

On the second incompleteness theorem and provability predicates

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- In this talk, T always denotes a consistent r.e. extension of Peano Arithmetic (PA) in the language of arithmetic.

The second incompleteness theorem (G2)

T cannot prove a sentence Con_T asserting the consistency of T .

- This statement of G2 is ambiguous because there are some sentences that seem to assert the consistency of T and are provable in T .
- So a precise statement of G2 requires more information on Con_T .

In this talk, I investigate relationships between several versions of G2 and derivability conditions for **provability predicates**.

Definition

$\text{Pr}_T(x)$ is a **provability predicate** of T

: \iff it is a Σ_1 formula and for any natural number n ,

$\mathbb{N} \models \text{Pr}_T(n) \iff n$ is the Gödel number of a theorem of T .

Outline

- 1 Several versions of G2
- 2 Derivability conditions
- 3 My results

- 1 Gödel (1931)
- 2 Hilbert and Bernays (1939)
- 3 Löb (1955)
- 4 Jeroslow (1973)
- 5 Montagna (1979)
- 6 Buchholz (1993)

3 My results

Gödel (1931)

Gödel's second incompleteness theorem

$$T \not\vdash \exists x(\text{Fml}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Pr}_T(x))$$

- In his famous paper, Gödel proved G2 with only a sketched proof.
- Gödel explained that by formalizing his proof of the first incompleteness theorem, G2 is proved.
- To carry out his idea, it is desirable that the formula $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ enjoys some natural properties as a formalization of the notion of T -provability.
- He wrote that a detailed proof would be presented in a forthcoming work, but such a paper was not published after all.

Hilbert and Bernays (1939)

- The first detailed proof of G2 was presented in the second volume of *Grundlagen der Mathematik* by Hilbert and Bernays.
- Especially, they proved that if $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ satisfies the following conditions HB1, HB2 and HB3, then $T \not\vdash \forall x(\text{Fml}(x) \wedge \text{Pr}_T(x) \rightarrow \neg \text{Pr}_T(\dot{x}))$.

Hilbert–Bernays' derivability conditions

HB1 $T \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \Rightarrow T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner)$.

HB2 $T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \neg \varphi(x) \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \neg \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner)$.

HB3 $T \vdash t(x) = 0 \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner t(\dot{x}) = 0 \urcorner)$ for every primitive recursive term $t(x)$.

$\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner$ is a primitive recursive term corresponding to a primitive recursive function calculating the Gödel number of $\varphi(\bar{n})$ from n .

Löb (1955)

- Löb proved that if $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ satisfies the following conditions D1, D2 and D3, then Löb's theorem holds, that is, for any sentence φ , $T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \varphi \Rightarrow T \vdash \varphi$.
- Then $T \not\vdash \neg \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner 0 = 1 \urcorner)$.
This is the most well-known form of G2.

Löb's derivability conditions

D1 $T \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner)$.

D2 $T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \rightarrow \psi \urcorner) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner))$.

D3 $T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \urcorner)$.

Every $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ automatically satisfies D1.

Jeroslow (1973)

- Jeroslow proved that if $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ satisfies the following condition, then $T \not\vdash \forall x(\text{Fml}(x) \wedge \text{Pr}_T(x) \rightarrow \neg \text{Pr}_T(\dot{\neg} x))$.

Jeroslow's condition

$T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(t) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \text{Pr}_T(t) \urcorner)$ for all primitive recursive terms t .

- Jeroslow's argument also shows that if $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ satisfies the following condition $\Sigma_1\text{C}$, then $T \not\vdash \forall x(\text{Fml}(x) \wedge \text{Pr}_T(x) \rightarrow \neg \text{Pr}_T(\dot{\neg} x))$.

Provable Σ_1 -completeness

$\Sigma_1\text{C}$ If φ is a Σ_1 sentence, then $T \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner)$.

Montagna (1979)

- Montagna proved that if $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ satisfies the following two conditions, then Löb's theorem holds.
- In this case, $T \not\vdash \exists x(\text{Fml}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Pr}_T(x))$.

Montagna's conditions

- $T \vdash \forall x ("x \text{ is a logical axiom}" \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(x))$.
- $T \vdash \forall x \forall y (\text{Fml}(x) \wedge \text{Fml}(y) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_T(x \dot{\rightarrow} y) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_T(x) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(y))))$.

Buchholz (1993)

- In Buchholz's lecture note, it is proved that if $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ satisfies the following condition, then it also satisfies D2 and $\Sigma_1\text{C}$.
- Then $T \not\vdash \neg \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner 0 = 1 \urcorner)$.

Buchholz's condition

For all $m \geq 1$,

$$T \vdash \bigwedge_{0 < i < m} \varphi_i(x) \rightarrow \varphi_m(x)$$

$$\Rightarrow T \vdash \bigwedge_{0 < i < m} \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi_i(\dot{x}) \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi_m(\dot{x}) \urcorner).$$

$\text{Pr}_T(x)$ satisfies Buchholz's condition iff $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ satisfies both D1^U and D2^U .

$$\text{D1}^U \quad T \vdash \varphi(x) \Rightarrow T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner).$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{D2}^U \quad T \vdash & \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \rightarrow \psi(\dot{x}) \urcorner) \\ & \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi(\dot{x}) \urcorner)). \end{aligned}$$

These different versions of G2 have different consequences.

Different consistency statements

- $\text{Con}_T^H \equiv \forall x(\text{Fml}(x) \wedge \text{Pr}_T(x) \rightarrow \neg \text{Pr}_T(\dot{\neg}x))$
- $\text{Con}_T^L \equiv \neg \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner 0 = 1 \urcorner)$
- $\text{Con}_T^G \equiv \exists x(\text{Fml}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Pr}_T(x))$

Different consequences

Gödel $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^G$

Hilbert–Bernays $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^H$

Löb $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^L$

Jeroslow $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^H$

Montagna $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^G$

Buchholz $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^L$

- $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Con}_T^H \rightarrow \text{Con}_T^L$ and $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Con}_T^L \rightarrow \text{Con}_T^G$.
- **I wanted to clarify the situation.**

- 1 A brief history
- 2 **Derivability conditions**
- 3 My results

Local derivability conditions

Local derivability conditions

- D1** $T \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner)$.
- D2** $T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \rightarrow \psi \urcorner) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner))$.
- D3** $T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \urcorner)$.
- Γ C** If φ is a Γ sentence, then $T \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner)$.
- B₂** $T \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \Rightarrow T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner)$.
- PC** $T \vdash \text{Pr}_\emptyset(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner)$.

$\text{Pr}_\emptyset(x)$ is a provability predicate of pure predicate calculus.

Uniform derivability conditions

Uniform derivability conditions

$$\mathbf{D1}^U \quad T \vdash \varphi(x) \Rightarrow T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner).$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{D2}^U \quad T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \rightarrow \psi(\dot{x}) \urcorner) \\ \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi(\dot{x}) \urcorner)). \end{aligned}$$

$$\mathbf{D3}^U \quad T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner) \urcorner).$$

$$\mathbf{\Gamma C}^U \quad \text{If } \varphi(x) \text{ is a } \Gamma \text{ formula, then } T \vdash \varphi(x) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner).$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{B}_2^U \quad T \vdash \varphi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x) \\ \Rightarrow T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi(\dot{x}) \urcorner). \end{aligned}$$

$$\mathbf{PC}^U \quad T \vdash \text{Pr}_\emptyset(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner).$$

$$\mathbf{CB} \quad T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \forall x \varphi(x) \urcorner) \rightarrow \forall x \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner).$$

Global derivability conditions

Global derivability conditions

$$\mathbf{D2^G} \quad T \vdash \forall x \forall y (\text{Fml}(x) \wedge \text{Fml}(y) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_T(x \rightarrow y) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_T(x) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(y)))).$$

$$\mathbf{\Gamma C^G} \quad T \vdash \forall x (\text{True}_\Gamma(x) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(x)).$$

$$\mathbf{PC^G} \quad T \vdash \forall x (\text{Fml}(x) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_\emptyset(x) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(x))).$$

$\text{True}_\Gamma(x)$ is a formula saying that “ x is a true Γ sentence”.

Remark

Global \Rightarrow Uniform \Rightarrow Local.

Known results

Hilbert–Bernays $B_2, CB, \Delta_0 C^U \Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^H$


Löb $D2, D3 \Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^L$

Jeroslow $\Sigma_1 C \Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^H$


Montagna $D2^G, PC^G \Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^G$

Buchholz $D1^U, D2^U \Rightarrow \Sigma_1 C^U$


Implications between prominent sets of conditions




Hilbert and Bernays (1939)




Löb (1955)




Jeroslow (1973)



Montagna (1979)



Buchholz (1993)



- ① A brief history
- ② Derivability conditions
- ③ **My results**

New sufficient conditions

I found two sets of sufficient conditions for the unprovability of Con_T^H .

Theorem

- $\mathbf{B}_2, \mathbf{D3} \Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^H$
- $\mathbf{PC} \Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^H$


$$\mathbf{B}_2 \quad T \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \Rightarrow T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner).$$

$$\mathbf{D3} \quad T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \urcorner).$$

$$\mathbf{PC} \quad T \vdash \text{Pr}_\emptyset(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner).$$

$$\text{Con}_T^H \equiv \forall x (\text{Fml}(x) \wedge \text{Pr}_T(x) \rightarrow \neg \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \neg x \urcorner))$$

New sufficient conditions



An improvement of Buchholz's result

Buchholz's result is stated precisely as follows:

Theorem (Buchholz)

$$D1^U, D2^U \Rightarrow \Sigma_1 C^U$$

I proved that only the $m = 2$ case of Buchholz's conditions is sufficient for $\Sigma_1 C^U$.

Theorem


$$B_2^U \Rightarrow \Sigma_1 C^U$$

$$\begin{aligned} B_2^U \quad T \vdash \varphi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x) \\ \Rightarrow T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi(\dot{x}) \urcorner). \end{aligned}$$

Corollary

$$B_2^U \Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^H$$

An improvement of Buchholz's result



Non-implications

- I am also interested in non-implications between sets of conditions.
- For example, I pay attention to Rosser's provability predicate:

$$\text{Pr}_T(x) \equiv \exists y(\text{Prf}_T(x, y) \wedge \forall z < y \neg \text{Prf}_T(\dot{\neg}x, z)).$$

- This is because PA proves Con_T^L of Rosser's provability predicates.

Theorem (Arai, 1990)

- There exists a Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying D2^G .
- There exists a Rosser provability predicate of T satisfying D3^G .
- Therefore each of D2^G and D3^G is not sufficient for $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^L$.

I extended Arai's results and showed that some sets of conditions are not sufficient for $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^L$.

Theorem A

This is an improvement of Arai's first result.

Theorem A

There exists a Rosser provability predicate $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ of T satisfying **D2^G**, **$\Delta_0\text{C}^G$** and **$\text{PA} \vdash \text{Con}_T^H$** . That is,

- $\text{PA} \vdash \forall x \forall y (\text{Pr}_T(x \dot{\rightarrow} y) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_T(x) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(y)))$.
- $\text{PA} \vdash \forall x (\text{True}_{\Delta_0}(x) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(x))$.
- $\text{PA} \vdash \forall x (\text{Fml}(x) \wedge \text{Pr}_T(x) \rightarrow \neg \text{Pr}_T(\dot{\rightarrow}(x)))$.

$$\bullet \{ \mathbf{D2}, \mathbf{D3} \} \Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^L \quad (\text{Löb})$$

$$\bullet \{ \mathbf{D2}^G, \mathbf{\Delta_0 C}^G \} \not\Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^L \quad (\text{From Theorem A})$$

Theorem B

There exists a Rosser provability predicate satisfying Hilbert–Bernays' derivability conditions.

Theorem B

There exists a Rosser provability predicate $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ of T satisfying **CB**, **D2** and $\Delta_0\text{C}^G$. That is,

- $T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \forall x \varphi(x) \urcorner) \rightarrow \forall x \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner)$.
- $T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \rightarrow \psi \urcorner) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner))$.
- $\text{PA} \vdash \forall x (\text{True}_{\Delta_0}(x) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(x))$.

- $\{\text{CB}, \text{B}_2, \Delta_0\text{C}^U\} \Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^H$ (Hilbert–Bernays)
- $\{\text{CB}, \text{D2}, \Delta_0\text{C}^G\} \not\Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^L$ (From Theorem B)

- $\{\text{D1}^U, \text{D2}^U\} \Rightarrow \Sigma_1\text{C}^U$ (Buchholz)
- $\{\text{D1}^U, \text{D2}\} \not\Rightarrow \Sigma_1\text{C}$ (From Theorem B)

Theorem C

This is an improvement of Arai's second result.

Theorem C

There exists a Rosser provability predicate $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ of T satisfying **CB**, **B₂**, **D3^G** and **Δ₀C^G**. That is,

- $T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \forall x \varphi(x) \urcorner) \rightarrow \forall x \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi(\dot{x}) \urcorner)$.
- $T \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \Rightarrow T \vdash \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner)$.
- $\text{PA} \vdash \forall x (\text{Pr}_T(x) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(\ulcorner \text{Pr}_T(\dot{x}) \urcorner))$.
- $\text{PA} \vdash \forall x (\text{True}_{\Delta_0}(x) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_T(x))$.

- $\{\text{D2}, \text{D3}\} \Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^L$ (Löb)
- $\{\text{B}_2, \text{D3}^G\} \not\Rightarrow T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^L$ (From Theorem C)

- Moreover, I also constructed some (artificial) provability predicates satisfying some conditions but not satisfying others.


For example,

Theorem

There exists a provability predicate $\text{Pr}_T(x)$ of T which satisfies $\Sigma_1 C^G$, but does not satisfy any of $D1^U$ and PC.

- I present some non-implications in these that relate to the previous figure.


Non-implications 1



Theorem

$\{B_2, D3\}$, $\{\Sigma_1 C\}$, $\{PC\}$ and $\{B_2, CB, \Delta_0 C^U\}$ are pairwise incomparable.


Non-implications 2



Theorem

Each of $\{B_2, D3\}$, $\{\Sigma_1 C\}$, $\{PC\}$ and $\{B_2, CB, \Delta_0 C^U\}$ is not sufficient for $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^L$.


Non-implications 3



Theorem

$\{D2, D3\}$ does not imply any of $\{\Sigma_1 C\}$, $\{PC\}$ and $\{B_2, CB, \Delta_0 C^U\}$.

Non-implication 4



Theorem

$\{D1^U, D2^G, \Sigma_1 C^G\}$ is not sufficient for $T \not\vdash \text{Con}_T^G$.

This shows that both of Hilbert–Bernays’ conditions and Löb’s conditions do not accomplish Gödel’s original statement of G2.

- G2 is a collection of theorems that claims the unprovability of Con_T .
- I constructed several artificial provability predicates, and it is not easy to specify the range of provability predicates to be treated in G2.
- Thus, the problem of what is an exact statement of G2 is still unclear.
- Is there any general principle behind these different versions of G2?

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