

# Normal modal logics and provability predicates

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**Kanazawa**

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## Outline

- 1 Provability predicates
- 2 Arithmetical interpretations and provability logics
- 3 Our results

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## Provability predicates

- $\mathcal{L}_A$ : the language of first-order arithmetic
- $\bar{n}$ : the numeral for  $n \in \omega$
- $\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner$ : the numeral for the Gödel number of  $\varphi$

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In the usual proof of Gödel's incompleteness theorems, a provability predicate plays an important role.

## Provability predicates

A formula  $\text{Pr}(x)$  is a **provability predicate** of PA

$\stackrel{\text{def.}}{\iff}$  for any  $n \in \omega$ ,

$\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}(\bar{n}) \iff n$  is the Gödel number of some theorem of PA.

## Standard construction of provability predicates

Gödel-Feferman's standard construction of provability predicates of PA is as follows.

## Numerations

A formula  $\tau(v)$  is a **numeration** of PA

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- The relation “ $x$  is the Gödel number of an  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -formula provable in the theory defined by  $\tau(v)$ ” is naturally expressed in the language  $\mathcal{L}_A$ .



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- The resulting  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -formula is denoted by  $\text{Pr}_\tau(x)$ .
- If  $\tau(v)$  is  $\Sigma_{n+1}$ , then  $\text{Pr}_\tau(x)$  is also  $\Sigma_{n+1}$ .

## Properties of standard provability predicates

## Theorem (Hilbert-Bernays-Löb-Feferman)

Let  $\tau(v)$  be any numeration of PA.

- $\text{Pr}_\tau(x)$  is a provability predicate of PA.
- $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \varphi \rightarrow \psi \urcorner) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner))$ .
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- $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \urcorner)$ .
- (Gödel's second incompleteness theorem)  
 $\text{PA} \not\vdash \text{Con}_\tau$ ,  
 where  $\text{Con}_\tau$  is the consistency statement  $\neg \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \bar{0} = \bar{1} \urcorner)$  of  $\tau(v)$ .
- (Löb's theorem)  
 $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner)$ .

## Nonstandard provability predicates

There are many nonstandard provability predicates.

- Rosser's provability predicate

$$\text{Pr}^R(x) \equiv \exists y(\text{Prf}(x, y) \wedge \forall z \leq y \neg \text{Prf}(\dot{\neg}x, z)),$$

where  $\text{Prf}(x, y)$  is a  $\Delta_1$  proof predicate.

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What are the PA-provable principles of each provability predicate?



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What are the PA-provable principles of each provability predicate?

This problem is investigated in the framework of **modal logic**.

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## Modal logics

## Axioms and Rules of the modal logic K

**Axioms** **Tautologies** and  $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$ .

**Rules** **Modus ponens**  $\frac{\varphi, \varphi \rightarrow \psi}{\psi}$ , **Necessitation**  $\frac{\varphi}{\Box \varphi}$ , and **Substitution**.

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## Normal modal logics

A modal logic  $L$  is **normal**

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
## Normal modal logics

A modal logic  $L$  is **normal**

$\stackrel{\text{def.}}{\iff} L$  includes K and is closed under three rules of K.

For each modal formula  $A$ ,  $L + A$  denotes the smallest normal modal logic including  $L$  and  $A$ .

- $KT = K + \Box p \rightarrow p$
- $KD = K + \neg \Box \perp$
- $K4 = K + \Box p \rightarrow \Box \Box p$
- $K5 = K + \Diamond p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond p$
- $KB = K + p \rightarrow \Box \Diamond p$
- $GL = K + \Box(\Box p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \Box p$
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## Arithmetical interpretations

A mapping  $f$  from modal formulas to  $\mathcal{L}_A$ -sentences is an **arithmetical interpretation** based on  $\text{Pr}(x)$

$\stackrel{\text{def.}}{\iff} f$  satisfies the following conditions:

- $f(\perp) \equiv \bar{0} = \bar{1}$ ;
- $f(A \rightarrow B) \equiv f(A) \rightarrow f(B)$ ;
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## Provability logics

$\text{PL}(\text{Pr}) := \{A : \text{PA} \vdash f(A) \text{ for all arithmetical interpretations } f \text{ based on } \text{Pr}(x)\}.$

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The set  $\text{PL}(\text{Pr})$  is said to be the **provability logic** of  $\text{Pr}(x)$ .

## Solovay's arithmetical completeness theorem

- Recall that for each  $\Sigma_1$  numeration  $\tau(v)$  of PA,
  - $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \varphi \rightarrow \psi \urcorner) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}_\tau(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner))$ ,
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- Corresponding modal formulas  $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$  and  $\Box(\Box p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \Box p$  are axioms of GL.
- In fact, GL is exactly the provability logic of standard  $\Sigma_1$  provability predicates.

Arithmetical completeness theorem (Solovay, 1976)

For any  $\Sigma_1$  numeration  $\tau(v)$  of PA,  $\text{PL}(\text{Pr}_\tau)$  coincides with GL.

## Feferman's predicate

On the other hand, there are provability predicates whose provability logics are completely different from GL.

**Theorem (Feferman, 1960)**

**There exists a  $\Pi_1$  numeration  $\tau(v)$  of PA such that  $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Con}_\tau$ .**

**Consequently,  $\text{KD} \subseteq \text{PL}(\text{Pr}_\tau)$  ( $\text{KD} = \text{K} + \neg\Box\perp$ ).**

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**Consequently,  $\text{KD} \subseteq \text{PL}(\text{Pr}_\tau)$  ( $\text{KD} = \text{K} + \neg \Box \perp$ ).**

Shavrukov found a nonstandard provability predicate whose provability logic is strictly stronger than KD.

**Theorem (Shavrukov, 1994)**

**Let  $\text{Pr}^S(x) \equiv \exists y(\text{Pr}_{I\Sigma_y}(x) \wedge \text{Con}_{I\Sigma_y})$ .**

**Then  $\text{PL}(\text{Pr}^S) = \text{KD} + \Box p \rightarrow \Box((\Box q \rightarrow q) \vee \Box p)$ .**

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### General Problem

Which normal modal logic is the provability logic  $PL(Pr)$  of some provability predicate  $Pr(x)$  of PA?

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- Kurahashi, T., Arithmetical completeness theorem for modal logic K, *Studia Logica*, to appear.
- Kurahashi, T., Arithmetical soundness and completeness for  $\Sigma_2$  numerations, *Studia Logica*, to appear.
- Kurahashi, T., Rosser provability and normal modal logics, submitted.

## Outline


- ① Provability predicates
- ② Arithmetical interpretations and provability logics
- ③ **Our results**

Several normal modal logics cannot be of the form  $PL(Pr)$ .

Proposition (K., 201x)

Let  $L$  be a normal modal logic satisfying one of the following conditions.  
Then  $L \neq PL(Pr)$  for all provability predicates  $Pr(x)$  of PA.

- ①  $KT \subseteq L$ .
- ②  $K4 \subseteq L$  and  $GL \not\subseteq L$ .
- ③  $K5 \subseteq L$ .
- ④  $KB \subseteq L$ .



## Theorem 1

There exists a numeration of PA whose provability logic is minimum.

Theorem 1 (K., 201x)

There exists a  $\Sigma_2$  numeration  $\tau(v)$  of PA such that  $\text{PL}(\text{Pr}_\tau) = K$ .

## Theorem 2

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- **For  $n \geq 2$ ,  $K + \Box(\Box^n p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \Box p \subsetneq GL$ .**
- **He conjectured that these logics are provability logics of some nonstandard provability predicates.**



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
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
We gave a proof of this conjecture.

## Theorem 2 (K., 201x)


For each  $n \geq 2$ , there exists a  $\Sigma_2$  numeration  $\tau(v)$  of PA such that  $PL(\text{Pr}_\tau) = K + \Box(\Box^n p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \Box p$ .

Therefore there are infinitely many provability logics.





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- We paid attention to Rosser's provability predicates  $\text{Pr}^R(x)$  because PA always proves the consistency statements  $\text{Con}^R$  defined by using  $\text{Pr}^R(x)$ .

## Rosser's provability predicates

However, provability logics of Rosser's provability predicates are sometimes not normal.

Theorem (Guaspari and Solovay, 1979)

There exists a Rosser provability predicate  $\text{Pr}^R(x)$  such that  $\text{PA} \not\vdash \text{Pr}^R(\ulcorner \varphi \rightarrow \psi \urcorner) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}^R(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}^R(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner))$  for some  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$ .

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On the other hand, there exists a Rosser provability predicate whose provability logic is normal.

Theorem (Arai, 1990)

There exists a Rosser provability predicate  $\text{Pr}^R(x)$  such that  $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Pr}^R(\ulcorner \varphi \rightarrow \psi \urcorner) \rightarrow (\text{Pr}^R(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \rightarrow \text{Pr}^R(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner))$  for any  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$ .

Then  $\text{KD} \subseteq \text{PL}(\text{Pr}^R)$  for Arai's predicate  $\text{Pr}^R(x)$ .

## Theorems 3 and 4

We proved that there exists  $\text{Pr}^R(x)$  whose provability logic coincides with KD.

Theorem 3 (K., 201x)

There exists a Rosser provability predicate  $\text{Pr}^R(x)$  such that  $\text{PL}(\text{Pr}^R) = \text{KD}$ .

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Moreover, there exists a Rosser provability predicate whose provability logic is strictly stronger than KD.

### Theorem 4 (K., 201x)

There exists a Rosser provability predicate  $\text{Pr}^R(x)$  such that  $\text{KD} + \Box\neg p \rightarrow \Box\neg\Box p \subseteq \text{PL}(\text{Pr}^R)$ .



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### Open Problem 3

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### General Problem

Which (normal) modal logic is in the set  $\{PL(Pr) : Pr(x) \text{ is a provability predicate of PA}\}$ ?