

Reading Schmitt against Schmitt in the Context of the “ New Wars ” Debate¹

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This article argues that the concept of new wars represents the ontological fear of the unfamiliar other after the end of the Cold War. While reviewing Carl Schmitt's arguments in *the Theory of Partisan and the Nomos of the Earth*, we reconfirm the historical fact that the modern global order has always been haunted by irregular wars that had similarities to new wars although it has tried to eliminate irregular wars by institutionalizing regular wars. In this sense, the concept of new wars seems to be misleading. With recent rapid globalization, however, the de-territorialization process of “ *the Nomos of the Earth* ” makes irregular wars conspicuous as new wars due to a cognitive turn. In other words, the parties participating in the inhumane new wars at a distance begin to emerge as absolute enemies, foes of humanistic universalism. Here we notice the rise of the “ new barbarism ” -- seeing the other as the barbarian. By reading Schmitt against Schmitt, we notice in the new wars literature the humanistic, liberal, binary worldview that tends to create absolute enemies in asymmetric relations.

The “ New Wars ” Debate

Since some armed conflicts began during the 1990s, the term “ new wars ” becomes fashionable (Gray, 1997, 146-168, Kaldor, 2006, Snow, 1996) In particular after 9/11, it became a buzzword (Duffield, 2001, Jung, 2003, Münkler, 2005, Shaw, 2005) Although many scholars use it in various ways, there are several common characteristics. According to Mary Kaldor, the new wars can be contrasted with earlier wars in terms of their goals, the methods of warfare and how they are financed (Kaldor, 2006, 7) The first characteristic of a new war is its goals. While old wars were about *la raison d'État*, such as geo-political or ideological goals, new wars are about identity and

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sometimes irrational. Other scholars point out that new wars are waged because of greed rather than grievance, and that the war itself becomes the purpose (Berdal and Malone, 2000, Collier et al., 2003). The second characteristic of new wars is the changed mode of warfare. As a breakdown of public authority blurs the distinction between public and private combatants, and between combatants and civilians, civilian casualties are increasing and civilians are sometimes deliberately targeted as an object of wars. The third characteristic is the relationship between new wars and the global economy. State failures and civil wars are usually caused by a global war economy. We note the typical case of the “ blood diamond ” in the civil war in Sierra Leone, where illegal trade of rare natural resources for small arms lead to greed-based new wars. In short, new wars propelled by the global war economy are conspicuous by their inhumane brutality.

With increasing high-technology security systems, images of new wars are emerging. Sketchy images through mass media--soldiers deliberately amputating civilians ' arms, or victims of ethnic cleansing--- reinforce impressions of brutality. However, if we look at regular wars in detail, we find some facts that refute the new wars hypothesis. First, according to the data of the UCDP-PRIO Conflict Dataset, we note the decline in the number of armed conflicts after the end of the Cold War (Gleditsch et al., 2002) Partly due to the end of the Cold War, many armed conflicts ended with negotiated settlements or victories. According to the data of the Human Security Data Set, 42 conflicts ended in negotiated settlements and 23 ended in victories in the 1990s, while only eight ended in negotiated settlements and 20 ended in victories in the 1980s. Seeing this trend, some scholars express the optimistic view that most current warfare is opportunistic predation waged by small packs of criminals and bullies and that war has been substantially reduced to its “ remnants ” (Mueller, 2004, 116) Although we should not over-estimate the current trend, the number of armed conflicts is now decreasing.

Second, several scholars also rebut the vague impression that the number of civil wars has increased since the end of the Cold War. In fact, the number of civil wars began to decrease in the mid-1960s, and civil wars account for over 50% of wars since the end of the World War . If we put proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union into the category of the internationalized civil wars, we can say that the

age of the civil wars had already begun during the Cold War era. In other words, only the number of internal civil wars has declined since the end of the Cold War (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005) In addition, the risk of death in battle declined significantly after World War I and again after the end of the Cold War (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005, Lacina et al., 2006) If we exclude five large conflicts (Vietnam War, Korean War, Chinese Civil War, Iran-Iraq War, and Afghan Civil War) the number of global battle deaths seems to fluctuate between high and low war intensity years, and we find a persistence of smaller scale and diverse conflicts. However, the data by no means support the gloomy picture painted by some scholars who emphasize the bloody aspect of new wars, at least when measured according to the number of battle deaths.

Furthermore, just over half the battle deaths have continued to occur in civil wars since World War I. Therefore, the high percentage of battle deaths in civil wars is not so new. In addition, some scholars refute the hypothesis that the ratio of civilian to military deaths in the new wars is increasing. We can determine the continuing high civilian-to-military casualty rates in small or savage wars waged outside of Europe since the colonial period (Henderson and Singer, 2002, 175) For example, in the Philippines-American War (1899-1902) 4,000 U.S. troops, 20,000 insurgents, and roughly 200,000 civilians were killed (Ileto, 1999, Karnow, 1989, 194) Such a high ratio of civilian to military deaths (almost 10 to 1) in “ the savage war of peace ”² is not unusual outside of Europe.

As many articles on the concept of new wars suggest, we find most of characteristics of new wars in old wars (Fearon and Latin, 2003, Henderson and Singer, 2002, Kalyvas, 2001, Melander et al., 2006, Newman, 2004) As some scholars point out, the work focusing on “ rebel greed ” as a new characteristic of recent conflicts underestimates the role of grievances and the interaction of greed and grievance (Keen, 2008, 25-70)

In sum, the new wars hypothesis seems to be dubious somehow. Instead of accepting the concept of the new wars at its face value, we gain a better perspective by understanding it in the context of the long history of irregular wars. In other words, we should pay attention to the way in which irregular wars have always been perceived. Although we can identify some new characteristics in the relationship between recent armed conflicts and neo-liberal globalization, the impact of

globalization on the cognitive framework is much more crucial for the emerging new wars hypothesis. As recent rapid globalization promotes time-space compression (Harvey, 1989) and new modes of information restructure our identities and cognitive frameworks (Poster, 1990) boundaries between the inside and the outside become blurred and distance begins to lose its significance. In this de-territorialization process of the global order, the irregular wars at a distance, to which we had not paid much attention, become visible as new wars. We might call this kind of change *the cognitive turn* here. In other words, the concept of new wars has emerged due to epistemological changes as well as ontological changes. Thus, what has changed is not the nature of the warfare but the Western perception of war³.

The Lineage of the Irregular Wars:

Asymmetrical Conflicts and Absolute Antagonism

It is Carl Schmitt who pointed out such a *cognitive turn* at the earliest stage. Schmitt had already mentioned the crisis of the modern territorial states system in his *Nomos Der Erde (Nomos of the Earth)* (Schmitt, 2003)⁴. According to him, the *jus publicum Europeum*, the spatial, political, and legal global order, came gradually into being in the sixteenth century from ashes of the *respublica Christiana*, the pre-global *nomos* of the Middle Ages. He called this modern order the *Nomos* of the Earth. The *nomos* is the foundational act that creates a concrete territorial order as unity of legal order and spatial orientation (*Ordnung und Ortung*) (Schmitt, 2003, 67-79). First, a process of land appropriation and of boundary fixing had constituted this territorial order. Second, this order had regulated war by making wars something like duels and institutionalizing indiscriminate wars between states. However, this kind of order began to be taken over by Anglo-American quasi-universalism in Schmitt's eyes. It is a crisis for the *jus publicum Europeum* because the quasi-universal power tends to destroy the global order by denying enemies equal status and by reviving just war theories. It might lead to the global civil war.

Such a crisis of global order now seems to be happening (De Benoist, 2007, Ulmen, 2007). Responding to the emerging quasi-universal power structures, the cognitive framework based upon the modern territorial order is now gradually being replaced by another. As a background of this kind of *cognitive turn*, we note that the

absolute asymmetrical relationship between the North and the South emerged due to the end of the Cold War. Instead of the former Communist block, the South (including militant Muslims) now takes the position of the threat for the West (“ the threat to international peace and security ” in the vocabulary of the UN) However, we cannot find symmetrical antagonism there any more. The absolute asymmetrical relationship leads to changes in the concept of state sovereignty in the South, which means denying the principle of non-intervention. In various ways, the West begins to justify its intervention in the domestic affairs of developing countries. One way justification is “ the responsibility to protect ” (ICISS, 2001). From humanitarian military interventions to preventive wars, there are similar arguments that justify “ good wars ” against evil in the new wars (Dexter, 2007, Lawler, 2002)

While this kind of asymmetrical relation makes old “ small wars ” look new, it also could give birth to new irregular wars (global civil war) To clarify this point, we must examine the lineage of irregular wars by putting them in historical context. According to Carl Schmitt’s *Theory of the Partisan*, the problem of the partisan first emerged in the guerrilla war that the Spanish people waged against the army of a foreign conqueror from 1808 to 1813 (Schmitt, 2007, 3) We know the atmosphere at that time through Francisco Goya’s famous painting “ The Third of May, 1808 ” and his etching “ The Disasters of War. ” Here we see the characteristics of new wars, such as the blurring distinction between civilians and the military, the high percentage of civilian casualties and so on. As Schmitt pointed out, “ the partisan of the Spanish guerrilla war of 1808 was the first who dared to fight irregularly against the first modern, regular army. ” One of his important propositions is that the idea of “ irregular ” wars first emerged in contrast with “ regular ” wars. Another important point is that regular wars sometimes accompanied irregular wars while marginalizing them.

However, this point seems to be contradictory to Schmitt’s own idea of *jus publicum Europeaum*. In the modern European territorial states system, there must be only regular wars between states. However, the fact is that the modern global territorial order could not complete its mission to eliminate irregular wars. As the institutionalization of regular wars proceeded, it became necessary to eliminate irregular wars. In order to do that, the superior side suppressed the inferior who

waged irregular wars. However, the inferior had no choice but to adopt guerrilla warfare in asymmetrical conflicts. Responding to this behavior, the dominant side also adopted irregular tactics such as counter-insurgency operations. In this way, the institutionalization of regular wars failed to eliminate irregular wars. In asymmetrical conflicts, irregular wars intermittently appeared in various forms, including savage wars and proxy wars. These tended to appear more easily at the periphery of the global order or the world system. In other words, the idea of the *jus publicum Europeum* had never been achieved completely. It was always haunted by irregular wars. Although Clausewitz showed his unwillingness to delve deeper into irregular wars, even he mentioned “people in arms” and gave a few pages to that topic in his book, *On War* (Clausewitz, 1976, 479-483). Thus, irregular wars continued to overshadow the institutionalization process of regular wars, Clausewitzian style of modern wars.

The Spanish guerrilla war, which Clausewitz seemed unwilling to mention, was the first irregular war in contrast to the regular wars in Europe, but there had been earlier cases outside of Europe. One of them is the French and Indian War in America (1755 - 1763). George Washington, who had learned tactics of partisan warfare in this war, applied them in the American Revolutionary War (1775 - 1783). In addition, we note that Johan Ewald, who was one of Hessian soldiers during the both the French and Indian War and the American Revolutionary War, wrote the first book on small wars (*Abhandlung Über den kleinen Krieg*) in 1785. Ewald characterizes the American Revolutionary War by a few distinct features: 1) the use of surprise attacks and ambushes; 2) speed, as the rebels perfected hit-and-run tactics; and 3) improvisation and deception. Here was an aspect of fighting that was as new for Ewald as it was for everyone else, and for which he could find no analogy (Ewald, 1991, 86).

It is ironic that the United States, which gained independence by using small war tactics, began to wage various kinds of small wars against weak nations one century later. A series of ambiguous labels such as revolutionary war, “low-intensity war,” and “complex emergencies” were invented to describe them. Outside of Europe, asymmetrical conflicts between major powers and minor actors have continued to give birth to many ambiguous small wars from the colonial era to the post-Cold War era. Small wars have appeared intermittently like specters in the West. In particular, the

United States was gradually captivated by “ the cult of guerrilla ” that appeared in small wars in Latin America and Southeast Asia. As one strategic study scholar lamented, too much preoccupation with guerrilla warfare and Special Forces leads to the failure to apprehend the complexities that caused the internal instabilities in places like the former South Vietnam (Smith, 1996) According to this view, the terms like “ guerrilla warfare, ” “ low intensity conflicts, ” and “ new wars ” are fundamentally flawed as analytical abstraction. War is war, regardless of what tactics are used. At the same time, all wars are unique to their time and place. Thus, if we want to know the true character of the new wars, we should put them into historical context.

Irregular wars do not always emerge in asymmetrical conflicts. On the other hand, they may occur in symmetrical conflicts. If you look back through history, there was a time when irregular wars were widespread inside Europe -- the Thirty Years ' War (1618 - 1648) By looking at the paintings and etchings by Jacques Callot and Sebastian Vrancx, we can surmise that civilians were killed indiscriminately by the military and that civilians, also killed. A structural parallel with the new wars is apparent in the war economy organized according to the principle of *bellum se ipse alet* (war feeds war) (Münkler, 2005, 44-45) War itself becomes part of an economic life that is no longer under political control or subject to political limitation. In other words, the institutionalization of modern warfare marginalized the irregular warfare that had been common at the time of Thirty Years ' War.

In light of that principle, we should revise Charles Tilly ' s famous thesis that war made states (Tilly, 1990) Regular wars made states, while states marginalized irregular wars. In other words, the modern states succeeded in constructing the myth of the social contract by giving protection to the population while they monopolized war machines and waged wars against each other by using the tax, which they extract from the people as a form of protection racket. One of reasons why war machines could become motors for promoting state-formation in Europe without destroying the political order is the principle of separation of church and state. On that principle, European societies succeeded in transforming the absolute antagonistic relationship (*absolute Feindschaft*) to a somewhat conventional one (*konventionelle Feindschaft*) According to Schmitt, “ the purely state war of the new European international law sought to neutralize and thereby, to overcome the conflicts between

religious factions; it sought to end both religious wars and civil wars. War now became a “ war in form,” *une guerre en forme* (Schmitt, 2003, 141) ”

Schmitt classified antagonistic relationships into three categories: conventional (*konventionelle Feindschaft*), real (*wirklich Feindschaft*), and absolute (*absolute Feindschaft*) (Schmitt, 2007, 85-89). First, a conventional state war of European international law began. Then real enmity arose out of major state wars. Real enmity seemed to end with a global civil war of revolutionary class enmity (absolute enmity) during the Cold War era (Schmitt, 2007, 95). Schmitt most feared the emergence of absolute enmity that late in the process. In the real or conventional antagonism, the parties involved respect each other as an enemy. There is no respect, however, in the condition of the absolute enmity, where the enemy becomes just a foe to be annihilated.

It is well known that he emphasized that the world must avoid the political, the friend/enemy relations, and opposed against the prohibition of the use of inter-State force from such a realistic standpoint. In other words, he wanted to keep conventional or real antagonism intact against universalism that might lead to absolute antagonism. At first, he notoriously took the pro-Nazi position and criticized Anglo-American liberal universalism as justifying the annihilation of enemies as evil. Following the beginning of the Cold War, he also began to warn against the emergence of absolute enmity triggered by communist guerrillas.

After Schmitt clarified four criteria of the partisan (irregularity, increased mobility, intensity of political engagement, and telluric character) he pointed out that the communist guerrilla began to lose the fourth, *telluric* character, by taking the form of “ globally aggressive revolutionary activists (*des weltaggressiven, revolutionen Aktivisten*) ” rather than “ defensive autochthonous defenders of the homeland (*des defensiv-autochthonen Verteidigers der Heimat*) ” Indeed, the absolute enmity between “ globally aggressive revolutionary activists ” and “ globally aggressive hegemonic dominators ” threatened the international public order during the Cold War. Fortunately, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and other historical events, we avoided the catastrophe of total absolute antagonism through nuclear exchanges.

However, we are now facing a newly emerging absolute enmity. This absolute enmity has expanded through various kinds of civil wars in the Middle East and

Central Asia. Following 9/11, unilateral military interventions taken by the Bush government expanded the absolute enmity between what is called “ the war against terror ” and “ jihad. ” That is also the process in which defensive guerrilla warfare by “ autochthonous defenders of the homeland ” who connected with each other through transnational networks transformed itself into absolute enmity by “ globally aggressive revolutionary activists. ” Reacting to this situation, even the liberal intellectuals and technocrats began to adopt the binary worldview, with the result that global civil society is now surrounded by a global civil war comprised of new wars. Then, with the cooperation of NGOs and IGOs, American counterinsurgency operations are promoted by integrating the civilians and the military⁶. In sum, in spite of decreasing numbers of armed conflicts, new wars emerged as a part of global civil war with the dissolution of the institution of states-centered war.

Neo-liberalism and the New Wars

As Schmitt suggested, absolute enmity tends to emerge when a liberal “ universal ” power tries to dominate the world by depoliticizing and criminalizing the political dissidents in the name of humanity. In his article, Schmitt wrote as follows in 1976.

“ Humanity as such as a whole has no enemies.... ‘ Humanity ’ thus becomes an asymmetrical counter-concept. If he discriminates within humanity and thereby denies the quality of being human to a disturber or destroyer, then the negatively valued person becomes an unperson, and his life is no longer of the highest value: it becomes worthless and must be destroyed. Concepts such as ‘ human being ’ thus contain the possibility of the deepest inequality and become thereby ‘ asymmetrical ’ (Schmitt, 1987, 88) ”

If the liberal universal power operates with its own full strength, it becomes difficult to maintain the conventional antagonism due to the shrinking sphere of the political. There are no conventional enemies any more. There are only foes (absolute enemies) in the absolute asymmetrical relationships. Schmitt wrote about this point in the conclusion to *The Concept of the Political*.

“ The adversary is thus no longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity (Schmitt, 2007, 79) ”

Thus politics under liberal global governance now becomes something like administrative technology rather than agonistic struggles. We should put the new wars scholarship in this context. In other words, irregular wars become conspicuous again as “ new wars ” when neo- universal power tries to overwhelm the rest of the world. Through images of inhumane new wars, the fear of violent death provokes the exclusion of the unfamiliar other, giving rise to Islamo-phobia or Afro-phobia. In other words, the deepest roots of the absolute antagonism of new wars may lie in the universal West itself.

To interpret Kipling for the twenty-first century, the “ savage wars of peace ” are needed to fight against evil in the zone of new wars. The zone of new wars might be a threat to global civil society. If we rephrase it according to the UN charter, it represents “ the threat to international peace and security. ” According to hawkish cosmopolitanism, we must stop inhumane wars such as new wars by force. In short, the new wars scholarship represents absolute antagonism and asymmetry between the civilized North and the uncivil South in some ways. We can identify this sort of observation in Robert Kaplan’s well-known book, *The Coming Anarchy* (Kaplan, 2000) In his book, Kaplan presents conflicts between primitivism and civilizations, between the educated few and the uneducated but newly empowered millions whose borders are not those of national states, but those of culture and tribe (Kaplan, 2000, 26) This simplistic way of representing the violence of subaltern peoples could be criticized as symbolic violence such as “ new barbarism ” (Richards, 1996) In addition, the South is not singular at all. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, there are many political forms, some of which do not suffer from armed conflicts despite poverty. “ It is a mistake to look for just one African political system (Allen, 1995, 302) ” Therefore, we should not classify it as one category, such as “ a zone of conflicts. ” Still, the images of “ the collapsed states. ” “ the rogue states, ” and new wars tend to represent Africa, Central Asia, or Middle East as dangerous through mass media.

In order to understand the substructure of this kind of representation, we must pay an attention to the restructuring process of the neo-liberal universal power. Here

we must part from Schmitt's critique of liberalism. Although he mentioned asymmetrical relations in liberal “ universalism, he never tried to analyze its origins because he disdained the Marxist way of thinking as well as weak liberalism. According to him, Marxism also accelerated absolute enmity by infusing military ideology into politics and remains in the nineteenth century because it thinks only in economic terms (Schmitt, 2007, 84) Although we should be careful about simple economic reductionism, it is impossible to grasp a total picture of meta-politics surrounding irregular wars without considering the logic of capital. Pace Schmitt, the *nomos* of the earth (the logic of territoriality) is only one principle ordering global politics. Without looking at the relationship between capitalism and liberalism, we cannot get an accurate picture. In addition, we should have in mind that Schmitt advocated a strong authoritarian state coexisting with a free economy. In this sense, although Hayek criticized Schmitt's writings regarding the rule of law, Schmitt's thought might be very close to Hayek's (Cristi, 1998, 146-168) In other words, “ Schmitt undertakes the critique of liberalism in a liberal world ” in a different way from Leo Strauss's critique (Strauss, 2007, 122) Here is one reason why we need read Schmitt against Schmitt.

Related to this point, Kaldor's claim that the new wars are closely related with global war economy seems partly suggestive of the intricate relation between liberalism and the state of exception (Tosa, 2009) In the zone of the new wars, war has become an economically attractive opportunity for warlords and militia leaders. By destroying the public order, irregular wars stimulate illegal economies while illegal economies support irregular wars. In short, illegitimate violence gives birth to great wealth while the wealth supports patrons of violence. This kind of vicious cycle definitely began to accelerate with the cutting of economic aid and resultant deteriorating economic conditions after the end of the Cold war and the deepening neo-liberal globalization⁷. During the post-Cold War era, the marginalization of the periphery leads to the expansion of informal sectors that sustain the new wars and sometimes leads to phenomena such as failed states or collapsed states. Contrary to Tilly's famous thesis that war made the state and promoted primitive capital accumulation, we are now observing that new wars destroy the state and hinder primitive capital accumulation in some parts of Africa and Central Asia (Niemann,

2007, Sørensen, 2001)

Who is responsible for this kind of vicious cycle? This question is closely related to the issue of the representation of the new wars. Under the present neo-liberal global governance, mainstreamers tend to hold the local government, such as bad or corrupt leadership, accountable. Although this argument is not wrong, we should be skeptical about their emphasis upon this factor. By ignoring problems at the global level, they focus upon problems on individuals or local government as causes of the security gap between the North and the South. Even the word “empowerment” actually implies forcing the governed into self-improvement and self-help efforts (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). In this way, neo-liberal global governance delegates (or imposes) the responsibilities to local government or each individual. However, if you reconsider the situation that some African countries where small arms and light weapons are not manufactured suffer from armed conflicts (Mkutu, 2008), it becomes clear that new wars are global as well as local in its nature.

In other words, it is necessary to re-examine the new wars in the context of rising neo-liberal global governance. If you look back upon the 1970s, you can understand the reactionary character of this neo-liberal global governance in the context of the North-South relationship. First, neo-liberal governance emerged reacting to the hegemonic crisis during the 1970s. At that time, the global hegemony faced the rebellion of the South such as NIEO and OPEC. As the South substantially dominated UNESCO, the US and the UK seceded from it temporarily. In the academic world, the dependency-approach scholars claimed that the poverty problem in the developing countries originated from the North. Reacting to this kind of hegemonic crisis, the North pushed forward neo-liberal restructuring at the global level as well as the domestic level. With the victory of the economic counter-revolution against Keynesianism in the North, the voice of the South gradually faded into neo-liberal backlash. After the dissolution of the Soviet block, the neo-liberal counter-revolution and the passive revolution spread out over the world. In this process, absolute asymmetric relations reemerged conspicuously, and dire poverty bedeviled the marginalized population in the least developed countries following structural adjustment programs. Then, the responsibilities for “the sovereignty gap” between *de jure sovereignty* and *de facto* sovereignty to serve the people there were assigned to the South. Representation of

this situation as new barbarism is one of the extreme cases. Kaplan writes:

“ In places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always been mass poverty, people find liberalism in violence (Kaplan, 2000, 45) ”

Here we notice that the rhetoric of new barbarism synchronizes with the rationality of neo-liberal global governance in the way in which new wars are understood (Duffield, 2001, 108) In this political reasoning, the periphery is forced to embrace the principle of self-help while the true global cause of the new barbarism is projected onto its victims. Furthermore, as declining global hegemony begins to display its characteristics such as “ the dominance without the hegemony ” (Guha, 1997) it also strengthens its use of sticks rather than carrots. Here, another type of new wars tends to be waged by the center against the periphery. Martin Shaw describes it as “ the new western way of war, ” transferring risks to the people in the periphery in the guise of collateral damages (Shaw, 2005)

However, insofar as new wars constitute one part of a neo-liberal global system, it is not sufficient to excise only the affected parts (evil leaders) by surgical military interventions. That approach may lead to even worse situations. Kaldor also criticizes this option and advocates the strengthening of the global civil society against global civil war including new wars.

“ Spectacle war and network war feed off each other and sustain themselves through fear and security. There is no victory in these types of war, merely destruction. ...The answer to this destructive stalemate is to minimize violence at a global level, through the extension of global rules based on consent. ...How can global civil society offer an answer to war? ...Above all, it is the job of civil society groups to promote international norms and values, to show that the notion of human consciousness can be actively practiced (Kaldor, 2003, 155-159) ”

Although her argument seems to be persuasive superficially, we notice here the binary worldview based on humanistic liberalism, which Schmitt sharply criticized.

According to Kaldor's worldview, global civil society confronts global civil war, including new wars. For example, Kaldor identifies the anti-Iraq war movement with global civil society. However, this simplistic view of civil society results in a false understanding of the complex dynamics of power relations around the state and the civil society, as the Neo-Gramscian political theorist Buttigieg asserted (Buttigieg, 2005) Kaldor seems to hold the idea that civil society is the non-state and the non-economic area of social interaction. We should keep in mind, though, that global civil society is also the by-product of neo-liberal globalism. In addition, current global neo-liberalism had been promoted by conservative intellectual movements in civil society, such as the Mont Pèlerin Society (Cockett, 1994) Although Kaldor pays attention to the relationship between the neo-liberal global economy and wars, she adopts a very simplistic view of global civil society. To say the least, it is misleading to rely upon this dichotomous view.

The global civil society does not always represent the oppressed, the marginalized, and the voiceless. We should give heed to the way in which the idea of global civil society is constructed during the 1980s - 90s. As Kaldor herself wrote, she places the origin of the present global civil society in the democratization movement leading to the 1989 revolutions against the communist authoritarian regimes by borrowing the conceptual framework from Cohen and Arato's *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Kaldor, 2003) That is one reason why she tends to dismiss the intricate connections between global civil society and global neo-liberal economic processes (Buttigieg, 2005) in spite of her appropriate argument on the relationship between new wars and the global economy. In short, Kaldor's view seems to be not so far away from Kaplan's in terms of the Eurocentric binary view. Related to this point, Kaldor writes:

“ I am not against the use of force. On the contrary, I favor humanitarian intervention to prevent crimes of humanity, crimes of war, massive violations of human rights, or genocide. I favored the Kosovo intervention although I was critical of the ‘ spectacular ’ means (Kaldor, 2005, 221) ”

If we adopt such a binary view based upon humanistic liberalism, we might

promote the global civil war in another way. It is very similar to hawkish liberals' adventures, such as wars against tyrannies for expanding the sphere of “ democratic peace.” Contrary to their intentions, this kind of idealistic globalism tends to expand the sphere of absolute enmity. Here we observe the paradox that successful institutionalization of the cosmopolitan regime whose objective is to secure the world actually conjures up the contrary: the legitimizing and legalization of war (Beck, 2005) The Eurocentric liberal vision must be deconstructed by the non-Western view, including the oppressed, the victim, and the voiceless marginalized people whom it does not represent. We now witness the deep cleavage between the idea of humanistic liberalism and the reality of global polarization (apartheid) In this sense, the deepest roots of the absolute antagonism of new wars may lie in a distorted ontological situation.

Concluding Remarks

This article argues that the concept of new wars represents the ontological fear of the unfamiliar other after the Cold War. While reviewing Schmitt's arguments in *Theory of partisan and the Nomos of the Earth*, we reconfirm the historical fact that the modern global order has always been haunted by irregular wars, which had similarities to new wars although it has tried to eliminate irregular wars by institutionalizing regular wars. In this sense, the concept of new wars seems to be misleading. With recent rapid globalization, however, the de-territorialization process of “ the *Nomos* of the earth ” makes irregular wars conspicuous as new wars due to a cognitive turn. In other words, the parties participating in the inhumane new wars at a distance begin to emerge as absolute enemies, foes of humanistic universalism. Here we notice the rise of the new barbarism, seeing the other as the barbarian.

As Napoleon, who impetuously tried to change the world, caused the “ disasters of war ” that Goya painted, the hasty peace-building movement motivated by political cosmopolitanism further blurs the distinction between peace and war. This kind of humanistic universalism might, despite its intent, lead to peace-destruction by aggravating absolute enmity. In order to promote peace building substantially, we need to deliberately deconstruct the binary worldview through self-reflective scrutiny and to correct injustices, such as absolute asymmetries, that might result

from neo-liberal globalization. By heeding the intricate relationship between global civil society and the forces fostering global civil war including, new wars, we may be able to avoid an ironic tragedy such as humanistic universalism engendering absolute enmity.

Notes

- 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the international symposium on "Globalization, Difference, and Human Security" (Osaka University, March 12-14, 2008)
- 2 Rudyard Kipling's famous poem "The White Man's Burden" was written in 1899, and its subtitle is "The United States and the Philippine Islands." In this poem, Kipling wrote as follows. "Take up the White Man's burden / *The savage wars of peace* / Fill full the mouth of Famine / And bid the sickness cease; / --The ports ye shall not enter, the roads ye shall not tread, / Go make them with your living, / And mark them with your dead!"
- 3 According to the old framework based upon the Westphalian states system, space can be differentiated between the inside and the outside by the territorial boundary. Apart from the "barbarian" outside, each territorial unit recognizes the sovereignty of the others. In this classical European worldview, old wars meant indiscriminate wars. As the famous Clausewitz dictum (war is a continuation of politics by other means) indicates, war had been regarded as a rational instrument of policy, based upon geo-strategic, economic, or ideological concerns. In addition, the distinction between wartime and peacetime was relatively clear. During wartime, the distinction between civilians and soldiers was also clear. However, this 19th century framework had been shaken by gradual transformations in world politics and finally began to collapse after the end of the Cold War. Drake, Michael. (2007) *The Sociology of New Wars in the Era of Globalization. Sociology Compass* 1: 637-50, Malësević, Sisiša. (2008) *The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent Conflicts. International Political Sociology* 2: 97-112.
- 4 It goes without saying that we must pay attention to Schmitt's conservative ontology and his anachronistic nostalgia for the old *Nomos* of the Earth during the 19th century as well as his affinity with Nazism. (Chandler, David. (2008) *The Revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical Theorists? Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 37: 27-48.) In addition, we should note that some sort of Schmittian decisionism tends to abuse the state of exception and expand the sphere of lawlessness. However, Schmitt's sharp political analysis of changing global order is still useful for us to examine the transformation of the meta-politics of the current situations. In other words, the revival of Schmitt indicates some symptoms of great transformation. (Scheuerman, William E. (2006) *Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib. Constellations* 13: 108-24.)
- 5 Clausewitz mentioned the importance of guerrilla warfare in his case study on Napoleon's campaign in 1812 in Russia. Clausewitz, Carl von. (1992) *Historical and Political Writings*, translated by Peter Paret and Daniel Moran. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 6 A recent field manual of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps emphasizes the need to integrate NGOs and IGOs in their counterinsurgencies: US-Army/Marine-Corps. (2007) *Counterinsurgency Field Manual (U.S. Army Field Manual No.3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No.3-33.5)* Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- 7 The decisive shift toward war economy occurred in the 1970s and the 1980s in the case of Peru and Columbia. Münkler, Herfried (2005) *The New Wars*, translated by Patrick Camiller. Cambridge: Polity. An essential condition for this was the creation of an open war economy, through association of the regional war economy with organized international crime. The growing and marketing of cocaine made such an alliance a real possibility. In the case of opium, the CIA's covert operation stimulated illegal trade around Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. McCoy, Alfred. (2003) *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Trade, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, Columbia*. New York: Lawrence Hill & Co.

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