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Securitization of Development and Clinical Gaze upon Poverty: Reconsidering the Political Shift of the Development Discourse

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As the past post-development literature suggests, it is undeniable that the development discourse as a hegemonic 'knowledge/power' regime tends to reproduce asymmetrical power relations by fabricating our preferences and subjectivities. We can notice a typical example of post-development critique against development in the following quotation. 'Development is the process whereby other peoples are dominated and their destinies are shaped according to the essentially Western way of conceiving and perceiving the world. The development discourse is part of an imperial process whereby other peoples are appropriated and turned into objects' (Tucker, 1999: 1).

In order to deconstruct the categories used in development discourses, it is important to pay greater attention to the unequal power relationship that prevails in the production of knowledge as well as excessive human-centricism. However, related to this respect, how do we interpret the dominant liberal and positive view of development, which is in stark contrast to the post-development literature? For example, according to Sen, the objective of development should be the enhancement of people's capabilities, or of the opportunities that are open to people of being and doing a variety of things (Sen, 1999). UNDP's *Human Development Report* defined the objective of development succinctly as enlarging people's choices in a way that enables them to lead longer, healthier, and fuller lives (UNDP, 1990: 10). Although this kind of liberal and humanistic view of development seems to be plausible, it tends to ignore the structural power relations due to its own individualistic approach.

Some scholars criticize Sen's entitlement approach to famine in the same way. It is certain that the entitlement approach shifted the focus of famine analysis from 'failures of food supply' to 'failures in access to food' by shedding light on the exchange entitlement decline. Although it succeeded to deconstruct the neo-Malthusian theory, it is still held in captivity in the myth of market-driven symmetrical exchange and ignores asymmetrical structural power relations that further the entitlement exchange decline. In Stephen Devereux's words, 'the entitlement approach is conceptually and analytically weakened by its methodological individualism and by privileging of economic aspects of famine to the virtual exclusion and political determinants (Devereux, 2007: 16)'. Similar criticism against Sen's argument is as follows.

> He (Sen) did not consider the possibility that famines could be a *product* of the social or economic system rather than its *failure*…. The second reason is why the radical potential of Sen's approach was blunted is to be found in Sen's very limited view of what politics is. He sees politics as separable from economics, and the state as ultimately benign and non-violent. (Edkins, 2007: 53-4)

In addition, the 'entitlement theory has no place for violence and underestimates the extra-legal transfers of entitlement as well as law-maintaining violence' (Edkins, 1996). This kind of criticism seems to be appropriate but demand too much because a conventional economist must separate economics from politics as far as they want to keep his 'academic' identity as an economist. (But it is noteworthy that development economics begins to adopt institutions as a key concept.) In this sense, the problem might derive from economics as an academic discipline in itself rather than Sen's own idea. As far as economics as a discipline excludes politics as externality, it cannot avoid seeing politics as separable from economics. But we should take note that the actual development discourse itself operates within the realm of 'the political'. In other words, even the problematic Sen's entitlement approach to hunger contributed to the shift of the political terrain of development discourse alongside emancipation in spite of several limits of his liberal standpoint. The important thing is not whether or not Sen's entitlement approach is sufficient for critical thinking of development but how the development discourse including the entitlement approach shifted through its politicization and de-politicization.

Development practitioners are likely to be affected by the political process much more than development economists. For example, development practitioners gradually became aware of concepts such as participation and empowerment, began to realize that local knowledge should be valued, and to take gender issues more seriously

during the 1990s. This shifting awareness is doubtless influenced by wider political transformations at the global level (Gardner and Lewis, 1990: 125). On the other hand, as some critical scholars pointed out, the hegemonic international development regime also incorporates concepts such as 'participation' and 'empowerment' into its own neo-liberal management and co-opts NGOs (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). In short, the development discourse is heterogeneous, contested and constantly changing while responding to hegemonic crisis. Here it is necessary to interrogate how different marginalized groups or individuals either engage with, or are excluded from, dominant development discourses during this changing process.

For example, the discursive practices of 'human security' itself are also operated upon such a political terrain. Through the concept of human security, some people try to politicize and securitize development issues for furthering emancipation, to free people from physical and human constraints that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do (Booth, 1991). UNDP's 'human security approach' is concerned with reducing and removing the insecurities that adversely affect an enlargement of human choices. The aim of this approach is to mobilize more political support and economic resources for addressing issues by framing poverty as a global human security issue.

However, on the other hand, securitization of issues often leads to the politics of exception. The politics of security implies the sovereign decision to identify the other as enemy, who threatens our lives and to exclude them from the inside. While this kind of security concerns will be captured by state elites, its exceptionalism tends to undermine the rule of law and leads to oppressive politics through the exclusion and objectification of the marginalized other. In short, securitization of development issues in the name of emancipation tends to become a tool for strengthening oppressive dominant hegemony in the case where order is prioritized over justice. This article reviews such a political move around securitization of development issues by examining its actual operations along neo-liberal global governmentality (Foucault, 2008).

GLOBAL BENCHMARKING SYSTEM: TECHNOCRATIC KNOWLEDGE/POWER DEPOLITICIZING SUBJECTS THROUGH RANKING

For neo-liberal governmentality as power/knowledge nexus, each actor's ability to self-govern efficiently is crucial. So the governing system tries to standardize a scale for measuring it and to classify the

whole governed according to that numerical standard. At the global level, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, journals and OECD countries, in particular the United States, are now making an effort to make various kinds of indicators and classify the performance of each state's governance by using them in order to promote neo-liberal global governance more smoothly.

Among international organizations, the World Bank plays a leading role both in the supply and use of cross-country governance ratings. One of the most widely used scales is the World Governance Indicators (WGI) that the World Bank Institute provides bi-annually since 1996. Another is the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) that is also produced by the World Bank since 1977. While both are perception-based assessments, the World Bank provided facts-based indicators such as 'Doing Business' Indicators too. NGOs and private companies are also providers for cross-country governance ratings – Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Freedom House's rating of freedom, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), *Foreign Policy's* Failed States Index and Globalization Index, Ibrahim Index of African Governance, and so on.

Why did this kind of explosive growth in supplies and uses of cross-country governance indicators occur? Christiane Arndt and Charles Oman point out four reasons: (1) the spectacular increase in international investment in developing countries; (2) the end of the Cold War; (3) failed development policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s; and (4) new institutional economics (a new awareness of the importance of institutions in economic development and policy reform) (2006: 35). It is certain that these combined factors lead to greater interest in the quality of governance in developing countries. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that collapsed states harbouring terrorists are perceived to be a threat to the United States and the international society in particular since 11 September 2001. During the 1990s, words such as 'collapsed states', 'failed states', and 'fragile states' became fashionable through the cases of Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Afghanistan. While it becomes very important for security policy makers to reconstruct failed states or to improve bad governance for preventing collapsed states (Rotberg, 2004), international financial institutions like the World Bank also became interested in governance issues following the post-Washington consensus by revising its market fundamentalism in particular after 1996 under the presidency of James Wolfenson. In other words, serious governance issues such as failed states or fragile states emerged at the

point where security concerns and development concerns converged (Duffield, 2001).

What kind of political mechanism operates with growth in supplies and uses of cross-country governance indicators? First of all, that system indirectly coerces each member to improve its own performance and forces him or her to aim for a higher rank in the given scale. Although there are many criticisms against perceptions-based governance indicators, in particular CPI, WGI, and CPIA (Kurtz, 2007a; Thomas, 2007; Arndt, 2006; Kurtz, 2007b), they continue to be adopted as 'objective' by donors. Despite systemic bias based on the policy preferences of vested interests, calculable knowledge looks neutral. While the benchmarking system succeeds to depoliticize its indirect domination through numericalization and standardization, it promotes 'governing at a distance' (Rose, 1999: 43) by setting objectives for the governed. This regulative power controls societies mainly through standardization rather than hierarchical organization or markets though all three sometimes complement each other (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000: 21-39). It is an attempt to implant the principle of self-reliance and incessant improvement to the governed through third-party (including NGOs) auditing and monitoring. In short, the society of control is an audit society. As Michael Power writes in his book *Audit Society*, 'The audit explosion has its roots in a programmatic restructuring of organizational life and a new 'rationality of governance' (Power, 1997: 10). In addition, the society of control is also a benchmarking society. To borrow Larner's words, 'benchmarking sits alongside audit and contractualism as another technique of advanced liberalism. If audit is about checking, and contract is about performing, then benchmarking is about comparison' (Larner and Walters, 2004: 214). Benchmark with audit has become an integral part of society of control at the global level as well as the national level.

This benchmarking system aims at the formation of self-reliant subjectivity through regulative powers. From the neo-Gramscian perspective, this kind of auto-control system could be described as one aspect of neo-liberal 'passive revolution' at the global level (Morton, 2007). But, if the governed is not self-reliant yet, the government system tries to intervene in his or her life in the name of 'empowerment' in order to promote 'passive revolution'. Here we should take notice of complementary relations between regulative powers and disciplinary powers. While disciplinary powers try to cast the governed in the same mould through punitive methods, the regulative powers try to force them to promote incessant improvement

and adjustment indirectly by using their network including NGOs and intergovernmental organizations. According to Nikolas Rose,

> In disciplinary societies it was a matter of procession from one disciplinary institution to another – school, barracks, factory – each seeking to *mould* conduct by inscribing enduring corporeal and behavioural competences, and persisting practices of self-scrutiny and self-constraint into the soul. Control society is one of constant and never-ending *modulation* where the modulation occurs within the flows and transactions between the forces and capacities of the human subject and the practices in which he or she participates. One is always in continuous training, lifelong learning, perpetual assessment, continual incitement to buy, to improve oneself, constant monitoring of health and never-ending risk management. (Rose, 1999: 234)

Through never-ending modulation, some developing countries succeeded in internalizing requirements of good governance in some degree. In other words, the World Bank works within the sovereign frontier to constitute a specific role for these states as mediators of African societies' interactions with global forces. Graham Harrison called them 'governance states' or 'post-conditional states' (Harrison, 2004, 2001). But, if some will not respond to the improvement requirement positively, they will be labelled deviant and will be punished by disciplinary powers. Related to the lowest rank, the global benchmarking system specifies a risk group including fragile states or failed states in order to manage them effectively because it represents the threat of ungoverned political space in the global system.

Mark Duffield also pointed out the same as follows:

> Within policy discourse, it exists as a set of technical prescriptions to bolster administrative capacity and strengthen international oversight, the aim of which is to transform the fragile state into governance state. In contrast to governance states, which are funding regimes providing stability to the donor-state relationship in aid-dependent countries, fragile states are dangerous because they lack the capacity to become aid-dependent and thus a known part of the West's sovereign frontier. (Duffield, 2007: 170)

Furthermore donors use the governance indicators for aid-allocation purposes and they sometimes suspend economic aid to countries that do not meet their criteria. We can notice typical disciplinary power here. While the international economic institutions and OECD countries try to embed neo-liberalism in developing countries by giving a showcase status such as 'governance states' to the best of them, they impose a low cut-off to define the drop-outs and sometimes punish them by suspending aid.

TARGETED GOVERNANCE: BACKLASH TOWARD THE DISCIPLINARY SOCIETY?

Influential powers always use sticks (coercive methods) with carrots (regulative methods). In the same way, the society of control is always accompanied by the disciplinary society. Although Deleuze predicted that the disciplinary society would be replaced by the society of control, the proportion of the former to the latter seems to increase again. As the global hegemony begins to disintegrate, it seems that violent disciplinary power is now becoming conspicuous at the periphery of global politics. It means that neo-liberalism as political rationality begins to lose its legitimacy and its rule becomes something like 'domination without hegemony'. In other words, with the decline of the hegemony the politics of exclusion begins to predominate the politics of inclusion.

Here we must pay attention to the transformation of the disciplinary power at the global level as well as the domestic level. Several works of critical criminology pointed out some important changes in the way that authorities govern offenders and deliver state punishment (Garland, 2001). While modern penalty focuses on the offender as a soul or as a psyche, aiming to normalize him/her, the neo-liberal tries to govern penal issues and penal populations through risk techniques that identify and evaluate the presence and the magnitude of risk factors in people and spaces in order to cut back state budgets. In the same way, the neo-liberal global governmentality seeks to govern security through risk techniques. The idea of risk governance or target governance was linked to the idea of efficient, apolitical, knowledge-driven policy because of a disappointment with or outright rejection of more totalizing dreams of governance that had come to be seen as hubristic and dysfunctional (Valverde, 2004: 245).

Global benchmarking system is also one sort of targeted governance aiming at effective controls that minimize costs and maximize development/security outcomes by using CPIA, WGI and CPI. As this system uses the insurance paradigm of risk based upon quasi-scientific calculus and group profiling, it seeks to identify the targeting of problem states, population, and activities. This targeted governance is always accompanied with policing activities. Since 11 September 2001, targeted governance has come to rely more on precautionary and arbitrary method of policing (Aradau, 2007). As the *2002 National Security Strategy* says, 'the United States today is threatened less by conquering states than we are by weak and failing ones'. The US policy makers can no longer consider failed states or

fragile states as peripheral to its security concerns and put them in its watch-list along with state sponsors of terrorism or rogue states. By centering insecurity and threat, the governmental grid of risk is transformed into a complete surveillance system with conservative 'lock-them up' policies. As Valverde and Mopas point out, 'the contradictory dream of information-driven targeted governance is dialectically intertwined' with a vision of targeting everything' (Valverde, 2004: 246-7).

With regard to the precautionary and arbitrary methods of targeted governance, we can see its prototype in 'the war on drug' declared by Nixon in 1969. As international drug enforcement effort expanded rapidly in the 1980s when presidents Reagan and Bush declared their own wars on drugs, the US drug enforcement agents brought with them a variety of investigative techniques, including 'buy and bust' tactics, extensive undercover operations, 'controlled delivery' of illicit drug consignments, various forms of non-telephonic electronic surveillance, and offers of reduced charges or immunity from prosecution to known drug dealers to 'flip' them into becoming informants (Andreas, 2006: 131). They also provided the impetus for the creation of paramilitary enforcement groups composed of US military and police officials to target drug facilities in South America. This kind of 'illegal' policing operation for 'law' enforcement becomes much more conspicuous in targeted governance after 'the war on drug' was replaced by 'the war on terror'.

On the other hand, the US pushed forward international law such as the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (ratified in 1988), which mandated extensive cooperation in all law enforcement tasks directed at international drugs trafficking, including extradition, mutual legal assistance, and the seizure and forfeiture of assets. In order to strengthen law enforcement, the State Department promoted its war on drugs through the annual *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,* which graded countries in terms of their level of cooperation with US anti-drug objectives since 2000. In order to curb the trafficking of women and children, the State Department also published its annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* since 2000. In both cases, the State Department warned that countries deemed to be not in compliance with the minimum standards and not making significant efforts might be decertified which would bring forth sanctions such as aid cut-offs. Here we notice the typical global disciplinary power activities again.

Corruption is also one of the most important issues for global targeted governance. This targeted governance also began as a uni-

lateral US initiative to criminalize bribery through the US. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Andreas, 2006: 55-6). It eventually turned into the 1977 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery for Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and to the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption, which required signatories to prohibit their corporations from paying bribes to foreign officials. In this process, the NGO Transparency International (TI), founded in 1993 by former World Bank officials, played a key role in strengthening this targeted governance by providing its 'informal surveillance cameras'. In 1994 TI began to publish its annual *Global Corruption Report*, which provides a ranking of countries from most to least corrupt using the Corruption Perceptions Index. It also began to publish the Bribe Payers Index. It is noteworthy that the World Bank also makes reference to TI's Index in its WGI and CPIA assessments. Despite its perception-based subjective evidence, TI's publication of index makes a big impact on the targeted subjects through its effective public shaming tactic. In sum, the US, international organizations, and NGOs cooperated with each other to strengthen targeted governance by their disciplinary power while governing the subjects at a distance. Their desired outcome is still subjects' docility rather than their auto-control.

This targeted governance is operated by new social control techniques highly dependent on punishment and exclusion rather than penal-welfarism (Garland, 2001). So its legitimacy is sustained by the continuing existence of threats and incidents representing them. As the penal system is just a part of an overall mechanism of domination and its very failure of the system is central to its success (Foucault, 1991: 272), this targeted governance would succeed to sustain itself by continuing to put a stigma on the drop-out by blaming their own poor self-regulation. However, as far as it ascribes the responsibility of failure to the local level and does not try to solve problems at the systemic level, it would just sustain the systematic contradictions. For example, governing elites would attribute humanitarian crisis to bad local governance rather than systematic problems at the global level in the neo-liberal context, in spite of the big impact of fluctuating global economy upon the population in the periphery. The rise of this kind of neo-liberal thinking might be related to the decline of the dependency approach or the Neo-Marxist approach, which emphasized the structural causes of poverty in the South. However, if the governance system over-emphasizes individual risk management responsibility and depends too much on punishments and quarantine techniques, the coercive rule would diminish the

consent of the governed and lose its legitimacy. It might lead to the rise of resistance, sometimes the uprising of violent rebellions. By responding to that kind of situation, the ruling elites would promote securitization of bad governance spaces (failed states or rogue states) by strengthening targeted governance, which might lead to the state of exception. We can notice this kind of vicious cycle not only in Afghanistan but also in the urban slums of the global South.

GLOBAL SLUMS AS HIGHLY SECURITIZED TARGETED GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED

As Israeli attack upon the Gaza Strip in 2008 indicated, high securitization of the marginalized people leads to very oppressive politics. That case is an extreme one because it reflects not just exclusionary politics of the present neo-liberal global governance but also the inherent contradictions of the nation-state system (the Jewish question). But if you focus on the former aspect, it becomes clear that the case of the Gaza Strip is just one part of global slums that represents failed governance at the global level. Following Neza (Mexico City), Libertador (Caracas), El Sur (Bogotá), San Juan de Lurigancho (Lima), Cono Sur (Lima), Ajegunle (Lagos), Sadr City (Baghdad), and Soweto (Gauteng), Gaza is the seventh largest mega-slum embracing 1.3 million people (half of them are refugees) (Davis, 2006: 28). If you look at slum dwellers as a percentage of the urban population, the Sub-Saharan African region is conspicuous in terms of its high percentage (72 per cent) which shows a clear contrast with Europe's 6 per cent (UN Human Settlements Programme, 2003: 15). The world's highest percentages of slum dwellers in the urban population are in Ethiopia (99.4 per cent), followed by Chad (99.4 per cent), Afghanistan (98.5 per cent) and so on. These slums are characterized by overcrowding, poor structural housing, inadequate access to safe water and sanitation, and insecure status. UN-HABITAT estimated that the global slum population was about 837 million in 2003 and it was growing by 25 million per year. Although the United Nations placed the 'cities without slums' as one of the targets in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2000,[1] the prospect regarding global slums becomes much worse. Jan Breman, the Dutch sociologist who continued field research on the poor in India and Indonesia for decades, said: 'My own extensive research on the informal sector has shown not much evidence, at least not on any large scale, of such upward mobility. In my opinion, it is a myth inspired by wishful thinking' (Breman, 2003: 174).

It means that slums are not just manifestations of a population explosion. As the UN-HABITAT report pointed out, 'slum must be seen as the result of a failure of housing policies, law and delivery systems, as well as national and urban policies' (UN Human Settlements Programme, 2003: 5)'. In other words, the collapse of formal urban employment in the developing countries and the rise of the informal sector must be seen as a direct function of liberalization. It goes without saying that the political factors strongly act on the collapse of formal sector in the case of Gaza. However, we can notice some degree of similarities among these various kinds of slums.

Generally speaking, the slum is the political space where urban governance has collapsed. The urban poor there are trapped in an informal and 'illegal' world where waste is not collected and public securities are not provided. The amalgam of exclusion, poverty and informality also accelerated the violence and the militarization of city-life: the militarization of gangs, drug cartels, and militia; the proliferation of religious and communal armed conflicts and violence; the absence of legitimate authority. In Appadurai's words, 'urban war zones are becoming armed camps, driven wholly by *implosive* forces that fold into neighborhoods the most violent and problematic repercussions of wider, regional, national, and global processes' (Appadurai, 1996: 152-3). In these urban war zones, the militarization of social control – from the US-style zero tolerance policing to outright urban warfare in the streets of Rio de Janeiro – also proceeded while the upper class retreated to their own heavily guarded 'gated communities'. As Terresa Caldeira pointed out,

> from Johannesburg to Budapest, from Cairo to Mexico City, from Bueno Aires to Los Angeles, similar processes occur: the erection of walls, the secession of the upper classes, the privatization of public spaces, and the proliferation of surveillance technologies are fragmenting the city space, separating social groups, and changing social groups, and changing the character of public life in ways that contradict the modern ideals of city life. (Caldeira, 2000: 323)[2]

In this fragmentation process, the slum population becomes the securitized target requiring continuous policing. Classical modern policing involves a process whereby a well-ordered civil society is shaped (Neocleous, 2006: 27). The state fashions the market, generates new forms of subjectivity, and subsumes resistances in order to fabricate a social order of wage labour. In addition, the key to the science of police is that the police deal with the criminal 'underclass' that have fallen from indigence into crime. The police are therefore to prevent the poor from falling into indigence. The essence of the police project is to identify and implement the mechanisms

necessary to prevent the poverty-stricken class from falling into indigence and from there into crime (Neocleous, 2006: 31). In this age of the global slum, the essence of the police still remains intact. There is no prospect that the whole slum population (the informal sector) would be transformed into the wage labour (the formal sector). So preventive policing and surveillance of global slum would become one of the everlasting characteristics of the present global governmentality. Furthermore, as Caldeira points out, 'the symbolic order of the talk of crime visibly mediates violence. Support for private and violent solutions has fueled the phenomenal growth of private security enterprises. Additionally, it has generated indifference to the illegal and brutal actions of a police force' (Caldeira, 2000: 39).

As the films *Slumdog Millionaire* (directed by Danny Boyle, 2008) and *City of God* (directed by Fernando Meirelles, 2002) indicate, popular culture sometimes dramatizes and romanticizes people's life in urban slums like Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro from the standpoint of the upper middle-class citizens. However, it is certain that nobody wants to live there. Furthermore, as in the TV documentary *Unreported World* of Channel 4 (UK) programmes such as *Mexico: Seven Days in Hell* (19 December 2008) or *Venezuela: Cult of the Thugs* (21 November 2008) shows, life in the urban slum in the global South represents the most fearful one that everybody wants to keep a distance from. We can notice some sort of 'clinical gaze' upon the poverty in this kind of representation.

On the other hand, most of the under-class people are forced to accept nearly bare life there. Although Agamben wrote that it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West today (Agamben, 1998: 181), a part of the city becomes something like the camp. In short, the slum becomes the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the present global politics. While the upper class enjoy their insured life by managing risks, the slum dwellers must endure harsh bare lives outside the insurance system. As Mike Davis writes, 'Everywhere the Moslem slums constitute seemingly inexhaustible reservoirs of highly disciplined desperation. Not surprisingly, the recent suicide bombers in Turkey came from Istanbul's sprawling slum of Bagcilar, as well as the grim provincial city of Bingol, where 60 per cent of the population is jobless' (Davis, 2004: 14). On the other hand, the US military constructed Arab cities as little more than 'terrorist nest' targets to soak up its own military fire power along the Orientalist framework (Graham, 2006).

Apart from suicide bombings, the people in the global slum try to respond to structural marginality in various ways, raging from the

charismatic churches and prophetic cults to ethnic militias, street gangs, neo-liberal NGOs empowering the poor, and revolutionary social movements (Davis, 2006: 202). It is noteworthy that the politics of the governed at the global slum is not always passive and weak. For example, responding to the de-politicization process of neo-liberal governmentality, squatter villagers sometimes tried to organize political pressures to the administrative office (Chatterjee, 2004). In Chatterjee's words,

> Although the crucial move here was for our squatters to seek and find recognition as a population group, which from the standpoint of governmentality is only a usable empirical category that defines the targets of policy, they themselves have had to find ways of investing their collective identity with a moral content. This is an equally crucial part of the politics of the governed: *to give to the empirical form of a population group the moral attributes of a community*. (Chatterjee, 2004: 57)

While the global governmentality promotes the de-politicization of the politics of the governed through policing, the people try to open up the sphere of 'the political' by turning the hegemonic political grammars to their own advantage.

While resisting against the counter-hegemonic moves and co-opting some of them, the governing political elites are still pursing their apolitical approach, seeking technical solutions that mitigate economic damage rather than political solutions that will enable structural change. The global slum as failed governance is not a technical problem but a political one, and it requires a political solution. As long as the governance system continues to deal with issues in a technocratic way and tries to avoid a political solution, the crisis will deepen. Related to this point, Toni Negri made an assertive diagnosis:

> Replacing the authoritarian mechanisms of government by the mediation procedures of governance – that have been introduced to resolve the difficulties encountered by the government – increases, deepens, and probably renders the crisis of government irreversible, including in the modern exceptionality of its definition. Consequently, it is within the context of governance that the class struggle led by the multitudes must be developed. (Negri, 2008: 141)

It is not certain whether or not this kind of eschatological prediction will be fulfilled, but it is clear that the neo-liberal global governmentality now faces crisis surrounded by the various kinds of failed governance and the state of exception. The global financial crisis deteriorated the situation greatly, which seems to reach the stage of terminal crisis of neo-liberal global capitalism. In other words, the neo-liberal global governmentality resonates with failed

governance, which is something like 'anarchical governance'. We can see the representative landscape of anarchical governance in Nairobi where the modern headquarter of UN-HABITAT existed. Just several kilometres away from the headquarter, there is the second largest slum (Kibera) in Africa, where about one million people live without running water, sewers or sanitations. The sharp contrast between the HQ and the slum represent the crisis of the present governmentality. However, this kind of crisis, which anarchical governance brings about, could also be a chance for 'the governed' to initiate and promote counter-hegemonic movements against elites-led securitization and de-politicization of development issues.

NOTES

1. Target 11 is: 'By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers'.
2. In this 'dual cities' structure, we notice some continuities or similarities with the colonial urban governance (Legg, 2007: 216-19).

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