off against the radical hip-hop band. Like many, I experienced the intro alone, not to mention the whole album, as a call to action, but more precisely a call to citizenship. I wanted to be that One who belongs to the All, and there was something about the unapologetic confidence in POC’s delivery that suggested that my subjecthood was protected and fought for. This sentiment is underscored when one member, Ishmael Morabe, rhymes in the song ‘Power to the People’: ‘The struggle goes on and the road is full of mist, Black man raise your fist, Say what you want to say what you want Black, lean on me I got your Back!’ This concept of ‘having one’s back’ is comforting and assuring. In addition, it was POC’s overall commitment to the project of decolonisation that provided youth with alternative avenues for imagining ourselves and our sense of citizenship in the world.

Speaking of decolonisation in the 1980s South Africa meant first and foremost the decolonisation of space and bodies, for in some ways the 1980s represented the pinnacle of apartheid and an era in which the wounded apartheid beast unleashed its most devastating last attempts to reverse its own demise. As echoed in Steve Biko’s phrasing of black consciousness, a decolonised mind is the prerequisite for all other decolonisation. What is important here is to understand that ‘decolonisation’ in South Africa was by no means a metaphor or allegorical framework – South Africa as a whole was still in the grip of colonial rule (even though officially speaking it was no longer administratively a colony of a European country). In South Africa this colonial rule employed as a defining characteristic one of the most dehumanising social experiments that any civilization ever endured in human history, namely apartheid. Anything that inspired self-actualisation or mental freedom, not to mention the freedom for bodies, was banned and kept away from Biko-black youth. Biko-black here refers to all non-white people who, in spite of the diversity among black, coloured and Asian (i.e. mostly Indian), all needed to participate in black consciousness in order to achieve liberation of the country.

POC also challenged conventional ways of becoming/being popular and redefined what it meant to hold social power. Prior to POC, the avenues through which young people were able to accumulate social power were quite limited. It was through gangs, churches or political parties that youth gained social networks, power and status. Hip hop suddenly offered another alternative
as it rewarded artistic virtuosity, powerfully attractive performances of Pan-
Africanism, knowledge and ‘street wisdom’. The electrifying artform that
inherently draws in the collective experience coupled with thought-provoking
content delivered in mother tongue created an overall phenomenon that cannot
be described with any other word than powerful; it was so powerful that the
regime censored it and forced the group into exile by criminalising their artistic
production.

When the format of the music video became popular and technologically
possible, POC, and other hip-hop artists, amplified the meaning of their songs’
content through visual input. In some instances, the music videos help a listener
decode the song’s message by becoming a viewer, and in other instances the
video supplies additional meanings. POC videos feature a defiantly localised
aesthetic and thus require a certain visual literacy in order to correctly read the
intended depiction of the real as opposed to fantasies of wealth and surplus that
became hallmarks of mainstream hip-hop videos. In the video to the 1995 single
release ‘Da Struggle Kontinues’ we first see the group’s members make their
way through an indoors party. The visually literate immediately notices that only
white people are present at this party and in addition they are decadently dressed
(tuxedos and smart evening wear) and sip on wine that they can clearly afford
to buy. The crowd is oblivious to POC’s presence. The literate viewer knows
that POC is ‘not supposed to be there’ and experiences their presence as a
deliberate disruption. The ‘informality of racial segregation’, as Gilroy would call
it, becomes tangible, except that it was of course formalised in apartheid South
Africa. The party is a cultural space that represents exclusion for black and
coloured youth; entering this space either results in being kicked out or in
invisibility. The counter-invasion of Biko-black youth into white space is
amplified in the cutaways of B-boy Ramone breakdancing on Cecil John
Rhodes’s Memorial as it overlooks the city at night. This juxtaposition works
like a visual formula to communicate both past and future South African space,
where black and coloured bodies have historically only been part of white spaces
as cleaners and servants. Whether one understands the actual lyrics of the first
verse or not, the video certainly harkens to a neo-apartheid age in which the end
of the regime may be a cause for celebration, but an end to acquired social
behaviours of exclusion is still not in sight. In the video POC subverts the
‘spatially structured patterns of power’ that music journalist Murray Foreman
studies in The ’Hood Comes First (2002). Per Foreman, hip hop functions as
‘important site for the examination and critique of the distribution of power and
authority in the urban context’. (Foreman 2002: xviii) POC also activates what
Alim calls the ‘translocal’ by making a localised struggle instantly readable to an
international Biko-black audience; for example, during the chorus we see one of
the most iconic images of both the US civil rights movement and anti-apartheid struggle – the elevated fist.

During the second verse of ‘Da Struggle Kontinues’, the location is a high-school classroom and the crew is now visible to all participants in the space. At first these participants look like students in school uniforms, but during the course of the video their appearance alters as they wear baggy jeans, fatigues and hoodies to signal hip-hop attire and the rejection of uniformity, but perhaps also the rejection of formal education that stifles protest and refuses to reform itself according to the needs of the post-apartheid era. Ready D delivers the second verse of the song in a teacher role and we see the students become active participants of the ‘lesson’ as they pump their fists in acknowledgement of lines like,

Unite all Blacks before we talk that freedom crap
knowledge is our only life support system ...

Here, we see how POC shifts the responsibility for attaining freedom to the ‘oppressed’ (in Freire’s sense) and asserts knowledge, and necessarily socially relevant education, as the only way forward. To emphasise his point, Ready D holds up Musamaali Nangoli’s No More Lies about Africa (1986), which elevates the meaning of the line ‘knowledge is our only life support system’ in a way that is only possible through the music video since the song itself cannot reference the book without breaking its flow. This time the camera cuts away to scenes that show crew members moving freely on the roofs of colourfully painted corrugated iron shacks, thus proudly representing the environment out of which black and coloured people, as well as their art, emerge. In the third verse POC continues to restructure the spatial pattern of power by positioning their rhyming skills and confident delivery of the song in the middle court of a housing scheme. This momentum accumulates in the final scene that shows the crew standing on the site of forced removals in District Six with Table Mountain (the symbol of prosperous Cape Town) looming in the background. What I would like to emphasise here is that it was not only that people saw themselves culturally or phenotypically mirrored in POC’s language and image, but also found affirmation in the physical environments and indeed people’s relationships to those spaces that resembled their own spatial conditions too.

If POC represents the beginnings of hip hop from the Cape, I want to conclude this chapter by highlighting one contemporary crew that carries POC’s work forward into the 21st century. In 2005, a youth-based collective of activists and artists called Uhuru Network convened the Uhuru Youth Camp at the Southern African Social Forum in Harare, Zimbabwe. Through the event they
sought to bring together people interested in speaking out against ‘neoliberal capitalism, dictatorship and authoritarianism’. The conference was particularly geared toward ‘horizontal organizing based on principles of direct participatory democracy’. The participants included the likes of Cape Town’s Anti-Eviction Committee and the Anti-Privatisation Forum. For many of the youth in attendance, this was the first time travelling outside of South Africa. Among other issues, the conversation at the conference included a focus on ‘building Hip Hop Activism and orienting Hip Hop culture towards the people’s struggles for social justice’. The momentum from the forum resulted in a number of resolutions and cross-border collaborations. The following year, in 2006, the Khanya College Winter School in Johannesburg hosted a follow-up cultural activist network meeting, at which participants devised a common regional programme for Southern Africa. It is out of this circuit of meetings that the Khayelitsha-based Soundz of the South (SOS) was formed and emerged as another notable collective.

The members of SOS were inspired by ideas around decentralised, horizontal organising against neoliberal capitalism and they resonated with the concept of theoretical and tactical unity. SOS articulated their vision as ‘an anti-capitalist cultural resistance movement working with activists who use hip-hop and poetry to spread revolutionary messages, raise consciousness and critique neoliberalism’. A dominant contingent in the leadership of the collective also defined themselves as anarchist, rejecting any notions of central political party control while articulating the need for worker-controlled and owned resources. SOS mobilises, educates and organises in a number of ways, including live events like weekly park jams, monthly shows known as Rebel Sistah Cypha sessions, and issue-specific events such as ‘the Train Cypha against Xenophobia’. All their activities incorporate performance of songs and poetry that critique abuses of power, be it race, class or gender-based.

To counter the destruction wrought by the wave of attacks on ‘foreign’ African nationals, SOS hosted concerts in which they used their music to transform and shift the anger of community members who felt that ‘foreigners’ were stealing their jobs and absorbing scarce resources. SOS also fielded a seven-day walk to rally solidarity for the families who were affected by the attacks. Another striking statement they made was to organise an intervention best described as a ‘train cypher’, for which they gathered a few hundred youth, who met on a train at Chris Hani station in Khayelitsha and filled up a carriage, transforming the vehicle into a performance space in which poets, emcees and dramatists performed pre-written as well as improvised material around the topic of the attacks as they made their way to a march in the city centre. This intervention is profound on a number of levels given how politically loaded the
space of the public train is in South Africa, particularly when traversed by the black body. For members of the first generation of hip-hop heads who would also fill train carriages on Saturday mornings in the 80s with impromptu performances on route to The Base,⁵ there was an equally exhilarating feeling involved in repurposing a piece of infrastructure whose sole use hitherto was to cart their mothers, fathers, uncles and aunts across the city between township and city to and from exploitative jobs. On SOS’s Train Cypher, the entire carriage, filled with a cross-generational crowd of mostly isiXhosa speaking travellers, was captivated as SOS’s MC Khusta (RIP) held court and delivered the following words:

**Khusta:**

We voting every day but we’re still victims, The lies that we’re told everyday by the leaders, since 1994 still life is not getting better. Sizayi that everyday yinami tender, while those who do the voting still stuck up in these gutters. Millions dying every day. The shacks burning every year. And the need that is basic. If we want it we should pay. It’s like we are in world war three. But the enemy is different. You try to toyi-toyi they might shoot you from a distance.

Amandla! (Power)

**Carriage audience:**

Awethu! (to the people)

**Khusta:**

Amandla! (Power)

**Carriage audience:**

Awethu! (to the people)

**Khusta:**

Pantzi xenephobia Pantzi (Down with xenophobia, down!)

**Carriage audience:**

Pantzi!

**Khusta:**

Pezulu Africa, Pezulu (Rise Africa Rise)

**Carriage audience:**

Pezulu!

For Selekwa and the SOS collective, the main takeaway from this experience was that ‘Hip Hop forces people to be real to themselves and to their communities. So being real became important to us’. Following on from this experience, Selekwa, Khusta and MC Indigenous signed up as the Cape Town
contingent of ‘Makinika Southern Afrikan Hip Hop Caravan’ – a pan-African conference and music festival held in 2008 in Nairobi, Kenya. There the main topic of discussion revolved around what it means to politicise the youth that were so invested in hip hop, given that so much ‘apolitical’ hip hop was spreading on the airwaves and in cyberspace. In response, they conceived an initiative that could ‘channel that energy’ and ‘challenge the critical left to acknowledge that culture is crucial in building movement – not just toyi-toying’. While they had been a collective since 2006, it was after the urgent work around xenophobia in 2009 that they formalised themselves as an organisation that not only had a mission, but also a strategic action plan. Providing youth with materials to make informed political decisions was only part of the challenge. It was equally important to persuade ‘mainstream culture producers’ of the importance of hip hop’s politicising potential. SOS took it upon themselves to demonstrate that music and art indeed held possibilities for improving individual and social conditions. Thus they set up spaces in which they invited artists to engage in key issues and analyses. Instead of orienting themselves to the regular club scene, SOS started hosting park jams in Khayelitsha and surrounding areas in 2010, which they continue to do well into 2019.

One of the regular park jams they host is called ‘Struggle, Hiphop ’n Poetry’ which takes place at Makhaza Wetlands Park every Sunday. This event has consistently placed the most critical issues of the moment at its centre. For instance, on 3 August 2014, they inaugurated an annual session dedicated to memorialising the Marikana massacre.6 At this event, they not only showcased lyricists, but also ran a political stencilling and graffiti workshop. Another event under the ‘Struggle, Hiphop ’n Poetry’ banner was named ‘Don’t Vote! Organize! They’re all Corrupt’. Their social media promotion for the event on 2 September 2014 featured a blurb that read:

In the build up to the 2014 elections, politicians – whether from the DA, ANC, EFF, or PAC – have been calling on us to vote. As part of this, they have promised to meet people’s needs, end poverty and serve communities when they are elected. The promises of all these politicians are lies ... ONLY THE WORKING CLASS CAN FREE ITSELF – SO DON’T VOTE (https://www.facebook.com/, accessed April 2016).

For SOS and for many other crews who try to build grassroots movements with their music, the park jam has proven to be a resilient model for community engagement. It is directly inspired by the early South Bronx public events that symbolised youth making public spaces their own by repurposing existing infrastructure. Aspects of park jams include towering sound systems with light
poles and sheets of linoleum that transform rough concrete slabs into slick break
dance surfaces. More importantly, the park jam takes the party to the people.
This is significant in South Africa, where segregation remains spatially
embedded and necessitates it for black youth to travel huge distances to
experience the arts scenes in the city centre. Alongside park jams, SOS also ran
numerous workshops with a focus on political education. However, they began
to feel the need to take the messages off the page and out of the workshop room
in order to speak more directly to the targets of their analysis – corporations and
corrupt politicians. In doing so, they respond not only to the effects of
discursive containment, but also create opportunities and structures for their
members and their audiences to outmanoeuvre the ramifications of the colonial
legacy of physical containment. The ‘train cypha’ against xenophobia literally
appropriated a state asset, the public train, which although is highly mobile, has
its routes fixed in a way that still serves the social infrastructure created by the
migrant labour system. In other words, the train traverses from Khayelitsha
station through various locales that are still racially distinct as it makes its way
to the city centre where employment is to be found for the subaltern subject.
By transforming the inside of one of those carriages into a stage, a site of
politically charged theatre and no less with the purpose of drawing attention to
and showing solidarity for Africans targeted as foreigners, SOS demonstrate
how effective hip hop can be when used as a tool for enacting a transnational
and social justice-minded citizenship.

Conclusion

South Africa is at once a central node in the global consolidation of racial
capitalism on one hand, but on the other hand, it is also a nexus point in a
transnational circuit of subaltern resistance struggles since the 19th century,
through the fiery demise of the apartheid system a mere 25 years ago, and well
into the contemporary resurgence of the mass student movement. The
consequences of this historical duality have implications for scholarship on the
African diaspora as it complicates the African continent’s place in it. Inspired
by the work of the artists profiled here, this essay signifies my own aspirations
as a scholarly kaatagapher, as it joins with a hitherto marginal intellectual project
that turns the focus temporarily away from West Africa and the Gold Coast
toward the southern tip of the African landmass to map underrepresented
narratives onto a history of the black Atlantic. At the same time I have to
acknowledge that a disproportionate amount of attention has been paid to the
Atlantic diasporas when compared to the work that still needs to be carried out
on South Africa’s locatedness in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
This chapter examined some of the ways in which people and ideas emanating from Southern Africa have dialogued with people and ideas emanating from North America and the Caribbean. My work has not only been concerned with the kinds of ideas that circulate, but also the means by which they circulate – all the better to understand their shifting strategies for producing and circulating countercultures. The artists showcased here present instructive ways of thinking about how art constitutes avenues toward mobility and modes of belonging that run counter to hegemonic political communities. In dialoguing with the work of Garuba in particular the chapter has offered the argument that hip-hop artists through practices of mapping in lyrics and music videos – which I have called kaatography – contribute to a vital challenge to colonially inscribed renditions of place and space that continue to contain subaltern subjects, territorially and discursively. Thus, the essay highlights vehicles for transnational cultural dialogue which include, among others, modalities and artistic forms like jazz and reggae and eventually hip hop. Such an inquiry situates my work in a tradition of scholarship that has traced the spectacular forays (as well as the mundane musings) of artists, activists and agitators who, facing the psychosocial, sociopolitical and political economic aftermaths of the middle passage and related catastrophes, dared to reimagine beyond what Gilroy called ‘the continuing lure of ethnic absolutisms’, towards an affinity with subalternity beyond narrowly defined ethnicity and state-centred nationalisms, and ultimately forging new possibilities for citizenships in the 21st century.

Notes

1 Sophiatown was a prominent location on the outskirts of Johannesburg during the 1950s. It was a centre of music and cultural innovation incubating the city’s Jazz and Maraba musicians, poets, writers and activists. The apartheid regime viewed the area with disdain because of the high degree of racial miscegenation that occurred within its confines. By the late 1940s Sophiatown had a population of nearly 54,000 black Africans, 3,000 coloureds, 1,500 Indians and 686 Chinese. (Brink 2010) In 1955 the government deployed some 2,000 policemen to forcefully remove hundreds of families and resettle them according to race in segregated areas – blacks to Meadowlands in Soweto, coloureds to Eldorado Park and Indians to Lanasia. This move spawned a spate of protest including a number of songs such as the Sun Valley Sisters’ ‘Bye Bye Sophiatown’, Miriam Makeba’s ‘Sophiatown is Gone’ and Strike Valakazi’s ‘Meadowlands’. Many in the struggle would come to draw parallels between Sophiatown and District 6 in Cape Town which equally stood as a place of cultural significance, producing legendary figures in the world of art and resistance and similarly fell victim to the same policies.

2 For more on this relationship see for example: Charles P. Henry, ‘Delivering Daniel: The Dialectic of Ideology and Theology in the Thought of Martin Luther King, Jr.’, Journal of Black Studies 17, no. 3 (1987). Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787 (Taylor and Francis 2003); Richard
Knight, ‘Documenting the U.S. Solidarity Movement – with Reflections on the Sanctions and Divestment Campaigns’.

3 Spaza is a mixture of isiXhosa and Afrikaans.

4 In this scene, the Prophets are somewhat prescient as the Rhodes statue connected to this memorial, part of University of Cape Town property became the focal point in the #RhodesMustFall movement almost 20 years later.

5 The Base was an important space in Cape Town’s hip-hop history. It was a club in the city’s central business district that made itself available for youth of colour to gather. It would play host not only to a hip-hop sessions run by the likes of Prophets of the City and attended by crews like Black Noise, but also accommodated other fringe music/cultural scenes like the emerging Punk scene.

6 This refers to an incident now widely known as the ‘Marikana Massacre’ on 16 August 2012 where South African National Police force cracked down violently on crowds of striking mine workers gathered to protest unjust compensation rates at the Lonmin platinum mine at Wonderkop near Marikana, Rustenburg municipality. 17 mine workers were fatally wounded and 78 injured in a tragedy described as the most lethal use of force by the South African security forces on its own citizens since 1976.

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**Songs/Albums/Music Videos**

Rosey die Rapper. 2018. ‘My Naam Hoor’ Produced by Ashmatic on the EP *Wie is Ek*.

Music video produced by Azania Rizing Productions, Directed by Kris Kets.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAEUTsz3OL8.

———1997 ‘Cape Crusader’ on Ghetto Code Ghetto Ruff.
———1993. ‘United we Stand’ on Age of Truth Ghetto Ruff.
———1995 ‘Never Again’ on Universal SoulJaZ Nation Records.

Music video (director unknown) available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7R8fjCOfDY.

CREAM (Marvin Van Wyk) 2012. ‘Cape Flats’ on Hype Presents CREAM – Bruin
Brood Pioneer Unit.

Gebaste Rhymes 2012. ‘Kaap issie Bom’ on One Day unreleased.

Busta Rhymes 1997. ‘Dangerous’ on When Disaster Strikes Flipmode
Records/Electra Records.

Music video directed by Hype Williams available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iu-dxGdIkDQ.

Dr. Dre featuring Snoop Dogg, Korrup & Nate Dogg 2001. ‘The Next
Episode’ single Aftermath/Interscope.

YoungstaCPT feat. Maloon Taliboom 2017. ‘Arabian Gang$ter’ on Yungloon
Taliboom TuneCore
(on behalf of NOMANDLA/Boyoom Connective/Y?GEN).
———2018. ‘Young Van Riebeek’ (YVR) on YVR Platoon Ltd (on behalf of
Y?GEN & NOMANDLA).

Music video directed by Imraan Christian available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j_w4TQCloCA

Films

Berry Gordy 1985. The Last Dragon directed by Michael Schultz Film.

Spike Lee 1989..Do the Right Thing for 40 Acres and a Mule Filmworks.
SECTION D

Concluding Reflections on Where We Think Citizenship Will Go in Future
Chapter 15


Harry Garuba

Introduction

In the wake of the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of apartheid, the idea of democracy in postcolonial, post-conflict, post-cold war polities became inextricably linked with the idea of civil society. The conventional assumption was that democracies will thrive only if and only when civil society is strong. A great deal of effort was expended by way of research and intellectual production, on the one hand, and material support, on the other, to civil society organisations in an effort to cultivate, strengthen and deepen their reach in the new democracies that were emerging in various parts of the world. From the states behind the Berlin Wall in Eastern Europe, and the emerging and re-emerging democracies in Africa and Latin America, cultivating civil society became the ethos of the times. The reasoning being that drive for civil society was that an active citizenry thoroughly engaged with the state through civil society was the bulwark against the rise of demagoguery and dictatorship; it would also act as the force that strengthens the institutions of governance. Citizenship was thus figured as a particular kind of relationship between the citizen and the state in which a rational, autonomous subject was conferred with specific rights and was thus, as a result, conceived as having certain obligations with respect to that nation state.

In South Africa where the struggle against apartheid had been conducted through mass mobilisation of citizens, it was easy for this civil society and state-centred idea of citizenship to take hold in the transition years of the 1990s. This is understandable because the struggle against apartheid was a struggle against a state that had denied the vast majority of its populace the basic rights of citizenship. In short, a citizen-civil-society-state model of citizenship became hegemonic in thinking about forms of sociality, solidarity and belonging in the world. This idea took hold in emerging democracies all over the world, from Eastern Europe through Latin America to Africa and Asia. Why was it so easy to ignore or forget the fact that this apprenticeship model and the approach to democracy it promoted failed dismally in the first post-independence states in Africa, for example? Had this not been the basis of the ‘civilising mission’ and
was this not the bequest of colonialism to the first states to gain political independence at the end of empire? A possible reason is that the failures of those first post-independence states could, with some justification, be attributed to the rivalries and geopolitics of the cold war era. Amartya Sen (1999) in ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’ also appears to favour this evolutionary idea when he argues that various limited forms of democracy have dotted human history from the Classical Greek era to the modern period but that it was only in the 20th century that the idea of democracy as a universal value and as an accepted norm became globally accepted.

However, this model entirely privileged the state and equal citizenship and, in its focus on civil society, it also ignored other kinds of transactional relationships that groups cultivate with the state that are not based on ideas of legality, rights, equal citizenship, responsibility and notions of the rational, autonomous subject.

In his book *Lineages of Political Society*, Partha Chatterjee (2011: 19) argues that:

> It is important to stress that the normative principles of Western political theory continue to enjoy enormous influence all around the world as models worthy of emulation. The actual practices of modern political life have resulted, however, not in the abandonment of these norms but in the piling up of exceptions in the course of the administration of the law as mediated by the processes of political society. The relation between norm and practices has resulted in a series of improvisations. It is the theorization of these improvisations that has become the task of postcolonial political theory.

Chatterjee’s point is that a norm-deviation paradigm has become the standard way of speaking about and analysing these political practices that fall outside the theoretical framework of western political theory. To be a citizen was to be this and not that; and that – no matter how numerous the ‘series of improvisations’ and exceptions were – remained outside the norm in the vocabulary of liberal democracy and normative political theory.

For him:

> The question is: can the contemporary practices be framed as a redefined norm that endorses differentiated rather than equal citizenship, as the normative standard of the modern state? (p. 24)

And thereafter he follows up with this other question: ‘Has there been a redefinition of citizenship in actual practice that is awaiting a political theorist to put into normative language?’ (p. 25). It is worth noting that Chatterjee here
foregrounds ‘actual practice’ in opposition to theory and its precepts. His observation is that the actual practice of citizenship does not accord with the normative conception and definition but has still not been theorised to give it conceptual authority.

What Chatterjee’s focus on the exceptions that define the actual practice of democracy does not explore and Amartya Sen’s narrative of the gradual expansion and acceptance of democracy as universal norm entirely sidesteps is the enduring impact of the denial and deferral of citizenship; that is, what in the present, it has done to the construction of citizenship within these groups denied citizenship, especially in those instances where this denial was enforced by violence and consolidated within racialised structures of knowledge/power, thus creating what in Foucauldian terms we could call a biopolitics of terror as a technology of rule. How is this trauma written into the scripts of citizenship that interpellate and define the subjects of this violence? How is this violence embedded in their subjectivities as ‘new’ citizens? Surely, the history of this violent denial – from slavery to Haiti, from colonialism to apartheid – makes its mark in various ways, especially on subjects who had tried to think freedom, especially as the tide of democracy was rising in Euro-American societies while they were still being actively denied inclusion in this new humanity? The spectres it creates are not easily accommodated within the normative narrative of citizenship that does not take into account the moments of pre-citizenship that preceded it.

This chapter focuses on an actual practice of citizenship, as represented in a work of narrative fiction, that carries all these traces and scars of a past is that not past. It explores the spectres that haunt the normative notion of citizenship in contemporary South Africa. Beyond South Africa, it must be said, the spectre of citizenship haunts the contemporary world. First articulated as a claim to a specific form of belonging that creates horizontal affiliation among people/populations, citizenship also rapidly – simultaneously, some may argue – became an instrument for legitimising exclusions, of determining who counts, who matters, on the one hand, and who is dis-counted and who is considered disposable, on the other. In the colonial world, disposability was not simply notional; it was one of the major technologies of rule. Citizenship acquired significance because it specified an order of belonging, a regime of rights and obligations, anchored on a political rationality framed around the priority of the rational subject, the nation and of democracy. However, as indicated earlier, citizenship was also defined in opposition to its Other/s, or, as Chatterjee states it, by its ‘exceptions’.

The spectral Other/s in the shadow of citizenship has lately become more visible in the age of Donald Trump, the rise of the nationalist far right, xenophobia and the televised plight of refugees across the world, particularly
from Myanmar and the Mediterranean to the US–Mexico border. In short, it has become quite clear that the intelligibility of the notion of citizenship depends on its exclusions, its spectral others, from the slave to the refugee. The more visible presence of the slave (cf: Nima Elbagir’s CNN documentary of *Slave Auctions in Libya*) and the refugee on the horizon of our vision shows that what haunts citizenship is not only its violent excretions (in form of those it expels) and the spectre of social death but death in the physical, literal sense, pure and simple. The images of dead babies, of bodies picked up from the sea have migrated from the confines of detention centres and the documents of immigration NGOs into our living rooms. In spite of the deaths that lurk everywhere, the quest for citizenship is still largely propelled forward by displacing and repressing this understanding of its hauntology of death and ghostly presences and focusing on its narrative of benefits, belonging and affiliation. But what happens when this narrative is pressed to its limits? What happens when the struggle for this ideal of citizenship falls apart at the moment of its attainment? The moment when the quest produces its own requiem such as is represented in these stories of those excluded at its borders and – for our purposes – as depicted in the first pages of Zakes Mda’s (1995) novel *Ways of Dying*?

In this chapter, I will be turning to fiction to explore these questions. I focus on *Ways of Dying*, a novel set in the 1990s at the end of apartheid and the period of the transition to democracy in South Africa. In this transitional state – the border, if you like – between non-citizenship and citizenship, a death takes place to set the events of the novel in motion. This is a death that defies the conventional, narrative frames for representing and accounting for such events in the time of apartheid and time truly now seems out of joint. This death at the dawn of citizenship brings to the foreground a whole series of oppositions and through these aporias and the life and love of Toloki, the professional mourner who is the protagonist of this novel, I reflect on the spectres that haunt the notion of citizenship in the South African context. I draw attention to the dialectic of presence/absence at the centre of the narrative and to the alternative or supplementary forms of citizenship, of exceptions, that can be extrapolated from the lived experience of the subaltern characters portrayed in the narrative and what one might call the practices of the poor. The practices of the poor in the business of living their daily lives often defy our social scientific categories for understanding and accounting for the phenomenon of social life.

I try to engage with Chatterjee’s questions and concerns about these practices that fall outside of our categories by exploring this novel, in which a character, a self-styled professional mourner, Toloki, enacts a new form of citizenship different, in many respects, from those previously examined in the empirical pile up of exceptions that have been highlighted and examined in the
domain of comparative postcolonial politics. Falling outside the categories of normative citizenship, or of primordial and civil citizenship (Ekeh 1975), of citizen and subject (Mamdani 1996), of bounded or flexible citizenship (Ong 1999, Nyamnjoh 2007), or of minorities, autochthony, migration and citizenship, (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000,) etc., it is truly a form of citizenship that is unintelligible when processed through these frameworks; it thus falls outside our order of knowledge.

I have chosen to focus on a work of narrative fiction because as many scholars (Nyamnjoh 2012, 2917, Zeleza 1999) have argued, Africa novels often provide us with ‘thick descriptions’ of the social worlds and contexts in which they are set. But more importantly, for my own purposes, this particular novel also falls out of the frame of the usual narratives of the anti-apartheid struggle and the civil society and nation-building narratives of the rainbow nation that followed. In this respect, it is unique in its exploration of modes of identity and belonging that do not fit into the conventional frames of narrativisation. Toloki is neither the anti-colonial, anti-apartheid, nationalist subject of citizenship, nor is he subject of some tribal authority, nor is he the post-apartheid subject of civil society nor the cosmopolitan, deterritorialised flexible citizen of globalisation nor is he the subject of political society in the sense in which Chatterjee examines it in his Indian examples. Toloki therefore presents a new perspective on postcolonial citizenship that none of these previously explored categories capture. What I argue in this chapter is that more than anything else Toloki represents the spectre that haunts our ideas of citizenship, he performs a form of spectral citizenship that not only falls outside of the frames we have developed to understand postcolonial citizenship but one that can only be understood by the deployment of a poetics of spectrality and perplexity that depends upon the slippage and scrambling of oppositional categories.

It is no coincidence that the novel begins with a struggle between a funeral procession and a wedding procession for right of way and that each one refuses to give way for the other. Though the narrator tells us that ‘out of respect for the dead, it is customary for funeral processions to have the right of way’ the bridal procession refuses to give in and ‘the wedding party is enjoying the stalemate’ (p. 6). This symbolic struggle between life and death is significant because it sets the stage for the procession of binaries and slippages which the narrative parades. For example, the death of Noria’s child with which the novel begins is caused not by the state and its agents as in apartheid times but by ‘our own people’. In another instance, in one funeral the wrong man is about to be buried when it is discovered that that is the wrong corpse. These instances provide us with illustrations of the kinds of perplexity that – I argue – act as a stand in for the idea of citizenship in the postcolonial world and haunt the very idea of citizenship, no matter how articulated and defined. So pervasive are these
instance of instability, of shifting identities and slippages of categories, that the personal name – that stable signifier of an individual’s identity also becomes a matter of contestation. The narrator tells us that: ‘The result was that Napu continued to call her son Vutha. The Mountain Woman continued to call her grandson Jealous Down, and Xesibe thought the best name will be Mistake, and proceeded to use that name at all times’ (75). In fact, when Vutha dies a horrifying death, the second son is named Vutha and this is the Vutha that is killed ‘by our own people’.

In the rest of this chapter, I will first explain the terms hauntology and the spectral as I deploy them and then relate these notions to the practice of post-apartheid citizenship as manifested in the novel. I will be doing this through a close, tropological reading of *Ways of Dying* to highlight the hauntedness of both the text and of Toloki and his father, Jwara, and of Noria, their common muse. I conclude with a note on haunting and spectrality and the kind of citizenship enacted in the novel.

**Haunting, Hauntology and the Perplexities of Postapartheid Citizenship**

Death lives with us every day. Indeed our ways of dying are our ways of living. Or should I say our ways of living are our ways of dying. (Zakes Mda 1995: 89)


> Slavery has ended, but something of it continues to live on, in the social geography of where peoples reside, in the authority of collective wisdom and shared benightedness, in the veins of the contradictory formation we call New World modernity, propelling, as it always has, a something to be done. *Such endings that are not over is what haunting is about.* (p. 139, emphasis added)

It is interesting to note that this statement could well have been made with a remarkable degree of accuracy about post-apartheid South Africa. All it would take to make this transposition is to change the word ‘slavery’ to ‘apartheid’ and the phrase ‘New World modernity’ to ‘post-apartheid modernity’. As noted at the beginning of this essay, the idea of a post-apartheid South Africa was anchored on a very modern idea of citizenship, civil society and the building of democratic institutions. What this idea failed to take into account was the history of settler colonialism and its reliance on violence as a means and mode of subject formation. This point has been well articulated and elaborated upon in Thiven Reddy’s (2015) book *South Africa, Settler Colonialism and the Failures of Liberal*
Democracy, which examines the contradictory formation of post-apartheid South African liberal democracy. Apartheid may have ended but something of it lives on, especially in its pervasive violence, in its social processes of subjectivisation and the shared benightedness it produced. As Gordon argues, it is this ending that is not over that haunting is about. Ways of Dying is a novel that explores aspects of this hauntology.

The term hauntology (French: hauntologie) was first used by Jacques Derrida in his book Spectres of Marx (1994) building upon the famous first sentence of The Communist Manifesto: ‘A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.’ The image of spectres and hauntings used by arch-materialists such as Marx and Engels and then appropriated by Derrida (1994), the prime theorist of deconstruction, may have provided ground for its resurgence as a means of social enquiry and as a trope for the exploration of literary texts and cultural phenomena in literary and cultural studies in recent times. According to Colin Davis in ‘Hauntology, Spectres and Phantoms’ (2005),

... in literary circles, Derrida’s rehabilitation of ghosts as a respectable subject of enquiry has proved to be extraordinarily fertile. Hauntology supplants its near-homonym ontology, replacing the priority of being and presence, with the figure of the ghost as that which is neither present nor absent, neither dead nor alive. Attending to the ghost is an ethical injunction insofar as it occupies the place of the Levinasian Other: a wholly irrecoverable intrusion into our world, which is not comprehensible within our available intellectual frameworks, but whose otherness we are responsible for preserving. (p. 373)

Later in the same essay, Davis asserts that ‘Derrida’s spectre is a deconstructive figure hovering between life and death, presence and absence, and making established certainties vacillate. It does not belong to the order of knowledge’ (p. 376, emphasis added). Being both present and absent, the spectre challenges our conventional categories of knowledge by planting a logical contradiction at the heart of the process of knowing.

The narrative of Ways of Dying and the figure of the professional mourner, Toloki, clearly disturbs our established certainties, troubles dominant understandings of citizenship, and slips through the categories which anchor our order of knowledge. I have already alluded to instances in the text in which established categories are scrambled and subverted. Let me elaborate briefly on one that bears directly on the question of citizenship. You will recall that at the beginning of the novel a young boy is killed. The Nurse, the character who gives
the funeral speech that is supposed to detail the life and circumstances of the
death, begins his speech with these words: ‘There are many ways of dying! ...
This our brother’s way is a way that has left us without words in our mouths.’ (p. 3,
emphasis added). He then describes why this particular death is different and
has left them speechless:

“This little brother was our own child, and his death is more painful because
it is our own creation. It is not the first time that we bury little children. We bury
them every day. But they are killed by the enemy … those we are fighting against.
This our little brother was killed by those who are fighting to free us! (p. 3)

What the Nurse is saying here is that the death has left them speechless
because the framework for understanding this is unavailable. Note the paradox
of a death that is our own creation or the irony of being killed by those fighting
to free us. During the apartheid period when children were murdered by the
state security police, the deaths were given meaning and made comprehensible
through the rituals of the anti-apartheid struggle funeral where the death was
conceived as a sacrifice, martyrdom for the cause of freedom; and the funeral
procession itself was the reaffirmation of resistance. Though the street
committee is still playing a part in this funeral, the anti-apartheid funeral does
not provide a script for how this should be performed. This death, the Nurse
says, is our own creation. The street committee’s vigilance this time is not
vigilance with respect to state security and its spies but with respect to ‘our own
people’. There is no sacrifice, no martyrdom, no meaning. The resistance funeral
script was constructed to meet the needs of the struggle for citizenship and the
choreographed performance of funerals and processions was enacted to achieve
this; it has no place for this, the killing of one of our own by our own people: it
is a non-sacrificial death. To use Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) description of the
shadowy figure of the homosacer, ‘he can be killed but cannot be sacrificed’. Yet
all the protocols of the anti-apartheid funeral are deployed, together with the
street committee for which there is really no scripted role in this instance. This
is the textbook example of the past loitering in the present, a haunting presence,
incomprehensible within the established order of things. This is what leaves the
Nurse without words in his mouth.

The South African transition to democracy is usually portrayed as a non-
vviolent affair with blacks and whites, and the various political parties, coming
together in a negotiated settlement. In short, the dominant narrative is a linear
one, emphasising the gradual attainment of full citizenship, followed by national
reconciliation. What this story ignores is the massive scale of the violence that
characterised these years – the so-called black-on-black violence that signalled
the living presence of apartheid, even as its death was being proclaimed and
celebrated. This large scale violence is often attributed to the ‘morbid symptoms’ of the transition, recalling Antonio Gramsci’s famous words in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (1971): ‘The old is dying, and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms’ (p. 276). And *Ways of Dying* is seen as the classic novel of the transition, punning on the word transition which captures the twin ideas of change and of death. Despite the multiple connotations involved in the invocation of the term, it does not sufficiently foreground the spectrality of the moment in the manner in which Mda’s novel does. This insufficient recognition of the hauntology of apartheid, the fact that it is an end that refuses to end, led to the valorisation of the linear narrative of transition to democracy and citizenship and an ignoring of the ghosts that still haunt the present: these ghosts that live on in the ‘social geography of where peoples reside’ – to quote Gordon’s apt description – and in their deep rootedness in apartheid technologies of rule that entrenched violence and the disposability of human life. This is what hauntology is about: an end that lingers on, haunting the present; an absence that is actively present.

*Ways of Dying* and the Poetics of Postcolonial Perplexity

It is important to begin this section with an explanation of why – though unusual in the social sciences – a recourse to poetics as an avenue of social inquiry and social theory may serve as a better analytic framework for understanding the question of citizenship in colonial and postcolonial contexts. A poetics, simply stated, is a theory of literature, literary and aesthetic forms, often focusing on their formal structure and the social ideologies that they encode. Aristotle’s *Poetics*, for instance, deals with tragedy and many others have explored the poetics of the realist or the romantic novel, to give two other examples. Historians and social scientists have also deployed the formal properties of literary forms to explain historical personalities or events or social phenomena. The examples of CLR James’s *The Black Jacobins* (1989) and David Scott’s *Conscripts of Modernity* (2004) easily come to mind.

We have already established the fact that the overwhelming emphasis on civil society as a way of strengthening democracies in the post-cold world period was part of a linear plot of democratic development that moves from transforming non-citizens into fully fledged citizens of functioning democratic polities: a plot followed and endorsed almost entirely across the board. The playing out of this plot and the purchase it had as a conceptual leverage for moving out of autocracy to democracy was enacted in full view both by Western powers, donor agencies and Foundations, and the anti-authoritarian, anti-apartheid national democratic elites that were about to take power in the transitioning new states. These plots almost all have a teleology that can be...
reduced to literary form as many anti-colonial nationalist biographies have done: a pre-colonial state of innocence, followed by the disruption of colonial oppression and alienation and then the anti-colonial resistance which culminates in freedom and national restoration. This vision of history as available for narrative emplotment and explicable through a recourse to poetics is present in all grand narratives. Therefore, I would argue, that the more complex poetics of the spectres of post-apartheid citizenship deserves this kind of attention.

Speaking of spectral presences, the idea of death as an ending that is not quite over is embedded within the frameworks of many African belief systems and religions and that notion of ancestors who, while dead, remain ‘alive’ in the present encapsulates this. However, it is not this kind of death and ancestral presence that Mda (1995) foregrounds in this novel. Rather, it is as Sam Durrant (2005) argues in ‘The Invention of Mourning in Post-apartheid Literature’, more in the order of what anthropologists call ‘bad deaths’.

Rather than constituting a culture’s most entrenched and unchanging traditions, mourning rites often reflect the instability and adaptability of colonised cultures, especially when communities are responding to new forms of death and dying. What anthropologists term mortuary rites usually relate to the so-called good deaths, where the death can be anticipated, preparations made and relations gathered around. It is under the pressure of dealing with what anthropologists call ‘bad’ deaths, those which happen outside of the home, in unexpected or unknown circumstances, that mourning rites undergo their most radical reinvention. (Durrant: 441–2)

Toloki’s acts of mourning both follow this pattern of radical reinvention while also maintaining a sense of continuity with the conventional mourning rites meant to re-inscribe the value of the person and the community. Just as the anti-apartheid funeral had extended this affirmation of the human and communal value to the question of citizenship, Toloki’s performance may be said to be tied to the issue of citizenship otherwise. We will return to this performance of citizenship otherwise later. But first, let us take a look at the directions critical commentary on the novel have taken.

There is a critical consensus in reviews and studies of Zakes Mda’s *Ways of Dying* (1995) that the novel is a fictional representation of the South African transition from the apartheid past to the new era of democracy. Set in the early 1990s, the period of South Africa’s transition for apartheid to democracy, *Ways of Dying* is a novel of transitions – an allegorical exploration of states of transition – political, historical, literal, symbolic, etc.: political transition as in a change of governments; historical transition as in the movement from one era to another;
transition at the literal level as in dying and death; and lastly, symbolic transitions in terms that are spiritual, aesthetic, creative, personal, etc.

Indeed, the trope of transition is so central to the novel that it bears it in its title; hence the quote from Gramsci’s *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (1971) which has become one of the most famous statements of the nature of such transitions: ‘The old is dying, and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms’ (p. 276). The morbid symptoms that Gramsci speaks of are everywhere present in the novel. Several critics have attempted to explore these morbid symptoms and the narrative techniques with which they are depicted (Grant Farred 2000; Rita Barnard, (2005); David Atwell 2005).

However, what has not been fully explored is the trope of aporia through which Mda presents these morbid symptoms. The trope of aporia is the trope of uncertainty and perplexity: it challenges our sense of distinction between categories, destabilises the foundations of logic and rationality; subverts the logical principle of non-contradiction: its site of operation is the unstable zone where opposites collapse into each other and hierarchies are reversed and our sense of the order of things (to use Foucault’s phrase) is scrambled. It is in the language of hauntology incomprehensive within our conventional knowledge frameworks, existing within a Fanonian ‘zone of occult instability’.

It is important to note at this point that anti-apartheid literature was characterised by certainties – clearly demarcated rights and wrongs – written, so to speak, in black and white. And the anti-apartheid movement plotted a journey to citizenship with its own milestones and landmarks, crafted with a sense of certainty of the destination. With regard to South African literature, Njabulo Ndebele’s seminal essay ‘The Rediscovery of the Ordinary’ (1984) makes the point about this prevalence of certainty in this literature arguing that the literature of the apartheid era presented us with straight heroes and villains in an apocalyptic landscape of struggle between good and evil where was no moral ambiguity or narrative nuance. An unrelentingly bleak social realism was its major narrative form and this demanded that the facts of oppression and suffering and violence be simply paraded without let.

In *Ways of Dying* these certainties give way to ambiguity and ambivalence: and, beyond these, to paradoxes and aporias. By foregrounding the trope of slippage, Mda’s *Ways of Dying* acts as an example/illustration of the poetics of postcolonial perplexity, focusing on the aporias that characterise daily life in what has been called the post-colony. This perplexity pervades the entire novel and, in a fundamental sense, it represents what I term the performance of citizenship otherwise.

Let us briefly recall the major story line of the novel. A professional mourner, Toloki, attends a funeral in an informal settlement in the city and
discovers that the woman who has lost her son is Noria, his home girl, who he hasn’t seen for decades since she left the village. From this chance meeting, the promise to see each other again and from then onward the stories of their lives become entwined again as they had been in the past. Through a series of flashbacks and reminiscences we are told these stories just as the stories of their present enfold. In the present, he assists her in securing material for and building her new shack and a romantic relationship develops between them. In normal circumstances this will be a romantic comedy but not in the world of Toloki and Noria where life/death, creativity/destruction, oppression/liberation, purity/prostitution are twinned. When Toloki tells Noria, ‘I cannot live without death’ or ‘You will be coming home to where death is’ (p. 115), we recognise the depth of his attachment to the funereal. As we are led through the emotional and psychic landscape of their lives, we are presented with paradoxes and contradictions that are held together in aporetic balance.

These strange couplings are presumably what has led critics to invoke the Bakhtin’s (1984) notion of the carnivalesque in speaking of this novel. But the carnivalesque is only one of the techniques deployed by Mda to achieve this coupling of profundity and profanity in this novel. It is interesting that the one character in the novel that becomes a millionaire is Nefelovhodwe, the coffin maker, who becomes disgustingly rich from the proceeds of death.

There is a discursive blending of narrative techniques from different genres and traditions of storytelling. In addition to the carnivalesque techniques of folk performance and humour already alluded to, narrative strategies derived from oral traditions of storytelling are deployed again and again. These strategies include the use of the communal voice – the collective ‘we’ narrator, the use of fantastic events, the reliance on rumours, hearsay and communal lore, the role accorded to dreams and premonitions, repetitions and so on. A good example of these repeated phrases is the use of epithets as a mode of characterisation. Noria is often described as ‘Noria of the aloes’ (p. 155), ‘She of the poppy-seed beauty’ (p. 176), or simply as ‘That stuck-up bitch Noria’ and these are repeated several times in the narrative. Nefolovhodwe’s city wife has no name: she is called ‘the petite girl as the great man’s wife’ or ‘the woman who was referred to as his wife’ and these are repeated several times in the narrative. Noria is muse both to Toloki and his father, Jwara: Vathu, the first, is eaten by dogs and the grisly death is repeated when Vathu, the Second, is necklaced with a rubber tyre and set alight.

These oral narrative forms are blended with the social realism of everyday life in the township and in the rural space. It is a measure of the narrative achievement of this novel that these realistic descriptions blend seamlessly with
the magical and fantastic elements depicting a plurality of ways of being and ways of knowing in the world.

**Citizenship Otherwise: An(Other) Order of Knowledge**

Let us return to the other ways in which the spectre of citizenship haunts the narrative of *Ways of Dying*. I will focus on only two of the major tropes of citizenship in contemporary capitalist, liberal democratic societies: consumption and mobility. After Noria’s shack is set alight and burnt down, Toloki assists her in building a new shack, using various discarded material that they can find or salvage. And then, Toloki obtains old copies of *Home and Garden* and proceeds to plaster the entire shack with pictures from pages of the magazine. And in true bourgeois luxury home-owner fashion, they get into the habit of taking a walk around their property, strolling through it garden, taking in its sights and smells, the brooks and ponds, the plants and flowers, its sheer landscape of aesthetic pleasure, expertly designed to appeal to the senses. Here is a snippet of one of their walks.

“You know I am an outdoors type. Let’s talk a walk in our garden, Noria.”

“Yes, Toloki, let’s go and admire our beautiful garden. You have put so much work into making it the best garden in all the land.”

They walk out of their Mediterranean-style mansion through the arbour that is painted crisp white. This is the lovely entrance that graces their private garden. Four tall pillars hoist an overhead trellis laced with Bells of Portugal roses. A bed of delphiniums, snapdragons, cosmos, and hollylocks rolls to the foot of the arbour. Noria and Toloki take a brief rest in the wooded gazebo, blanketed by foliage and featuring a swing. Noria likes to sit on the swing and Toloki pushing her.

The whole garden is potpourri of colour, designed by expert landscape architects … There are also varieties of grasses that create a natural palette of textures, rhythm and soft colours. There are slashing brooks and waterfalls that cascade to a collecting pool. Pools and ponds are a haven of wildlife and water plants. Besides giving the place a rugged, semi-wild look, the variety of bushes and shrubs create hiding places for Noria and Toloki when they play hide-and-seek.

It is getting late so they must return to the house. (p. 104)

Remember: all of this is happening in a squatter camp, in a shack built of odds and ends by a poor, unemployed couple: a home with no furniture and hardly any space to move around. This is a ‘house’ built with abandoned zinc sheets, cardboard, the waste of the dockyards, literally trash collected from here and there. And this stroll through the garden, the sumptuous dining table and
bedrooms is all done inside the shack without irony. This imaginative walk, assisted by pictures from *Home and Garden*, elaborated in fine detail, mimics the lifestyle of the consumer citizen, who has money to spend and is therefore able to afford a dream home and all the accoutrements of a modern home in the city that recreates the natural abundance and greenery of the rural landscape. The mimicry performed here echoes Homi Bhabha’s notion of colonial mimicry in ‘Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse’. Toloki and Noria enact an *original* that is not quite original: it is an ‘original’ as represented by *Home and Garden*. Their performance like colonial mimicry is the imaginative imitation of an original that is itself an imitation, a pictorial representation. The recreation is so intense that on one occasion when they are unable to recreate the enchantment because they are tired from the day’s activities, Noria bursts into tears and apologises to Toloki.

“Perhaps we should take a walk in the garden before we sleep. It is beautiful to walk among the flowers with you, Toloki.”

“Yes, let us walk in the garden.”

However, they do not walk in the garden. They stare at the pictures on the walls, but are unable to evoke the enchantment. They concentrate very hard, without success. Noria bursts out crying and apologises to Toloki. She says it is all her fault. Her mind is full of too many things that are not pleasant. (pp. 165–166)

The earnestness with which she says this underscores the depth of their investment in this performance; this spectral enactment of consumerism and citizenship is an integral part of their identities and their relationship. Fantasy and phantasmagoria define this appropriation of the tropes of citizenship.

These scenes are closely aligned with the image of Toloki walking the city in an enactment of mobility: he moves around with a shopping trolley, filled with almost all his worldly possessions, visits all the public spaces, observes the hustle and bustle of city life, with all its varied assortment of characters and its characteristics. Toloki has fallen in love with these so much so that he takes a wistful look of regret at it as he moves to start his new life with Noria in the squatter camp at the city’s edge.

Toloki walks along the highway, pushing his shopping cart. It is the middle of the night, and there are not many cars on the road. He walks unhurriedly, sometimes stopping to look at the stars. And to look back at the harbour. He is going to miss the throbbing life, the nightwatchmen, the dockworkers, the sailors and their prostitutes, even the inane grin of the tourists from the inland provinces. He is making a major change in his life, and it is not clear in his mind why he is doing it. (p. 109)
Like a flaneur and a citizen-consumer, he saunters through the city. But this character, we know, is not the rational, autonomous subject of modernity and civility. It is significant that the shopping cart has been ‘expropriated’ from a shopping mall. Yet he moves through the city unpretentiously, like a subaltern flaneur, in his smelly clothes, savouring its smells, it open places, its sea, beaches, docks, etc. Consumption for him is plastering the walls of his shack with pictures from Home and Garden and taking his lover on an imaginative stroll through the garden, lounging in sitting room, lying and rolling on the luxurious bed, etc. He mimics and mocks all the indices of modern citizenship, specifically the idea of the citizen as consumer and mobile cosmopolitan. Rather like baby Noria, who as a child cried when she was tickled, Toloki’s performance of citizenship reverses all the conventions and tropes of citizenship that we know. And, in this sense, it challenges our order of knowledge and, like a spectre, haunts our notions of citizenship.

As we argued at the beginning of this chapter, these spectres of citizenship are not easily accommodated within the normative narrative of citizenship because that does not take into account the moments of pre-citizenship that preceded it. This moment was characterised and defined by the deployment of violence and disposability as technologies of rule. These technologies in their turn created subjects formed in the crucible of death and disposability and the core of this subjectivity lingers on into the democratic present of citizenship, characterised by a yawning gap of structural inequality.

By Way of Conclusion

Spectres of citizenship? Are these spectres only present in postcolonial contexts? Abdul JanMohamed’s (2005) fascinating book The Death-Bound Subject: Richard Wright’s Archaeology of Death, which explores subject formation under conditions in which the threat of violence, lynching and death are always present, shows that in other contexts of deep violence and historical traumas beyond the postcolonial, these spectres always remain hauntingly present. How does an understanding of these hauntings expand or redefine our notions of citizenship? How does paying attention to the spectre – representing an ending that is not over, an absence that permeates our present – enable us rethink the question of citizenship? Will performances of citizenship otherwise be helpful in this endeavour? It is more appropriate, I believe, to conclude with these questions that open up the discursive space rather than provide answers that aspire to closure? In sum, therefore, these are the questions that I hope this chapter will generate.
Bibliography


Rethinking Citizenship in 21st Century Africa: Some Conceptual Considerations

Francis B. Nyamnjoh

Introduction

Citizenship can be a very nebulous concept. The idea of a citizen as an autonomous, rights-bearing individual who enjoys total freedom of rational choice in a legal and political sense, and who is answerable to none other than the constitution as supreme law of the land protected by a minimalist enabler state sits uncomfortably with an Africa caught between and betwixt corrupted cultural traditions and a blighted modernity. To insist deftly that there are no intermediary solidarities and loyalties (such as those informed by race, culture, geography) between the individual and the state (except those arrived at through freedom of association guaranteed by the right to subscribe and unsubscribe in tune with the whims and caprice of each individual member), or to ignore such loyalties (the membership of which is not always determined by choice but often by blood) where their existence is recognised and actively reproduced by those who share them, is to force Africans who often claim or are compelled to claim such solidarities and loyalties to live a lie or live in chains in the name of so-called ‘modernity’ and its purported ‘individual and personal freedoms’.

When insistence that there are no intermediary solidarities and loyalties between the individual and the state is by scholars in Africa or elsewhere, it is tantamount to privileging a prescriptive scholarship of sterility and teleology with little bearing on the lived experiences of the supposed citizens studied, as the impression is given that the shelf life of concepts is more important than their analytical relevance and empirical grounding. Yet, often isolated from the rights and privileges of the included or of those who ‘belong’, ‘outsiders’ (strangers who may or may not be immigrants) tend to mediate barriers, borders and boundaries in fluid and dynamic ways, producing identities that run across cultures, languages, spaces and places in cities and national contexts (Nyamnjoh 2006). The efforts and processes they engineer at ‘composite’, ‘crossroads’ or ‘frontier’ identities (Kopytoff 1987) often escape scholarship that uncritically reproduces taken-for-granted dichotomies between insiders and outsiders (nationals and non-nationals, citizens and non-citizens) and bounded notions of being and belonging. Not to recognise such extensions to the conceptualisation
of citizenship made possible by the vast majority of African villagers and urbanites immersed in popular cultural traditions of meaning making, shared and enriched through histories of convivial encounters with one another, would be contrary to the very affirmation of autonomy of thought and representation accorded citizens (regardless of class or status) in principle. However schooled in western modernity the state elite may be, to label and dismiss as a contradiction to citizenship all that is counter to their Western-inspired templates, is to belie the very claim that their project is predicated on the principle of freedom of choice. It makes little sense to employ free-floating, untested assumptions about citizenship in the study of Africa where people, in their lived realities, have little room for neat dichotomies, even when their pronouncements or discourses might sometimes suggest otherwise. If the test of our theoretical puddings must come from the practical eating, this is as true of citizenship studies as it is of every other facet of being and living in Africa.

A nuanced, carefully negotiated, accommodating and flexible understanding of citizenship would be one that embraces instead of shying away from the complexity of being African. Identities on the continent, like identities elsewhere, are a permanent work in progress. Stereotypical evolutionism aside, human beings everywhere are complex and intricate, and identities the result of processes of becoming, best understood as flexible, fluid and full of ellipses – an unfinished and unfinishable story in sociality and civility. Being and becoming citizens as works in progress require open-mindedness and open-endedness in encounters and the relationships they engender, reproduce or contest. Contextualised understanding of citizenship matters, and the experiences of people in given contexts challenge us as nationals of different countries in particular ways to heighten or lower the bar and threshold of acceptability and tolerability in claims and denial of citizenship. It is through a simultaneous recognition of the capacity of Africans to act on others as well as to bear the actions of others in time and space that an appropriate citizenship actualises. Such a citizenship is far from possible in many a so-called modern context championed by narrowly articulated and often exclusionary ideas of individual and personal freedom, where the myth of self-cultivation, self-activation and self-management is uncritically internalised and reproduced with effortless abundance like an easily counterfeited devalued currency. Citizens are not citizens in abstraction, but through binding relationships and social action.

**Towards Flexible Citizenship**

The future of citizenship in Africa and globally is in recognising and providing for the truism that rights articulated in abstraction and without
adequate provision for obligations to society, collective interests and group rights do not amount to much. Throughout the world civic (legal or juridico-political) citizenship is facing hard times, as multitudes (ranging from women’s movements to diasporas to youth movements and cultural communities big and small) clamour for inclusion by challenging the myopia implicit in the conservative juridico-political rhetoric and practices of nation states. In Africa, social media-driven youth movements (such as the Arab Spring of North Africa) are involved in renegotiation of the exclusionary bases of citizenship prescribed and administratively enforced by the state that have fuelled conflicts over belonging and representation. Women’s movements are equally active throughout the continent, challenging the indicators of citizenship narrowly informed by the privileged biases of Western and African masculinities.

There is a clear need to reconceptualise citizenship in ways that provide for and facilitate access to political, cultural, social and economic space for excluded nationals and non-nationals alike, as individuals and collectivities. Such inclusion is best guaranteed by a flexible citizenship (Ong 1999; Nyamnjoh 2007a; Isin 2012) unbounded by race, ethnicity, class, gender or geography, and that is both conscious and critical of hierarchies that make a mockery of the juridico-political regime of citizenship provided by the coercive illusion of the nation state. In this fluid and open-ended idea of citizenship, space should be created for its articulation at different levels, from the most global to the most local or autochthonous, from the ethnic to the civic, and from the individual to the collective. Just as cultural, economic and social citizenship are as valid as juridico-political citizenship, so collective, group or community citizenship is as valid as individual citizenship, to be claimed at every level, from the most small-scale local to the most mega-scale global level. The idea of corporate, digital, electronic, cyber, global, itinerant and related claims to citizenship are easily understandable and accommodated under the framework of flexible citizenship. The emphasis should be on the freedom of individuals and communities to negotiate inclusion, opt out and opt in with total flexibility and reversibility of belonging in consonance with their realities as repertoires, melting pots or straddlers of various identity margins.

Society in Africa and elsewhere not being a monolith whatever the ambitions of some in this regard, an idea of citizenship as recognition and representation for pluralism and diversity requires a delicate balancing of tensions between competing and often conflicting interests, aspirations and truths. The more intricate the constellations of interests are, the greater the divergences in claims of citizenship, and the more imperative a case for a negotiated, accommodating consensus on the importance of providing for citizenship in its flexible and nuanced complexities. Depending on the society
in question and the disposition for mutual accommodation of its members, the interests are shaped by real or imagined identity or boundary markers. Articulated either as cast in stone or lines drawn on beach sand, such markers may include the race or ethnicity, place or geography, class or status, gender or sexuality, generation or age of the individuals or groups competing for civil spaces and opportunities to activate and cultivate themselves to maximise, inter alia, their political, social and economic dreams and aspirations. Such factors are the basis on which privileges are claimed and contested, sought and maintained. Within a given social context, the fulfilment of citizenship is dependent on the relative advantage or disadvantage of each social category in relation to others in the interplay of hierarchies engineered by all or some of these factors and more. The interplays in turn result in hierarchies of interests legitimated by the relationships and dynamics of power between the social actors compartmentalised by these same factors. Histories and processes of encounters amongst social categories and between societies are critical for understanding changing configurations of citizenship.

Africa and Citizenship

The above understanding of citizen and citizenship is a particularly relevant framework for Africa, in view of the phenomenal challenges facing current postcolonial attempts in Africa at crafting a common political and legal citizenship. It is in recognition of these challenges and tensions that Mahmood Mamdani, in *Citizen and Subject* (1996), invites us to recognise the dual and often conflictual nature (bifurcated nature) of citizenship in Africa by distinguishing between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ citizenship. Overt tensions and conflicts within and between states speak of the unfinished and sometimes unstarted business of nation building around a shared or consensual set of core values. In many a situation, the state remains an extravagant irrelevance in terms of the actualisation of the economic, cultural, social and even political merits of citizenship in the lives of nationals with hardly any significant legitimacy beyond the handful of elite in power. Popular forms of citizenship and legitimacy with much longer histories of practice, relevance and suffrage are more likely to be expressed along lines of indigenous and endogenous forms of social organisation and government than on lines of party political and civil society organisations of voluntary membership that came with European colonialism or mimic present-day Western associations. Given the very recent colonial past of the continent, and in view of the overwhelming grip of Western modernity on postcolonial state making, the challenges facing citizenship projects in Africa are particularly daunting.
In postcolonial Africa where social action unfolds within a framework of interconnecting global and local hierarchies, communities large and small have both accepted and contested arbitrary colonial and postcolonial administrative boundaries and the dynamics of dispossession. Social movements and associations (voluntary and otherwise) concerned with the struggles for freedom and social justice of marginalised social categories and identities have proliferated across Africa, sometimes with the assistance of alternative and social media. Failing to achieve the idealised ‘nation-state’ form and relatively weak vis-à-vis global forces and hierarchies of states, African states have often sought to capitalise on the contradictory and complementary dimensions of civic, ethnic and cultural citiizenships. In this context, being a citizen in ethnic or cultural terms is much more than merely claiming to be or being regarded as an autochthon or an authentic son or daughter of a native soil. Under colonial and apartheid regimes when technologies of dominance were perfected with policies and practices of divide-and-rule, to be called ‘indigenous’, ‘autochthonous’ or ‘native’ was first to create and impose a proliferation of native, autochthonous or indigenous identities circumscribed by arbitrary physical and cultural geographies; second, it was to make possible not only distinctions between colonised ‘native’ and colonising Europeans but also between ‘native citizens’ and ‘native settlers’ among ethnic communities within the same colony; and third, it was to be primitive, and therefore a perfect justification for the colonial mission civilisatrice (civilising mission), for dispossession and confinement to officially designated tribal territories, homelands or Bantustans, often with callous disregard to the histories of relationships and interconnections forged with excluded others, or the differences and tensions even among the included (Nyamnjoh 2007b).

In all, being an ethnic citizen was for the majority colonised ‘native’ population to be shunted to the margins. These dynamics of classification and rule conceived of the ‘natives’ through frozen ideas of culture and imagined traditions or what Mamdani (1996) has termed ‘decentralised despotisms’ in rural areas, while the town and city were reserved for the minority colonial settler population and their purportedly ‘modernising’, ‘cultured’ and ‘detribalised’ African servants and support staff. Today, towns and cities are still instinctively perceived as the places and spaces well suited for citizens, while rural areas and villages are the reserve and preserve of ethnic citizens and ethnic strangers who are confined or subjected to the diktats of culture and tradition under chiefly authority. Few, even among critical-minded scholars, are ready to entertain the prospect that Africans are active agents, busying themselves domesticating imported ideas of citizenship by bringing them into conversation with
endogenous ideas of citizenship, some of which pre-date the continent’s subjection to the whims and caprices of European ambitions of dominance.

If the negative colonial (and apartheid, in the case of South Africa, for example) history of ethnic or cultural citizenship continues to shape the highly critical stance of African intellectuals and nationalists toward all claims of autochthony by Africans, it has also, quite paradoxically, tended to render invisible to scholars and scholarship the everyday reality of postcolonial Africans (including those same intellectuals and nationalists) who straddle civic, ethnic and cultural citizenships, on the one hand, and multiple global and local cosmopolitan identities, on the other hand. The baby of ethnic and cultural citizenship does not have to be thrown out with the bathwater of colonialism and apartheid.

With growing uncertainties and the questioning of the inadequacies of civic citizenship and its illusions of autonomy, rigid and highly exclusionary affirmations of being indigenous have become obsessive among majority and minority communities alike within various states in Africa. An outcome is covert or overt confrontation and conflict over territoriality and access to power and resources. The logic of ever diminishing circles of inclusion in the rigid regime of citizenship articulated by and through the nation state and its scant regard to the history and sociology of flexible mobility of people dictates that the next foreigner or stranger is always one layer below the obvious one.

South Africa, where xenophobic eruptions against migrants from elsewhere in Africa are commonplace, offers excellent illustrations of this obsession both in a song by popular Zulu musician, Mbongeni Ngema, released in May 2002 and in a Nando’s diversity advert released in June 2012. Titled ‘AmaNdiya’, Ngema’s controversial song claims to ‘begin a constructive discussion that would lead to a true reconciliation between Indians and Africans’, and accuses South African Indians of opportunism and of enriching themselves to the detriment of blacks. In the song Ngema goes on to say that if Indians are to be taken seriously as belonging to South Africa, they must display greater patriotism and stop straddling continents. Implied in his song is that Indians risk losing their South African citizenship should they refuse to change their ways. And if and when Indians are gone in this bizarre nativity game of exclusionary violence and South Africa’s economic, social, political and cultural problems are still unsolved the next is just a layer below.

This regressive logic and the scapegoating of perceived outsiders are also well captured by the Nando’s diversity advert. The advert articulates an idea of identity and belonging in South Africa that is both conscious and cognisant of the histories of mobility of peoples that have made South Africa possible. The advert starts with black Africans illegally crossing a barbed-wire border fence
into South Africa. There is a voiceover and each time the voice calls out a name, the group of people who represent that particular identity are transformed into a cloud of smoke, as follows:

You know what is wrong with South Africa: all you foreigners. You must all go back to where you came from – you Cameroonian, Congolese, Pakistanis, Somalis, Ghanaians and Kenyans. And of course you Nigerians and you Europeans. Let’s not forget you Indians and Chinese. Even you Afrikaners. Back to Swaziland you Swazis, Lesotho you Sothos, Vendas, Zulus, everybody.

In the end, only one person is left standing, a San man who, armed with a bow and arrow and ready to explore the wilderness, confronts the voiceover with these words: ‘I’m not going anywhere. You found us here.’ The ad concludes with the voiceover saying: ‘Real South Africans love diversity. That’s why we have introduced two more items: new peri-crusted wings and delicious Trinchado and chips.’

To my mind, far from promoting xenophobia, this ad challenges narrow and parochial identities, or ideas of being and belonging as a zero-sum game. It plays with exclusionary obsessions by demonstrating the absurdity of ever-regressive logics and ever-diminishing circles of being South African in a world characterised by the flexible mobility of people. It invites us to contemplate what it is to be South African, if every colour of its current rainbow configuration must go back to their Nazareth (to draw a parallel with the nativity census recounted in the Bible related to the birth of Jesus Christ in Christianity) and be counted. If belonging is articulated in rigid exclusionary terms, where everyone, however mobile, is considered to belong to a particular homeland somewhere else, a place they cannot outgrow and which they must belong to regardless of where they were born or where they live and work, then South Africa can only belong to one group of people, those who were there before everyone else – the San – they who know only too well that they are the bona fide sons and daughters of the South African soil and its resources, the only authentic South Africans. These examples demonstrate the flexibility of citizenship when negotiated from an unfolding history of encounters between different people and ideas, and among a diversity of interests and aspirations.

**Everyday Conviviality and Citizenship**

States and policy makers, inclined to police rather than facilitate mobility and a flexible disposition to citizenship, stand to learn from the forging of everyday conviviality in urban Africa. Urban life in Africa (and elsewhere, I
should add) depends on the extent to which Africans circulate or are circulated. The city, urban transport most especially, offers us a privileged site to fathom how Africans in their flexible mobility negotiate their citizenship through relationships. Citizenship and belonging are negotiated in spaces of public transit, such as trains, taxis, and buses, and are dependent upon a fine line of conviviality. As a multitude of travellers pass in, out and through each day, zones of mobility and public transport become places of intense negotiation and interaction. Conviviality emerges in the frequent interplay between dynamics of group autonomy on the one hand and interdependent communalism of groups on the other hand. Tensions are often put aside out of mutual necessity to make one’s way throughout the city. Conviviality emerges out of the necessity to earn one’s living, to surmount the tensions and divisions of inequality with attempts at flexibility propelled by the need to get by. Conviviality, in many ways, results from compliances with cultural implications of power. Its intricacies in the lived everyday are, in fact, steeped in tensions (see Nyamnjoh and Brudvig 2014a and 2014b for examples).

Understanding the sense of belonging that citizens feel, display, mobilise, invest in and invariably ambiguate is essential to the challenge of exploring and theorising what Edgar Pieterse (2010) terms ‘African cityness’. An analytical focus on conviviality in the everyday narrative of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and their relationships as ‘intimate strangers’ demonstrates the thorny paradoxes of intimacy and mutuality, representative of contestations with belonging taking place in urban African crucibles of becoming. Conviviality rests on the nuances inscribed and imbibed in everyday relations – the micro-trends of socialisation (see Nyamnjoh and Brudvig 2014 and 2014b for examples). Conviviality makes possible interdependence amongst humans whose tendency is to seek autonomy even at the risk of dependencies. Urban conviviality has little room for neat dichotomies emphasising distinct places and spaces for different social categories and hierarchies, as urbanites, like porcupines compelled to huddle together to keep warm in winter, can ill afford to insist rising above the messiness of everyday realities. The entangled, interconnected or even mangled lives of urbanites suggest an approach at understanding them that seeks to marry the emotional and the rational which they embody as social and relational beings.

How simple or complex, bounded or flexible – indeed, how convivial or not – one’s articulation of what constitutes citizenship in Africa is informed by whom one is ready to include in one’s shopping basket for ‘an African’. In this regard, critical interrogations such as the following demonstrate the intricacies involved in situating the attributes of being and belonging as a citizen in Africa:
What does it mean to be African? Who qualifies to claim Africa? Is being African or claiming Africa an attribute of race and skin colour (black, white, yellow), birth (umbilical cord, birth certificates, identity cards, passports), geography (physical spaces, home village), history (encounters), culture (prescriptive specificities), economics (availability and affordability, wealth and deprivation), sociology (social configurations and action, inclusion and exclusion), psychology (mind sets), philosophy (world views), politics (power relations) or collective memory (shared experiences and aspirations) – to name just a few of the many possibilities that present themselves? These are questions which have deep roots in debates on citizenship and identity – and, therefore, in the definition of rights, entitlements, duties and responsibilities. The questions of course, are, not uniquely African – indeed, similar issues have been posed and debated with considerable passion in other parts of the world both historically and contemporaneously, and contestations around them have also often been played out in violent communal confrontations, civil wars and interstate conflicts. And while they may seem straightforward to answer, the questions have been rendered much more complex by the dynamic interplay of race, ethnicity, gender and religion in the structuring and exercise of power and opportunity. Precisely for this reason, they are not questions that can be addressed in the abstract. (Olukoshi and Nyamnjoh 2004: 1).

In Africa, like everywhere else, aspirations for and claims of purity, authenticity, primary and often parochial identities coexist with notions of the nation state and its logic of large-scale, exclusive communities. This would suggest a conceptual framework in citizenship is necessarily bringing the parochial and the cosmopolitan (ideas, values, cultures and practices as embodied by insiders and outsiders, locals and foreigners) into conversation aimed at providing for and encouraging a citizenry that negotiates and navigates conviviality from the intersection of myriad identity margins. Yet, everywhere in the world, we are all familiar with the question: ‘Where do you come from, originally?’ which seems ready for no answer short of the land of your birth, or the birth of your father. Here is an exchange which reportedly took place between an English woman and a black British girl:

English woman: where were you born?
Black girl: Manchester.
English woman: I mean before that.

Similarly, when people I meet for the first time seem to think they know where I come from with questions like: ‘Are you from X?’ – X standing for the
village, town, city or country of their guesswork – I usually leave them perplexed when I answer: ‘Not yet’.

Within the framework of hierarchies among nationals as insiders and between nationals and non-nationals in Africa, even where citizenship by law is granted to mobile outsiders, the emphasis in official documentation on ‘original country of birth’ means that naturalised citizens are always haunted by the potential inferiority of ‘legal citizenship’ to ‘citizenship by birth’, as claims of authentic belonging as ‘sons and daughters’ of the ‘native’ soil – autochthons – can always be invoked to exclude those who belong only by force of the law. We have seen manifestations of this derogatory discrimination against perceived strangers, outsiders and foreigners almost everywhere in Africa – ranging from ‘Ghana Must Go’ in Nigeria and ‘Cam No Go’ in Cameroon, to ‘Makwerekwere’ in Botswana and South Africa, through ‘Nyak’ in Senegal and ‘L’Ivoirité’ in Côte d’Ivoire. In this sense, the state despite laws to the contrary in some instances, facilitates violence against those seen not to be lawful or official rights bearers, for politically expedient reasons, especially in climates of economic challenges. To make a case about who belongs, states do not hesitate to explore and embrace the distinction between ‘handheld and heartfelt’ citizenship and indicators of belonging. It is not enough to carry official documentation of belonging and wave the national flag of a given country; you have to be seen to belong by hard core or bona fide blood and umbilical cord insiders who arrogate to themselves the prerogative of ultimate legitimisers of belonging (Nyamnjoh 2006, 2016).

Such bureaucratic and legalistic indicators as national identity cards and passports, and the opportunism they excite notwithstanding, it is however safe to say that to most ordinary people in Africa citizenship is more than just a birth certificate, an identity card or a passport – documents that many of them may not have, even as others coming from elsewhere could easily acquire all of these documents and be opportunistic about claims and denials of belonging. For most ordinary folks, to be African and belong to a country or a community is not simply to be labelled or merely defined as such bureaucratically and for purposes of administrative control. It is to be a social actor enmeshed in a particular context that has been and continues to be shaped by unique histories that are marked by unequal encounters and misrepresentations often informed by the arrogance and ignorance of the economically and politically powerful who take the liberty also to arrogate a cultural superiority to themselves. For many an ordinary African, being and belonging anywhere in Africa is above all a lived reality, one that is constantly shaped and reshaped by their toil and sweat as subjected and devalued humanity, even as they struggle to live in dignity and to transform their societies progressively. Belonging and citizenship to them is
not something to be authenticated bureaucratically by means of documentation. For these people, the fact of their belonging and citizenship is neither in question nor a question.

A citizen, therefore, is a person who has attained considerable social visibility within the community to which he or she belongs. Such visibility may come from the responsibilities that a person assumes in his or her community. Fulfilling responsibilities entitles the person in turn to seek rights from and protection by the institutions that govern everyday life, practices and processes in the community. There is nothing, however, to suggest that such relationships of obligation and reciprocity can or may only be fulfilled under and by a state or a particular form of state. This point is worth insisting upon as states are the product of history, whose form and transformation are dictated by contextual specificities and the encounters and relationships that shape and are shaped by them. Every community, state and stateless, large scale and small scale, seeks to reproduce itself through shared values and aspirations by insisting on rights and obligations from those it recognises and purports to represent or those who aspire to be recognised and represented by it. The status of citizen can be claimed under group identities that are not necessarily static or large scale or common in origin. Belonging and being a citizen are more flexible identities than we have the habit of admitting when we define and confine them in abstraction.

Never-ending Citizenship

Being a citizen is a permanent work in progress. It is part of a lifelong quest to be human in the world. Although being incomplete is the normal order of things and calls for interdependence and conviviality, it is a common tendency for some to mobilise coercive violence in an illusory and elusive quest for independence for themselves, to accumulate with reckless abandon while policing the appetites of others. Citizenship is an attribute of being and becoming human through constant awareness and provision for the normalcy of incompleteness in how one claims rights in full cognizance of one’s obligations to oneself, to others and to the imperatives of society and sociality. Citizenship is a capacity, technique or technology of self-cultivation and self-activation through relationships of sociality and civility. Given the ambitions of dominance of those in power who may or may not act on behalf of the communities or societies they purport to lead, citizenship is also a technology, technique or capacity of ownership and control of mechanisms of belonging. It is in this sense that apparently emancipatory technological innovations in the fields of information and communication are often paradoxically employed by
states and corporations to police the circulation of people, ideas and things. Citizenship in this sense becomes the power to mobilise and immobilise, recognise and ignore with impunity. It is the dictatorship of being privileged and in charge. Thus, not surprisingly, for example, African states are just as keen as states elsewhere in using the emerging computerised identification and biometric technologies to define, confine and monitor for disciplinary purposes the flow of people, things and ideas within and across borders. As a system of social recognition and social control, citizenship pertains to the whole complex of power, privilege, obligations and responsibilities of being a citizen in time and space. However, to confine or reduce citizenship to the beck and call of zero-sum games of power and dominance is to impoverish the creative innovation of being human through rights and responsibilities.

Citizenship thrives on a balance of tensions between centripetal and centrifugal forces in the lives of individuals and societies. It is simultaneously open-ended and close-ended, inclusive and exclusive, real and aspirational. Citizenship is as much a mark of birth and an observatory for navel gazing as it is about creative innovation, achievement and choice. Put differently, citizenship is both the result of where and how one is born, and how and where one is able to exercise one’s capacity to act and to redefine one’s circumstance. Even as a birthmark citizenship can be formed, transformed and reformed, configured and reconfigured with changing encounters and the myriad possibilities inspired by such encounters. Citizenship is a thirst for which there is no final quencher, a quest whose successes are measured not in definitive answers, but rather in the ever new ways of questioning it engenders. The story of citizenship the world over is the story of how actively and successfully those claiming it are open to balancing the possibilities and tensions between nature and nurture, ascription and achievement, blood and choice, autonomy and sociality, independence and dependence, us and them, here and there, the familiar and the profane. It is the story of the making of conviviality by turning into intimate strangers porcupines who each would love a world in which they enjoyed a monopoly of quills.

It is evident that such flexible citizenship is incompatible with the prevalent illusion that the nation state is the only political unit permitted to confer citizenship in the modern world. Nor is it compatible with a regime of rights and entitlements that is narrowly focused on the illusion of ‘the autonomous individual’. The price of perpetuating these illusions has been the proliferation of ultra-nationalism, chauvinism, racism and xenophobia that have consciously denied the fragmented, multinational and heterogeneous cultural realities of most so-called ‘nation states’. The tendency has been for the citizenship thus inspired to assume the stature of a giant compressor of, especially, cultural
differences. Almost everywhere, this narrow model has cherished hierarchies based on race, ethnicity, class, gender and geography, which have tended to impose on perceived inferior others the decisions made by those who see themselves as more authentic or more deserving of citizenship. The citizenship that hails from such a celebration of insensitivities is clearly not a model for a future of larger mobility and increased claims for rights, recognition and representation by its individual and collective victims. Flexible citizenship informed by flexible mobility in and out of spaces and places in cities and national contexts on the other hand – a reading of citizenship whose relationship with the nation state is open-ended and convivial – renders citizenship and belonging as truly cosmopolitan and in tune with the age-old reality of composite identities and societies in Africa.

References and Suggested Reading


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