3

Neoliberal Governmentality and the Politics of the Governed[1]

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1. Introduction

While neoliberal global governmentality promotes the homogenization of self-improving subjectivities at the global level through its networked powers and benchmarking system, it also promotes the politics of exclusion by targeting deviant groups in the periphery. This highly disciplinary social control of the marginalized population sometimes leads to a state of exception where the people have to endure bare lives as *homo sacer*. Here we should pay an attention to the way in which the global governance based upon the neoliberal governmentality creates an informal sector at an enormous scale, which leads to a failed governance in which vicious cycles of violence becomes normal. In addition, the failed governance as a threat is not only a politico-economical byproduct of neoliberal globalization but also an indispensable symbolic supplement for the liberal peace order. In other words, while the neoliberal governmentality resonates with the state of exception at a semiotic dimension as well as at a materialistic dimension, it promotes securitization of the risky groups in the marginalized periphery.

For purposes of explaining the fact that the neoliberal global governmentality is complementary to the state of exception, this article is divided into three parts. The first part reviews Foucault's concept of governmentality and bio-politics in the context of hegemonic neo-liberalism and re-examines the complementary relationship between the governmentality as political rationality and the sovereign power to kill. The

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second part examines neo-liberalism as a technique of governing from a distance by focusing on the case of a global benchmarking system. While the benchmarking system operates in order to fabricate self-improving subjectivities, it also works for identifying risky areas or groups. In relation to the governance of risky groups, the third and the fourth part examines targeted governance as a state of exception by focusing on the case of Gaza Strip and global slum as failed governance. The global slum including Gaza Strip represents the risky area or group, which the governance system tries to eliminate by exceptional means of violence or to contain by building up the security walls. Here it is noteworthy that an urban informal sector like slum, in which a state of exception sometimes emerges, constitutes an essential component of neo-liberal global governance because the latter produces the former by restructuring the whole system alongside the post-Fordist flexible production. In addition, the contradictions inherent in the sovereign states system also cause such as refugee issues that sometimes lead to a state of exception, which we can notice in the case of Palestine issue. In sum, although the state of exception is over-determined by various kinds of factors, it is certain that the neo-liberal governmentality resonates with the state of exception, which could be described as 'anarchical governance'. In conclusion, I try to engage with the possibility of an alternative politics against such neo-liberal global governance which fabricates the homogenous subjectivities at the center and securitizes the dangerous other at the marginalized periphery.

2. Neo-liberalism as Political Rationality and the Transformation of Bio-politics

Since 1979, when the first English version of Foucault's lecture 'On governmentality' appeared in the journal *Ideology and Consciousness*, many scholars focused on his concept of governmentality and began to investigate the notion of liberalism as a technique of governance. These scholars began to apply this focus to the analysis of the present neoliberal governance (Cruikshank 1999; Dean and Hindess 1998; Dean 1999; Ericson et al. 2003; Foucault et al. 1991; Garland 1997; Hindess 1997; 2005:344-384; Hunt and Wickham 1994; Nadesan 2008; Rose 1999). The study on

neoliberal governmentality has become a sort of fashionable knowledge industry. The 'Foucault effect' now seems to have become much more influential in the scholarly arena. This renewed focus was prompted by the recent publication-in the original French and in an English translation-of Foucault's series of lectures that were delivered at the *Collège de France* (Foucault 2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). Although most IR scholars were initially conducting research into the governmentality of advanced capitalist states at a national level, they have also begun to pay attention to it at regional and global levels, against a background of rapidly expanding globalization (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Larner and Walters 2004; Lipschutz and Rowe 2005; Merlingen 2003; Walters and Haahr 2005). Some scholars have also tried to examine the transformation of biopolitics as well as governmentality within the context of global politics, (Edkins et al. 2004). It may well be appropriate to assign Negri and Hardt's book *Empire* into this category (Hardt and Negri 2001).

Foucault outlined the details of neoliberal governmentality in his lecture at the *Collège de France* in 1979 (Foucault 2008). It is not very surprising that Foucault recognized the emergence of neoliberal governmentality, when we take into account the context at the time: Friedrich von Hayek had received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1974 and Milton Friedman had also received it in 1976. However, his attempt to understand the totality of networked powers through the prism of governmentality is still very relevant today. In particular, as networked powers have become increasingly skillful in the global arena, and as neoliberal techniques of governance become increasingly prominent in this post-Fordism era, the applicability of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality seems more appropriate then ever for the purposes of analyzing the power operations of global governance.

The nexus of 'power/knowledge' has been restructured so that it now exists alongside the neoliberal globalization process. This is not just an extension of neoliberal governance from the domestic level to the global level; it is a much more qualitative transformation of governance. As neoliberal governmentality extends into the global arena, it promotes qualitative change, a de-territorialization of the global order, and a movement from the so-called Westphalian system to the post-Westphalian

system. In the post-Westphalian system, it is not only states that play an important role in sustaining neoliberal global governance, but also other kinds of transnational actors, such as NGOs, IGOs, and MNCs. As part of this de-territorialization process, networked power begins to form a global 'power/knowledge' nexus, based upon the logic of neoliberalism. According to conventional understanding, global governance implies 'governance without government', This means that there is no central authority, which itself results in a need for multi-level collaboration or cooperation among governments and other actors who seek to encourage common practices and goals in addressing global issues (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Weiss and Gordenker 1996). However, this kind of conventional understanding of global governance lacks a recognition of the strong link between neoliberal political rationality and multi-level global governance (Bache and Flinders 2004).

The fact that neoliberal rationality has received very little attention indicates that, in the present situation, neoliberalism has already been accepted as the natural 'order of things'. As neoliberal governmentality spreads throughout the world, the presentation of an alternative governmentality becomes increasingly difficult. During the Cold War, state socialism, despite being problematic, still managed to countervail governmentality, to a certain extent. With the total disintegration of state socialism, any viable alternative to neoliberalism seemed to disappear, with the exception of Islamic theocracy. However, any real possibility of an alternative governmentality that would be acceptable to western intellectuals disappeared when the 1956 Hungarian uprising was crushed by the Soviets. It was for this reason that some of intellectuals tried to identify a viable alternative in Mao's China or Tito's Yugoslavia. Foucault himself also showed a keen interest in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and he tried to identify it as a spiritual alternative to neoliberalism (Afary et al. 2005). However, all of these possible alternative systems that initially looked attractive, resulted in complete failure, which has resulted in a neoliberal governmentality hegemony at the global level.

This process of expanding neoliberal governmentality at the global level is also transforming the shape of biopolitics in various ways. In relation to this issue, Foucault saw the birth of biopolitics in the nineteenth century as

follows:

I think that one of the greatest transformations the political right underwent in the nineteenth century was precisely that I wouldn't say exactly that sovereignty's old right - to take life or let live-was replaced, but it came to be complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, permeate it. This is the right, or rather the opposite right. It is the power to 'make' live and 'let' die. The right of sovereignty was the right to take life or let live. And then this new right is established: the right to make live and to let die. (Foucault 2003b: 241)

To clarify, modern biopolitics emerged as a response to the transition that was occurring, from an age of 'the right to take life or let live' to an age of 'the right to make live and let die'. Under welfare regimes, the latter concept became much stronger. However, as the cost of 'governing too much' became too high, full-scale neoliberalism was introduced as a technique of governance in the late 1970s. After this, the notion of 'the right to make live and let die' seemed to retreat drastically, until it existed only as a peripheral notion of governmentality. Furthermore, the notion of 'the right to take life or let live' reappeared, particularly after the instigation of the so-called 'war on terror'. Although Deleuze had pointed out that the biopolitical paradigm would shift from a disciplinary society toward a society of control (Deleuze 1992), the disciplinary mode of control has never disappeared in global politics. On the contrary, it often plays a complementary role in societies of control. In his lectures, Foucault himself also mentioned the complementary relationship between both techniques of governance, in the following terms:

Now I think we see something new emerging in the second half of the eighteenth century: a new technology of power, but this time it is not disciplinary. This technology of power does not exclude the former, does not exclude disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it, to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques....The two sets of mechanisms-one disciplinary and the other regulatory – do not exist at the same level, which means of course that they are not mutually exclusive and can be articulated with each other. (Foucault 2003b: 242-250)

Although the articulation of both disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms remains intact, they are in a different form in the present than they were in the past. The Fordistic form of biopolitics-where positive intervention is made in each life-that had close connections with welfare states, has now been transformed into a post-Fordistic form. To clarify, this notion has now been transformed into one that is focused on the neoliberal biopolitical message 'to let live and let die'. On the other hand, we notice the reemergence of the right of 'the sovereign power to take life', in the periphery of the world system.[2] For example, instances of the state of exception tend to appear more and more as the dominant paradigm in contemporary politics when faced with the unstoppable progression of 'global civil war' (Agamben 2005: 2). In this case, the camp is the arena where life is nothing but 'bare life' – an example of the extreme case of biopolitics. In this sense, the camp at Guantánamo Bay seems to be emblematic of the increasing instances of states of exception.

However, the proposition that the 'bare life' that is lived in the camp is a representative form of biopolitics, or that it is a permanent of state of exception in current global politics is dubious. Firstly, we should pay attention to the relationship between, on the one hand, the neoliberal global governmentality or quasi-legality that lies at the center of the world system and on the other hand, the state of exception at its periphery. Although it is clear that both complement each other, we cannot be certain that the latter will necessarily swallow up the former. The conceptual context behind the practices at Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere are saturated with a received colonial history that can reactivate our colonial past (Gregory

2 In his lectures, Foucault raised the issue of racism and the role of race in relation to the sovereign power's right to kill and wage war several times in 1987. Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76* (New York: Picador, 2003b) xxxiii, 310 p.. This issue might be important when considering the power to kill without homicide, in the context of 'a state of exception'. This is because racism often promotes dehumanization of the subjects and makes it easier for the sovereign power to kill without punishment. In other words, racism might occur at the periphery of liberal governmentality as a necessary supplement to overcome 'a state of exception'. The recent racial profiling targeting Muslims in 'the war on terror' might also be one of such practices.

explain the concept of 'governmentality' in various ways, his famous definition, 'conducting the conduct', seems to be the most significant. In relation to this definition, he mentioned the following at the *Collège de France* in 1979:

> So, we have been trying out this notion of governmentality and, second, seeing how this grid of governmentality, which we may assume is valid for the analysis of ways of conducting the conduct of mad people, patients, delinquents, and children, may equally be valid when we are dealing with phenomena of a completely different scale, such as an economic policy, for a example, or the management of a whole social body, and so on. What I wanted to do — and this was what was at stake in the analysis-was to see the extent to which we could accept that the analysis of micro-powers, or of procedures of governmentality, is not confined by definition to a precise domain determined by a sector of the scale, but should be considered simply as a point of view, a method of decipherment which may be valid for the whole scale, whatever its size. In other words, the analysis of micro-powers is not a question of scale, and it is not a question of a sector, it is a question of a point of view. (Foucault 2008: 186)

To summarize, governmentality might be an example of meta-governance, which is structured around a supreme principle that directs various aspects of actual governance. As the word 'govern' is derived from the Latin word *gubernare*, meaning 'steer', the government is the appropriate arena for the promotion of policies that are implemented to lead the people toward a suitable goal-rather like steering a ship toward a destination. Following Guillaume de La Perrière's text, Foucault also used the metaphor of the ship in his lectures:

> What is it to govern a ship? It involves, of course, being responsible for the sailors, but also taking care of the vessel and the cargo; governing a ship also involves taking winds, reefs, storms, and bad weather into account. What characterizes government of a ship is the practice of establishing relations between the sailors, the vessel, which must be safeguarded, the cargo, which must be brought to port, and establishing these relations in the face of all those eventualities, like winds, reefs, storms and so on. (Foucault 2007: 97)

2007). This means that a continuity exists between our colonial past and the present violence. In other words, the state of exception or emergency, which had been rather normal in colonial governments, under the guise of martial law, seems to reappear in a new form (Hussain 2003: 99-131). To summarize, the rule of law always accompanies a state of exception. However, it is not clear that the latter will become decisive in future global politics.

Furthermore, there must be recognition of the diversity within such terms as harsh biopolitics. Even within the same category-for instance refugee camps-we can see a diversity in the kinds of biopolitics that are deployed, from extreme cases like the massacred Palestinian refugees at Sabra and Shatila in 1982, to the case of Burundian refugees who live in a camp that functions like a kind of a laboratory for UNHCR (Turner 2005). If the extreme cases, such as the 'bare life' that is lived in the camp at Guantánamo, represent the total picture, then there can be neither possibilities nor hope for emancipation. Agamben's concept of the exception-as-the rule seems to leave no room for resistance from the social realm, nor for the Schmittian concept of exceptional rule (Huysmans 2008). As Laclau has pointed out, Agamben's message seems to reflect his own political nihilism (Laclau 2007: 42). Therefore, we should handle Agamben's assertive statement with caution.

On the other hand, the theory of governmentality or the meta-theory of governance is also too general. Governmental programs are never perfectly realized in practice (Garland 1997: 194). Therefore, governmentality studies have to go beyond the tendency to totalize, and they must instead look at specific ways in which the actual powers operate, and how resistance and movements can modify governmentality. This article tries to examine not only the intricate relationship between neoliberal political rationalities and the state of exception, but also the actual practices that instantiate neoliberal rationality at the global political level, in order to explore some possibilities of resistance against the present global governmentality.

Before discussing the intricate relation between neo-liberal global governmentality and a state of exception, we need to clarify the concept of governmentality itself. Although Foucault himself tried to define and

negotiations and a controversial visit by Ariel Sharon-the then leader of the right-wing Likud Party-to the Temple Mount in September 2000, the Palestinians launched the second Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada). In March 2002, after a series of particularly devastating attacks by Palestinian militants, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reoccupied many of the West Bank areas that had been ceded to the Palestinian Authority (PA), and they later withdrew unilaterally and imposed a blockade, in particular on the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Israel also began the construction of an eight-to-ten-meter-high wall, running 670 km roughly along the West Bank. However it has often been noted that over 95 percent of the wall intrudes into the West Bank, beyond the armistice ('green') line that is in place to protect the new Jewish settlers in the occupied enclave (Koury 2005: 49).

The wall has a significantly negative impact on the Palestine people in terms of their socio-economic conditions. This was not only because it hindered their free movement but also because it enabled appropriation of their land. Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza steadily and dramatically deteriorated to the point where the situation is worse than during any other period of Israeli occupation (Roy 2007: 234). In addition to the wall, Israel built up various kinds of obstacles including permanent and partially manned checkpoints, concrete roadblocks and barriers, metal gates, tunnels, and trenches that limit the freedom of Palestinian to move only between school, hospital, home and work. These barriers have substantially dissolved the remaining West Bank into many isolated areas, by sorting them into several zones-A under Palestinian authority, B under mixed authority, C under Israeli authority and so on.[4] In addition, by constructing tunnels and highways, Israeli archeological incursions into the occupied territory are three-dimensional. Eyal Weizman described this aspect as follows:

> After fragmenting the surface of the West Bank with walls and other barriers, Israeli

4 For targeted governance, group profiling using ID cards is also crucial. While Israeli citizens and permanent citizens including Arabs are issued with ID cards with blue casing, residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are issued with orange cards and Palestinians who are barred from Israel are issued green cards.

planners started attempting to weave it together as two separate but overlapping national geographies-two territorial networks overlapping across the same area in three dimensions, without having to cross or come together. One is an upper-land-the land of the settlements-a scattering of well-tended hilltop neighborhoods woven together by modern highways for the exclusive use of its habitants; the other, Palestine-crowded cities, towns, and villages that inhabit the valleys between and underneath the hills, maintaining fragile connections on improvised underpasses. (Weizman 2007: 182)

In other words, the Palestinian Territories no longer maintain their territorial integrity in three dimensions. Although the Israeli government justifies the wall as a necessary instrument for its own security and calls it a security fence, it is clear that the aim of the built-up barriers including the wall is not just for defensive security but also to implement offensive politicide or spatiocide of the targeted people (Hanafi 2005; Kimmerling 2006). It has been noted by several scholars and journalists that there are some similarities with the Bantustan system under the former Apartheid regime in South Africa (Farsakh 2003), but the politics of segregation in Palestine seems to be much harsher than that in South Africa in terms of its intensity of antagonism.

At the time of withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in September 2005, the IDF demolished more than 3,000 buildings and left the bulldozed rubble there. This kind of scene is not unusual. When the IDF attacked the Jenin camp in the West Bank in response to the Palestinian suicide bombings in 2002, the IDF used armored bulldozers to demolish many residents' homes. Its destruction extended well beyond that which could be conceivable for the purpose of gaining access to fighters, and was vastly disproportionate to the military objectives pursued. According to a UN report, the IDF placed the Palestinian death toll at approximately 52 while the Palestinians Authority alleged that some 500 were killed and over 1200 residential properties were damaged (UN 2002). Throughout the military operation, the IDF continued to deny access to its self-proclaimed military zones for everyone, including medical doctors, ambulances, humanitarian services, and journalists. Therefore, ascertaining exactly what happened there is a significant challenge. However, it is certain that the rule of law was suspended and the state of exception was established as the norm in that

At this stage it would be fitting to recall the fact that meta-governance also changes depending on historical conjuncture. This means that the direction of ship and the practices of shipping might also change. Foucault gave a more general explanation of governmentality in the same lecture. Despite its length, I quote the whole paragraph here because of its importance:

> By this word 'governmentality' I mean three things. First, by 'governmentality' I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population at its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by 'governmentality' I understand the tendency, the line force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the preeminence over all other types of power-sovereignty, discipline, and so on-of the type of power that we can call 'government' and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (*appareils*) on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges [sic] (*saviors*). Finally, by 'governmentality' I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually 'governmentalized'. (Foucault 2007: 108-9).

Here Foucault defined governmentality as akin to a nexus between governmental apparatuses (*apprareils*) and knowledge (*savoirs*). Governmentality as a nexus of power/knowledge provides political rationality as a base for each actual governance. According to Foucault's rough sketch, the principle behind the notion of western governmentality in its role as a meta-governance, began as Christian pastoralism and shifted to embrace the principle of raison d'état, which-after secularization-refused to subordinate the needs of the state to divine command (Foucault 1981). This transformed either into the police theory (*Polizeiwissenshaft*), which promoted public tranquility and security in Germany, or into liberalism, which promoted governance through self-governing spheres in England between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. After the crisis of liberalism, the politically rationalistic justification for active intervention

into each life emerged, and it became institutionalized in the form of welfare states.

However, this system also faced difficulties in sustaining itself during the 1970s. It has been generally accepted that political rationality transformed into neoliberalism at this point. While the technique of social-liberalism under the welfare regime was an attempt to directly control the 'social problems' that were caused by an excess of laissez-faire, neoliberalism was a technique that indirectly controlled the problems by ascribing responsibilities to each individual and socializing them in the context of an eternal self-improvement movement. It is noteworthy that neoliberalism is a technique that governs 'the social' from a distance, not only through the markets, but also through civil society, which includes non-governmental organizations. In this regard, neoliberalism is not simply a return to the past laissez-faire. As this kind of new political rationality penetrates the global system, a multi-level global governance based on a benchmarking system emerges. Even after the global financial crisis, this political rationality seems to survive by tuning itself to new fluctuations.

3. A Global Benchmarking System: Power/Knowledge Ranking, Auditing, and Monitoring Subjects

In the context of a neoliberal governmentality as a power/knowledge nexus, each actor's ability to self-govern is crucial. Therefore, the governing system attempts to standardize a scale for measurement and to implement a classification of the whole, which is governed according to that numerical standard. At the global level, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, journals, and OECD countries-in particular the United States-are now making an effort to produce various kinds of indicators and classify the performance of each state's governance, by using these indicators to promote the smooth running of a neoliberal global governance.

Among these international organizations, the World Bank plays a leading role both in the supply and use of cross-country governance ratings. One of the most widely used set of indicators are the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) that the World Bank Institute has provided bi-annually

since 1996. Another is the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) that has also been produced by the World Bank since 1977. While both are perception-based assessments, the World Bank also provides fact-based indicators such as 'Doing Business' Indicators. NGOs and private companies are also main providers for cross-country governance ratings-Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Freedom House's rating of freedom, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), *Foreign Policy*'s Failed States Index and Globalization Index, Ibrahim Index of African Governance and so on.

What prompted this explosive growth in the supply and use of cross-country governance? Christiane Arndt and Charles Oman have identified four factors: 1) the spectacular increase in international investment in developing countries; 2) the end of the Cold War; 3) the failed development policy reforms of the 1980s and 1990s; and 4) the emergence of a new institutional economics (a new awareness of the importance of institutions in economic development and policy reform) (2006: 35). It is clear that these combined factors have contributed to a greater interest in the quality of governance in developing countries. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that collapsed states harboring terrorists are being perceived as threats to the United States and international society, particularly since September 11, 2001. During the 1990s, phrases such as collapsed states, failed states, and fragile states became fashionable on the back of the situation occurring in countries such as Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, DRC, and Afghanistan. While it became very important for security policymakers to reconstruct failed states, and to improve bad governance, in order to prevent collapsed states (Rotberg 2004), international financial institutions like the World Bank also became interested in governance issues. This interest developed following the post-Washington consensus, and was implemented by revising its market fundamentalism, particularly after 1996, under the presidency of James Wolfenson. In other words, serious governance issues including failed or fragile states, emerged at the point where security and development concerns converged (Duffield 2001).

What kind of political mechanism operates when there is a growth in the supply and use of cross-country governance indicators? First of all, the system indirectly coerces each member to improve its own performance

and forces him or her to aim for as higher ranking as possible, within the given scale. Although there are many criticisms of perceptions-based governance indicators, in particular the CPI, WGI, and CPIA (Arndt and Oman 2006; Kurtz 2007a, 2007b; Thomas 2007), they continue to be adopted as 'objective' by donors. Despite the systemic bias that emerges on the back of the policy preferences of vested interests, the calculable knowledge still remains neutral. While the benchmarking system succeeds in depoliticizing indirect domination through numericalization and standardization, it also promotes 'governing at a distance' (Rose 1999: 43) by setting an objective for 'the governed'. This regulative power controls societies predominantly through standardization, rather than hierarchical organizations or markets, although all three sometimes complement each other (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000: 21-39). The benchmarking system is an attempt to implant the principle of self-reliance and continual improvement into 'the governed', by auditing and monitoring conducted by a third party, which includes NGOs. In short, a society of control is an audit society. As Michael Power writes in his book *Audit Society*: 'The audit explosion has its roots in a programmatic restructuring of organizational life and a new 'rationality' of governance' (Power 1997:10). In addition, a society of control is also a benchmarking society. To borrow Larner's words, 'benchmarking sits alongside auditing and contractualism as another technique of advanced liberalism...If auditing is about checking, and contract is about performing, then benchmarking is about comparison' (Larner and Walters 2004: 214). The combination of benchmarking and auditing has become an integral part of the society of control both at the global and national level.

This benchmarking system is aimed at forming a kind of self-reliant subjectivity, through the use of regulative powers. From the neo-Gramscian perspective, this kind of auto-control system could be described as an aspect of the neoliberal 'passive revolution', which is occurring at the global level (Morton 2007). However, if the populace is not perceived as being self-reliant yet, then the governing system tries to intervene in his or her life in the name of 'empowerment', in order to promote a 'passive revolution'. At this point, we should take notice of the complementary relationship that exists between regulative powers and disciplinary powers.

While disciplinary powers try to force the populace into the same mold by using punitive methods, regulative powers try to persuade the populace-indirectly by using their networks, including NGOs and intergovernmental organizations-to pursue incessant improvement and adjustment. According to Nikolas Rose, 'in disciplinary societies it was a matter of processing from one disciplinary institution to another-school, barracks, factory-each seeking to *mould* conduct by inscribing enduring corporeal and behavioral competences, and persisting practices of self-scrutiny and self-constraint into the soul. Control society is one of constant and never-ending *modulation* where the modulation occurs within the flows and transactions between the forces and capacities of the human subject and the practices in which he or she participates. One is always in continuous training, lifelong learning, perpetual assessment, continual incitement to buy, to improve oneself, constant monitoring of health and never-ending risk management' (Rose 1999: 234).

Through a process of unlimited modulation, some developing countries succeeded in internalizing the requirements of good governance to some degree. In other words, the World Bank works within sovereign frontiers, to create a specific role for these states as mediators in African societies' interaction with global forces. Graham Harrison called these 'governance states' or 'post-conditional states' (Harrison 2001, 2004). However, if some states do not respond to the improvement requirement positively, then they are labeled as deviants, and will be punished by the disciplinary powers. In relation to those occupying the lowest rank, the global benchmarking system specifies this as a risk group that includes fragile or failed states. It classifies them thus in order to manage them effectively, because they represent the threat of ungoverned political space within the global system.

Mark Duffield also points out the same thing in the following terms. 'Within policy discourse, it exists as a set of technical prescriptions to bolster administrative capacity and strengthen international oversight, the aim of which is to transform the fragile state into governance state. In contrast to governance states, which are funding regimes providing stability to the donor-state relationship in aid-dependent countries, fragile states are dangerous because they lack the capacity to become aid-dependent and thus a known part of the West's sovereign frontier' (Duffield 2007: 170).

Furthermore, donors use governance indicators for aid-allocation purposes, and they sometimes suspend economic aid for countries that do not meet their criteria. It is clear here that typical discipline is being exercised here. International economic institutions and OECD countries try to embed neoliberalism into the infrastructure of developing countries by allocating a showcase status such as 'governance states' to those states that are regarded as the best, they also impose a low cutoff line that is used to define those who do not meet these standards, and sometimes they punish these states that do not meet this cutoff by suspending aid.

4. Targeted Governance as a State of Exception: the Wall & Targeted Assassinations

Influential powers always use so called sticks (coercive methods) in combination with carrots (regulative methods). In the same way, the society of control is always accompanied by a disciplinary society. Although Deleuze predicted that a disciplinary society would be replaced by a society of control, the proportion of the former to the latter seems to be on the increase again. As the global hegemony begins to disintegrate, it seems that violent disciplinary power is now becoming conspicuous at the periphery of global politics. This means that, as political rationality begins to lose its legitimacy, neoliberalism and its rule becomes something like 'domination without hegemony'. In other words, the politics of exclusion begins to dominate over the politics of inclusion as the traditional hegemony declines.

At this stage, we must pay attention to the transformation of disciplinary power at the global level as well as the domestic level. Several works of critical criminology have identified some important recent changes in the way that authorities govern offenders and deliver state punishment (Garland 2001). While the modern penalty focused on the offender as a soul or as a psyche, and aimed to normalize them, the neoliberal approach attempts to deal with penal issues and penal populations by using risk techniques that identify and evaluate the presence and the magnitude of risk factors that are involved with people and environments, in order to reduce necessary spending. In the same way, the neoliberal global governmentality seeks to govern security by deploying risk techniques. The

idea of risk governance or target governance has been linked to the idea of efficient, apolitical, and knowledge-driven policies because of a disappointment with, or outright rejection of, the more totalizing dreams of governance that had come to be seen as hubristic and dysfunctional (Valverde and Mopas 2004: 245).

A global benchmarking system is also one sort of targeted governance that is aimed at establishing effective controls that minimize costs and maximize development/security outcomes, by using CPIA, WGI, and CPI. As this system uses the insurance paradigm of risk based upon quasi-scientific calculus and group profiling, it seeks to identify how to target problem states, populations, and activities. This targeted governance is always accompanied by policing activities. Since September 11, 2001, targeted governance has come to rely on a much more precautionary and arbitrary method of policing (Aradau 2007). The *2002 National Security Strategy* has stated that 'the United States today is threatened less by conquering states than we are by weak and failing ones'. U.S. policy makers can no longer consider failed or fragile states as peripheral to its security concerns, and it must do more now than put them in its watch-list of state sponsors of terrorism or rogue states. By placing insecurity and threat, at the center of the governmental grid of risk, it is transformed into a total surveillance system complete with conservative 'lock-them up' policies. As Valverde and Mopas have pointed out, 'the contradictory dream of information-driven targeted governance is dialectically intertwined with a vision of targeting everything' (Valverde and Mopas 2004: 246-7).

With regard to the precautionary and arbitrary methods of targeted governance, we can see a prototype in 'the war on drugs' that was declared by U.S. President Nixon in 1969. As part of an international crackdown on the drug trade, which expanded rapidly in the 1980s when both presidents Reagan and Bush declared their own wars on drugs, the U.S. drug enforcement agents implemented a variety of investigative techniques, including 'buy and bust' tactics and more extensive undercover operations, including 'controlled delivery' of illicit drug consignments, various forms of non-telephonic electronic surveillance, and offers of reduced charges or immunity from prosecution to known drug dealers (in order to 'flip' them into becoming informants) (Andreas 2006: 131). The U.S. drug

enforcement agents also provided the impetus for the creation of paramilitary enforcement groups composed of U.S. military and police officials, to target drug facilities in South America. This kind of 'illegal' policing operation for 'law' enforcement becomes much more conspicuous in targeted governance in the period after 'the war on drugs' was replaced by 'the war on terror'.

On the other hand, the U.S. pushed forward international laws such as the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (ratified in 1988), which mandated extensive cooperation in all law enforcement tasks directed at international drug trafficking, including extradition, mutual legal assistance, and the seizure and forfeiture of assets. In order to strengthen law enforcement, the State Department promoted its war on drugs through the annual *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, which, since 2000, has graded countries in terms of their level of cooperation with U.S. anti-drug objectives. In order to curb the trafficking of women and children, the State Department has also, since 2000, published its annual *Trafficking in Persons Report*. In both cases, the State Department has warned that countries that are deemed to not be in compliance with the minimum standards that have been set out, and countries that are not making significant efforts to uphold the standards, might be decertified, which itself might bring with it sanctions such as aid cutoffs. Here we notice typical global disciplinary power being exercised again.

Corruption is also one of the most important issues for globally targeted governance. This targeted governance also began as a unilateral U.S. initiative to criminalize bribery through the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Andreas 2006: 55-56). This eventually became the 1977 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery for Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and thence to the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption, which required signatories to prohibit their corporations from paying bribes to foreign officials. During this process, the NGO Transparency International (TI), founded in 1993 by former World Bank officials, played a key role in strengthening this targeted governance by offering usage of its 'informal surveillance camera'. In 1994, TI began to publish its annual Global Corruption Report, in which it provides a ranking

of countries from most to least corrupt, by using the Corruption Perceptions Index. It also began to publish the Bribe Payers Index. It is noteworthy that the World Bank also makes reference to TI's Index in its WGI and CPIA assessment. Despite its perception-based subjective evidence, TI's publication of this index has a big impact on the targeted subjects, due to its effective public shaming tactic. In sum, the U.S., International Organizations, and NGOs have all cooperated with each other, in order to strengthen their targeted governance through deployment of their disciplinary power, while governing the subjects from a distance. The desired outcome of this collection of groups is still the subjects' docility, rather than their auto-control.

This targeted governance is operated by new social control techniques that are highly dependent on punishment and exclusion, rather than penal-welfarism (Garland 2001). Therefore, its legitimacy is sustained by the continuing existence of threats and the incidents that represent them. As the penal system is only one part of an overall mechanism of domination, the very failure of the system is central to its success (Foucault 1991: 272), this targeted governance would also succeed in sustaining itself by continuing to stigmatize the dropout states and blaming them for their own poor self-regulation. However, in as far as it assigns the responsibility for failure at the local level and does not attempt to solve problems at the systemic level, it merely sustains the systematic contradictions. For example, governing elites would attribute a humanitarian crisis to bad local governance rather than systematic problems at the global level in the neoliberal context. This is in spite of the big impact that the fluctuating global economy has upon the population who exist on the periphery. The rise of this kind of neoliberal thinking might be related to the decline of the dependency approach or the Neo-Marxist approach, which emphasized the structural causes of poverty in the South. However, if the governance system overemphasizes individual risk management responsibility and depends too much on punishments and quarantine techniques, coercive rule ends up reducing the agency of 'the governed' and eventually loses its legitimacy. This could lead to the rise of resistance, or even possibly the uprising of violent rebellions. By responding to that kind of situation, the ruling elites promote the securitization of bad governance spaces (failed

states or rogue states), by strengthening targeted governance, which itself might lead to a state of exception. We can see this kind of typical vicious cycle not only in Afghanistan and Iraq but also in the Israel/Palestine issue.

According to the ratings published by NGOs and IGOs, Israel is not such a bad offender in terms of governance indicators. For example, in 2008, the NGO Freedom House assigned Israel the first grade score in terms of its political rights while it gave the Palestinian-authority administered territories the fifth grade score in the same category. Even in terms of the World Bank's WGI (percentile rank) in 2008, Israel is given relatively high scores in all areas (84.4 in governmental effectiveness, 75.4 in control of corruption, 82.5 in regulatory quality, and 73.3 in rule of law) except political stability (13.0). However, a cursory look at the situations around the Palestinian territories, reveals that these indicators do not reflect the disgusting conditions that exist on the ground This must be because of a political bias in the indicator and its measurements.

At the very least, we should put aside these scores and look at the real state of exception that exists around the Palestinian territories. The Israeli manner of handling the Palestinian issue might well be an extreme case of targeted governance that relies heavily on punishment and quarantine techniques. This targeted governance became more salient after the Oslo peace process[3] failed. In 1993, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's Labor Party-led coalition government secured a breakthrough agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Declaration of Principles outlined a phased Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and limited Palestinian autonomy in those areas, in exchange for Palestinian recognition of Israel and a renunciation of terrorism. However, in 1994 a right-wing Jewish extremist assassinated Rabin in Tel Aviv and an extended summit at Camp David with the U.S., Israeli, and the Palestinian leadership failed to produce a final settlement. Following the breakdown of

3 It is noteworthy that the Oslo agreement itself was congruent with Israeli terms and 'failed to improve or strengthen the Palestinian position relatively or absolutely and in fact worsened this position to the point where an acceptable and meaningful compromise became politically — and physically — impossible' Sara M. Roy, *Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict* (London Pluto, 2007) , p.xxiii.

situation. In addition, since the beginning of the second Intifada, the IDF had begun to rely on the extreme tactic of targeted governance, specifically, it introduced targeted assassinations to disrupt Palestinian armed and political resistance (Weizman 2007: 237-258). This extra-judicial state execution is undertaken mostly from the air and sometimes causes heavy collateral damages to innocent civilians. Here we can notice the most advanced form of targeted governance. It goes without saying that 'the war on terror' at the global level has promoted this kind of Israeli targeted governance enthusiastically since 9/11.

In short, it seems that most of the Palestinians are to all intents and purposes placed in outlaw situations. To borrow Agamben's words, Palestinians seem to be regarded as '*homo sacer*'. According to Agamben, a *homo sacer* is a person who can be killed without any punishment and yet may not be sacrificed in religious ritual (Agamben 1998: 71-74). In other words, it is permitted for the IDF to kill Palestinians without committing homicide and without celebrating the Palestinian death as a sacrifice, within the sovereign sphere-such as military zones. As, in this case, the sovereign nation appears by taking the form of 'the state of exception', Palestinian lives are subject to a power that can take their lives and they are as abandoned, destined to be only *homo sacer*. However, it is noteworthy that Agamben raised the issue of homo sacer as an aspect biopolitics while at the same time bearing in mind that this could apply to the Jews in the Nazi concentration camps, not the Palestinians in the refugee camps. In reality, the Jewish dead were cast as sacred sacrifices who had symbolically contributed to the founding of the state of Israel. This attitude is clear from the Yad-Vashem Holocaust History Museum in Jerusalem. In James E. Young's words, 'Yad-Vashem functions as a national shrine both to Israeli pride in heroism and shame in victimization, a place where Holocaust history is remembered as culminating in the very time and space now occupied by the memorial complex itself' (Young 1993: 244). Israeli official nationalism seeks to use this preeminent national shrine to highlight the link between the Holocaust and statehood in. The murdered Jews were conferred with Israeli citizenship posthumously, so they are no longer *homo sacer*. At present we are now witnessing the historical irony of the founding and expansion of Israel, which is based upon the myth of 'a land without

people for a people without land'. This process includes sacrilizing those Holocaust victims by ironically producing more *homo sacer* out of the Palestinian refugees both in the occupied territories and outside of Israel.[5]

In this historical and political context, it is natural that constantly high levels of contiguous antagonism led to the production of 'a state of exception' as normal. The wall therefore appeared as an architectonic representation of that violence which suspends the rule of law (Azoulay and Ophir 2005). As the wall itself indicates, in Israel-Palestine, the significant sovereign power suspends the rule of law while establishing a highly securitized political process. Furthermore, the sovereign power suspends law in a modern form of colonial violence, by dehumanizing the targeted subjects. That is one of reasons why the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a very critical opinion on a wall that was constructed in the occupied Palestine territories in 2004 (ICJ 2004). According to the ICJ, the construction of the wall, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law and Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law.[6] However, the Israeli government continued to construct the wall. Furthermore, major countries-including the U.S.-tacitly permitted this and, instead, suspended economic aid to the Hamas-dominated Palestinian government, despite of its electoral victory in January 2006. In sum, the wall functions as an aspect of the 'a state of exception', representing the exclusionary politics that is prevalent in

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5 In addition, this kind of Israeli official nationalism ignored Primo Levi's paradox: survivors must bear witness in the name of the impossibility of bearing witness Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive* (New York: Zone Books, 2000) 175 p..

6 The advisory opinion is as follows. 'In sum, the Court finds that, from the material available to it, it is not convinced that the specific course Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security objectives. The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated régime gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order. The construction of such a wall accordingly constitutes breaches by Israel of various of its obligations under the applicable international humanitarian law and human rights instruments'.

present global governance, as well as the deviant governance of Israel.

In relation to the politics of exclusion that is at work in Israel-Palestine, we should pay attention to how the Jewish question, in the same manner as the inherently contradictory concept of the nation-state system, was transplanted from Europe to Palestinian soil. As Arendt pointed out in *the Origins of Totalitarianism*, there are always gaps between the rights of citizens and the Rights of Man, gaps which might derive from the inherent contradictions of nation-states (Arendt 2004: 344-384). If nations try to promote their homogeneity alongside ethno-nationalism, they cannot help but exclude the unassimilated other, in order to purify their own collective identity. The issue of refugees, stateless people, or oppressed minorities represents the kind of aporia that is present in modern territorial governmentality. In short, the Jewish question, as an instance of the 'aporia of nation-states', has been transformed into a Palestinian question through geo-political forces, but the aporia itself still remains intact and unsolved. The wall as an example of the 'state of exception' and the 'nearly bare' life of the Palestinians inside the camp yet surrounded by the wall, are rooted in these political and historical conjunctures. Now targeted governance under the influence of neoliberal global governance, and conducted in the name of 'the war on terror', is also strongly imposed on this political mechanism of exclusion.

5. Global Slums as Failed Governance and the Politics of 'the Governed'

To reiterate the above argument, the biopolitics at the Palestinian refugee camps in the Gaza Strip are an extreme case. This is because they reflect not only the exclusionary politics of the present neoliberal global governance but also the inherent contradictions of the nation-state system. However, if you focus on the former aspect, it becomes clear that the case of the Gaza Strip is just one part of the global slums that represent failed governance at the global level. Following Neza (Mexico City), Libertador (Caracas), El Sur (Bogotá), San Juan de Lurigancho (Lima), Cono Sur (Lima), Ajegunle (Lagos), Sadr City (Baghdad), and Soweto (Gauteng), Gaza is the seventh largest mega-slum. which embraces 1.3 million people

(half of them refugees) (Davis 2006: 28). If you look at the ratio of slum dwellers as a proportion of the urban population, the Sub-Saharan African region has a conspicuously high proportion (72%)-this is clearly contrasted with Europe, where the proportion of slum dwellers is 6% (UN Human Settlements Programme. 2003: 15). The world's highest proportion of slum dweller in the urban population is found in Ethiopia (99.4%), followed by Chad (99.4%), Afghanistan (98.5%), and the list continues. These slums are characterized by overcrowding, poor structural housing, inadequate access to safe water and sanitation, and insecurity. UN-HABITAT estimated that the global slum population reached approximately 837 million in 2003, and was growing by 25 million per year. Although the United Nations proposed the concept of 'cities without slums' as one of its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000,[7] the outlook for the world's global slums is becoming increasingly bleak. Jan Breman, a Dutch sociologist who has conducted field research on the poor in India and Indonesia for decades, said: 'My own extensive research on the informal sector has shown very little evidence, at least not on any large scale, of such upward mobility. In my opinion, it is a myth inspired by wishful thinking' (Breman 2003: 174).

This means that slums are not just manifestations of a population explosion. As the UN-HABITAT report pointed out, 'slums must be seen as the result of a failure of housing policies, law, and delivery systems, as well as national and urban policies' (UN Human Settlements Programme 2003: 5). In other words, the collapse of formal urban employment in developing countries and the rise of the informal sector must be seen as a direct result of liberalization. It goes without saying that political factors have impacted particularly strongly on the collapse of the formal sector, in the case of Gaza. However, there are, to varying degrees, similarities to be found among these various kinds of slums.

Generally speaking, the slum is a political space where urban governance has collapsed. The urban poor there are trapped in an informal and 'illegal' world where waste is not collected and public securities are not provided. The amalgam of exclusion, poverty, and informality also

7 Target 11 is: 'By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers'.

accelerates violence and the militarization of a city-life: the militarization of gangs, drug cartels, and militia; the proliferation of religious and communal armed conflicts and violence; and the absence of legitimate authority. In Appadurai's words, 'urban war zones are becoming armed camps, driven wholly by *implosive* forces that fold into neighborhoods the most violent and problematic repercussions of wider, regional, national, and global processes' (Appadurai 1996: 152-3). In these urban war zones, the militarization of social control-from U.S.-style zero tolerance policing to outright urban warfare on the streets of Rio de Janeiro-has also increased, while the upper classes have retreated to their own heavily guarded 'gated communities'. As Terresa Caldeira has pointed out, 'from Johannesburg to Budapest, from Cairo to Mexico City, from Bueno Aires to Los Angeles, similar process are occurring: the erection of walls, the secession of the upper classes, the privatization of public spaces, and the proliferation of surveillance technologies are fragmenting the city space, separating social groups, and changing social groups, and changing the character of public life in ways that contradict the modern ideals of city life' (Caldeira 2000: 323).[8]

In this fragmentation processes, the slum population has become the securitized target, which requires continuous policing. A well-ordered civil society is shaped by the process of classical modern policing (Neocleous 2006: 27) The state fashions the market, generates new forms of subjectivity, and subsumes resistances in order to fabricate a social order of wage labor. In addition, the key to the science of policing is ensuring that the police can deal with the criminal 'underclass' who have fallen from indigence into crime. The function of the police is therefore to prevent the impoverished classes from falling into destitution. The essence of the policing project is to identify and implement the mechanisms that are deemed necessary to prevent the poverty-stricken classes from falling further into indigence and from there into crime (Neocleous 2006: 31). In this age of the global slum, the essence of the policing project still remains

8 In this 'dual cities' structure, we notice some continuities or similarities with the colonial urban govermnality Stephen Legg, *Spaces of Colonialism: Delhi's Urban Governmentalities* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2007) xvi, 254 p.: 216-219.

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

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Contents