Let’s Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War\(^1\)

**Joseph M. Grieco, and Christopher Gelpi**

*Duke University*

**Jason Reifler**

*Georgia State University*

**and**

**Peter D. Feaver**

*Duke University*

Recent scholarship on international institutions has begun to explore potentially powerful *indirect* pathways by which international institutions may influence states’ domestic politics and thereby influence the foreign policy preferences and strategies of state leaders. In this paper, we provide evidence documenting the indirect impact of institutional cues on public support for the use of force through an analysis of individual-level survey data and a survey-based experiment that examines support for a hypothetical American intervention in East Timor. We find that institutional endorsements increase support for the use of force among members of the American public who value the institution making the endorsement and among those who do not have confidence in the president. These individual-level analyses show that international institutions can affect domestic support for military action by serving providing a valuable “second opinion” on the proposed use of force.

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Do international institutions matter in world politics? We seek to contribute to a new and important line of research on this enduring question. We suggest that, when it comes to going to war, IOs matter because democratic leaders are constrained to act as if they do, and they believe they must do so because members of the public look to IO support for the use of military force as a way of getting a “second opinion” on whether going to war, as urged by their national leaders, is a good or bad idea.

Specifically, we find that IO endorsements increase support for the use of force among members of the American public who value the institution making the endorsement and among those who do not have confidence in the president. For these individuals, the endorsement of the IO acts like a second opinion from a trusted outsider, confirming the apparent wisdom of the proposed use of force. We reach these conclusions about the indirect impact of IO cues on public support for the use of force through an analysis of individual-level survey data on public attitudes toward the United Nations and a survey-based experiment that examines support for a hypothetical American intervention in East Timor.

This “second opinion” role for international institutions is anticipated by other theoretical work that explores the manner in which public views of international institutions might constrain the ability of national leaders to go to war (Chapman and Reiter 2004; Grieco 2004; Voeten 2005; Thompson 2006, 2009; Chapman 2007, 2009; Fang 2008), but until now the theory has not been tested with the appropriate micro-level data. Chapman and Reiter (2004), for example, argue that the United Nations Security Council can provide an important signal to a state’s citizens about whether or not they should support their leader’s desire to use military force. They demonstrate that American presidents have enjoyed larger “rally ‘round the flag” effects when the United Nations endorses the use of force than when it does not do so. They speculate that the preferences of citizens may be closer to those of the IO than their state leader, allowing the IO to provide an informative signal to the public. Chapman (2007) and Fang (2008) present game-theoretic analyses that formalize and generalize this argument. Their models demonstrate that a “rational public” could use signals from IOs to determine whether they should reward or punish their leaders for the use of force. Chapman (2009) shows through a series of analyses of aggregate opinion and observational data that presidential rallies after US uses of force have been stronger when the Security Council has endorsed the action, but this effect is more pronounced when the other veto-wielding members of the

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2 During the 1980s to the 1990s, scholars addressed this question by focusing on a proposed direct pathway by which international institutions might affect international outcomes, arguing in particular that international organizations (IOs) provide information to state leaders about the behavior and intentions of other state actors (Keohane 1982, 1984; Stein 1982, 1990; Axelrod and Keohane 1985), and thereby facilitate cooperation between them. This research program generated lines of criticism about relative gains issues (Grieco 1990; Krasner 1991) and the substantive importance of IOs (Mearsheimer 1994). Scholars also suggested that IOs and compliance with their rules may be endogenous to state preferences, raising serious doubts that direct causal effects of IOs on state behavior are substantial (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996). Recent work has sought to take into account the endogeneity problem while still identifying direct causal effects of IOs on state behavior in the particular area of international finance (Simmons 2000; Simmons and Hopkins 2005; Von Stein 2005; Grieco, Gelpi, and Warren 2009). There is also a rich vein of literature following the path-breaking work by Putnam (1988) that explores the ways international institutions might indirectly affect the domestic conditions in which leaders operate (Simmons and Martin 1997; Drezner 2003; Vreeland 2003). For example, scholars in this research trajectory have suggested that IOs can influence the domestic legal conditions in which judicial and political leaders frame policy choices (Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, and Slaughter 2001), or provide information to voters on whether their leaders are pursuing appropriate commercial policies (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002), which in turn may constrain the trade policy options of those leaders. Our article follows in this vein by proposing yet another indirect causal pathway for international institutions, this time as a second opinion validating the wisdom of a proposed military option.

3 Thompson (2006) makes a similar argument about the impact of UN endorsement on the attitudes of citizens in states other than the one considering the use of force.
Security Council have held foreign policy views at greater variance with the US position, whereas a failure to secure that endorsement when the other veto players are at greater variance does not have as substantial an impact on the rally. In other words, the public seems to respond more favorably to endorsements from perceived international opponents (or at least skeptics), but discounts disapproval from these oppositional sources.

A more complete investigation of the arguments by Chapman (2007, 2009), Fang (2008), and Chapman and Reiter (2004) requires micro-level evidence. Formal work that demonstrates that rational members of the public could use IOs as informative signals does not mean that they actually do so. Moreover, observation at the aggregate level of a correlation between UN endorsement and rally size could be due to a variety of selection effects regarding the decisions of leaders to seek endorsements and the willingness of the UN to grant them. Individual-level data are necessary to show that actual behavior matches the theorized behavior. We offer an analysis of just such data in the pages to follow.

Moreover, in this paper, we fortify the signaling logic described by Chapman and Fang by connecting their argument to the American Politics literature on cues and public opinion. In doing so, we complete the theoretical causal chain linking IOs to state behavior through the mechanism of domestic politics. By examining the responses to IO cues at the individual level, we are able to determine which members of the public do and do not respond to such cues and why they do so. This individual-level analysis allows us to document the mechanism by which IOs impose costs and benefits on state leaders regarding the use of force, and it allows us to determine the circumstances under which it will be more or less important for the president considering the use of force to obtain a “second opinion” from an IO. In doing so, our results also shed further light on the long-standing question of whether or not the American public is multilateralist.

Explaining the Public’s Preference for International Authorization for War

A wide range of scholarly literature finds that a majority of the US public is internationalist in general and is more likely in particular to support US foreign policies that may end in war if the American government first obtains international authorization or support for the use of force (Wittkopf 1990; Page and Shapiro 1992; Kull and Ramsay 1994; Kull 1995; Kull, Destler, and Ramsay 1997; Kull and Destler 1999; Holsti 2004; Page and Bouton 2006). At the same time, some studies find a more muted, ambivalent or conditional support for military multilateralism (Jentleson and Britton 1998; Jentleson 2003–2004; Eichenberg 2005). On balance, the public generally tends to support multilateralist policies, but varies significantly in the strength of this preference. Unfortunately, we know relatively little about what causes variation in preferences for multilateralism across issues, and we lack an understanding of how differing segments of the public may vary in their preference for multilateralism from one military mission to another.

Americans may assign importance to multilateralism because they believe that it improves the ability of the United States to negotiate with an adversary (Voeten 2001; Schultz 2003; Thompson 2006, 2009) and to fight successfully if necessary (Stam 1996; Choi 2001, 2003). Similarly, the public might believe that multilateralism helps the United States share the costs of using military force more equitably with its partners against a common foe. 4 And finally, and in

4 While we do not focus on the burden-sharing or diplomatic effectiveness arguments as a cause of public support for multilateralism, our results are not inconsistent with the claim that such concerns influence the public even after accounting for the “second opinion” effects that we demonstrate here. We hope that future research on this topic will investigate and compare the impact of these different sources of public attitudes toward multilateralism.
accord with Thompson (2006, 2009), Chapman (2007, 2009), and Fang (2008), multilateralism may give the public what we would term a “second opinion” about the merits of their leaders’ desire to use military force. Thus, democratic leaders may be constrained to seek allied and international support in order to justify the use of force to their home publics.

Members of the public face a serious problem of asymmetric information when a president argues for military operations abroad (Chapman and Reiter 2004; Chapman 2007, 2009; Fang 2008; Thompson 2009)—they have grave difficulties in assessing whether their leaders’ stated grounds for going to war are correct and valid. Despite this lack of information, members of the public are capable of expressing policy preferences and making voting choices that are consistent with their “interests” because of their ability to interpret cues from elite sources (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). For example, in matters of war, members of the public often attend to cues from party leaders (Zaller 1992; Larson 1996; Berinsky 2007).

Members of the public may also take cues from international elites. For a cue to be informative, Lupia and McCubbins (1998) emphasize that the cue giver needs to be perceived by the receiver to be more informed about the “true” state of the world than the receiver. International institutions appear to meet this condition. While the public generally does not see the classified information that drives decisions about war, foreign leaders being asked to join a military operation are likely to see at least some of that information. Moreover, foreign governments will have their own intelligence and military assessment capabilities and presumably will be relying on them to second-guess and validate what the US government advocates.

In addition, Lupia and McCubbins emphasize that informative elite cues must satisfy one of the following two criteria: (i) the cue giver and receiver share common interests or (ii) the cue giver faces external constraints. One kind of constraint that Lupia and McCubbins identify is the verification of a cue by a third party. That is, cues from a non-trusted source may be persuasive if they are subject to verification by a source that is independent of the cue giver. According to this logic, cues from IOs may influence public support for the use of force through two distinct mechanisms. First, individuals may respond to the cue because they perceive themselves as sharing common interests or preferences with the IO. Second, individuals may respond to the cue from an IO because it serves as verification of a cue from the president regarding the wisdom and importance of the mission.

The first of these causal pathways suggests that IO cues should be influential for individuals who place intrinsic value on the endorsement of international institutions. These individuals value the procedures involved in obtaining international sanction for the use of force and so are likely to view themselves as sharing “common interests” with international institutions when it comes to questions of the use of force. If an international institution sanctions the use of force, then these individuals should attend to that cue and judge the mission to be in their interest as well.

The second of these causal pathways suggests that IO cues should be influential for those who need independent verification of the president’s statements. For these individuals, the fact that the international institutions are comprised of the representatives of many different states—some of whom may not view the United States favorably—means that the institution can serve as something of a check on reckless American behavior. If an international institution endorses the use of force, then a variety of non-US officials who do not necessarily share

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5 A related claim that—consistent with our argument—is that members of the public believes that institutions such as the United Nations Security Council have been invested with moral legitimacy (Hurd 2002, 2005), giving the UN an ability to send persuasive cues.
common interests with the president nevertheless agree that military force is justified in this instance. Thus, the IO can act as verification for those who do not trust the president even if they do not intrinsically value the IO in question. Those who do not value IOs and who already have confidence in the president, however, would see little value in an international endorsement of the use of force and should have no reason to prefer multilateral missions to unilateral ones.

**Measuring the Public’s Preference for Multilateralism**

Eichenberg (2005) points out that much of the existing US polling data may bias respondents in favor of multilateralism because the questions often do not force respondents to face up to the potential trade-offs in following a multilateral path. The key question is what the president should do after attempting, but failing, to obtain UN support? Should the president wait until the Security Council can be persuaded or proceed without UN support? Answers to questions of this sort provide a better measure of public attitudes toward multilateralism because they capture the extent to which the public is willing to pay costs (or accept constraints) to obtain international support.

In a survey fielded in October 2004 through Knowledge Networks, we asked a sample of the public, “Before deciding to take military action, the president often seeks the approval of IOs like the United Nations. What should the president do if he is not able to gain that approval?” Of course, some people will never support the use of force, even with UN approval, while others believe that UN approval is not even desirable, so we allowed respondents to offer these opinions as well. Table 1 reports the answer categories and the distribution of responses to this question. We see clearly that the vast majority of the public believes that the United States ought to attempt to obtain UN support before using force, with only very small minorities believing either that the United States should not even seek UN approval or that the United States should not use force regardless of UN authorization. That is, we find that the public overwhelmingly prefers multilateralism when it is not costly.

When obtaining multilateral support might require altering US behavior, however, the public is quite divided about how to proceed. Just over 40% of the public prefers to proceed unilaterally, but an almost identical proportion of the public prefers multilateralism even if it requires altering US policy. Our argument suggests—in part—that those who are less confident in the president will be

| Table 1. “Before Deciding to Take Military Action, the President Often Seeks the Approval of International Organizations Like the United Nations. What Should the President Do If He Is Not Able To Gain That Approval?” (October 2004, Column percents) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| He should not take military action period, regardless of whether he can get international approval | 99 (10%) | 13 (4%) | 29 (10%) | 57 (14%) |
| He should delay military action until he receives international approval | 439 (42%) | 66 (20%) | 130 (44%) | 240 (61%) |
| He should take military action even without international approval if he thinks it is necessary | 436 (42%) | 244 (72%) | 111 (38%) | 84 (21%) |
| He should not seek international approval before deciding to take military action | 53 (5%) | 15 (4%) | 23 (8%) | 15 (4%) |
| Total | 1027 | 338 | 293 | 396 |
more likely to prefer that the president wait for international approval before using military force.

**Hypothesis 1:** Individuals who are less confident in the president will be more likely to prefer that the United States secure international endorsement before taking military action, even if seeking international endorsement imposes costs on US policy.

Dividing the responses in Table 1 by party identification gives some preliminary support to H1. Here, we can see that Democrats—who were less likely to be confident in the sitting Republican president—had a much stronger preference for multilateralism. To investigate this result further, we analyze respondents in the two middle categories of Table 1. Specifically, we take the two middle categories of the question in Table 1 to form a dependent variable. We set “[The president] should take military action even without international approval if he thinks it is necessary” equal to 0 and set “He should delay military action until he receives international approval” equal to 1.

Our independent variables include Sex, Education, Age, Party Identification, and Confidence in the White House. Party Identification is coded −1 for Democrats, 0 for Independents, and 1 for Republicans. For Confidence in the White House, our survey asked respondents to state whether they are very confident, somewhat confident, not very confident, or not at all confident “in the people running the White House.” This variable is measured as a 4-point Likert scale with higher values indicating greater confidence in the White House.

Table 2 demonstrates that our first hypothesis is strongly supported. Confidence in the White House has a negative impact on support for multilateralism even after accounting for the impact of party identification. Specifically, the coefficient for confidence in the White House in Model 2 of Table 2 is negative and statistically significant, and the reduced coefficient for party identification

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td>−0.713 (12.85)**</td>
<td>−0.459 (7.10)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.405 (4.42)**</td>
<td>0.455 (4.78)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−0.093 (1.97)*</td>
<td>−0.165 (3.32)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>−0.040 (0.86)</td>
<td>−0.448 (7.95)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in White House</td>
<td>0.448 (7.95)**</td>
<td>0.471 (8.13)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 875 870 870

(Notes. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%).

6 We set aside those who oppose force no matter what and those who think a president should be free to use force regardless of IO approval because we expect that those responses will be driven by other factors. We tested this assumption by analyzing all the responses with a multinomial logit model that allows for categorical rather than ordinal responses. This analysis indicated that variation into the extreme categories was driven by different factors than within the central two categories. The multinomial logit also yielded similar results to the probit model we report regarding variation between the two central categories.

7 Confidence in the White House is obviously related to party identification, but the two concepts are not identical. The correlation between party identification and confidence in the White House is approximately 0.53 regardless of whether party identification is measured on a 5-, 7-, or 9-point scale. For example, about 60% of Republican respondents in our study stated that they were “very confident” in the White House, but about one-third of Republicans were only “somewhat confident.” Democrats were even more diverse in their views of the White House at the time of this study. About one-quarter of Democrats stated that they were “not at all confident” in the White House, but 30% of Democrats stated that they were “somewhat confident” and 10% even stated that they were “very confident.” Thus, we feel confident that our question was able to separate the concept of confidence in White House decision makers from broader differences in political preferences that are related to party identification.
between Models 1 and 2 suggests that confidence in the White House is one of
the reasons that we observe such a wide partisan gap in Table 1.

It is worth noting, however, that Model 2 in Table 2 continues to show a signif-
icant impact for party identification. According to the logic of our argument, this
residual partisan gap should exist because Republicans and Democrats differ in
terms of the extent to which they perceived themselves as having common inter-
ests with multilateral institutions. We will explore this mechanism in greater
detail when analyzing our survey experiment, but we begin here with an explor-
atory investigation of the relative importance of confidence in the president and
intrinsic preferences for IO endorsement.

If Democrats, on average, exhibit stronger support for multilateral policies, we
would expect that confidence in the White House will play a smaller role in
determining the opinion of Democrats about the need for UN approval because
they will value such endorsements regardless of their views of the president. For
Republicans, who generally care less about getting international approval, on the
other hand, confidence in the White House should be a more powerful predic-
tor of whether international approval is required for the use of force.

**Hypothesis 2:** The impact of confidence in the White House on an individual’s preference
for multilateral military action will depend on his or her party identification.

The third analysis in Table 2 therefore adds an interaction term between party
identification and confidence in White House to the previous model. We see in
this case that the coefficient for the interaction term is positive and significant at
the $p < .1$ level.\(^8\) Consistent with H2, the effect of confidence in White House is
greater for Republicans than it is for Democrats. Figure 1 depicts the predicted
probabilities that respondents will prefer waiting for the UN when approval is
not forthcoming by party identification. Slightly more than a half (53%) of
Democrats who are “very confident” in the White House (while controlling for

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\(^8\) A log-likelihood ratio test revealed that the overall contribution of the interaction term to the model was also
significant at the $p < .1$ level ($\chi^2 = 3.26$ [1 d.f.]).
other factors) would still like to see approval from an IO, which again demonstrates the strong preference Democrats have for multilateral institutions. For Republicans, only 13% of those who are “very confident” in the White House (again, controlling for other factors) see the need to have the approval of an IO before the president uses force. Among those who are not confident in the White House, however, the partisan gap narrows substantially with large majorities of Democrats and Republicans preferring multilateralism.

These data suggest several important conclusions. On the one hand, consistent with Kull and Destler (1999) as well as with Holsti (2004), we find that, in the abstract, the public overwhelmingly prefers that military force be used multilaterally rather than unilaterally. At the same time, consistent with Jentleson and Britton (1998) as well as with Eichenberg (2005), we find that much of this generalized preference falls away when respondents are faced with the potential costs and constraints of working with international institutions such as the UN. Finally, the assent of IOs seems to be most important for those who lack confidence in the president and therefore need a second opinion.

Nevertheless, a number of important questions remain unanswered by these data. Perhaps most importantly, causal inference can be difficult when working with cross-sectional survey data because of pervasive problems of endogeneity. One might wonder, for example, whether respondents prefer multilateralism because they lack confidence in the White House, or whether they lack confidence because the White House did not comply with their preference for multilateralism. Even beyond questions of causation, one might wonder whether a general public preference for multilateralism translates into attentiveness to IO cues in specific military scenarios. The impact of cues from IOs might be overwhelmed, for example, by the impact of cues from domestic elites. And finally, if individuals do attend to cues from IOs, are the effects of these cues mediated by the factors predicted by our argument?

Experiments on the Second Opinion Hypothesis

In order to address these critical issues, we constructed a survey experiment that measures support for a specific military mission while manipulating the cues that subjects receive about elite support—both domestically and internationally. Our experiment asks subjects about sending American troops to East Timor in response to a hypothetical Indonesian attack against the newly independent state.9 Because we are measuring the effect of elite cues, we wanted to choose a mission that would not overpower the elite cues in the experimental conditions. We chose East Timor because it is obscure enough that respondents probably have few well-entrenched predispositions regarding that country, yet the plausibility of an actual incident of this type would prevent respondents with greater political information from dismissing the scenario as impossible.10 We fielded this experiment in a nationally representative telephone survey that was

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9 Focus on a specific scenario for using force limits our ability to test the impact of the primary policy objective. Future research should investigate the variation in IO impact across different kinds of military missions.

10 Of course, the United States does have a history of interaction with East Timor (see, for example, Nevins 2005). However, the available polling data from the late 1990s when the East Timor issue was relatively prominent on the international security agenda suggests that the public never followed it especially closely. For instance, a Gallup report from October 1999 showed that only 30% of Americans said they were following the conflict closely—putting this issue among the least-followed International issues about which Gallup was polling at the time (Newport 1999). Pew had similar results on attention, but a PIPA study did report a survey result showing that 70% of Americans reported approving the US decision to contribute 200 troops to the UN peacekeeping mission (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 1999, PIPA 2000). A large body of research suggests that the public’s level of factual knowledge of such events is minimal. For example, less than half of the respondents in our sample could correctly identify the currently serving Secretary of Defense at the time (Donald Rumsfeld). Thus, we are confident that specific knowledge of East Timor is unlikely to contaminate our treatment effects.
conducted by the Parker Group between September 22 and October 12, 2003. The experiment yielded a total of 1,203 respondents, and the complete text of the survey instrument is available from the authors.

Our experimental treatment provided respondents with information about the views of two major elite groups regarding a potential intervention in East Timor: (i) the views of the UN Security Council and our NATO allies and (ii) the views of Democratic and Republican leaders of Congress. We chose to rely on both the UN and NATO for our cue from IOs because these are the two most salient institutions pertaining to American foreign military policy. We pool these two institutions into a single treatment since resource limitations prevented us from testing each institution separately. Although our focus is on cues from international institutions, we chose to cue both domestic and international elite messages because the public opinion literature has emphasized domestic elite cues and we hope to compare the impact of domestic and international cues. For our domestic cue, we included both Democratic and Republican Congressional support because scholars such as Zaller (1992), Larson (1996), and Berinsky (2007) emphasize domestic partisan elite consensus as the critical cue for generating broad public support for the use of force (however, see Howell and Kriner (2008) for a study examining how citizens respond to cues from different parties).

Our experiment is a simple $2 \times 2$ factorial design, with the first manipulation being the presence or absence of Congressional support and the second manipulation being the presence or absence of IO support. In the first treatment, only the president supports the mission, while “Congressional leadership of both parties the UN Security Council and NATO allies” oppose sending force (President). The president’s views are constant across all the categories, since US intervention is impossible without presidential support. In the second treatment, “the UN Security Council and NATO allies” support the use of force while Congress opposes (International). In the third treatment “Democrats and Republicans in Congress support, but the UN Security Council and NATO allies oppose” (Domestic). In the final treatment, the UN Security Council and NATO as well as Democrats and Republicans in Congress endorse the mission (All).

Our argument suggests that—all else equal—subjects in treatment conditions with IO endorsements of the use of force should be more supportive of the East Timor mission than those in comparable conditions without an IO endorsement. That is, we expect greater support in the International condition than in the

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11 In real-world cases, such cues are of course delivered through the news media. Thus, media outlets have the opportunity to frame the cues given by IOs (see for example, Entman 2004). We hope that future research in this area will investigate the media’s ability to frame IO cues, but we focus here on establishing whether unmediated cues can influence opinion.

12 Chapman and Reiter (2004) find that the endorsement of the UN Security Council mattered more than other IO endorsements. Our argument suggests that institutions with preferences that are closer to those of the public and farther from the preferences of the president should be more influential. The views of the Security Council members are likely to be more diverse, suggesting that it might be the more influential “second opinion” giver. But France is among the key actors in both the Security Council and NATO with preferences that are likely to be distant from the preferences of US presidents, and Germany is another major player in NATO known to take positions different from the United States on key security issues, so it is possible that there is no clear ex ante view on which of these institutions should matter more in the aggregate. At the time of our survey, of course, France was not fully integrated into the NATO command structure but France’s role in NATO and in the UNSC was highly salient. We hope that future research in this area will explore the impact of different institutions.

13 At a theoretical level, of course, the issue of presidential support is not moot. It is possible that the public or Congress, or portions of the public or Congress, will press a reluctant president to consider the use of force. For example, a segment of the American public argued that President Bush was too reluctant to consider military options to address the genocide in Darfur. Likewise, there was a debate over how much US military action is appropriate in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, where Bin Laden and senior Al Qaeda leaders are presumed to be hiding. It is at least possible that the public considers second opinions valuable checks on a President that it worries is unduly reluctant to use force. We do not have survey data to address this issue.
President condition and we expect greater support in the All condition than in the Domestic treatment condition.

**Hypothesis 3:** Subjects will be more supportive of a military mission if they receive a cue indicating that the UN and NATO support the operation.

Our argument is agnostic about the impact of the Congressional cue, but the majority of the literature on elite cues has focused on domestic elites as the central sources of these cues (Zaller 1992; Larson 1996, 2000; Berinsky 2007; Howell and Kriner 2008). Thus, the conventional wisdom would expect support in the Domestic treatment condition to be higher than in the President condition. Similarly, the conventional view would expect greater support in the All condition than in the International condition. We are also agnostic about the relative impact of the Congressional and IO cues.

Consistent with H3, Table 3 demonstrates that the endorsements of the UN and NATO significantly increase public support for the East Timor operation regardless of the cues from Congressional elites. Specifically, when Congress endorses the mission, the UN and NATO endorsement raises approval of the mission from 48% to 75%, and when Congress is not supportive, the UN and NATO endorsement still raises approval from 24% to 48%. Consistent with previous scholarship (Zaller 1992; Larson 1996, 2000; Berinsky 2007; Howell and Kriner 2008), bipartisan Congressional support also increases approval for the East Timor mission. Interestingly, the effects of the domestic and international cues are roughly comparable.

We would not, of course, infer that such elite cues will always be so influential. The hypothetical intervention in East Timor is clearly an “elective” mission in which the security and economic interests of the United States are not directly threatened. This would seem to be the ideal circumstance for elite cues to influence public opinion. Nonetheless, we believe that such missions have become a very prominent part of American foreign policy and are arguably the most common kind of scenario for considering the use of force over the past couple of decades. Thus, responses to this kind of intervention represent a plausible testing ground for understanding the potential impact of domestic and international elite cues on public support for using force. At the same time, we recognize that the East Timor mission is a specific type of mission—a humanitarian intervention for which the US national interest stakes are likely to be perceived as low even by those who support intervention. Further research should extend the tests we do here to other hypothetical cases that reflect a range of missions including those that might involve a different sort of national security calculus on the part of the public.

The striking size of these treatment effects, however, does not identify the mechanism by which these cues matter. Does the endorsement of NATO and the UN increase support through the two mechanisms specified by our

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Support for Intervention in East Timor Depending on Elite Cues</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Congress approves</strong></td>
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<td><strong>UN &amp; NATO approve</strong></td>
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<td>Strongly approve</td>
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</table>
argument? We attempt to answer this critical question through a multivariate analysis of support for the hypothetical East Timor mission. Our analysis begins with three variables: IO Cue (whether or not IOs support the East Timor mission), Congress Cue (whether or not Congress support the East Timor mission), and IO Cue \times Congress Cue (the interaction between domestic and international treatments). The direction and magnitude of the coefficient for the interaction term tells us whether the total effect of having both cues is less than the sum of the two cues individually (a significant and negative coefficient), whether the effect of the two cues together is simply additive (a non-significant coefficient), or whether the effect of both cues together is greater than the sum of the two cues individually (a significant and positive coefficient).14

In our initial model, we reestimate the treatment effects displayed in Table 3 while controlling for a variety of factors. We control for the same demographic factors as in our previous analysis: gender, age, education, and party identification. In addition, we include measures for two attitudes that have been prominent in the debate over American public support for military operations: individuals’ expectations about the likely number of US casualties,15 and their expectations that the mission will succeed16 (Mueller 1971, 1973, 2005; Larson 1996; Gartner and Segura 1998; Klarevas 2000; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009).17

Consistent with H3, the first analysis in Table 4 indicates that the cue from the UN and NATO continues to have a significant positive influence on support for

### Table 4. International organization (IO) Cues, Confidence in the Executive and Support for Intervening in East Timor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IO Cue</td>
<td>0.585 (5.83)**</td>
<td>0.605 (5.95)**</td>
<td>1.321 (5.51)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress Cue</td>
<td>0.506 (4.91)**</td>
<td>0.497 (4.76)**</td>
<td>0.500 (4.71)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO Cue \times Congress Cue</td>
<td>0.135 (0.96)</td>
<td>0.140 (0.99)</td>
<td>0.135 (0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected casualties</td>
<td>0.077 (2.46)*</td>
<td>0.070 (2.18)*</td>
<td>0.082 (2.54)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected success</td>
<td>0.453 (9.84)**</td>
<td>0.422 (8.80)**</td>
<td>0.414 (8.58)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.169 (2.38)*</td>
<td>-0.166 (2.32)*</td>
<td>-0.140 (1.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.043 (1.43)</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.41)</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td>-0.057 (2.26)*</td>
<td>0.000 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.007 (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value IO endorsement</td>
<td>-0.136 (3.75)**</td>
<td>-0.319 (5.85)**</td>
<td>-0.396 (4.55)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in executive</td>
<td>0.156 (2.52)*</td>
<td>0.396 (4.55)**</td>
<td>0.396 (4.55)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO Cue \times Value IOs</td>
<td>0.315 (4.31)**</td>
<td>0.315 (4.31)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO Cue \times Conf. in Exec.</td>
<td>-0.396 (3.81)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1016</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.)

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14 We could have estimated the exact same model using three mutually exclusive dummy variables instead of an interaction term. If we were to do so, the only coefficient that would be different would be the coefficient for the “Both” dummy variable, which would be the sum of the IO Cue, Congress Cue, and the interaction (1.226, $p < .01$).

15 This variable is a 6-point ordinal scale. Respondents could state that they expected 0 casualties, 1-50 casualties, 50-500 casualties, 500-5,000 casualties, 5,000-50,000 casualties, or more than 50,000 casualties. The modal response was 50-500 casualties (37% of respondents), with 17% and 22% choosing the categories above and below that level respectively. Thus the responses showed some variation but generally appeared to be reasonable estimates of what the United States might experience in such a mission.

16 This variable is a 4-point ordinal scale. The response categories were “very likely” to succeed, “somewhat likely” to succeed, “not very likely” to succeed, and “not at all likely” to succeed. Respondents were quite confident in America’s ability to accomplish this mission with almost 80% of the respondents stating that the United States was “very likely” or “somewhat likely” to succeed.

17 The results regarding the impact of IO cues remain robust regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of the control variables.
the East Timor intervention even after accounting for the impact of our various controls. Congressional support continues to have a significant positive impact as well. The substantive effects of these two cues remain quite similar to the effects described in Table 3. Moreover, the substantive size of these treatment effects does not differ significantly from one another ($\chi^2 = 0.65, p < .43$). Additionally, this new analysis confirms that the very high level of support when both IOs and Congress endorse the mission is due to the combined linear effects of these cues, not an interaction between them, since the coefficient for both cues does not approach statistical significance.

Contrary to our expectations, the positive coefficient for expected casualties indicates that respondents who stated that they expected a larger number of casualties tended to be more supportive of intervention. The mention of casualties within a survey question generally decreases support for the use of military force (Mueller 1994; Larson 1996; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gelpi et al. 2009). In this instance, however, our question about expected casualties was asked after the question about support for intervention. By asking the questions in this order we sought to measure respondents’ support for the mission without cuing casualties. Then, we asked about their expectations of casualties to see whether those expectations matched up with their policy preference regarding intervention. We had some concern that those having expressed a preference for intervention might feel pressure to state that they did not expect casualties—creating a potential endogeneity problem. However, this concern turned out to be unfounded. Those who supported the mission expected more casualties. There is some previous evidence from the literature, though certainly less direct, that perceived costs and mission support can be positively correlated. Herrman, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) found higher average support for military missions against an adversary with nuclear weapons. Herrman et al. (1999) speculate that the seriousness of the threat caused by a nuclear armed foe engenders the higher support for military action. Taking these two experiments together, it appears that higher costs do not automatically lead to a loss of support.

Expectations of success, on the other hand, have their anticipated impact on support for interventions (Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi et al. 2009). Subjects’ expectations of the likely success of the mission have an impact on support that is comparable to the impact of elites. For example, increasing a respondent’s expectations of success from “not at all likely to succeed” to “very likely to succeed” increases the probability that they will support the intervention by more than 32 percentage points. Thus, the impact of elite cues—both domestic and international—appears to be roughly similar to the impact of expectations of success.

Neither age nor education level has a significant impact on support, but we do find that women tend to be less supportive than men. As was the case with our cross-sectional analysis of multilateralism, we find that party identification has an impact on support for the East Timor mission. In this case, our party identification variable scores respondents from 1 to 5 with a value of 1 representing strong Republicans and 5 representing strong Democrats. Thus, the negative coefficient indicates that Democratic respondents are—on average—less supportive of the mission than Republicans.

The first analysis in Table 4 demonstrates that the results presented in Table 3 are robust to the inclusion of a variety of control variables. This analysis does not, however, examine the mechanisms by which IO cues influence public support. In order to do so, we construct measures of the two attitudes that our argument expects will mediate the impact of IO cues: confidence in the president and valuation of IOs.

Our measure of confidence is similar to the one used in the previous cross-sectional analyses, but in this case, we asked specifically about confidence in the
president rather than “the people running the White House.” We also asked about respondents’ confidence in other elements of the executive branch that are related to security and military conflict: the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the US Military. Responses to these questions fit together closely into a scale of confidence in the executive branch (alpha score = 0.84). When we refer to confidence in the executive, we are referring to this scale.

With regard to IOs, we asked our respondents a set of more general questions about the importance that they felt the opinions of various groups should play in determining whether the United States should use military force. These questions did not specify any particular scenario for the use of force, nor did they mention the president by name, nor the office of the presidency. Instead, the question asked respondents whether statements of opinions by differing groups would make them more or less likely to support the use of force. Two of the groups that we asked about were the endorsement of the United Nations and NATO. Not surprisingly, respondents on average said that NATO and UN endorsements would—in the abstract—increase their support for the use of force. For example, 41% of respondents stated the refusal of the UN Security Council to endorse the use of force would reduce their support for doing so, while 22% said that the UN refusal would increase their support. Similarly, 47% of respondents stated that the lack of NATO endorsement would reduce their support for using force, while 21% stated that it would increase their support. We measured these variables on 5-point scales, coded from −2 to 2. A value of −2 indicated that the respondent felt that the failure of the relevant IO to endorse the use of force would make them “much more likely” to support using force, while a value of 2 indicated that the respondent felt that a lack of endorsement would make them “much less” supportive. A value of 0 indicated that the respondent felt the cue from the IO made no difference. We averaged the response to these two questions as a measure of the importance that respondents place on the opinions of the UN and NATO in the abstract—absent any specific scenario for the use of force or any specific cues from the president (alpha score = 0.63).

These two mediating attitudes are correlated with partisanship, but not nearly as strongly as one might expect. The correlation between party identification and our scale for the value of the UN and NATO was 0.20 (p < .01). Just more than half (55%) of the Democrats stated that UN endorsement would increase their support for the use of force, while only about a third (30%) of Republicans expressed this view. Respondents said that an endorsement from NATO would be slightly more persuasive—60% of Democrats and 40% of Republicans say NATO endorsement would increase their support for using force. The correlation between partisanship and confidence in the president was higher at 0.52. For example, more than 90% of Republican respondents indicated that they were “somewhat confident” or “very confident” in the president. But responses among independents and Democrats were more divided. About 60% of independents expressed confidence in the president at the time of our survey, and even 37% of Democrats shared this view.

If our argument about attentiveness to IO cues can account for the partisan differences in support for the East Timor mission, then we would expect the impact of partisanship to disappear once we control for the valuation of IOs and confidence in the executive branch. Thus, in the second analysis in Table 4, we add confidence in the executive and valuation of IOs to the model. These results clearly indicate that the partisan differences over the use of force are comprised of two distinct effects. Confidence in the executive branch and valuation of IOs
each have a significant impact on support for the mission, while the impact of party identification disappears when we control for these mediating factors.19

Finally, the third model in Table 4 allows for interactions between the IO cue and the mediating attitudes of confidence in the executive branch and valuation of IOs. This model directly tests the mechanisms posited in our argument regarding the persuasiveness of IO cues. If our argument is correct, then we would expect to see statistically significant and substantively large interaction effects between exposure to the UN and NATO endorsement and subjects’ confidence in the executive branch and their valuation of IOs.

**Hypothesis 4:** The impact of supportive cues from the UN and NATO on support for a military operation will increase as subjects’ valuation of IOs increases.

**Hypothesis 5:** The impact of supportive cues from the UN and NATO on support for a military operation will decrease as subjects’ confidence in the executive branch increases.

Model 3 in Table 4 clearly indicates a strong interaction between IO cues and our key variables. Both of the interaction terms are statistically significant and a log-likelihood ratio test clearly indicates that the model including the interaction terms is a significantly better fit ($\chi^2 40.5, 2$ d.f., $p < .01$). Because of the interactive nature of the model, however, the coefficients and significance tests in Table 4 do not provide a full description of the treatment effects for the IO cue. Figure 2 provides a test of H4 about whether the impact of IO cues depends on an individual’s valuation of IOs. The horizontal axis in Figure 2 displays variation in subjects’ valuation of the UN and NATO, while the vertical axis displays the

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19 This result is not due to a colinearity problem. The auxiliary $r$-squared for the party identification variable is only 0.33, and the coefficients in Table 4 indicate that including these control variables dramatically changes the estimated coefficient for party identification but does not increase the estimated standard errors.
estimated coefficient for the impact of the UN and NATO endorsement on support for the East Timor mission. The large gray circles represent the estimated coefficient for the IO treatment variable, while the black bars represent the 95% confidence intervals around the estimated coefficients. Consistent with H4, the figure demonstrates that the impact of the UN and NATO endorsement nearly triples as one moves from subjects with a low valuation of these institutions to those with a high valuation of them. This result is consistent with our expectation that those who perceive themselves as sharing common interests with an IO will be more attentive to cues from that institution.

Figure 3 elucidates the claim in H5 about the conditional impact of IO cues based on an individual’s confidence in the executive branch. In this figure, the horizontal axis represents variation in subjects’ confidence in the executive branch, while the vertical axis still displays the estimated coefficients for the impact of the UN and NATO endorsement on support for the East Timor mission. Once again, the large gray circles represent the estimated coefficient for the IO treatment variable, and the black bars represent the 95% confidence intervals around the estimated coefficients. Consistent with H5, we see that the impact of the UN and NATO endorsement depends dramatically on a subject’s confidence in the executive branch even after we have accounted for partisanship and for the subject’s attitude toward the UN and NATO. The estimated impact of a supportive IO cue is about ten times larger among those who are “not at all confident” in the executive branch than among those who are “very confident.” In fact, the cue from the UN and NATO has a negligible impact on those who are “very confident” in the executive, and this effect does not approach statistical significance.

These results clearly indicate that cues given by international institutions influence American public support for the East Timor mission through two distinct mechanisms: (i) the intrinsic value that some individuals place on IO sanction for the use of force and (ii) the impact of IOs as verification on the president’s
preference for using force among those who lack confidence in the Commander-in-Chief. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that the impact of the UN and NATO endorsement is varied and conditional. These estimated coefficients, however, still cannot tell us about the substantive impact of these cues on support for the East Timor mission. Moreover, while Figures 2 and 3 isolate the conditional effects of IO cues as expected H4 and H5, these two interactions are occurring simultaneously as individuals form their attitudes toward the hypothetical East Timor mission. In order to illustrate both the substantive importance of IO cues and the manner in which the interactions in Figures 2 and 3 work together, Figure 4 displays the impact of the supportive IO cue on the probability that a subject will approve of the East Timor mission.

The vertical axis in Figure 4 describes the predicted change in the probability that a respondent will support military intervention when the UN and NATO endorse the mission. The left-right axis describes a respondent’s level of confidence in the executive branch. Those on the far left of the axis are not at all confident in the executive branch, while those on the right are very confident. Finally, the front-rear axis describes a respondent’s valuation of UN and NATO endorsements of the use of force. Respondents toward the front of the axis stated that UN and NATO endorsements would make them much less likely to support the use of force, while those at the back end of the axis stated that UN and NATO endorsements would make them much more likely to support a mission.

Several important results emerge from these estimated effects. First, UN and NATO endorsement increases support for the use of force among most—but not all—members of the public. In particular, those who state that UN and NATO endorsement would reduce their support and who already are confident in the executive branch actually become less supportive of the East Timor mission when the UN and NATO sanction it. For those at the extremes of both of these scales, an IO endorsement actually reduces their support for the mission by nearly twenty percentage points! More generally, we find that about 20% of our respondents were coded as “somewhat” or “very” confident in the executive and as stating that UN and NATO endorsements would make them “somewhat” or “much less” likely to support the use of force. Among these respondents, the

![Image](https://example.com/image.png)

**Figure 4.** Impact of International Organization Endorsement on Support for East Timor Mission
Second, Figure 2 indicates that the substantive impact of the “second opinion” and “value of IOs” mechanisms are relatively similar. In order to judge the size of the “second opinion” mechanism, we should evaluate the impact of UN and NATO endorsement among respondents who state that they do not have confidence in the executive branch but also state that they do not value the endorsement of the UN and NATO per se. About 20% of our respondents fell into this category, which can be found in the front-left quadrant of Figure 2. On average, the endorsement of the UN and NATO increased support for the East Timor mission by about 25% despite the fact that these subjects stated that they are indifferent to such endorsements or are actually opposed to them in the abstract. Why would the IO sanction increase the support of such respondents? It seems likely that these individuals are using the UN and NATO purely as a “second opinion.” That is, while these respondents do not feel positively about the UN and NATO, they also do not have confidence in the president and the executive branch. However, if the president, the UN, and NATO can all agree on undertaking this mission, then this agreement serves as verification of the president’s policy because such a wide range of constituencies seem to be in favor of it.

Third, we can observe the importance of the “value of IOs” mechanism by examining the response of those who have confidence in the executive branch but also state that they value UN and NATO endorsements. About 40% of our respondents fell into this category, which can be found in the back-right quadrant of Figure 2. In this instance, the endorsement of the UN and NATO increased the probability that these respondents would support the East Timor mission by an average of about 25%, despite the fact that these respondents already expressed confidence in the executive. It seems likely that these individuals are responding to IO cues because they perceive themselves as sharing common interests with the UN and/or NATO.

Finally, we can see that IO cues mattered most for those who stated that they valued the endorsement of the UN and NATO but did not have confidence in the president or the executive branch. About 20% of our respondents fell into this category—found in the back-left quadrant of Figure 2, and a cue from the UN and NATO endorsing the mission increased the likelihood of their support by an average of about 38%.

This result brings us back to our starting point: partisan differences in support for multilateralism. Nearly 80% of the respondents in this last category—those who lack confidence in the executive, but value IOs—identified themselves as Democrats. Thus, the very striking effect of IO cues in this context would seem to account for the broad bipartisan support for the use of force that we observed when the UN and NATO endorsed the mission as well as the dramatic partisan gap when they did not. Specifically, we found that when the UN and NATO endorsed the mission, we found that about 62% of Republicans and 63% of Democrats supported the East Timor mission. Without the endorsement of these IOs, however, support among Republicans slipped to 47% while support among Democrats plummeted to 20%. IO support is important in gaining majority support for a mission among Republicans, but it is essential for Democrats—although this relationship may be different when a Democrat resides in the White House.

Conclusions

Does the American public prefer multilateralism when it comes to questions of military force? Perhaps this question is better stated as: Which segments of the
American public also need to hear from an IO when making judgments about use of the military? Our analyses suggest that support for a military mission among individuals who value multilateral institutions and among individuals who lack confidence in the president will strongly depend on cues provided by international institutions such as the UN and NATO. However, among those individuals who do not value international institutions and who are already confident in the president’s judgment, such IO endorsements will not increase support for a military mission and may even undermine it. This contingent influence of multilateralism may account for the varied previous findings regarding the public’s preference for multilateralism. Thus, our results suggest that we are better off asking which members of the public prefer multilateralism rather than asking whether “the public” is multilateralist.

In our study, about 80% of our respondents expressed either support for international institutions or a lack of confidence in the president, or both. In the aggregate, by consequence, we found that IO cues had a substantial impact on support for a military intervention in East Timor. In other circumstances, however, IO cues might be much less important. A highly popular president, for example, would reduce the importance of multilateral support (confidence in the executive would presumably be higher). Similarly, international cues about military missions that were more central to America’s core security interests might be less important (knowing what an IO thinks may be less important). Nonetheless, at any given time, a substantial segment of the public is likely to lack confidence in the president simply because of partisan differences. Thus, our results indicate that cues from IOs regarding the use of force in a particular mission are generally likely to influence aggregate public support for that mission.

Does this public preference for multilateralism imply that IOs can influence state decisions to use force by altering the domestic political incentives to do so? Once again, our answer is a qualified “yes.” Consistent with Chapman and Reiter (2004), Chapman (2007, 2009), and Fang (2008), we use individual-level data to validate and extend the game-theoretic and aggregate-level empirical findings that the public relies on cues from international institutions regarding the use of force. More specifically, we show that those who have confidence in the president’s judgment will generally rally to his support in case of war, but those who lack such confidence are left looking elsewhere for cues to help them form their opinions. For these individuals, we find that a cue from an IO can provide an important source of verification on the wisdom of the president’s policy choice.

While previous research had posited such a principal–agent mechanism for the importance of UN sanctioning of force and had presented some aggregate public opinion data consistent with this argument, this work had not demonstrated the causal impact of IO cues on attitude formation. Previous research in American politics on the use of cues in forming foreign policy opinions, on the other hand, had emphasized the public’s reliance on domestic partisan cues while overlooking the impact of international institutions (Zaller 1992; Larson 1996; Berinsky 2007). By bringing together the international relations and public opinion literatures on the use of force, however, we have been able to document the mechanism by which the public incorporates international institutions such as the UN and NATO into its calculations about military force.

Asymmetric information problems make it difficult for members of the public to evaluate their leaders’ claims about the wisdom of using military force. And these problems of asymmetric information are likely far worse in judgments about foreign policy than in other political decision-making contexts. A motivated citizen can learn the details and nuances of different car insurance reforms. The same cannot be said when becoming fully informed involves
classified intelligence and details of military planning. Yet citizens cope with their lack of information in a similar fashion—by evaluating the cues provided to them by competing elites. While some members of the public will accept the cues provided by the president and rally to his support, those who distrust his judgment will look elsewhere for cues. Our research indicates that international institutions such as the UN Security Council and NATO can be important sources of such cues for many—but not all—segments of the American population. While even substantial shifts in public support such as the ones we document here cannot prevent a president from using military force, the effects appear substantial enough to entail significant political repercussions for a president who ignored them. We hope that future research on these indirect effects of international institutions will begin to investigate the impact of differing kinds of institutions as cue givers and will compare the impact of institutional cue givers to the influence of cues from less institutionalized sources—such as "coalitions of the willing."

We do not argue that this second opinion effect trumps all other effects. For instance, we would expect the general rally effect to operate regardless of the second opinion cue. Yet, as Chapman and Reiter (2004) have demonstrated, the second opinion cue could affect the amplitude of the rally. We conjecture it might even affect the speed of collapse of the rally if the war effort begins to bog down. An interesting extension of our research would compare the erosion of public support, both within the United States and within allied publics, for the Iraq and the Afghanistan missions. The stronger second opinion cue in Afghanistan may have helped prop up support longer despite the challenges there.

Of course, in an international environment that remains anarchic at its root, states will remain capable of using international force regardless of the actions of IOs such as the UN Security Council. The United States—as the world’s preeminent military power—is especially difficult for IOs to constrain. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to conclude that IOs do not matter, even for the United States. As long as (some) Americans lack confidence in the executive or value the opinion of IOs, then American presidents will pay substantial costs in terms of public support for using force in the absence of international authorization.

References


